Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

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Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

Argued February 26, 1975
Decided June 23, 1975

Full case name:	Richard Erznoznik etc. v. City of Jacksonville

Citations:	422 U.S. 205; 95 S. Ct. 2268; 45 L. Ed. 2d 125; 1 Media L. Rep. 1508

Prior history:	288 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 419 U.S. 822 (1974).

Holding

The Court ruled that the ordinance was invalid on its face because the ordinance discriminated among movies solely on the basis of nudity, but not all offensive content so it could not be justified.

Court membership

Chief Justice: Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices: William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist

Case opinions

Majority by: Powell
Joined by: Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun
Concurrence by: Douglas
Dissent by: Burger
Joined by: Rehnquist
Dissent by: White

Laws applied

U.S. Const., amend. I; Jacksonville Municipal Code § 330.313

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning a city ordinance prohibiting the showing of films containing nudity by a drive-in theater.

(a) The ordinance by discriminating among movies solely on the basis of content has the effect of deterring drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or even educational, and such censorship of the content of otherwise protected speech cannot be justified on the basis of the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets, who if offended by viewing the movies can readily avert their eyes. Pp. 208-212.

(b) Nor can the ordinance be justified as an exercise of the city's police power for the protection of children against viewing the films. Even assuming that such is its purpose, the restriction is broader than permissible since it is not directed against sexually explicit nudity or otherwise limited. Pp. 212-214.

(c) Nor can the ordinance be justified as a traffic regulation. If this were its purpose, it would be invalid as a strikingly under-inclusive legislative classification since it singles out movies containing nudity from all other movies that might distract a passing motorist. Pp. 214-215.

(d) The possibility of a narrowing construction of the ordinance appears remote, particularly where appellee city offered several distinct justifications for it in its broadest terms. Moreover, its deterrent effect on legitimate expression in the form of movies is both real and substantial. Pp. 215-217.