Egyptian Islamic Jihad

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The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Arabic: الجهاد الإسلامي المصري ‎) (EIJ), formerly called simply Islamic Jihad ( الجهاد الإسلامي ) originally referred to as "al-Jihad," and then "the Jihad Group", or "the Jihad Organization",[1] is an Egyptian Islamist group active since the late 1970s with origins in the Muslim Brotherhood. It is under worldwide embargo by the United Nations as an affiliate of al-Qaeda.[2] It is also banned by several individual governments including that of The Russian Federation.[3] Since 1991 it has been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The organization's original primary goal was to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Later it broadened its aims to include attacking the United States and Israel interests in Egypt and abroad.

EIJ has suffered setbacks as a result of numerous arrests of operatives worldwide, most recently in Lebanon and Yemen.[citation needed] In June of 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which had been associated with each other for many years, merged into "Qaeda al-Jihad." [4]

Contents

[edit] History

Al-Jihad or "Tanzim al-Jihad" was formed in 1980 from the merger of two clusters of Islamist groups: a Cairo branch, under Mohammad abd al-Salam Faraj, and a Saidi (Upper Egypt) branch under Karam Zuhdi.[5]

Farj used to deliver Friday sermons in a private mosque that had been built by his in-laws. During the ensuing discussions with his listeners, he managed to convince some to join in a clandestine organization to eventually wage violent jihad. ... The Cairo branch was composed of five or six groups, loosely connected and each with its own emir (one of whom was Ayman al-Zawahiri). They had autonomy but met weekly to work out a general strategy. ..." [6]

In October 6, 1981 it carried out the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

After the assassination, the Egyptian government succeeded in rounding up the membership of Tanzim al-Jihad, but "was rather lenient in the ensuing trial. Only the four direct perpetrators and the Cairo leader Faraj, were condemned to death." In prison, the Cairenes and Saidis reverted into two faction, the Cairo militants later becoming the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Saidis later forming the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, or Egyptian Islamic Group.

The leader of the Cairo militants was Abud Zumour, "a onetime army intelligence officer serving a life sentence for his part in the plot to kill Sadat." This faction, the Islamic Jihad, "was small and tightly disciplined. ... Among it members was a 30-year-old Cairo physician named Ayman Zawahiri ... [7]

Most of the middle-rank members were discharged from prison after only three years and fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the mujahideen there and escape persecution at home.[8]

[edit] Pakistan and Afghanistan

In the mid-1980s, in Peshawar Pakistan, the militants reconstituted themselves as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, "with very loose ties to their nominal imprisoned leader, Abud al-Zumur." A physician by the name of Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif or "Dr. Fadl" was head of EIJ for some time,[9] although eventually Ayman al-Zawahiri, "whose leadership style was autocratic," would take over. During this time EIJ became more extreme, with for example, Dr. Fadl emphasizing the importance of takfir and execution of apostates, which he argued should include those who registered to vote, since this was a violation of God's sovereignty over governance.[10]

It was also at this time that some saw "the Egyptians" of the EIJ begin to exert an influence on Osama bin Laden, who at the time was known as a wealthy and well-connected fundraiser for the jihad in Afghanistan. Egyptian filmmaker Essam Deraz, "bin Laden's first biographer," met bin Laden in the "Lion's Den" training camp in Afghanistan and complained that the Egyptians "formed a barrier" around bin Laden and "whenever he tried to speak confidentially to bin Laden, the Egyptians would surround the Saudi and drag him into another room."[11] One of those who complained of being elbowed aside[12] was a former mentor of bin Laden Abdullah Azzam, the original exponent and organizer of global jihad on behalf of the Afghan mujahideen. [13]

In 1991, EIJ broke with al-Zumur and al-Zawahiri took control of the leadership. At this point, Marc Sageman (a former foreign service officer who was based in Islamabad from 1987 to 1989), says "the EIJ became a free-floating network without any real ties to its original society or to its surrounding society." [14]

[edit] Sudan

Al-Jihad (EIJ) had a blind-cell structure, meaning members in one group did not know the identities or activities of those in another, so that if one member were captured they would not be able to endanger the whole organization. However, Egyptian authorities captured the membership director of EIJ, the one member who had all the other members names. The database in his computer listed every member's address, aliases, and potential hideouts. Al-Jihad leader al-Zawahiri bitterly lamented "the government newspapers" elation over “the arrest of 800 members of the al-Jihad group without a single shot being fired." [15]

In August 1993 Al-Jihad attempted to kill the Egyptian Interior Minister, Hasan al-Alfi. who was leading a crackdown on Islamic militants and their terror campaign. A bomb-laden motorcycle exploded next to the minister's car, killing the bomber and his accomplice," but not the minister. The attacked marked the first time Sunni Islamists had made use of suicide in terrorism, a technique made famous by Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is "likely that the notion of suicide bombing" was inspired by Hezbollah as EIJ head Ayman Zawahir had been to Iran to raise money, and had sent his talented underling Ali Mohamed, "among others, to Lebanon to train with Hezbollah".[16]

A few months later in November Al-Jihad made another bombing attempted, this time to kill Egypt's prime minister, Atef Sidqi. The car bomb exploded close to a girls' school in Cairo as the minister was driven past. The minister, protected by his armored car, was unhurt, but the explosion injured 21 people and killed a young schoolgirl, Shayma Abdel-Halim. Unfortunately for al-Jihad this bombing was preceded by two years of terror by a larger terror group, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya that had killed 240, and the patience of the Egyptian public had run short. "Little Shayma's death captured people's emotions as nothing else had" and "when her coffin was borne through the streets of Cairo, people cried, `Terrorism is the enemy of God!`" A harsh police crackdown followed and 280 EIJ member were arrested, with 6 eventually given a death sentence. [17]

EIJ's longtime association with al-Qaeda became closer at this time when "most" of its members were reported to have gone "on the al-Qaeda payroll." EIJ leader hoped this would be a temporary measure but later confided to one of this chief assistants that joining with bin Laden had been `the only solution to keeping the Jihad organization abroad alive.`"[18]

[edit] Mubarak assassination attempt

In June 1995 another failed assassination attempt caused yet a greater setback. Operating from its exile base in Sudan, EIJ joined forces with the Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Sudanese intelligence[19] in an attempt to kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia for a conference of the Organization of African Unity. The leader of the plot was "Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda and commander to the military branch of the Islamic Group." The plotters had been planning the attack for more than a year, and even married local women in Ethiopia. They received assistance from Sudanese intelligence services, which smuggled weapons into their embassy in Ethiopia.[20][21]

Their hope was to decapitate the Egyptian government thereby eliminating the "iron grip" of the state security services, and creating a power vacuum which Islamists could then fill. Unfortunately for this plan, the attack was foiled by a malfunctioning grenade launcher and Mubarak’s bulletproof limousine.

[edit] Expulsion from Sudan

Back in Egypt, Mubarak launched a ruthless campaign to crush anyone involved in Islamist terrorism,[22] but in Sudan the EIJ had even worse troubles. It had enraged the Sudanese intelligence service by executing two sons of senior EIJ members on Sudanese soil after promising not to. The boys, Ahmed, the son of Mohammed Sharraf, and Mus'ab, son of Abu al-Faraj, had been drugged and blackmailed by the Egyptian intelligence service and were collaborating with them. Sudanese intelligence service captured them and allowed EIJ to interrogate them. The boys immediately confessed, were found guilty of "sodomy, treason, and attempted murder," and sentenced to death under "Sharia law". Al-Zawahiri ordered their execution by firing squad and distributed videotapes of it.

When the Sudanese found out about the executions in its jurisdiction, al-Zawahiri and the rest of EIJ were ordered to leave the Sudan.[23] It was a devastating blow to the group. "In Zawahiri's hands, al-Jihad had splintered into angry and homeless gangs." [24]

Bin Laden was also weakened by this failed operation. The core of his al-Qaeda group was made up of members of Islamic Jihad. Because of Sudan's collaboration in the plot, the United Nations voted to impose sanction on the country.[25] To rehabilitate itself in the international community, the Sudanese government pressured bin Laden to leave the country.[26] [27] Bin Laden and many EIJ returned to war torn Afghanistan having lost many members and almost all of bin Laden's assets. [28]

The November 19, 1995 bombing of the Egpyptian embassy in Islamabad served as a prototype for future attacks by its sister organization al-Qaeda, such as the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa.

[edit] Afghanistan

According journalist Lawrence Wright, according to testimony given at the trial of the Albanian cell members in the late 1990s or early 00's, EIJ membership had dwindled to 40 members outside Egypt, and none at all inside the country where "the movement had been eradicated". [29]

In Afghanistan Zawahiri wrote the 1998 fatwa for the "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," calling for the killing of Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, which was signed by representatives of several jihadi organizations, including EIJ. [30]

Dissent among EIJ members to this change of direction and abandonment of the taking over Egypt as the group's primary goal, was so strong that "in the end, Zawahiri pledged to resign if the members failed to endorse his actions. The organization was in such disarray because of arrests and defections, and so close to bankruptcy, that the only choice was to follow Zawahiri or abandon al-Jihad." One of those who did abandon al-Jihad was Zawahiri's own brother Muhammed, the military commander of EIJ. [31]

[edit] Merger with al-Qaeda

In June of 2001, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into an entity formally called jamaa'at Qa'idat al-Jihad,[32] with leadership of EIJ "comprises the majority" - six of nine seats - "of al Qaeda's ruling council (shura)." [33][34]

Consequently it often considered synonymous with Al-Qaeda, (for example by the U.S. Treasury Department), [35] although some refer to it as a separate organization with al-Zawahiri as its leader and global jihad's main ideologist.[36]

[edit] Activities

The organization specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against official US and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Egyptian Jihad and rival armed group launched a wave of violence against Egypt's secular government in 1992, a campaign they only abandoned at the end of the decade. Nearly 1300 people died in the unrest, including policemen and government officials. It is responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1995. In 1998 a planned attack against the US Embassy in Albania was thwarted by a roundup of suspects who are now called the Returnees from Albania.

[edit] Leadership

Al-Sharif passed the Jihad leadership to Ayman al-Zawahri amid dissent within the movement in the mid 1980's. The al-Zawahri faction subsequently formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda leading over time to the effective merger of the two groups operations inside Afghanistan.

Although al-Zawahri is frequently referred to as a 'lieutenant' or 'second in command' of Al Qaeda this description is misleading as it implies a hierarchical relationship. The modern Al Qaeda organization is the combination of Bin Laden's financial resources with al-Zawahri's ideological and operational leadership. Despite the effective merger of al-Zawahri and Bin Laden's groups in the Afghanistan area of operations there is evidence that suggests that at least part of the Islamic Jihad group continuing to operate in Egypt remains independent of Bin Laden's organization and reports to al-Zawahri personally.[citation needed]

[edit] Location/Area of Operation

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad operates in the Cairo area. It has a network outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.

[edit] External Aid

The extent of its aid from outside of Egypt is not known. The Egyptian Government claims that both Iran and Osama bin Laden support the Islamic Jihad. It also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.[citation needed]

Iraq March 1993 agreed to renew relations with the Islamic Jihad Organization in Egypt. [37]

[edit] Further reading

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower, Knopf, 2006, p.123
  2. ^ Affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, United Nations Security Council Committee 1267
  3. ^ ‘Terror’ list out; Russia tags two Kuwaiti groups, Arab Times, February 2003
  4. ^ The Man Behind Bin Laden"
  5. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.134
  6. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.134
  7. ^ Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002, p.67
  8. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.147
  9. ^ Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.122
  10. ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.124
  11. ^ 1988 visit to Lion's Den, in Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.129
  12. ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.130
  13. ^ Looming Tower, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.107-8
  14. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.148
  15. ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2002), p.184-5
  16. ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2002), p.186
  17. ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.186
  18. ^ Wright, Looming Towers (2006), p.185
  19. ^ BBC News | AFRICA | Egypt and Sudan repair relations
  20. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.45
  21. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.213-215
  22. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.213-215
  23. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.45
  24. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.216
  25. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.216, 220
  26. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.220
  27. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.45
  28. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.222-3
  29. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.336
  30. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.259
  31. ^ Wright, Looming Towers, 2006, p.260-1
  32. ^ The Man Behind Bin Laden"
  33. ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.63
  34. ^ Wright, Looming Tower, (2006), p.336
  35. ^ SDN and SDGT list, US Department of the Treasury
  36. ^ Sageman,Understanding Terror Networks, (2004), p.63
  37. ^ http://a.abcnews.com/images/pdf/Pentagon_Report_V1.pdf
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