Talk:Epistemocracy
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[edit] Origin and popularity of the term
I haven't researched the origin of the term, but as of 2008-04-29, a Google search for epistemocracy -taleb -"the black swan" -wikipedia returns 315 hits, at least some of which are publications that use the term. Accessing many of them requires a subscription, however. Moreover, their usage of the term may not conform to the meaning stated in the article.
As for sources that support the definition stated in the book, as of 2008-05-05, there surely are some, but they are generally blogs or non-notable book reviews, and they carry no weight. --AB (talk) 15:55, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
- Good research AB. And good comment below. Like your fair, objective, encyclopedic approach to assessing this article. I'm just being playful myself. Seriously though, between us I think we're working out that this article represents popular culture rather than serious philosophy. Alastair Haines (talk) 16:13, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
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- Personally, I think wait and see. It may get some press coverage or be noted in a published work in the popular market. It may be picked up by sociology or ethicists or political theorists. It may end up being quoted in a serious work as an example of modern skepticism. It may all just lapse into silence. It's not really controversial or offensive. It's not particularly notable, but 315 hits is more than one individual pushing a POV. I have a high tolerance for low notability material, so long as it does not express POV damaging to serious comment. IMO, this is harmless, let it live. Alastair Haines (talk) 01:07, 6 May 2008 (UTC)
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[edit] Skepticism about this entry
I don't understand the improbability of black swans, all native Australian swans (Cygnus atratus) are black. I'm skeptical about this entry, does that make me an epistemocrat? Alastair Haines (talk) 16:57, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
- If you're asking whether this article can be used to serve as a reason for being skeptical about being an epistemocrat itself, the answer is no. Circular reasoning is a logical fallacy. --AB (talk) 02:04, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
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- (A) All people who think things are false are epistemocrats.
- (B) Socrates thinks (A) is false.
- Therefore
- (C) Socrates is an epistemocrat.
- Is this a valid syllogism?
- Yes. Can Socrates assert himself to be an epistemocrat on the basis of (A). No.
- Is (A) an accurate reproduction of the definition given in the article? No. ;) Alastair Haines (talk) 03:17, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
More generally though. It's a beautiful example of a theory vulnerable to both Kant's categorical imperative and Socrates' peritrope.
- Kant proposes, "what is good for me to do, is that which is good for everyone to do."
- Epistemocracy proposes, "it is good for a person to doubt."
If Kant is right, Epistemocracy must value everyone doubting, including people doubting the theory of Epistemocracy itself. If Epistemocracy is good, it should not be believed. But if it is believed, it is not good. That seems to me a pretty serious bind.
- Protagoras proposed, "a thing is true because it is believed (rather than things being believed because they are true)."
- Socrates noted, "if you are right, things not believed must be false, your theory is not believed, so it is false."
In other words if Protagoras was right, then he was wrong. A nasty bind shared with epistemocracy. If all truth claims merit disbelief, this truth claim itself merits disbelief.
What entertains me most is that by asserting I am not an epistemocrat, epistemocracy must assert, "to the contrary, your skepticism makes you one!" I think I am not, but they must insist that I am!
In other words, epistemocracy suffers from the extraordinary situation that those who deny it will be held up by those who believe it as paragons of the ideology. On the other hand, those who believe it will have to look down on themselves as poor examples of the ideal they espouse, because they actually believe something. So cute! ;) Alastair Haines (talk) 03:44, 4 May 2008 (UTC)
- It can indeed sometimes be confusing for someone to make up one's mind, if one is skeptical about two opposing beliefs. If I remember correctly, in the book, Taleb suggested going with the option which you know will result in the least possible harm; unfortunately, this too is not always clear-cut. Perhaps a formal analysis of the two uncertainties and their utilities can help, to the extent that it is feasible. --AB (talk) 00:20, 27 May 2008 (UTC)
