Talk:Euthyphro dilemma

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See Talk:Divine command theory --Tagishsimon 10:33, 14 Mar 2004 (UTC)

I am not a wikipedia person, so I don't know the right format for submitting this, but someone needs to look at this article -- it is REALLY incoherently written in parts. This is really unacceptable.

I agree...it is quite confusing and needs to be fixed so that it makes more sense. --210.84.41.237 09:40, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] Accidentalism

Has anyone suggested accidentalism as a solution for this dilemma? That that the gods love what is pious is simply a happy coincidence? Pmurray bigpond.com 04:08, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Wouldn't that imply that piety is independent of the gods? Hairouna 02:34, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Text moved from article

4.240.108.8 (talk · contribs) has been making extensive changes to the article. Some of them changed clear and precise to less clear and precise language (such as "implies that" to "leads to the view that"), some changed one stylistic approach to another, and some turned U.K. in to U.S. English, but the main section is this:

"The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into five main problems. First, it implies that the moral status of things is wildly contingent—if he had wanted to, God could have made rape, murder, and torture morally right. Secondly, it threatens the normative force of the claim that God is good—it turns into the mere claim that God is consistent, or that God approves of himself. Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to analyze evaluative claims (e.g., that murder is wrong) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to reduce evaluative claims to mere descriptions of God's activity. Fourthly, it seems to make morality subjective, with moral truths determined by the mere attitudes of an individual. Fifthly, it threatens the conception of God as a rational being. For, supposing God had a reason for forbidding rape, this reason should also be the reason that rape is wrong. Otherwise, God's decision would have been based on the wrong reason. But if the reason rape is wrong is that God has forbidden it, then it can't be God's reason for forbidding it, on pains of circularity. So God's moral decisions were based either on the wrong reason, or on no reason at all."

Some of this can usefully added, but some isn't really acceptable: "is wildly contingent" is not only unencyclopædic style, but is less clear than "is arbitrary, based merely upon god's whim". It also introduces technical terms where they're not needed (as does "normative force" which, in addition, surely misses the target; it's not the normativity of "god is good" that's at issue, but its status as a meaningful evaluation). His or her fourth point isn't very commonly raised, and is surely implicit in the other points. The final point contains material that could be made use of, but is in fact a discussion of the article's first point. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:42, 20 August 2005 (UTC)

In Euthyphro discussions "arbitrary" means based on no reason, which is quite different from "contingent" meaning could have been different—the current article conflates the two. As far as normative force goes, I take it that's exactly what distinguishes evaluations from mere descriptions—would "evaluative force" make it clearer? In any case, the problem isn't that divine command theory makes "God is good" meaningless. Far from it. The problem is that it gives it the wrong kind of meaning, by construing it as a neutral description of God's activity or nature. The point regarding reasons is arguably the main point of the discussion in the Euthyphro and is found in, e.g., Francis Snare's Nature of Moral Thinking. The fourth point on the current page badly misconstrues divine command theory ("what is wrong is simply to disobey god"), thereby missing the point that, if God gives things their moral status, then he can easily give things different moral statuses. If you know of a better way to fix these misrepresentations and confusions, then please let me know.
  1. In this context, "arbitrary" means (as usual) something like "subject to pesonal whims", which is what the problem is; "contingent", however, raises further and different problems (if god is a necessary being, then his decisions and actions are necessary, but that might not make them less arbitrary). Moreover, while arbitrariness is an immediate and obvious problem for the foundation of morality, contingency isn't.
  2. Normativity is certainly at the heart of discussions of the concept of morality, but I don't see that it's particularly relevant here; indeed, I know of no discussion of the dilemma that focusses on normativity.
  3. You say: "the problem isn't that divine command theory makes 'God is good' meaningless"; well, it's a problem that is frequently cited, and in those terms. If "good" means no more than "whatever god commands", then in what sense can god be said to be good? As "good" is essentially evaluative, then a use involving no evaluation is a misuse, and the result is nonsense.
  4. The fourth point is again to be found in much of the literature, and is the way that many writers have construed (and developed) DCT. Moreover, many writers would deny that the fact that god gives things moral status means that he can change that status (for that would involve changing his mind, and that would imply imperfection). perhaps you mean (which is widely accepted by Divine Command Theorists) that he could have given them a different status.
  5. Your most recent edit adds the unnecessary and uninformative qualification: "In the relevant passage" (where else?), and makes some stylistic changes that involve no clarification (in fact, to my eye, make the text slightly less clear). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:40, 21 August 2005 (UTC)


I'll try to be clearer:

  1. We agree about the meaning of "arbitrary" as applied to decisions or attitudes: not based on reason, but instead based on (what else?) whimsy or caprice. But I insist that the current article is conflating two distinct problems. "First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon god's whim" concerns the problem of arbitrariness, whereas "if god had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been" concerns the problem of contingency. Arbitrariness has to do with the absence of any good reason behind God's decisions or attitudes. It threatens the traditional conception of God as a rational being (see e.g. Cudworth), and it also threatens the objective status of morality—so the arbitrariness problem encompasses two worries, one about God's rationality and the other about the status of morality. Contingency has to do with the modal status of moral truths. It seems very odd to say that rape just happens to be morally wrong, that it could have been morally required if things had just gone differently. But DCT seems to entail just that (though, of course, many theists want to deny this entailment). And that's the contingency worry. If you still think they are not distinct, notice that contingency doesn't entail arbitrariness—there is no contradiction in the claim that, though God had a good reason for giving things their moral statuses, he could have given them different moral statuses.
    I disagree, I'm afraid (which goes to show that we're not concerned with expressing the argument clearly, but with philosophical questions). The claim: "if god had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been" of course involves contingency, but the problem – the reason that believers find it uncomfortable – isn't contingency but arbitrariness. Note also that the claim isn't that rape would have been morally required "if things had just gone differently" – that would be outright contingency, I agree – but if god had chosen or commanded differently.
    Having said all that, there's certainly room for adding something to bring out the contingency issue; perhaps we could hammer out an extra sentence or two here?
  2. I'd say that Cudworth's discussion (which is an absolute classic on the topic) focuses on normativity. His main point (IIRC; I could go look it up) is something like "God's commands give reasons only with the assumption that we have reason to obey God's commands", which is all about the reason-giving force of morality. In any case, your claim that, "[a]s "good" is essentially evaluative, then a use involving no evaluation is a misuse" seems to be knee-deep in issues of normativity.
    I don't think much of Cudworth's discussion, to be honest (as I remember, my reasons are those of Brad Hooker, given in the Analysis paper in the article's references). Again, though, we're trying to give an overview of the problem, and the views of a particular Cambridge Platonist, however interesting, are those of only one person.
  3. I think you're generating the result of meaninglessness only by building in a category mistake, in a way no DCT'er worth his salt would accept. God's commands (like any commands) can only have a reference to actions; so naturally his commands can't ground any evaluative conclusions regarding the goodness of God the individual. The goodness of individuals is presumably a matter for God's approval, just like the goodness of states of affairs is presumably a matter for God's valuing. So a DCT'er can simply say "God is good" means the same thing as "God approves of himself". And however unsatisfactory this might be as an analysis, it doesn't make for meaninglessness—a misconstrual doesn't annihilate meaning, it merely gives the wrong meaning. (Also, I should point out that DCT'ers don't have to give the meaning of evaluative claims, they only need to give the grounds of evaluative claims; this follows the strategy of Cornell realists and non-reductive materialists. This vitiates the charge of naturalistic fallacy, though the charge is common enough that I thought it should remain).
    Again, you're assuming certain philosophical positions, and the outcomes of certain philosophical disagreements; we can't do that here. The meaninglessness point might be put more clearly, but it's been advanced too often for us to omit it merely because you think that it can be met satisfactorily. That discussion might go in the section of responses, of course (made suitably NPoV).
  4. Here you've just accidentally misread me. My point was that God has more than two moral statuses at his disposal. He's got more in his quiver than just forbidden and required. He can give things different degrees of moral wrongness. Or at least from the premise that God gives things their moral statuses it does not follow that he is limited to only two fixed-degree moral statuses.
    Perhaps — but again, it belongs in the responses section, and shouldn't affect how the problem is presented.
  5. The reason I added "in the relevant passage" is that I don't want to suggest that the Euthyphro is entirely about this issue, or that the small summary in the article covers the entirety of the dialogue.
    To be honest I think that that can be taken as read (though, of course, the Euthyphro is (unusually for Plato's dialogues) focussed on this one problem). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 19:07, 22 August 2005 (UTC)

[edit] The "False-dilemma Response"

This approach is, however, essentially a rejection of the Divine Command Theory in favour of the other horn; that is, it depends upon the notion that goodness is a property of god, and thus not under god's control.

It isn't clear how this is a rejection of one horn in favour of the other. Doesn't this solution do what it is supposed to: that is, it chose neither the option that morality is independent of God nor that morality is solely dependent on God's dictates? In that case, then wouldn't the criticism that goodness is not under God's control, regardless of how valid it may be, be a different argument altogether. That is, wouldn't that be a criticism regarding God's omnipotence rather than whether good is independent of Him or a whim of His? Hairouna 02:42, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

well, a less-than-omnipotent God is the other horn. Few Christians would accept that their God is just a magical superhero type, rather than an omnipotent creator type. dab (ᛏ) 08:01, 8 December 2005 (UTC)
I disagree. In some formulations the other horn is that good and evil (morality) is independent of God; the omnipotence of God is not the dilemma's direct concern. In fact, in this article that is partially the case, for it says "The first horn of the dilemma implies that morality is independent of god and, indeed, that god is bound by morality just as his creatures are." Perhaps it can be mentioned that He is still bound by morality, stating that this raises some questions regarding the omnipotence of a good God, but that is not directly the dilemma's concern. Hairouna 23:29, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Feel free to edit it further, but I think the way I've currently got it worded makes both points. If the first horn is framed so that morality depends on anything besides God's active choice, then Aquinas' view does turn out to be within the scope of the first horn. But then the biggest problem with the first horn doesn't follow. Most theists who don't like the first horn see the problem as an external limitation on God. But if God's nature determines morality, then there's no external limit on God. It's God's nature that determines God's being bound by morality.
On the other hand, if you think of the first horn as it's often portrayed (e.g. in James Rachels' introductory ethics text), then it is indeed a false dilemma. The standard presentation of the dilemma as I've seen it contrasts a morality based on God's commands, whatever they happen to be, and a morality based on something independent of God. Aquinas' response then indeed does count as a third view. So it all depends on how the dilemma is presented, but if it's presented so that Aquinas' view falls under the first option then what many see as the only undesirable aspect of the first option simply doesn't follow. Parableman 13:27, 21 January 2006 (UTC)
Yeah, it seems that your edit does the job. I think it needs to be clarified though, because it's somewhat confusing as is. I'll try to get around to doing it if you don't by the time I can. Hairouna 02:54, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Capitalization of Proper Names

Why does this article fail to capitalize the proper name 'God'? I realize that some people don't want to capitalize pronouns for God for various reasons, but the name 'God' in English is a proper name, and we capitalize proper names in English. That's a standard rule of written English. If we were using it as a common noun by talking about gods in plural or a god or the god with articles, that would be another story, but this article uses the proper name and fails to capitalize it. That's simply poor English. Parableman 13:07, 21 January 2006 (UTC)

  1. It's by no means agreed that "god" is a proper name (indeed, that's a very non-standard view, and difficult to argue for, either on theological or on etymological grounds).
  2. The use of "god" without the capital is very common in (especially) academic writing.
  3. Wikipedia has (wrongly, in my view, but that's another matter) generally decided that the word should be capitalised when talking about the deity of monotheistic, especially the Abrahamic, religions. That's not the case here, though.
  4. When an article has been written by someone using the capital, I don't remove it (a similar approach to that used with regard to regional varieties of English); I expect the same courtesy from others. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 23:38, 25 January 2006 (UTC)
Two questions. Firstly, what/who is the word "god" referring to in this article? Secondly, is there a particular reason you also reverted the changes I made to Parableman's wording of the second part of the False-dilemma response? Hairouna 03:25, 26 January 2006 (UTC)
  1. It doesn't refer to any specific god.
  2. Because you changed what seemed to me to be a correct (and accepted) view into what seemdd to me to be an incorrect (and at best uncommon) view. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:57, 26 January 2006 (UTC)
1. So what does it refer to?
2. It seems to me that my change was formal, not substantial. So I don't see how it could be any less correct or common than what it was based on. Hairouna 18:23, 29 January 2006 (UTC)
  1. To whichever notion of god is in play in the context in which it's used; in Plato, the reference was to the gods, in modern discussions it's often to the god of the Abrahamic religions, but in philosophy it's to any god or gods thought to be the origin of morality.
  2. Your change (though I suppose that it might have been meant to have been merely formal) substantially changed the meaning. The original text pointed out that claiming that there's in fact no dilemma boils down to choosing one horn; your text claimed that it doesn't boil down to that. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 19:14, 29 January 2006 (UTC)
Okay then. Thanks for the explanations. Hairouna 23:07, 6 February 2006 (UTC)
Mel is right - thee are lots of philosophers out there who refuse to capitalize god because they think it changes his ontological status. This is as silly as the BC-AD/BCE-CE debate and is just a timesink.. like a lot of other "debates" on Wikipedia. FranksValli 01:29, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

That wasn't in fact my point. There are a number of reasons for not capitalising "god", some more important than others. If the reason for capitalising the word is that it's a proper name, however, that's just a mistake. "Jahweh" is a proper name, "Allah" is a proper name, "Jesus" is a proper name — "god" isn't. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:57, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

I know that wasn't your point, I was wording rhetorically more than anything else. The seriousness of all this is pretty funny. FranksValli 01:58, 27 January 2006 (UTC)
If it's not a proper name, then it needs an article. You need to talk about the god or a god or use the plural. Common nouns are not capitalized, but they also take articles when singular. The fact that you aren't doing that is extremely strong evidence that you are using it as a proper name. I still contend that this is extremely poor English. You could discuss this issue without using that word at all, using 'Joe' to refer to whatever the source of morality is supposed to be. It would be wrong to use lower case simply because you're using the name as a placeholder. Yet that seems to be exactly what you're doing here with the word 'god'. Parableman 16:08, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Not all common nouns demand articles (mass nouns, for example, including names of abstractions like "rudeness" and "arrogance"); moreover this usage is very common, especially in academic works. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:58, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

"Allah" is a proper name – no, it's just the Arabic word for "god". Arabic- and Maltese-speaking Christians use it, too.
David Marjanović | david.marjanovic_at_gmx.at | ignore my IP address, it's dynamic —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 193.251.17.118 (talk) 12:23, 13 February 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Is this part of the E. dilemma?

From the article:

"Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what god has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’)."

This is covered in divine command theory, and I don't think it necessarily applies. Saying that morality is defined as God's will does not necessarily mean to be a motivation for acting morally. After all, some people would say we should follow God's will simply because he will reward us for it. This does not commit the fallacy, and neither do other possible responses. The fallacy only pertains if someone says, "we should be moral because God wants us to", without providing further explanation. --Catquas 04:31, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

I think that you're wrong, but more importantly, your claim is "original research". The article states what is a common argument. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:57, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

  • I guess you are right I was just checking to see what people thought. But I might include a response to that point at the end because divine command theory need not commit the naturalistic fallacy, it depends on how it is phrased.--Catquas 13:17, 3 March 2006 (UTC)
Divine command theory is the theory that what is good just is what god commands; that has nothing to do with motivation (a different argument has been offered with regard to that). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 15:37, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Islam

There was a lot of discussion of this issue in Islamic philosophy/theology... AnonMoos 15:48, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

I know something of it (though I don't recall anything very distinctive), but if you're up on the area, why not add it? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:22, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Non-existence of problem

For the sake of logical completeness I have added that the problem rest on the assumption that God both exists and is good. If you think either of these are not true, when the problem does not exist.

Someone removed this addition claiming that it was original research. I disagree. No one questions that the dilemma only exists if you assume that God exists and is good. A very minor piece of very basic logic is not original research which no-one seriously questions, is not original research. I am putting it back. -Sensemaker

First, in one sense it's original research, in that no-one says it. They don't say it because it's so obvious — and it looks silly. Secondly, as it was worded, it was false; it included reference to the notion that god is good, but that's an integreal part of the discussion of the dilemma (on most versions of the Divine Command Theory it makes no sense to say that god is good). --Mel Etitis (Talk) 12:53, 22 March 2007 (UTC)
Your first argument rests on a very inclusive interpretation of what is original research. If the fact that no-one says is enough to make something original research when the prohibition against original research would result in wikipedia consisting of nothing but quotes. That would not be desirable, is not current practice and is not what the guidelines say. What the guidelines do say is:
"The original motivation for the NOR policy was to prevent people with personal theories attempting to use Wikipedia to draw attention to their ideas.[1] Original research includes editors' personal views, political opinions, and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that appears to advance a position. That is, any facts, opinions, interpretations, definitions, and arguments published by Wikipedia must already have been published by a reliable publication in relation to the topic of the article. See this example for more details.
An edit counts as original research if it does any of the following:
It introduces a theory or method of solution;
It introduces original ideas;
It defines new terms;
It provides or presumes new definitions of pre-existing terms;
It introduces an argument, without citing a reputable source for that argument, that purports to refute or support another idea, theory, argument, or position;
It introduces an analysis or synthesis of established facts, ideas, opinions, or arguments in a way that builds a particular case favored by the editor, without attributing that analysis or synthesis to a reputable source;
It introduces or uses neologisms, without attributing the neologism to a reputable source. "
What I am doing is none of the above. I am expressly stating the unspoken premeses of the dilemma.
Concerning your second argument that it is so obvious that it is silly I partially agree. These are indeed fairly obvious to someone with some schooling in logic or used to theological and philosophical discussions, such as you and me, Mel Etitis. It was indeed obvious to Socrates and Euthyphro, and to Plato's students in Academia (presumably the intended audience for this text). At wikipedia, we do not have such an exclusive audience. We cannot assume that all who read the article have such schooling or experience. On the contrary, experiences in teaching have told me to make me believe that it is wise to be quite explicit when explaining the premeses of a logical argument. Yes it is indeed implicit, in the definition and in the following text, but for the sake of good pedagogics and logical completeness I do believe it needs to be explicit.
To suggest a compromise we could include it under "the dilemma in Plato"-heading instead. Saying something like "Plato does not explicitly say so but the entire dilemma rests on the assumption that God both exists and is good. If you do not believe that God exists (atheism) or that God is not good (dystheism), the dilemma does not exist." This way, it will hopefully not look like a somewhat silly afterthought. ("Oh yeah, I forgot to mention that the entire discussion rests on the assumption that...") Pedagogically it is much better if you include the premeses of an argument early in the argument.-Sensemaker

First, no original resarch doesn't lead to everything being quotation, but it does mean that everything has to be cited (my objection, however, doesn't rest upon the original-research claim). Secondly, I suppose that there's room somewhere in the article (probably in the lead) for the comment that the dilemma holds only for the believer. Thirdly, you're still ignoring what is perhaps my main point: your version is simply false. The dilemma doesn't depend upon the belief that god is good. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 16:00, 22 March 2007 (UTC)

Now we are getting somewhere. We seem to agree on the first issue. The no original research rule should not be read as the text only should consist of quotes. When you wrote: "First, in one sense it's original research, in that no-one says it." it sure sounded like you thought everything no one has said, id est everything that is not a quote, counted as original research. I am glad to find that this is not what you meant. Second it is very good that we now agree that there is room for an explanation that this is only a problem for a believer. On your third point I do not quite understand what you mean. Do you mean that a dysteist (someone who believes that God exists but is not good) also faces a euthyphro dilemma? I fail to see how. Such a person would certainly say that what is commanded by God is certainly not the same thing as what is good. A dystheist believes God can and probably does command many things that are evil. Thus the problem "is it good because God commanded it or did God command it because it is good" does not arise, as far as I can see. But you disagree. Please explain how a dystheist faces an Euthyphro dilemma. -Sensemaker
One horn of the dilemma is consistent with what you're calling dystheism — thus dystheism involves the choice of one horn. You might just as well say that the dilemma doesn't arise for the Divine Command Theorist. (It would also be argued by many theists that the notion of god is unified, and that removing one of his properties, such as goodness, is to lose the concept altogether... but that's another issue.) --Mel Etitis (Talk) 13:02, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
(I should add that I'm not wholly convinced, still, that we need to explain that the dilemma doesn't arise for someone who doesn't believe in god — any more than we need to say that the prisoner's dilemma doesn't arise if you're not a prisoner, or that moral dilemmas don't arise if you're amoral, or that Haldane's dilemma doesn't arise on a planet where evolution doesn't occur, etc. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 13:06, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

I don't quite agree that being a dystheist is the same as choosing one end of the horn. However, if you are a dystheist, the euthyphro dilemma is not a dilemma, the choice is competely obvious from the definition of dystheism. You have already made your choice. There is only one choice that does not contradict previous choices I have made. Can I when call it a "dilemma"? If I have already stated that I do not eat any beans, can I call it a dilemma to whether I shall eat green beans?

Still let's compromise. We could say something like: "The entire dilemma rest on the assumption that God exists and is good. If you believe God does not exist (atheism) the dilemma does not exist at all. If you believe God is not necessarily good, you have already made your choice and you belong firmly to the first horn of the dilemma."

That the prisoner's dilemma applies to a prisoner is explicitly mentioned in the title and that moral dilemmas apply to people with moral is implicitly stated in the title "moral dilemma". If the title of the euthyphro dilemma likewise explicitly or implicitly stated that the problem that the problem is limited to theists i.e. it was called something like "theist's dilemma" I would consider the title sufficiently explanatory and no explicit "applies only to theists"-comment would be necessary. I am not familiar with Haldane's dilemma. I will look it up.

Furthermore: not mentioning the very valid possibility of God (few theists would deny that God not existing is a relevant possibility -albeit one they do not believe in) not existing would mean that the entire article is written from a theist point of view. Wouldn't that violate the NPOV? -Sensemaker

Now I have read about Haldane's dilemma. It will exist in a world there evolution does not occur, but will be limited to breeder's problem. Not even creationists deny that breeding works. A world there neither breeding nor evolution works is not an option anyone has seriously suggested. Thus it is not a valid option. Thus it need not be explicitily explained.

Furthermore, that the Haldane's dilemma is used as an argument against evolution is explicitly mentioned in the wikipedia article -thus logically implying that the dilemma wouldn't arise on a planet where evolution does not occur. -Sensemaker

I'm afraid that your arguments are at best weak here. Moreover, any choice of one horn over the other could be cited as meaning that the dilemma doesn't exist for you; for a confirmed believer that god exists and is good, and that therefore morality isn't his creation, the dilemma wouldn't arise. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 09:58, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
Perhaps it is too much to say that a dilemma does not exist if the choice is automatic (you have already made this choice in previous choices you have made you can only make one choice without contradicting yourself). However, if the choice is automatic it hardly merits the word dilemma. Look up the word in wikipedia and you will see that it is a choice between two option, neither of which you are comfortable with. A dystheist is perfectly comfortable with the idea that God is not good (he has already accepted this). Thus it can hardly be called a dilemma, can it? That is what I am arguing. If something is a very obvious and automatic choice to you, it cannot be termed a dilemma with the current defintion.
By the way are you comfortable with my current suggestion for compromise.

-Sensemaker

No, sorry — this just doesn't wash; any dilemma is no dilemma for someone who's already made up her mind on one of the two horns. That just doesn't need saying. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 13:05, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

Initially it seemed to me that you stated that we should make a "doesn't apply to dystheists" comment because it does apply to dystheists. Now you seem to be arguing that we should not make a "doesn't apply to dystheists" because it is obvios that it doesn't apply to dystheists and thus doesn't need saying. I have ceased to understand you. Very well, please make a counter-proposal. -Sensemaker
First, I can't think how you misunderstood me that badly; looking back, I said nothing that could have lefd you to that conclusion about my view. I've given my arguments against "dystheists" being an exception, and they don't correspond to your account of them.
Secondly, I have no counter-proposal, except "leave the article alone, your argument is unsound"... --Mel Etitis (Talk) 17:22, 27 March 2007 (UTC)
How could I misunderstand you. Well, you wrote: "The dilemma doesn't depend upon the belief that god is good." Which is the same as saying that this is a dilemma even to a dystheist. Concerning your proposal you are essentially saying: "Let's do it precisly my way." That does not sound very constructive. I had expected some willingness to compromise on your part. I am disappointed. Perhaps it is time to bring in a third person to arbitrate. -Sensemaker
Mel Etitis didn't say "The dilemma doesn't depend upon the belief that god is good", he also said "[your edit] included reference to the notion that god is good, but that's an integreal part of the discussion of the dilemma", and I'm afraid I have to agree. The dilemma doesn't so much presuppose that "God is good", but it is all about "what do we really mean when we say 'God is good'? Does that even make sense? etc." I also repeat that the original dilemma is about the gods and to hosion, that is, "is that which is loved by the gods loved by the gods because of some absolute quality, or is it simply loved by the gods, arbitrarily", the notion of "good" doesn't even explicitly enter the dilemma. Plato asks, can we somehow separate "that which is loved by the gods" from the gods and treat it as a quality of its own, laying the very foundation for the concept of "good", which is rather the opposite of making any presuppositions about "gods being good". dab (𒁳) 08:24, 28 March 2007 (UTC)
Mel Etitis did write precisely "The dilemma doesn't depend upon the belief that god is good." Use the search function and search the text for precisely those words and you will see that it is a perfectly correct word-for-word cut-and-paste quote. -Sensemaker —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 193.183.79.7 (talk) 12:30, 28 March 2007 (UTC).
you are right, sorry; nevertheless, I still agree with him. dab (𒁳) 13:33, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

Of course the dilemma can't depend upon the belief that god is good, given that one of its two horns makes meaningless the claim that god is good. And of course it's a dilemma for the dystheist, just not one that interests her because she's already chosen a position that is consonant with one of the two horns (I also refer to it is a dilemma, and I'm an atheist).--Mel Etitis (Talk) 13:49, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

You've lost me. On one hand you are saying 1) "The dilemma doesn't depend upon the belief that god is good." You have just restated that position. And you are expressly saying that the dilemma applies to a dystheist. On the other hand you are saying: 2a)"One horn of the dilemma is consistent with what you're calling dystheism — thus dystheism involves the choice of one horn." and 2b)"any dilemma is no dilemma for someone who's already made up her mind on one of the two horns. " These are direct, cut-and-paste quotes. 1) Says that the dilemma Italic textdoesItalic text apply to dystheists. 2a) Says dystheists have already chosen one horn. 2b)Says it's not a dilemma for anyone who has already chosen a horn. 2a)+2b) creates the logical syllogism that Euthyphro is not a dilemma to dystheists. Thus I think your statement 1) clearly contradict 2a)+2b). -Sensemaker
I think the confusion is due to the term "dilemma". You mean "it depends on the assumption that the gods are good in order to be irresolvable". In that sense, yes, the dystheist chooses one horn and pretends to be comfortable with it, which means the problem ceases to be a "dilemma". Let's rephrase it in terms of "the Euthyphro question". Does the question pre-suppose that gods are good? no. Does it presuppose that there are gods? yes. A dystheist's answer would be "it is [scarequotes] 'pious' because it is loved by the gods. Hha! don't talk to me about 'pious', all lies!". An eutheist's (and Socrates') answer would be "it is loved by the gods because it is pious". Augustine's answer would be "what's the difference?". An atheist's answer would be "what gods?". dab (𒁳) 10:41, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
I'm with you on that, dab. You and I both think that the dilemma does not apply to an atheist and is just a fairly simple question (and thus not a "dilemma" in the sense a difficult, uncomfortable, hard-to-choose, either-or-question -which is the wikipedia definition of the term) to a dystheist. What I do not understand is why you write that a dystheist "pretends" to be comfortable with one horn. To me he or she would be genuinely comfortable with one horn (albeit somewhat contemptful towards piety). It would seem we agree on what the reality of the situation is. The question is now if it is a good idea to expressly write in the article that the dilemma does not apply to an atheist and is just an easy question to a dystheist. I think so for several reasons. 1. I think it is good pedagogics to be explicit and clear in logical arguments. 2. The dystheism article in wikipedia mentions the Euthyphro dilemma a lot. Failing to mention the dystheism perspective would disappoint people who come from dystheism article via link to Euthyphro dilemma article. 3. The dystehistic and atheistic perspective are highly relevant to this dilemma. Failure to mention them at all would make the entire article written from a eutheistic perspective. That would violate NPOV-policy.
As to exactly what Mel meant, I would prefer to hear it from the horse's mouth. -Sensemaker
because "dystheism" is a hypothetical position. We haven't been able to account for anyone holding it other than tongue-in-cheek in spite of Craig zimmerman (talk · contribs) trying for two years. As it happens, piety/justice/morality/ἀρετή/virtue/righteousness is an innate human concept, much deeper than rationalization involving "gods". But dividing the idea of "gods" from it amounts to just classing back gods to the level of "elves, spirits and fairies": you'll not be a "dystheist", you'll be an animist. It is unclear where the moral outrage at the gods for not being good (that would separate a "dystheist" from an animist who never expected the supernatural to be "good" in the first place) should come from. An animist's reply to the "dilemma" would be "well, I suppose what you call 'pious' it is loved by some gods, such as the god of the oath etc., but I know a few other gods who have never even heard of the concept."
In a nutshell, I would agree with you that the "dilemma" is based on certain particulars of classical Greek ethics/religion that are really at the core of philosophical monotheism. It is true that the "dilemma" may be meaningless or uninteresting to some, including atheists and animists, no need to invoke "dystheists". dab (𒁳) 12:06, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
Your argument makes sense in the sense that if your premeses were true, your conclusion would also be true. The premesis that dystheism is a hypothetical position is, however, certainly not true. You have simply been looking in the wrong direction. You should have looked backward in time instead. At least some gnostics and cathars seems to have been dystheists. (Their demiurge created the world -he is certainly on a completely different level of power from a fairy.)Most polytheists do not seemt to think that their gods are perfectly good -but certainly very powerful. Zoroastrism seems to have believed that good and evil gods existed and were of roughly equal strength. If you really wish to avoid dystheism, for whatever reason, we could avoid mentioning them and just say animists and polytheists (thus neglecting the cathars and gnostics but what the heck, they have been rooted out anyway). Still, I think this would be sub-optimal since the dystheism article discusses the Euthyphro dilemma extensively. Someone who came from there to the Euthyphro dilemma article might be disappointed. However, if you insist, I am certainly willing to compromise. -Sensemaker
that's not true, unfortunately. The Gnostics did believe in a "good God", they just didn't believe he would have created the material world (which was their way of solving the problem of evil). That's not dystheism, that's merely dualism, and different from Christian "God vs. Satan" views only in the 'detail' that Satan would have created matter. Polytheists aren't "dystheists" either, since they do not believe "God is evil", or even "some gods are evil". I think general discussion of this belongs on problem of evil/theodicy, there is no point in repeating the same debate in five different articles. I think this article should really restrict itself to Plato's dilemma and its subsequent discussion. But let's wait for what Mel thinks. dab (𒁳) 12:46, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
I ask to remind you that the wikipedia description of dystheism goes: "Dystheism is the belief that there is a God that does exist and is not wholly "good", or might even be "evil". The opposite concept is eutheism, the belief that God exists and is good." Thus if you are a dualist (some gods are good, some are bad) you certainly belong to the dystheist camp because you think god (or at least some gods) are not wholly good. Christianity is not dualistic and dystheistic because (among other things) they do not call Satan a god (he is a fallen angel -clearly inferior to God). Cathars and gnostics, on the other hand certainly seemed to consider the demiurge a god, albeit one they did not like much. Furthermore, most polytheists do not consider their gods to be wholly good and should thus be classified as dystheists if you use the wikipedia description quoted above. Actually considering god to be fully evil would be a subset of dystheism and comes close to what the dystheist article describes rather vaguely as maltheism and misotheism. The reason you have not found any dystheists is simply because you have used a very narrow definition. Use the wikipedia description instead and there will be plenty of them. -Sensemaker
the "Wikipedia (Koons) definition of dystheism" relies on monotheism. Dystheism within polytheism isn't well-defined. I think your argument is terminological harping on "god vs. God". You can only talk of "evil" if you have a "good" pole, and that good pole happens to co-incide with "God". If you take away the "good" pole, you have neither "eu-" nor "dys-", just "poly-". dab (𒁳) 13:11, 29 March 2007 (UTC)
I have not seen anything is the dystheism article that expressly states that the term only applies to monotheistic religions. The current description of dystheism does not require God to be evil, only not fully good. If I do not have a good pole, but do have a god I have a dystheistic scenario. I am not particularly happy with your mentioning of dualism in its current form (I do appreciate the effort, though): "Gnosticism and other dualistic schools similarly postulate that God is identical with goodness, which turns the dilemma into a tautology." Here you fail to mention the very important fact that dualism requires an opposite. The dualist response to the euthyphro dilemma is thus that that piety is the definition of one god and impiety of another. Thus we have two tautologies. If we add something like "-as long as we are talking about the good god that is. Dualism similarly defines an evil deity." We could make the current text work, though it would be clumsy. -Sensemaker

I have now edited the article so that it talks about this dilemma as a dilemma for theistic philosophers -thus indirectly stating that it does not apply to atheists. I can live with the article in its current form -though I would have preferred a more explicit mention- and I now offer that as a compromise. -Sensemaker

Mel has now edited away the compromise suggestion mentioned above. I really thought I went far to please him in the above section. The atheist perspective was only inferred, not explicitly mentioned, but even that was obviously too much for Mel. Mel, I shall have to ask you to create a compromise on this issue -not just edit away my attempts at compromise, not just suggest "let's do it precisely my way". Please suggest some true compromise. -Sensemaker

As your view was discussed and failed to achieve consensus, why do you insist on including it? --Mel Etitis (Talk) 10:45, 3 April 2007 (UTC)

You failed to achieve consensus, why do you insist on editing out my attempts at compromise? Why is it I who must achieve consensus? You failed to achieve consensus as much as I did. I attempted several forms of compromise and you edited all of them back -usually without even attempting to give any reasonable explanation, much less a decent compromise. Dbachmann seems to agree that the dystheistic and atheistic perspective should somehow be included. So if anyone is closer to a consensus it is I, not you. It seems that your idea is that we take turns to decide. If we agree I decide, if we disagree you decide. -Sensemaker
It's the person who wants to change the article who needs to achieve consensus. You also seem not noticed to have or to have ignored my attempt to go as far as needs to be gone in your direction. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 13:54, 3 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] "All of these dilemmas have been solved"??

With all imaginable respect, I submit that Ezzi386's edits of 9 November are at best less than encyclopedic in style and at worst shallow and circular. He has deleted the point about the naturalistic fallacy and then goes on to commit that very fallacy. The paragraph that begins with the word "Alterability" is not even readable.

[edit] clarity

The treatment of the original dilemma (on piety) and its monotheistic application (on morality) should be divided more clearly. They are, of course, closely related, but the dialogue should be shown for its role in the emergence of monotheism altogether. Piety is, after all, something fundamentally different from "goodness", but since the latter concept emerges out of the former at precisely this point in history, it is difficult and vexing to keep them apart. All the more effort at clarity is needed. dab (𒁳) 12:04, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

I concur. For the moment, I fail to find a good way to express it. -Sensemaker
Plato asks of what sort of δίκαιον (moral rectitude) όσιον (piety) is (Euthyphro 12d), so I don't think that it's right to say that they were fundamentally different at this point. I'm not sure, either, that the dialogue had any rôle in the emergence of monotheism; what did you have in mind? --Mel Etitis (Talk) 10:58, 3 April 2007 (UTC)
yes, the two terms are closely related indeed, that's what makes the case so difficult for Socrates. He is trying to figure out what exactly he means by hosion. For us it is even more difficult to follow, because we are not native speakers. Saying that hosion means "piety" can be misleading, because "piety" for us has a distinctly Christian, quietistic meaning, and it isn't a word we use every day, at least for me it has an antiquated ring. While hosion is obviously a term with direct relevance to social life. I do not think the question can be understood without detailed awareness of Athenian society and religion at the time. As for the development of monotheism, I think it is undisputed that Plato, via "Neoplatonism" is largely responsible for the emergence of monotheism-as-we-know-it. And among the works of Plato, this probably is one of the more relevant to the topic. Monotheism#The_development_of_monotheism fails to address this, not surprisingly rambling on about the Hebrew Bible, since we are told in Sunday School that Abraham invented monotheism in 1900 BC. This is a rough sketch of my take on the topic, intended for a charitable reader: of course I would have to come up with specific sources before inserting the gist of it into any article. regards, dab (𒁳) 07:53, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

I'd agree that Plato indirectly had a huge effect on the way that early Christianity developed (and some effect on the Judaism of the time and a little before); I'd draw back from saying that that effect was on the development of monotheism (though "as-we-know-it" could cover a multitude of sins, as it were). I agree with your implication (it is your implication isn't it?) that Judaism was henotheistic rather than monotheistic, at least until the time of Jesus, and probably for some time afterwards. --Mel Etitis (Talk) 11:05, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

yes, well, it is futile to draw a clean line between monotheism and henotheism. People have been saying "there is only X" of deity X, just to suck up to X, since the Bronze Age. Folk religion is never monotheistic, at least not folk Christianity. "True" monotheism must be philosophical and abstract, and no, I don't assume that Judaism was monotheistic in this sense before it came into contact with Hellenism from the 3rd c. BC or so. It would follow that Plato is important even for the solidification of Judaistic monotheism, not to mention the Gnostic and Christian flavours. There is of course a lot of room for disagreement over the term "monotheism", and it should all be carved out on the monotheism article. For the purposes of this article, I was concerned about not taking the equation "hosion=piety" for granted, and I tried to elucidate the terminological background. My present version may however be overly pedantic philology-cruft to be fit for general consumption, and the paragraph on hosios vs. dikaios vs. hieros may even qualify as OR, that is, I am certainly open towards further improvement there. dab (𒁳) 09:23, 13 April 2007 (UTC)
as an afterthought, if we really want to zoom in on the Socratic invention of monotheism, we may find it is the moment Euthyphro suggests that if the gods disagree among themselves, we will only take into consideration those bits on which they are unanimous. The "Divine" would thus be the greatest common denominator of the plurality of what is merely "divine" :) dab (𒁳) 09:29, 13 April 2007 (UTC)

That afterthought is fascinating; complete OR, of course, but really interesting OR. I'll have think about it.

[edit] Please change use of "other horn" in the section 'False-dilemma response'

This paragraph is hard to comprehend because of the use of the phrase "other horn" at different points:

This approach is considered by its opponents to be a rejection of the Divine Command Theory in favour of the other horn, depending on how the other horn is construed; in particular, it depends upon the notion that goodness is a property of God, and thus not under God's control. If the first horn is seen as bad because it takes God to be bound by morality, and thus in some sense irrelevant to the existence or discovery of it, then this response does not help. But if the other horn is seen as bad only because it requires an external limitation on God, then this response solves the problem and is not equivalent to the first horn.

Some of us are left wondering which is currently the "other horn" in the last sentence.
The explaination of the dilemma introduces the first horn of the dilemma as 'that which is moral is commanded by God because it is moral'. The second horn of the dilemma is 'that which is moral is moral because it is commanded by God, known as divine command theory'.
If you are familiar with the subject and understand this paragraph, please replace each instance of the phrase "other horn" with either "first horn" or "second horn" as appropriate in each case.

[edit] Small missunderstanding?

"Gnosticism and other dualistic schools similarly postulate that God is identical with goodness, which turns the dilemma into a tautology."

In Gnosticism The True God didn't have anything to do whit this material world, and so had nothing to do whit morals. In dualism Good and Bad belong together, one cannot excist whitout the other. What is considered good or bad is matter of opinion culture and religion. Not something that has anything to do whit even, well gods.

82.215.228.44 (talk) 21:49, 7 December 2007 (UTC)