User talk:Envoy202

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Hey, thanks for providing so much factual information in your arguments. I am continuously learning about the region and I really enjoyed reading your posts, highly informative I must say.

Would you be able to tell me what the current population of Pristina is? The article about the city is a real mess, and I need some sort of official estimate.

ThanksTonycdp 14:33, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] Arbitration request on Kosovo

Dear Editor, since you have been involved in editing the Kosovo article in the last months, and that article has been the subject of long ongoing edit wars, your name is listed in the Request for Arbitration on this matter. You can make a statement here: Wikipedia:Requests_for_arbitration#Kosovo. Due to the large number of editors involved, however, I would to ask you to keep your statement concise and to the point. If you feel you have not been substantially involved in the disputes surrounding the Kosovo article, please do not remove your name from the Arbitration request, but rather make a short statement there explaining why you feel you have not been involved enough to be part it. To understand my reasons for requesting Arbitration, please read my statement on the Requests for Arbitration page. Best regards, Cpt. Morgan (Reinoutr) 10:13, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Wikipedia:Requests for arbitration/Kosovo

Hello,

An Arbitration case involving you has been opened: Wikipedia:Requests for arbitration/Kosovo. Please add evidence to the evidence sub-page, Wikipedia:Requests for arbitration/Kosovo/Evidence. You may also contribute to the case on the workshop sub-page, Wikipedia:Requests for arbitration/Kosovo/Workshop.

On behalf of the Arbitration Committee, --Tony Sidaway 16:48, 4 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Temporary injunction in the Kosovo arbitration

For the duration of this case, any of the named parties may be banned by an uninvolved administrator from Kosovo or related pages for disruptive edits.

You are receiving this message because you are one of those covered by this injunction.

For the arbitration committee. --Tony Sidaway 17:55, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Wikipedia:Requests for arbitration/Kosovo

This case is now closed and the results have been published at the link above.

For edit warring, personal attacks, and other disruption, PerfectStorm/C-c-c-c is banned from editing Wikipedia for one year. For edit warring and incivility, Bormalagurski is banned from editing Wikipedia from one year. For edit warring and disruptive use of sockpuppets, Dardanv under any username or IP, is banned from editing Wikipedia for one month.

Hipi Zhdripi is limited to his one named account, Hipi Zhdripi. All edits by Hipi Zhdripi under another account or an IP address shall be treated as edits by a banned user.

Ilir pz, Hipi Zhdripi, Vezaso are banned for one year from editing articles related to Kosovo. Relation to Kosovo is to be interpreted broadly so as to prevent gaming. Either may be banned from any related non-article page for disruptive editing. All articles related to Kosovo are put on Article probation to allow more swift dealing with disruption. Editors of Kosovo and related articles who engage in edit warring, incivility, original research, or other disruptive editing, may be banned for an appropriate period of time, in extreme cases indefinitely.

ChrisO is warned not to engage in edit warring, and to engage in only calm discussion and dispute resolution when in conflict. He is instructed not to use the administrative rollback tool in content disputes and encouraged to develop the ability and practice of assisting users who are having trouble understanding and applying Wikipedia policies in doing so. .

Dardanv, Ferick, Laughing Man, Osli73, and Tonycdp are placed on Probation for one year. Each may be banned from any page or set of pages for disruptive edits, such as edit warring or incivility.

Ilir pz, Hipi Zhdripi, Vezaso, Dardanv, Ferick, Laughing Man, Osli73, and Tonycdp are placed on standard revert parole for one year. Each is limited to one revert per article per week, excepting obvious vandalism. Further, each is required to discuss any content reversions on the article's talk page.

For the Arbitration Committee. Arbitration Committee Clerk, 03:36, 21 October 2006 (UTC)


Envoy,ti si govno smrdljivo YXYX 04:39, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

I will use profanity whenever the fuck I want. Thank you. // Laughing Man 01:37, 8 January 2007 (UTC)


Hello. Could you take a look at Racak incident article? I think that the article the way it is now is very biased, one sided and not conform NPOV rules of Wikipedia. Please read also my comments made in the talk page. Maybe you can contribute to make the article NPOV. Best regards. --Noah30 13:31, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Hiya

Hi there, thanks for your words of support for the Kosovo ext links, I intend to be as even handed as possible which I know is very difficult, Even if we removed the ones where links don't work , it would be a start. Not trying to rub up feathers here. Buffadren 14:09, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Need your opinion

Hi Envoy, I have a zelous editor on the Kosovo page, will you take a look....cheers Buffadren 14:19, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Thanks Envoy, a gent Buffadren 11:23, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Kosovo: country debate

Hello Envoy202, long time no hear. There's a discussion going on Talk:List of countries as to whether or not Kosovo should be included in that list and I know you're a frequent contributor on Kosovo. You contributed to the same discussion at Talk:List of unrecognized countries and I thought you might be interested. The articles List of countries and Annex to the list of countries (where the inclusion criteria reside) are both relevant. Cheers. DSuser 13:29, 28 July 2007 (UTC)

Hi again. It's probably a minor point, but there a discussion and vote going on at Talk:Kosovo#Kosovo:_terminology as to whether or not it's better to use Kosovo rather than Kosovan or Kosovar in the Wikipedia articles. Perhaps you have no interest, in which case sorry to bother you! DSuser 15:47, 31 July 2007 (UTC)

I just read your argument about how calling Kosovo the "Autonomous Province of Kosovo" was a pro-Serbian sentiment, due to the fact that Kosovo has been self governing for quite a few years now. Interesting, I hadn't thought of it that way before. Cheers! Gopher65talk 04:12, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] 1244 UNSCR

Reading some of your comments at Talk:Kosovo/Archive 12, I've noticed the following:

"As part of that breakup, the UN Security Council (itself a major source of international law) passed Resolution 1244 that called for a UN-led political process to determine Kosovo's future status -- that Resolution deliberately did not rule out any particular status outcome, including independence.

However that's not correct. The resolution ruled out any form of independence, and mandated a UN-led political process to determine the level and form of Kosovo's autonomy. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 10:41, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Yes, I'm fine. Thanks for asking. Can't say the same for the Balkans though (with all the Bosnian, Kosovan and Montenegrin disputes heating up). How about you?
Yes, I'd like to discuss it a bit. Here are some quotes from the resolution 1244 from 10 June 1999. Here's from its preamble:
"Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,"
This is from UNSCR 1160:
preamble: "Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
article 5: "Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialog, with the proposal in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, and the Charter of the United Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration;"
This is from UNSCR 1199:
preamble: "Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,", "Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration," and "Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
This is from UNSCR 1203:
preamble: "Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998 and 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, and the importance of the peaceful resolution of the problem of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", "Recalling the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration," and "Reffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
article 4: "Demands also that the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo;"
This is from UNSCR 1239:
preamble: "Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, and 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998, and the statements of its President of 24 August 1998 (S/PRST/1998/25), 19 January 1999 (S/PRST/1999/2), and 29 January 1999 (S/PRST/1999/5),"
An excerpt from an official statement of the President of the Security Council from 29 January 1999: ""The Security Council reiterates its full support for international efforts, including those of the Contact Group and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission, to reduce tensions in Kosovo and facilitate a political settlement on the basis of substantial autonomy and equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Kosovo Albanians and other communities in Kosovo. It reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" —Preceding unsigned comment added by PaxEquilibrium (talk • contribs) 13:55, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
"Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,"
"Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,"
Here's article 10 "Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;"
article 11 explains the mandate of the international civil presence, under (a): "Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);" and (c) "Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;"
in Annex 1 the Secretary-General adopts the conclusions of the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting at Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 for the general principles to solve the future status of Kosovo: "A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;"
and this is Annex 2 with some additional established principles, article 5: "Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo." and article 8: "A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions."
Here's something from the Rambouillet Agreement, upon which the UN SC resolutions often call:
in its preamble: "Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
In Article I: Principles at its Framework: "2. National communities and their members shall have additional rights specified in Chapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the exercise of these additional rights. The national communities shall be legally equal as specified herein, and shall not use their additional rights to endanger the rights of other national communities or the rights of citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democratic government in Kosovo."
In its Constitution bit's preamgle: "Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from which the authorities of governance set forth herein originate,"
This is Article I from the Constitution, dealing with the principles of the democratic self-government in Kosovo: "3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over the following areas, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b) maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which power shall be exercised in a manner that does not discriminate against Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h) federal elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement."
In the 2nd Implementation bit, in Article I dealing with general obligations: "a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter, including the establishment of a multinational military implementation force in Kosovo. The Parties invite NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this Chapter. They also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)."
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Institutions in Kosovo adopted 15 May 2001, in Chapter 1, Basic Provisions: "1.4 Kosovo shall be governed democratically through legislative, executive, and judicial bodies and institutions in accordance with this Constitutional Framework and UNSCR 1244(1999)." I'll just mention this one, as this "Constitution" entirely endorses resolution 1244. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 12:54, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
This is the Helsinki Final Act from 1 August 1975, upon which resolution 1244 calls: I Defining sovereignty: "The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations." In III Inviolability of frontiers: "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State." In IV Territorial Integrity of States: "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal." Though the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the signatory force, the resolution 1244 clearly implements this in the case of FRY too. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 13:05, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
And lastly, the Charter of the United Nations from 24 October 1945 upon which resolution 1244 calls. Chapter I, Article 2: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. In addition to that, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was internationally recognized in its borders on 1 November 2000. Both then and during the finishing momentums of the Kosovo crisis 1999, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 27 April 1992 was in act as the supreme legal act in FRY. Its 3rd article: "The frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are inviolable." The same case is with the subordinate to it Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 28 September 1990. In the 2nd Article: "Sovereignty is vested in all the citizens of the Republic of Serbia. Citizen shall exercise their sovereignty through a referendum, people's initiative, and their freely elected representatives." and the 4th article stated: "The territory of the Republic of Serbia is a single whole, no part of which may be alienated. Any change in the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia shall be decided upon by the citizens in a referendum."
There I hope you'll study my statements and present your own. :) Cheers. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 13:37, 22 November 2007 (UTC)
I didn't precise quite well. The resolution does not preclude independence as a possible outcome, obviously. However they lead towards it, calling for increased autonomy of Kosovo. I think the obvious outcome would have been a proposal of some form of autonomy, and yet instead Martti Ahtisaari - one of the draftees of the UNSCR 1244 and the person who told publicly in Belgrade in 1999 that the UN has come to settle peace in Kosovo and that Kosovo will never separate from FRY - proposed some form of supervised independence ("Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,").
However, let me quote article 5, which is a decision of UN SC: ..and expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration or ..the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration.. It is not controversial to be seen from the text that the solution of the Kosovo problem would be autonomy, and not independence - from these parts. So actually, the resolution(s) also gear up towards autonomy, much closer than independence, if we can set a scale.
The calls upon the UN Charter and the Helsinki Act I already mentioned. By the way, the PISG is braking the constitution by promoting independence in official institutions - the act in itself which is unconstitutional. ;)
Surely, the desire of the people (the Albanian majority in this case), as per not only the Helsinki Act and the Rambouillet Agreement, but also even the UN Charter itself, must be taken into account. However they clearly (in the Helsinki Act and the Rambouillet Agreement) cannot be picked as supreme and highest over all the other factors (e.g. quote from the Rambouillet Accords, 1st amendment: 3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.)
I'd have to disagree that independence was an open opinion, because that would greatly discredit a lot of world leaders, apart from Ahtisaari I mentioned, Javier Solana and Olli Rehn, who (subsequently after the Bulldozer revolution in Serbia) both stated that the future status of Kosovo will be decided on the grounds of sovereignty of FRY/SERB. For instance, I do not believe Madeleine Albright's and Richard Holbrooke's interpretations that UNSCR 1244 and such messages were sent mainly to play out Slobodan Milosevic's regime and keep the Democratic Opposition of Serbia in strong. AFAIK these acts obviously much more damaged Serbia - as they are nourishing the revisionist forces, especially seen in the example of the Serbian Radical Party. For instance, if we observe the Security Council's resolutions in Croatia, its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty is supported - as well as endorsements for a negotiated compromise between Croats and Serbs (the Republic of Serbian Krayina was under protectorate similar to the case of Kosovo, however it wasn't UN-administered). However no where there was the final outcome specified either. And yet the Republic of Croatia claimed the territory on the basis of international recognition from 1992 and these very institutions, to, contradicting to the very decisions of the UNSCRs, forcefully takeover the territory of RSK in an operations that is currently at process at the ICTY as a "joint criminal enterprise" in a successful campaign to expel the Serbs from Croatia. Most Serbs in Croatia fiercely didn't want to remain in an independent Croatia. I'd also like to side-point here: many Serbians understand that this precise message from many circles of the international community endorsing Kosovo's independence, can be interpreted as a punishment (!) for not expelling most of the Albanian population and maintaining control over its southern province by force to the end. That is why after all the Socialist Party of Serbia, and even Democratic Party of Serbia, indirectly and the circles like the Movement of Veterans of Serbia and their "Guard of Emperor Lazar" consider that Serbia should follow Croatia's case and takeover Kosovo in a rapid military operation - the major difference, however, being NATO's presence in Kosovo.
You mentioned the factors to be taken. Well, let me remind you of one from 1991. The (international) decision was that SFRY can dissolve in its republican borders, specifically notifying that the other borders are not to be considered. This principle was used in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 which (even considering to the fact that the referendum for its independence failed), contrary to practically everyone's opinion, stands as an (well, some form of) independent country. The same argument was used in the case of FYROM (in 2001), and finally in the most controversial case of CRO in 1991-1995 - all other arguments were subjected under this major one. Although most of the international community supported a common state of Serbia and Montenegro, in 2002 the same forces again drew upon the very same argument, that all former Yugoslavian republics should have the right to become independent, no matter what - and hence the Belgrade Agreement. However now, in 2007, these arguments are clearly dismissed for the case of Kosovo (which is part of former Yugoslavia). Some even try to identify a province's borders with those of the Yugoslavian ex republics, however completely fallaciously, as that cannot be done.
Ah, but you missed one major point - all of Serbia's argumentations do not require the Albanians' participation in Serbian authorities. AFAIK they precise that Serbia is composed by two systems, one of Serbia itself and the other of Kosovo - which would end the effect by which only the Serb and other minor parts of Kosovo technically are "in Serbia" - they would be "in Kosovo". What Belgrade proposes is factually two separate worlds, but under one common sovereignty, and without the right to brake from each other. And actually, yes, I do believe that hypothetically speaking such a case is adopted, that in 10 years or so some minor political factors (just like the Liberal Democratic Party in Serbia which supports Kosovo's independence) will emerge, and even include into the Serbian government. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 12:47, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
So in the end, I think that blunt opposition to independence from the Serbian side is absolutely not constructive - but the simpleton demand of nothing but independence from the Kosovo Albanian side is an obstacle too. For instance, adopting a new resolution in the Security Council (regardless if Serbia opposes it) would be the working point - however I myself and a lawyer in my house after interpreting these acts do not see how unilateral independence and then subsequent recognition from some factions in the world would have foundation in international law. And the end I'd like to add that I (and many other) think that international law is just on paper, as you too can also probably agree - that it understands only the tip of the sword. It is to my opinion that the best proof is in former Yugoslavia, where only forceful moves and acts have come to fruition so far - and all the others have either never been transferred into action or vanished from the course of history. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 12:54, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
P.S. I consider the Hong-Kong model very silly and laughed when I heard, but I am actually a bit sympathetic about the Aland proposal. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 13:50, 24 November 2007 (UTC)
Who is by your opinion better for Kosovo: Agim Ceku or the new Premier Hashim Thaci? --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 19:37, 20 December 2007 (UTC)
No, no; for Kosovo, or better simply said - who is better for seat of PM. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 11:58, 21 December 2007 (UTC)
But anyway I see them this way: Agim Ceku has during his year proved to be quite democratic and opened, going beyond Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. Yes, he has proved open to the Serbs, most notably by shockingly opening a speech at the Kosovo Assembly when he started his career in Serbian language. His term has passed with absolutely no greater problems for Kosovo and the situation advanced greatly. I think that the result of all this is that he's not a politician at all. Ceku's desire for an independent and multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo is well known. :))) However Hashim Thaci is pronely very Albanian nationalistic, and himself still has indirect support for a Greater Albania. He is in every way closed to the minorities, arrogant and openly has personal issues with the Serbs and Serbia. He's much pushy and aggressive than Ceku who is notable for moderate actions. And above all like sugar on top are the countless suspicions of Thaci's criminal activities, of which I am personally convinced. His connections to the mafia, which sadly spread great due to the heavy consequences in the past years, can't be really denied by anyone. On the other hand stands Agim Ceku of whom I have no doubt has no illegal trade. And to add to this - Hashim's wife is his gangster connection, while Agim's wife is of Serb descent. :) --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 12:22, 21 December 2007 (UTC)
I remembered another shocking thing - Ceku always looked at the future, while Thaci today makes shockingly bizarre statements. On one hand, several months ago, he stated that the KLA expelled most Serbs, with the help of the NATO, and that today an effort must me made to enable their return. Several days ago, when asked if he is sorry and if he would apologize by the press, he refused.
So practically, Thaci admits that he is part of an enterprise which included removal of an ethnic group (the "joint criminal enterprise", in Serbia called Genocide) and feels nothing wrong about it at the very same time. Horrible, no? --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 18:35, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
Also, the Rambouillet clearly defines that Kosovo is not to become independent, but remain under Serbian sovereignty (without possible double interpretations). UNSCR 1244 draws upon it "fully". --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 18:12, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Final arguments

And as a final, because I'm retiring right now, I'd like to point out that the UN has reached a consensus on the matter that the self-determination in the UN Charter does not refer to possible unilateral declarations of independence, as concluded by numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. An example is the Declaration on Principles of International Law [2625 (XXV)], which clearly marks this, as is one of the pointers that it truly referred primarily to colonialism. Next to that, if you refer to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, you will see that the right of indigenous peoples explicitly refers to autonomy. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 23:15, 18 February 2008 (UTC)

Greetings to you too. :)
But let me remind you on several things - firstly, there is absolutely no reason to believe that UNSCR 1244 didn't explicitly require such a settlement - if it is carefully read, yes, in its annexes sovereignty and territorial integrity refers to the provisional administrative period (otside the Preamble, in which explicitly commits the Member States to Serbia's sovereignty just in general); but if its decision and compactness is read, one can see that the resolution is explicitly determined to a negotiated status, and is not even ambiguous on that matter. It points out that two factors need to be considered for the solution: 1) territorial integrity and sovereignty & 2) Will of the people. Neither of the two was supposed to be included and unilateral acts were in general explicitly banned, as per the Contact Group 2005, 2006 & 2007 conclusions which stated that unilateral acts shall be considered illegal.
Additionally, Belgrade did not want (nor does want) authority over Kosovo. Moreover, I do not understand what you mean by "near-certainty of war", could you clarify that bit please?
There is no doubt that some part of the West will do the best to fight separatism, but one must also look reality into the eye - this will induce separatists no matter what, especially those violent ones who are ready to take up arms at anything. Let's hope that the situation will remain stable from now on. I just feel murky about the unclosed topics, including the Presevo and Montenegrin Albanians and Bosnia? What is their future? --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 09:22, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] WikiProject Kosovo

Hey Envoy202,

I've seen that you have been very active within the Kosovo subject and would thus like to personally invite you to join the Kosovar WikiProject. Cheers. --Prevalis (talk) 21:18, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Bosnia & Kosovo

Hi! There is one crucial difference. Indeed "statehood" of Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly questionable, e.g. when compared to its neighbors of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, but the factor in the Bosnian case is that it is internationally recognized - or more precisely, that it has got a seat in the UN. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 21:17, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Consenus breached, need support

Hello Envoy, contrary to a reached consensus there is a splitting going on instead a merging: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Kosovo#Split_completed And I would appreciate your assistance. Thank you! --Tubesship (talk) 05:34, 28 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] A very interesting thing...

....I found while searching through international documents:

No one should misunderstand our position on the core issue involved. We support neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. As we have set out clearly, the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based upon the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and be in accordance with OSCE standards, the Helsinki principles and the Charter of the United Nations. Such a solution also must take into account the rights of the Kosovo Albanians and all those who live in Kosovo. We support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which a substantially greater degree of autonomy would bring and recognize that this must include meaningful self-administration.

The fundamental position of the Contact Group remains the same. We support neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo as the end result of negotiations between the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo Albanian leadership on the status of Kosovo. Without prejudging what that result may be, we base the principles for a solution to the Kosovo problem on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on OSCE standards, the Helsinki principles, and the Charter of the United Nations. Such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians and all those who live in Kosovo. We support a substantially greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo which must include meaningful self-administration.

These are the principles upon which the status of Kosovo has to be resolved. Tell me, does this seem as if it can be interpreted in different ways? --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 11:18, 27 April 2008 (UTC)

SFRY? Don't you mean FRY?
We are not talking about dates. These points are the groundwork points for a future solution to the status of Kosovo - as per the UNSC.
Also, support for territorial integrity of Serbia was there as well in 1999. It only changed primarily after 2005, firstly presented in 2001 as a possibility by Washington (back then alone; remember also how the proposal was criticized greatly by the international community). --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 21:44, 27 April 2008 (UTC)
But Envoy202, the statements of the Contact Group to the above are from 1998. There was no SFRY for 6 years by then and all conflicts and Yugoslav wars had ended. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 10:14, 28 April 2008 (UTC)
Aha - but - in Yugoslavia, many largely think it is the foreign powers who have had a too big mess and quarreled the Yugoslavians. For instance, the West (by saying so I mean only a part of it) has obviously assisted and approved expulsion of Serbs from Croatia, it has obviously given a green light to the genocide in Srebrenica, and its games over Kosovo and the remainder of Yugoslavia have done far greater damage then not. Another argument, as you remember, fiercely supported by Germany and the US - is that recognition of the self-declared Yugoslavian republics will end the conflicts - but now we see that they it actually did no good - the wars itself ending years later. Of course, hypothesizing about would there have been conflicts at all - including genocide - if recognitions didn't occur, is the (in)famous "what if".
I think you seem to have indeed mixed SFRY and FRY. If you recall, even after 2000 the European Union saw EuroAtlantic integrations of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo - as one country. MNE has been planning on for years to secede, the international community - all major powers of the west included - declared that independence of Montenegro does not assist the stability of the Balkans. They also declared that a Declaration of Independence, even if backed by a referendum - shall be considered illegal and not recognized. They worked hard to reintegrate Serbia and Montenegro, the European community even remained in 2006 against Montenegro independence. As I said, the crucial moment of the change is right in 2006 - when the negotiations failed and Martti Ahtisaari actively worked to convince that no compromise between the two sides is possible - which was of course absurd, as the Contact Group clearly stated that "once the process begins, it cannot be terminated", and that a solution must be brought by compromise, confirmed also by the United Nations Security Council. Conflicts like this last for decades (Cyprus, Korea, Taiwan, Palestine), it's only normally expected to maintain negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia up to the 2020s, if not 2030s - and then conclude that the two sides cannot reach a common solution.
This might/will surely affect the Republic of Srbska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. E.g. if Kosovo ever becomes internationally recognized and gets a seat in the UN - there is no force on the world that could keep that country together.
Yes, the '98 Contact Group Ministrial statement, later passed by the UN SC to be the grounds for a solution for the final status of Kosovo.
I am actually sad as well to see this happening. Looking on other parts - Korea, where the two sides finally talk about unification, China, or even Cyprus - it seems that only we mainland Europeans are still dividing our selves and promoting ethnic segregation, building walls and treading to isolation - this tragedy really talks a lot about us Balkaners, if not to say Europeans in general. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 10:31, 28 April 2008 (UTC)
P.S. And this evolution of the West (rather than the international community in general) is actually the true cause of strength of the Patriots in Serbia, which will so seemingly form the next government after 8 years of failed democracy & reform, as well as (combined with the fact that the wife of the British Prime Minister was Haradinaj's defender) the source of all those Serbophobia conspiracy theories. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 10:39, 28 April 2008 (UTC)
Actually - since there was no negotiated result to the status of Kosovo, and since especially the West had to now look for a solution outside the United Nations (sic!), this actually shows yet another failure, rather than a diplomatic success, of those powers.
I think that Pristina was equally hampered, if not more, just as Belgrade - the same way that Belgrade refused the possibility to consider Kosovo's independence, so did the Kosovar negotiating team actually didn't want to express a momentum of thought about reintegrating into the Serbian society as an autonomous province. Therefore, do you not think it is only just to say that both sides were uncreative in the negotiations?
Well, we have to look into it deeper. For example, more than 70% Slovenes opposes independence of Kosovo - we can clearly see that that is an opinion solely of the political elite, rather. An overwhelming majority of Bulgaria opposes independence of Kosovo - causing even swift reactions from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and eventually possibly to a change of the political structure soon. The lobby, pressure and influence of the United States of America was greatly crucial on the moment. Let me remind you that this is not a speculation - remember that scandal when the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaked into the public secret documents, which proved that the USA was using coercion on countries like Turkey (formerly openly declared against Kosovo independence) and Japan. A similar comparison to this is Kazakhstan's opposing to Kosovo independence, or of other Russian satellites. To add a thing - yes, majority of EU states have recognized independence of Kosovo - but how will that help Kosovo's blocked European integrations? A number of EU countries won't think of it, approving its integrations only first to Serbia. Doesn't this mean that Kosovo will pass through years and years of limbo in the same manner, before, somehow, convincing those countries (which - considering that they have 'veto' practical powers - will take no shame in doing so) to change their opinions, or force Kosovo to reintegrate into the Serbian society?
Could you please explain what you mean by its post-independence actions and statements to destabilize Kosovo and promote institutional ethnic partition? Thanks, --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 00:44, 29 April 2008 (UTC)
Isn't the perpetual limbo continuing? What most people do not know, is that actually nothing at all changed from before and after the day of declaration of independence - same uncertainty, same everything. The countries that recognized it are its supporters, and nothing at all has yet factually changed in Kosovo itself. We shall see how long this limbo continues (and by that I particularly mean Kosovo's lack of access to membership in many very important international organizations).
Recall that the UNSCR 1244 had put no end date on the UNMIK - as well as that it still remains, in an independent Kosovo, and will obviously remain. Such a governance is in Bosnia and Herzegovina for even more then Kosovo - and there is no prospect that it will change anytime soon. Is it functioning in Bosnia? Also, the only way to terminate a process of negotiations (evading instability) is to openly side on one side - which inevitably means that one is the loser and the other the winner. Imagine that the West, as in Georgian and Cyprot cases, sided with the centrist option - this would mean a great injustice done to the Kosovo Albanians, further anxiety, perhaps even resistance and terrorist attacks against NATO and UN officials. Another extreme is - this one! Siding with the Albanian side and eventually messing up Serbia and the Balkans in general. As we see, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence doesn't/didn't bring stability to the Balkans (so far) - a whole mess created in Serbia, where the government collapsed, the country braking off relations, new countries and protests that escalate to violence; Macedonian government collapses and FYROM pushed further into moments of instability, the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina (maybe even the Macedonian) reopened after closed in a closet temporarily, separatists all over Serbia strengthening their demands, and the event had shaken even Croatia. This reminds me of the opinion that recognitions of independences of Croatia and Bosnia will end the wars and induce stability... --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 01:06, 29 April 2008 (UTC)
You may know many young Serbs - but that doesn't change this: Serbian parliamentary election, 2008. There is no future for Serbia. At least not a bright one. With Patriots potentially coming, Russians taking over the entire economic system of the country and the politics closing to the West - we can all see which way this is going. Consider Serbia's future as a democratic Belorus. It will, naturally, further affect the entire region and destabilize it - perhaps even intentionally, by recognizing an illegal and unilateral independence of the Republic of Srbska. What is going to happen to the separatist minorities in Serbia? Do they then face oppression too? What is the prospect of the Serbs in Kosovo? How will, in such a political situation, Montenegro remain stable? And of course, as you know, when nationalism comes, like a tarot of cards it follows - I'm thinking about the Macedonian Albanians. Don't get me wrong, I just don't see from where actually does come your optimism? Is it just personal hoping or something more? --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 01:14, 29 April 2008 (UTC)
Hi, I am interested to hear your opinion on these matters, including what would be an all-out Eastern Question solution. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 20:25, 7 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] IADL

The United Nations-sponsored Brussels-based International Association of Democratic Lawyers yesterday issued its newest resolution in Tokyo. It condemned the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and its recognition by a number of Countries, deeming it in contrast to the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act.

What do you think about this one? It will be also interesting to see how it plays out, as seems that there is a consensus among most of the world's objective legal interpreters that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is illegal. I can't wait to hear what the International Court of Justice will say. --PaxEquilibrium (talk) 14:42, 22 May 2008 (UTC)