Talk:Epistemology/Archive 4

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Archive This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Contents

tasks for when the article is unlocked...

  1. Clarify the section on the "no accident account"
  2. Describe Gettier problem in terms of the diagram - it's the grey bit.
  3. Edit list of epistemic philosophers
  4. Clean the muck out of the talk page.
  5. link to ido page: io:epistemologio

Please add more... Banno 23:55, August 27, 2005 (UTC)

Relativism

Added a relativism secion.

Dot Six temporary injunction

For those that missed it:

DotSix, using any IP is prohibited from editing any Wikipedia page other than his talk page and the pages of this Arbitration case until a final decision is made in this case. [1]

As I understand it, if he edits here again, we report it to Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Incidents to have him blocked; add a link to the diff of the arbitration decision by way of explanation.

Perhaps it would be worth unlocking this page now? Banno 10:51, August 29, 2005 (UTC)

Well, that worked well, didn't it? Banno 12:24, August 30, 2005 (UTC)

Reply to Dotsix Re: Gettier

DotSix continues to push his misinterpretation of Gettier; I've remained silent on the issue, not wanting to feed the troll. But I now think a few brief comments might be needed, since the argument is not well known (for obvious reasons) outside of philosophy circles.

The first things that the interested reader should note is that what DotSix says above is for the most part a cut-and-paste from the article Gettier problem; it is a good article, so please, read the argument there in context to gain a better insight.

The second thing is that DotSix is alone in the idea that the "belief has nothing to do with knowledge". No other philosopher or editor has supported this view.

Up until Gettier presented his argument, Philosophers pretty much followed Plato's account. Plato argued that Knowledge was Justified True Belief. Gettier showed that these three criteria are insufficient, by giving examples of instances of Justified true beliefs that do not count as knowledge. That is, he showed that Knowledge is not just justified true belief; some further analysis is needed.

There are a range of possibilities; one approach is to add another criteria - the article calls this the "JTB+G" approach. Several other possibilities are listed in the main article. One thing that they all have in common is that they agree that our knowledge is a subset of our true beliefs.

That is, none of the responses to the Gettier problem agree with DotSix's position.

DotSix has been asked to provide citations or references to anyone that agrees with his position; not surprisingly, he has not done so.

Epistemology has been carefully written to accommodate Gettier's account. Plato's theory is presented first because of its historical significance. The Gettier problem has been there since the start of the discussion with DotSix - perhaps it has simply taken him this long to read to the end of the article?

In summary, the Gettier argument does count against Plato's definition of knowledge. But it does not count against the view that knowledge is a subset of our true beliefs. So it does not in any way support the perverse contention pushed by DotSix. That is his own peculiar invention.

The upshot is that the discussion here is not about the content of the article. DotSix's position is so perverse it is not worthy of consideration; it is like someone attempting to edit out all the references to rocketry from NASA, or Darwin from evolution.

DotSix's usual response when presented with this sort of rebuttal is to insert a range of derogatory comments within the post, with links to other articles. That will make this post difficult to read, but if you are sufficiently interested go to the main articles Epistemology and Gettier problem; you will find they do not support DotSix. Banno 21:38, August 30, 2005 (UTC)

To Anyone Really Interested in the Gettier Problem

I just added a bit on this subject to the article on Robert Nozick, the author of my own preferred solution. In effect, Nozick proposes not to add a fourth element to JTB, but to redefine the 'J', replacing justification with subjunctive conditionality. --Christofurio 13:35, August 31, 2005 (UTC)

You are right that no fourth element is needed, but no solution is needed either...only some fisking. The so-called "Gettier Problem" is flawed; there is no problem. Gettier-type-problems conflate the sense-reference distinction. The flaw is that the element of "true" in the "justified, true belief" formula is typically missing because the referent of belief shifts in these sorts of "problems". —B|Talk 18:47, 9 September 2005 (UTC)
Not necessarily. This sort of dissewction is inadequate, although interesting. When (to go back to the problems of Jeff the bridge engineer, below) is a bridge the "same" bridge? If a bridge is rebuilt, plank by plank, over a period of a year (because that's how many planks there are) then when would it become a new bridge? Such a question isn't very far from epistemology, anyway, because our notion of continuing thinghood is crucial to our learning process. But re-work the hypothetical if you like. The terrorists (or Nazis, or whomever) loosen the bolts on the bridge, in the hope and expectation that a large truck will come by the next morning and the bridge will then dramatically collapse under its weight. The bus doesn't come by. But our former bridge engineer DOES come by, and walks across the bridge in (accurate) confidence that he'll make it safely across. I've already stipulated where that confidence came from.

Is this the "same" bridge, removing the identity difficulty? Does the tampering nonetheless defeat the equation of the engineer's confidence with knowledge? --Christofurio 23:08, September 2, 2005 (UTC)

Retrieved (with a bit of modification) from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Banno"

Or consider the "barn" problem I've outlined in the Talk page of Gettier problem. --Christofurio 15:01, September 11, 2005 (UTC)

More about Knowledge vs. Belief

From the article:

Knowledge is distinct from belief and opinion. If someone claims to believe something, they are claiming that they think that it is the truth. But of course, it might turn out that they were mistaken, and that what they thought was true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must be true.

Okay. Rewind a bit to back when Jeff thought that the bridge was safe and would not collapse on him. Did he have knowledge /back then/? If he did, then that means the only criterion for knowledge is being subjectively justified belief; but if he didn't, that means any justified belief which's truth is not necessitated by the justification (i.e. might be wrong) is not knowledge, and thus NOTHING is knowledge because due to strong underdetermination no body of evidence can absolutely necessitate a theory. Jeff has no useful way of differentiating between justified belief that seems to be true and IS true (eg the bridge still being there at all) and justified belief that seems to be true but is false (the bridge being safe). What gives? --AceMyth 20:03, August 31, 2005 (UTC)

For what it is worth, in the Kirkham article listed in the references at the end of the page, Kirkham argues this same point. Knowledge requires evidence that necessitates the truth of the belief. Any less stringent justification condition is subject to some kind of counterexample or other. He seems to agree that this does imply a very sweeping skepticism. But I think he has a way of taking the sting out of that. --Nate Ladd 21:02, August 31, 2005 (UTC)
Personally I think the appropriate way of taking the sting out of that is, in the absence of certainly true knowledge, settling for knowledge that is probably true which is perfectly acceptable for all practical purposes (see Quine's various theses and their application to instrumentalism). I'll go read the article now to see what this Kirkham fellow says. --AceMyth 21:12, August 31, 2005 (UTC)
Well, Kirkham's point (and yours I thought) is that there's no such thing as knowledge that is merely probable. If the belief is not certain, then it doesn't count as knowledge. --Nate Ladd 21:24, August 31, 2005 (UTC)
Yes, and I was talking about a new, unconventional way to define "knowledge" based on this problem - knowledge as a belief justified such that it appears to probably be true. This type of knowledge, which is the only type we can have, is fallible yet useful. --AceMyth 22:07, August 31, 2005 (UTC)
This view is also apparent in F. P. Ramsey's writings, in which he attempted to replace true with various levels of probability. I think it problematic; such probabilism presents its own problems. For instance, what is the probability that 1+1=2?
For my own part - and this is personal mussing, so not eligible for inclusion in the Wiki - an amalgam of Quine's coherence theory, Wittgenstein and Austin's language as use, and Popper's falibalism is sufficient to give an account of knowledge. But unfortunately we should not discuss such things here; I'll meet you all in the forum of your choice, if you like. Banno 20:45, September 1, 2005 (UTC)
"The probability of 1+1=2" thing is the well known problem of whether "Self-evident" truths exist or not. Quine said they don't; I personally think that as "1" and "2" are auxiliary concepts of our own creation, conceived precisely to fit into their role such that two "1"s would make a "2", it would be really silly to fear the universe suddenly turning on us and proving us wrong when it had nothing to do with the whole thing in the first place. --AceMyth 05:47, September 4, 2005 (UTC)

Just for fun, let's make this a Gettier problem. Jeff believes the bridge is safe for him to walk across. The bridge in fact IS safe for him to walk across. What is his justification? He is an engineer, and he was at this spot on the river bank when the bridge was being built. He observed that it was built with up-to-date methods and should be able to hold X number of tons, etc. So there is JTB, and knowledge, right? Well, unbeknowst to Jeff, the night before a group of terrorists substituted the sound bridge that he saw being constructed with an identical paper-mache duplicate, similar enough in appearance to fool even him. It just so happens, though, that even the paper mache bridge can support Jeff's weight, and he walks across safely. Did Jeff have knowledge of the safety of the bridge or not? The conditional account addresses such problems by asking: if the bridge were not safe, would Jeff's view of its safety have been different? If the terrorists had substituted a slightly more flimsy paper mache than the one they did employ, then the bridge would not have been safe for Jeff. But that wouldn't have changed Jeff's view of it, because his view would nonetheless have been based on his observations of a year before. So it isn't knowledge. Christofurio 14:57, September 1, 2005 (UTC)

(sideline: What interests me here is that the substitution was done by terrorists. Presumably twenty years ago it would have been communists. And prior to that, Nazis. Curious, don't you think?)
I think there is another problem with this example - it deals with two bridges, not one. Jeff was correct in thinking that the bridge he saw built would hold his weight, but mistaken in thinking that this was the bridge on which he walked. It is problem of identity, not epistemology. Banno 20:15, September 1, 2005 (UTC)
Banno, my point exactly made above: so-called Gettier "problems" conflate sense-reference, as if Jeff's belief in the example above had a JTB about the bridge the entire time as if it were the same referent, BUT Jeff doesn't...it is not the same bridge/referent. —B|Talk 19:41, 9 September 2005 (UTC)
In another twenty years, somebody will use the same hypothetical, except the substitution will be accomplished by Martians. Tricky red-planet devils.

Problems with the Knowlege and belief section

Moore's paradox is misdescribed in the Knowledge and belief section. It would be be better to distinguish "belief" in the sense of either belief in or understanding/comprehension of. I can understand a proposition/concept/etc, but not believe in it. The way the term "belief" is used in that section is confusing. —B|Talk 19:47, 9 September 2005 (UTC)


Hi, Bo. your change "Knowledge is a true belief" won't do, since someone could misconstrue the "is" to be that of equivalence, which would clearly be wrong. Banno 20:13, September 9, 2005 (UTC)

First, it is NOT clearly wrong to an epistemic minimalist, and second it is much better than the gobbledly gook that was there before: "believed to be true" is NOT an element of knowledge..."belief", yes, but not "believed to be true". —B|Talk 21:53, 9 September 2005 (UTC)

Post-gettier definitions

I've removed this from the article:

Some examples of these new definitions include (where S is the belief holder and p is the belief):

  • Peter Unger's "No accident account of knowledge", which defines knowledge as "S knows p if and only if it is not at all accidental that S's belief in p is true".
  • The "Defeasibilty account of knowledge", where "There is no other proposition (q), such that if S became justified in believing q, S would no longer be justified in believing p". Under this account, q is known as the "defeater".
  • The "Causational Account", where "The fact of p causes S's belief in p"
    • A problem with the Causational account is that deviant causal chains can emerge. Philosopher Alvin Goldman added that "Fact that p, causes fact that q, causes S's belief in q is not knowledge, but belief in q, from which p is inferred, is knowledge". However, there must be an awareness of the causal chain.
  • The Conditional Account associated with Robert Nozick. S believes in p, p is the case, and if p were not the case, then S would not believe it.
  • The "Reliable Analysis" account, which adds to the "justified true belief" definition that "S arrived at p by a reliable method, or S is a reliable judge in such matters".

Although it is accurate, I wonder at the purpose of having these theories mentioned in such a brief and formalistic way. Perhaps someone might re-write this section in plain prose, or with examples. or perhaps it belongs at Gettier problem?

Has anybody written an account of what happens when you try feeding the regress argument to any of these definitions? i.e.
    • (Causational account) To know P you need to know that P causes S and observe S,
    • Therefore you need to know that (P causes S) causes T plus that (your observing S) causes Q, and observe both T and Q,
    • (Ad infinitum) Wheeeeeeee.... --AceMyth 05:39, September 4, 2005 (UTC)

Feature article?

Is this up to submission for feature article status? See Wikipedia:What is a featured article. Banno 10:11, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

Gettier references from the knowledge page

I eliminated the discussion about Gettier from knowledge, since it's already here in much greater detail. Here are some left-over references to articles that don't seem to exist in this article. I'll let you decide if this should be added to this article, since I'm not really qualified or interested enough to figure it out myself. Sbwoodside 07:05, 23 October 2005 (UTC)

References

  • Creath, Richard, "Induction and the Gettier Problem", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.LII, No.2, June 1992.
  • Feldman, Richard, "An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52 (1974): 68-69.
  • Gettier, Edmund, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis 23 (1963): 121-23.
  • Goldman, Alvin I., "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 73.20 (1976), 771-791.
  • Hetherington, Stephen, "Actually Knowing", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.48, No. 193, October 1998.
  • Lehrer, Keith and Thomas D. Paxon, Jr., "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief", The Journal of Philosophy, 66.8 (1969), 225-237.
  • Levi, Don S., "The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins", Philosophy, 70, 1995.
  • Swain, Marshall, "Epistemic Defeasibility", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.II, No.I, January 1974.

A "Moonie Way of Knowledge"

I wonder if anyone here would be interested in Unification Epistemology as an alternative to traditional epistemologies? For example:

Cognition is always accompanied by judgment, and judgment can be regarded as a kind of a measuring act. For measurement, standards (criteria) are necessary, and it is the ideas within the human mind that serve as the standard of cognition.

Lots more where that came from. You might not agree with it all, but after compraing Dr. Lee's explanation with what you already think, at least you'll know where you stand. Uncle Ed 21:16, 26 October 2005 (UTC)

Epistemic philosophers

Combining two of the comments at Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Epistemology/archive1, I suggest we remove the long list of philosophers from the See also section to here, and re-insert them by placing citations to each at the appropriate place in the article. Banno 03:05, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

The following is the full list:

Epistemic philosophers

Eastern Epistemology

I have started a article on Eastern epistemology. I don't know a lot about this area myself, but I hope those interested in Epistemology would contribute to this article. Thanks. deeptrivia 05:05, 4 November 2005 (UTC)

I agree with Deeptrivia's assessment of the article. This is a problem that runs throughout the philosophy articles. I wonder at your solution, though.
To have a single article on Eastern epistemology conflates a range of distinct traditions. That is, I don't think that there is necessarily anything that units the various "Eastern" traditions apart from their geography; and that therefore to unite them in a single article is to do so without a relevant reason. It also might give the mistaken impression to a lay reader that there are two sorts of philosophy - the Eastern stuff and the "real" European sort. I think it wold be far better to treat Eastern traditions in the same way as we have treated the various Western traditions - by giving them each a separate article, and a paragraph link here in the main article.
Since in the interests of consistency what we do here should also be done in the other philosophy articles, [[I'll refer this discussion to WikiProject Philosophy . Banno 21:03, 5 November 2005 (UTC)
Is there such a creature as Islamic epistemology? I'm not trying to be a smart-ass in asking, I really don't know if there's any body of theory distinctive to the Koranic tradition that addressed theory-of-knowledge questions. If the answer is "yes," would it be eastern or western? --68.9.147.54 01:40, 6 November 2005 (UTC)
BTW, 68.9 etc. is Christofurio, when I forget to log in before posting. --Christofurio 01:51, 6 November 2005 (UTC)
I don't know, either. My guess would be, given the heavy influence of the Greeks on Islamic philosophy, that such a thing woudl resemble Plato anyway. I don't think that we should go on a fishing expedition, looking for rare and endangered epistemologies. Rather I think some arrangement might be possible for new epistemologies to be added as a main article is added for each. Banno 20:41, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

Sure. I fully agree that it is a good idea not to classify epistemologies as eastern and western. Any suggestions on how to go about it will be highly appreciated. I would prefer that the main epistemology page briefly describes all kinds of epistemologies, and we have separate detailed articles on them. (We can of course, then delete the article on Eastern epistemology) I think this would work perfectly well everywhere except in one place: when we discuss how these theories evolved (for example if we have an article like History of epistemology.) We might have a problem combining everything there since these theories developed almost independently in east and west. deeptrivia 17:00, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

On the question of whether there is a distinctive Islamic epistemology. I think there must be, they had a rich philosophical tradition (al-kindi, avicenna, Averroes, to name those I can remember) and while it was greatly influenced by Greek philosophy it had plenty of distinct claims (partly because they: tried to make Greek philosophy compatible with Islam; had a 'unitarian' idea of Greek philosophers (i.e. they all agreed with each other!); and were clever guys who could think for themselves). I'm talking from very vague memory here, but I think I recall a really interesting argument that had similarities to Cartesian doubt. But finding someone who could say something about its tradition in epistemology would be very difficult, I imagine. --Dast 10:40, 8 November 2005 (UTC)


Recently removed text

Imagine a banana. Now imagine a banana sitting in a field. How do you know it is there? Is it the yellow colour? Or the green of the field. Now imagine yourself eating the banana. How does it taste? How do you know it is a bananana if all you have ever eaten is dodo meat.

It sounds funny, but it does deal with epistemology of course, so it's not vandalism like the hairtrigger reverter thought :-) I hope the editor who added it comes back and does more useful stuff. Kim Bruning 04:51, 15 November 2005 (UTC)