Dual_EC_DRBG

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Dual_EC_DRBG is a controversial pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) designed and published by the National Security Agency. It is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and is one of the four PRNGs standardized in the NIST Special Publication 800-90.[1]

Contents

[edit] Security

This stated purpose of including the Dual_EC_DRBG in NIST SP 800-90 is that its security is based on a hard problem from number theory. Given the importance of having secure random number generators in cryptology, in certain cases it may be desirable to sacrifice speed for security.

Subsequent to the standardization of the Dual_EC_DRBG, various researchers have reported certain security of the properties of the Dual_EC_DRBG:

  • The intermediate values it generates, a sequence of elliptic curve points, should, under certain reasonable assumptions, be indistinguishable from uniformly random elliptic curve points.[2][3][4]
  • The sequence of bits generated from the Dual_EC_DRBG, under certain parameter choices, can be distinguished from uniformly random bits, making its output unsuitable for use as a one-time pad, and arguably for more general uses.[5][2][4]
  • The security requires that a certain problem be hard, but one of the recommended configurations of the Dual_EC_DRBG allows for the possibility that a key has been retained to solve this problem. See the Controversy section for more discussion.

[edit] Controversy

This PRNG has been controversial because it was published in the NIST standard despite being three orders of magnitude slower than the other three standardized algorithms, and containing several weaknesses which have been identified since its standardization.[6]

In August 2007, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson discovered that the algorithm has a vulnerability which could be used as a backdoor. Given the wide applications of PRNGs in cryptography, this vulnerability could be used to defeat practically any cryptosystem relying on it. The algorithm uses several constants which determine the output; it is possible that these constants are deliberately crafted in a way that allows the designer to predict its output.[6][7]

This backdoor would work analogously to public-key encryption: the designer of the algorithm generates a keypair consisting of the public and private key; the public key is published as the algorithm's constants, while the private key is kept secret. Whenever the algorithm is being used, the holder of the private key can decrypt its output, revealing the state of the PRNG, and thereby allowing him to predict any future output. Yet for third parties, there is no way to prove the existence (or in-existence) of the private key. However, Appendix A.2 of the NIST document, which describes the weakness, does contain a method of generating a new keypair which will repair the backdoor if it exists.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ (2007-03). "Recommendations for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised)" (PDF). . National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST SP 800-90
  2. ^ a b Comments on Dual-EC-DRBG/NIST SP 800-90, K. Gjosteen
  3. ^ Conjectured Security of the ANSI-NIST Elliptic Curve RNG
  4. ^ a b A Security Analysis of the NIST SP 800-90 Elliptic Curve Random Number Generator, Brown and Gjosteen, CRYPTO 2007, LNCS 4622, Springer, pp. 466-482. IACR ePrint version
  5. ^ Cryptanalysis of the Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudorandom Generator, Berry Schoenmakers and Andrey Sidorenko, IACR ePrint 2006/190.
  6. ^ a b Bruce Schneier. "Did NSA Put a Secret Backdoor in New Encryption Standard?", Wired News, 2007-11-15. 
  7. ^ Dan Shumow, Niels Ferguson (2007-08). "On the Possibility of a Back Door in the NIST SP800-90 Dual Ec Prng" (PDF). CRYPTO Rump Session 2007, Microsoft. 
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