Talk:Ethical intuitionism
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[edit] Definitions
I suspect that there will be some controversy over the definition of "ethical intuitionism" and perhaps some other terms in this entry. I've gone with the minimal definition of "ethical intuitionism" as the epistemological view that there are some basic (i.e., foundational, non-inferential) moral beliefs. So this leaves out as inessential to the view: moral realism, ethical non-naturalism, pluralism, and deontological ethics. It also then is neutral between a rationalist version and empiricist version (moral sense theory). This then allows for people like David Hume to be an ethical intuitionist, which is as it should be. Hume is a sentimentalist (or moral sense theorist), but he's also standardly taken to be an anti-realist and naturalist. In any event, hopefully this is not too controversial. I think this is pretty standard (see Sinnott-Armstrong, Huemer, and others). -- Jaymay 17:39, 12 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Clean up and expansion
Hi all. I'm starting to work on this article and the moral sense theory article that I created. I'm hoping to clean up and expand them, and distinguish the two (rationalist intuitionism and moral sense theory) from one another. Any help and ideas here would be great. -- Jaymay 22:53, 11 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Format
The format is wrong. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.158.33.66 (talk) 16:52, 17 September 2007 (UTC)
- Please be more specific. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:53, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
[edit] Occam's razor argument
This section below:
Besides, Occam's Razor is a redundant principle in the wake of particle physics. It was once thought everything is made up of atoms, and this was proved to be true. According to Occam's Razor, we needn't have looked any further than that for the building-blocks of the world. But now it turns out there are particles within particles, and quantum physics shows that the universe is far more complex than was previously imagined. If Occam's Razor cannot aid us even in the precise field of science, how can it be of any use to us in philosophy?
The argument doesn't make sense. The utility of Occam's Razor is unaffected by discoveries of quantum physics, or indeed, any discoveries. It may once have been the case that atoms were sufficient to explain our world, just as Newtonian mechanics was once thought to be perfect. However, those thoughts are a function of the level of awareness of how the world actually works. When more and better data are gathered, the awareness of what the world is really like deepens. Once this occurs, many theories are developed in the attempt to explain the updated world view, and then Occam's Razor may once again be used to distinguish between those theories. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.241.88.125 (talk) 13:54, 29 January 2008 (UTC)
- I agree. I cleared up those arguments. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:52, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
[edit] Counter-arguments
I added some counter-arguments. Also, I cleared up the counter-arguments against the Occam's Razor criticism. 68.1.124.88 (talk) 06:51, 10 February 2008 (UTC)
I strongly think it doesn't need to be here. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.185.43.130 (talk) 15:15, 2 May 2008 (UTC)
