Talk:Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig

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To-do list for Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig: edit · history · watch · refresh

This is the basic outline of what needs to be done.

Early encounters text needs to be substantiated with references; I adapted much of the text from John French, 1st Earl of Ypres.

  • Early Encounters
Tensions quickly arose between Haig and French. Haig and Lord Kitchener, who was now Secretary of State for War, clashed with French over the positioning of the BEF. French argued to the war council) that it should be positioned in Belgium, where he had confidence in the country's many fortresses, while Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in Amiens, stating that the BEF would have to abandon its positions in Belgium once the poorly-equipped Belgian Army collapsed, forcing the BEF into retreat with the loss of much of its supplies. During an inspection of Aldershot, Haig told King George V that he had "grave doubts" about French's competence.
  • Stalemate (maybe another name)
1915-early 1916
  • The Somme and Passchendaele
  • Counter-offensives: The final months (might need a better title)
Second Battle of the Marne and Hundred Days Offensive
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Contents

[edit] Complaints

FUNNY, WEEKS AGO I HERE POINTED AT THE FACT THAT THIS IDIOT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HALF A MIO. MEN'S DEATH IN FIRST WW - WHY DOENST THIS NOTE APPEAR HERE NUMBAWAN SEPR 21 2005

According to the history, the first message on this talk page is yours right there. Are you sure you saved the edit? - Lucky13pjn 23:15, 20 September 2005 (UTC)

If anyone is "responsible" for those deaths, it's the German Army and its leaders. Bastie 21:12, 23 September 2005 (UTC) no mention of the firing squads he authorised gaffers10 191005

Actually, it can easily be argued that Mr. Haig was responsible for the deaths of thousands of men, simply because his tactics were uninspiring, and he did not think about his men at all. Research before you comment please. unsigned comment by Chardonnay (talk · contribs) i suggest you heed your own advice Chardonnay and look at the bigger picture. emotions are best left out of history.

If you're not happy with the article as it stands then use the edit button at the top of the page and change it. It could clearly be improved, but simply complaining on the talk page won't do anything to help. Leithp 11:16, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

If by "think about his men" you mean "stay on the defensive and wait for the tank to be invented", that would have meant losing the war by default. And incidentally, this is pretty much what the Allies did in WWII. The strategy certainly saved lives, but it had another unfortunate side-effect which I'm sure we're all aware of here. Bastie 15:28, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

What "Alies"??? You surely mean only the British and the French, and forgot the Americans and the Red Army.
As regard to Haig, no, we didn't mean "stay on the defensive and wait for the tank to be invented", we expected a minimum of respect for human life. After so many deaths since the first year of the war, even this imbecile should had learnt better how to conduct a ofensive without useless sacrifice of life.
The reason that Haig cannot be held solely responsible for the British Empire deaths on the Western Frount is simply because he was not in complete control over his own actions a nd there are many others who accurately desrve a share of the blame. These include The German Army, The French, who demanded to set the location and time of, most of the attacks that the BEF made, The British Government, Haigs Superiors, who sent an army badly prepared, for the type of war it would be fighting, into combat. and made many foolish and bad decisions, for which Lloyd George, for one, was more than happy to pass the blame where possible, onto the Generals, for decisions which were his responsibility.

As for the reason, Haig did not find a way to conduct an offensive without great loss of life, All of the various armies in WW1 suffered massive casualities making offensives on the Western Frount, those who sugwest that he should have found another way, have an onus on them to show that such tactics wre available too him, and that he refused, without good reason to use those tatics. I have yet to see any such tactics put up, which stand up to critical examination

It's not so much about tactics, he was just incompetent. Take the battle of Somme, for example. First he wastes 1.5 million rounds of artilery ammunition by ordering a completely inefficient bombardment of the German bunkers and trenches, then he suddenly stops the bombardement, which let the Germans know that a major attack was coming, which allowed for them to take up their machine-gun positions. After he stopped the bombardment, he ordered the first wave of british troops to WALK (he actually and directly ordered the troops to walk) accross no-man's land, which was filled with swamps and barbed wire, with 60-150lb. packs. When the German's opened fire with their machine guns, the first wave of british troops were completely obliterated. After news of the elimination of the first wave, Haig just assumed that the british troops were too afraid to attack, and so he ordered the second wave, a battalion coming from Newfoundland, to walk to their deaths like the british wave. And so, five months later, after 600000 deaths on the Allied side... Haig's Somme campaign allowed the Allies to gain a whopping twelve kilometers. Pure incompetence.

This version of events is a combination of Blackadder Alan Clark and children's textbooks written in the 1960's. Study of WW1 and the reputation of Haig has moved on and the comments do need to reflect this rather than recite old discredited myths.

A utterly Haig biased review As a well read historian, who has attempted to bring some of the truth into this shameful article, and having seen it deleted within 24 hours. I can only assume that the Haig lies must be allowed to stand.

This article is not history, but lies and prevarication. There is no doubt about about what Haig was, to those who bother to study enough about the period.

But carry on lying

The well worn anti Haig myths are trotted out occasionally on this page. They get deleted not because of bias but because they are based on rubbish pedalled by long discredited historians like Laffin and Clark or even Blackadder. Whether Haig was a great commander of the stature of Wellington is a worthy topic for debate. What is not debatable is that under the leadership of Douglas Haig the British Army won the First World War defeating the best army in the world in the process. He must deserve credit for this. No-one is denying that mistakes were made but ultimatly he succeeded and the task he faced was incredibly difficult. There was really no easy cheap way to defeat the Germans and those who criticise his actions have yet to suggest what else he could have done.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Douglas_Haig%2C_1st_Earl_Haig"

[edit] Haig's post-war charity

Haig's treatment of ex-servicemen post-World War I certainly contradicted his actions during the war. His dedication to the welfare of ex-servicemen post-war certainly contrasted with his apparent lack of compassion and understanding of what they were enduring when he was Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Why the sudden change? Guilt, perhaps?? SoLando (Talk) 14:17, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

I think you're right, it was guilt from a man who led so many of his countrymen to death. 147,000 Scots died I believe, which made Scotland second only to Serbia in terms of deaths per head of population. He couldn't have failed to have noticed the devastating effect this had on the country, particularly on rural communities. In every village in Scotland, no matter how small, there is a memorial listing the names and the lists always seem to be huge for the size of the communities. Leithp 14:48, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

This is disgusting to read. Why would there be a need for Haig to feel any more guilty for his actions than other Commanders from any other country in WW1? Why can't credit be given to the man for doing something good without finding a reason to denigrate him. It's a good thing this is on the talk page and not in the article. Anomaly 54 19:01, 11 September 2006 (UTC)


About the only good thing I can say for butcher Sir Doug, is that there were worse commanders in that war than him. For instance- Robert Nivelle, Charles Mangin were argueably worse. One could also point to any number of lesser known, Italian, Turkish, Austrian or Russian commanders who were worse than Haig as well. But Haig remains very much a 19th century general in a 20th century war. He might have been great at Waterloo or on the Alma or at Ulundi, but on the Somme and at 3rd Ypres (or "Wipers" as the Tommys called it) he was a disaster. Though it may be highly inapproriate here to make a reference to light opera, I cannot help but think of Gilbert and Sullivan's Major General Stanley-"For my military knowledge, though I'm plucky and adventury, Has only been brought down to the beginning of the century...". So in this, I think Haig was more like unto Stanley than General Melchett. He certainly did not want or intend to become a "butcher", but he was thrown into circumstances for which his tactical mindset was unsuited, so he unwillingly became one. And it haunted him the rest of his days--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 16:36, 30 October 2005 (UTC)
Can I just thank both of you (yet again! :-)) Yes, his post-war knowledge of the sheer extent of the United Kingdom's losses (especially Scotland) must have had a tremendous effect on him, not to mention the fact that Haig was (I think) deeply religious. I hear his diaries give a fascinating insight into the man (if only they could be accessed online!). Speaking of when/where Haig could have been a "good" commander, do you think Haig might have had reasonoble success in the Middle East? His experience with the cavalry could have bore him in good stead in a region where the cavalry still maintained its importance. Though, of course, he'd of never accepted commanding such a "lowly" theatre. Well, the article is looking much better than it did a mere week ago. If you guys don't want to delve further into the article, I'll most certainly understand :-) Thanks for your work, guys! SoLando (Talk) 05:17, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
I doubt that he would have been better than Allenby in the middle-east. Haig was, famously, quite dense and I don't think he would have been as innovative or diplomatic as Allenby. That said, Haig was confined by the nature of the technology available to him and even the best WWI commanders took horrific casualties on the western front. Leithp 08:52, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
Allenby and Haig did seem to share one unfortunate trait, which Haig has often been criticised about - the inability to verbally communicate what they wanted in an understanble manner. This is from Haig's intelligence chief John Charteris (who is just as controversial - known, among other titles, as Haig's "evil counsellor"):
Allenby shares one peculiarity with Douglas Haig, he cannot explain verbally, with any lucidity at all, what his plans are. In a conference between the two of them it is rather amusing. D.H. hardly ever finishes a sentence, and Allenby’s sentences, although finished, do not really convey exactly what he means. Yet they understand one another perfectly; but as each of their particular Staffs only understands their immediate superior a good deal of explanation of details has to be gone into afterwards and cleared up.
I remember hearing Lord Kelvin lecture. He had just the same peculiarity and had a sort of Greek chorus in the form of an assistant who explained in very broad Scotch exactly what Lord Kelvin meant. The only difference then was that the comments and chorus went on at the same time as the main motif. At these Army conferences no on dares to interfere, and all clearing up has to be done afterwards. All the same, Allenby’s preparations are as perfect as anything can be in war, and the Chief looks forward to a very big local success to-morrow.
It's quite an ironic statement when you considered they seemed to be such rivals, yet seemingly (at least according to Charteris) knew exactly what each other was attempting to convey. If Allenby really did suffer from this, which no commander wants, then he circumvented it through iniative, vision, charisma and the adoption of more innovative tactics - just like you said Leithp :-) Haig's lack of tact created too many acrimonious relationships, which blighted him throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief. I personally think he could have had success in the Middle East region - maybe Mesopotamia. Though Charles Townshend seemed to be a good commander (though his experiences as a POW contrasted predictably with that of his troops), he didn't appear to wield enough influence to prevent himself being pressured by the Indian Government into a push on Baghdad, while Haig had the ear of King George V (I hope that doesn't prompt any jokes relating to Haig's nickname ;-)). Yes, I know i'm clutching at straws here, but I always want to see the best in someone, that every indivudual has their worth - even "Butcher" Haig. SoLando (Talk) 10:47, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
This inability to communicate is, I think, something of a trait among British WWI and WWII commanders. In WWII Wavell (Allenby's biographer oddly enough), Auchinleck and Alexander were all accused of it. The best of the British generals in WWII learned from the mistakes of WWI and made a point of explaining plans clearly to their officers and soldiers. Montgomery, Slim and Horrocks being notable examples of people who were able to communicate clearly. Sorry if this is a bit off-topic. Leithp 11:20, 31 October 2005 (UTC)
Considering that, I'm amazed there was never anything during the period along the lines of: "Be a Loyal Briton - Don't Talk Coherently!" (Could have been part of the whole "Careless Talk Costs Lives" series in WWII :-D) Speaking of Slim, he is personally my favourite general. His article really needs expanding. It's quite remarkable how The Auk, Wavell and Alexander (if they really did "suffer" from this trait") circumvented communication problems to be (IMO) really capable commanders. By the way, I love to regularly get off-topic (who doesn't? ;-)). Regarding this article, I was going to put one of those "to-do" templates on here, but I think there only needs to be a new section below. SoLando (Talk) 12:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] To Do

This is the basic outline of what needs to be done.

[edit] World War I

Early encounters text needs to be substantiated with references; I adapted much of the text from John French, 1st Earl of Ypres.

  • Early Encounters
Tensions quickly arose between Haig and French. Haig and Lord Kitchener, who was now Secretary of State for War, clashed with French over the positioning of the BEF. French argued to the war council) that it should be positioned in Belgium, where he had confidence in the country's many fortresses, while Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in Amiens, stating that the BEF would have to abandon its positions in Belgium once the poorly-equipped Belgian Army collapsed, forcing the BEF into retreat with the loss of much of its supplies. During an inspection of Aldershot, Haig told King George V that he had "grave doubts" about French's competence.
  • Stalemate (maybe another name)
1915-early 1916
  • The Somme and Passchendaele
  • Counter-offensives: The final months (might need a better title)
Second Battle of the Marne and Hundred Days Offensive


[edit] Style issue discussion

There is a discussion going on here whether or not the first sentence of a biographical article should contain the full name of the individual and include any post nominal initials (eg. VC, KCB, OBE) or whether these should be relegated to later in the article. I have tried to point out that this is standard style and part of their full titles but there are “readability” concerns. This arose because of the Richard O’Connor featured article and one possible solution, a biobox, is now in place on that page. Please make your opinions known.Dabbler 12:25, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Douglas Haig-a great British soldier.

I think this article is a fair and reasonably objective summary of Haig's career. It should be said, though, that it has taken decades to clear away the lies and misconceptions-refelected in some of the silly comments on this page-that have precluded a proper understanding of his achievments as a soldier.

The war, as Haig understood, could only be won by defeating the main German army on the Western Front. The problem was that all commanders-and Haig was initially no exception to this rule-tend to base their tactics on those used in previous wars. In 1914 nobody understood the kind of war that was about to unfold. By 1918, however, the British command on the Western Front was deploying tactics that was to do much towards defeating the Germans. Gone were the lengthy artillery barrages followed by wave after futile wave of infantry advances. By ensuring close cooperation between the artillery and infantry, Haig made steady and relentless progress against the Germans, and the British army made advances far greater than those of its French and American allies.

I have absolutely no hesitation in making the claim that the British Army had become one of the best in the world, largely owing to the leadership of Douglas Haig. A remarkable achievment when one considers that the country had little in the way military tradition, and that for several generations before 1914 the army's experience was confined, for the most part, to stamping out colonial bush fires. The 'contemptable little army' of 1914-numbering only four divisions-had come a long way.

In my estimation Haig, along with Sir William Slim of Burma, deserves to be ranked amongst the greatest British commanders. Rcpaterson 23:20, 11 May 2006 (UTC)


Have you read "Haigs Command: A Reassessment", Dennis Winter, Penguin 1999? He suggests that most of British WW1 history, including the official history, are based on heavily doctored evidence. His claims are based on a comparision of documents held in the usual British repositories (IWM, PRO etc) and duplicates made immediately after WW1 and held in Ottawa and Canberra. His key thesis is that following the end of the war, the Committe on Imperial Defense ordered a large scale cover-up and rewrite of British poilitical and military policy of the war. Matthew Donald 08:47, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Denis winter's work on Haig, is one of the most unscholarly texts produced on the subject, Laffin at least stuck to proper historical research. winter on the other hand, would synthesize sources to suit his thesis. it's all very well for a member of the pulic to read an agree with it, but when a histoian picks it up, the bulls**t shines through. i suggest going out and reading the vast array of criticism towards winter's book, from top scholars, many of whom are no fans of Haig, but dislike winter's sloppy tactics in what can only be seen as a vicious personal attack by someone who apparently has an axe to grind. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.42.124.19 (talk) 16:23, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

I have not; but I will-thanks. I will let you know what I think in due course. Rcpaterson 22:55, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Winters' analysis of Hiags' command is devestating. He provides compelling evidence of monumental logistical stuff-ups, of a magnitude that lead to the failure of entire campaigns (eg Battle of the Somme). Some of Winter criticisms are probably unimportant - so what if Haig was a bisexual who was promoted through the patronage of Lord Escher (an Edwardian eminence grise who had a weakness for dashing hussars). Haigs legacy is dictated by his competence (or lack thereof), not his sexuality. Winter makes a good case for the lack of competence.

While I don't agree with everyting Winter proposes (especially his conspiracy theories), he does provide solid evidence of a cover-up following the end of WW1. The reasons and aims of the cover-up are another matter. There is far more work required comparing the offical histories with unmodified source documents than Winter has done (or had the time to do - there is many years work required here) before any conclusions on motives can be made. Matthew Donald 20:43, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that useful summary. I have to say that, as a gut reaction, the alarm bells may not be ringing but they are certainly starting to swing! Haig, I know, remains a controversial figure, but it sounds as if the author of this book started with an 'agenda' and a fairly clear slate of preconceptions, which is the worst possible way to begin any form of historical research. Having said this, it would be wrong to pass a final judgement before reading the book. I promised to do this, and I will. The fact remains, however, that the British Army's achievment in both holding the Michael offensive, and in launching a sweeping counter-attack was remarkable. I personally can find no better assessment of Haig than that of Black Jack Pershing, who described him as the soldier who won the war. As for Haig's alleged incomptetence I am reminded of Abraham Lincoln's response when he was told that U. S. Grant was a drunk-'let me know what brand of whiskey he drinks and I'll send it to my other generals.' Rcpaterson 02:05, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Apparently Correlli Barnett published a devastating indictment of the sloppy research, verging in some cases on deceitful quotation of sources, in Winter's "Haig's Command", in some literary journal back in the early 1990s. Have never seen a copy, though.

Hi Guys. I've made a slight cleanup, as I think this article had over-corrected and perhaps become a little apologist. I entered another citation and referenced it and made some cleanup. Main push of my edit is that although Haig should not be demonised for everything that he often is and although historians cited are correct in pointing out some of the difficulties Haig had to work with, he wasn't the great innovator the article was picturing him as, and is support of some of the war's genuine morons really does need to be answered for... Innovation credited to Haig in the article as it stood instead goes to subordinate generals such as Plumer - Haig's good work and "imagination" comes in ensuring these commanders had the support they needed from 1917 onwards, with the development of Bite and Hold, and Currie and Monash's work on combined arms later in the war. Xlh 14:07, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

Have deleted: "Additionally, Haig's supporters have made the point that when it came to the battles waged by Haig between the 1916 Somme Offensive, and 1917 Passchendaele campaigns, Haig was largely hamstrung into committing to these battles due to the need to support French initiatives endorsed by Lloyd George." A mistaken view I think, unless somebody can come up with some serious citation. Lloyd George committed the British forces to supporting the Nivelle Offensive, but had deep misgivings about the Somme and Passchendaele (though he did little besides wringing his hands rather than asserting Cabinet authority over the generals). Haig and Robertson were both committed to major offensives on the Western front as the only way to defeat Germany.

A couple of points. The French and British agreed to no large-scale offensives in 1918 so the prerequisite ineffective bombing was not used, but had it been abandoned as a tactic? And as to holding the St.Michael offensive. It can be said the rout of Gough's forces luckily resulted in an over extention of the unsupported German line. Not the first case of an effective German advance turning against themselves. It seems to me that both French and Haig were incompetent. Everyone initially waged an old world war, but the Germans adapted. Take Bruchmuller's artillery in the German 1918 offensive as opposed to Haig's at Passchendaele.Bostoneire 18:53, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The Michael Offensive, for whatever reason (British losses in 1917, Lloyd George hoarding manpower in the UK) enjoyed far greater numerical superiority - about fifty or sixty divisions hit Gough's Army - than Haig ever enjoyed. The British "adapted" their tactics in 1916, arguably a bit more slowly than the French and Germans, but then they'd been doing less fighting up until that point. The key point about bombardments was that what mattered was their intensity - tonnage of shell per square foot - not their length, and it took everybody a while to figure this out. Ironically the British had got the intensity right by accident at Neuve Chapelle early in 1915, but at the Somme they shelled for a week over too wide an area (because they wanted to get a wider breakthrough). So by the late war you would have 1) a brief (a few hours?) but intense bombardment, using High Explosive and poison gas to shock the defenders, then 2) the attackers would advance behind a creeping barrage. By 1917 the Germans were defending against these tactics using pillboxes and fortified zones rather than the trench "lines" of earlier in the war. The other key thing to grasp is that a great deal of battles like the Somme and Passchendaele then consisted of incessant German counterattacks by fresh divisions shuffled into the battle, which is why the casualties were much nearer parity than the one-sided slaughter of 1914, 1915 or the First Day of the Somme. The attackers would be protected from this by 3) a standing barrage. All this took much more co-ordination than had been the case earlier. You would also have shelling of German reserves moving up to the front, and counter-battery fire to knock out German guns, using sound-ranging and air spotting. By 1917-18 most of the time generals had a reasonable idea how much shelling would be needed (and Currie was able to predict the casualties in taking Passchendaele Ridge). For a good summary of the improvements made by British artillery by 1917, see the opening chapters of Prior & Wilson on Passchendaele (they also make the point that the Germans at Verdun had made a similar mistake of spreading their artillery too thin in a vain attempt to widen the offensive). For British infantry tactics (light machine gunners, grenadiers etc using tactics similar to the German stormtroopers, rather than the lines of riflemen of the early war) see Paddy Griffith. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.134.22.112 (talk) 23:56, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Citations

This article, particularly the criticism section, desperately needs some citations. Eg. "However, other historians regard" which historians? I can't really fill in the blanks as I don't know which source the previous author was referring to. I think what's said ie the balance reflecting two different interpretations is actually fine but we need some names put to the arguments.Alci12 14:59, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Date of Death

I have changed the date of death from 28 January to 29 January, in accordance with the Britannica entry on Haig. Danny 10:57, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

The debate over proportionate casulaties in Normandy and the Somme seems to have been settled. The point is that after the number of troops and the length of time have been considered casualties were lower in WW1. Also the proportion of infantry was lower in WW1 than WW2. If you were a junior infantry officer or rifleman you were safer on the Somme. The essential point is that warfare between technically advanced armies in the twentieth century invariably resulted in large casualties on both sides and Haig was as subject to this as anyone else.

Indeed, and the casualties of 1916-18, when infantry and artillery tactics had become more sophisticated, were nothing like as one-sided as those of 1914-15 (IIRC the French had 500,000 killed in the five months' fighting of 1914 alone; Britain had 750,000 killed in the entire war, or 900,000 if you include Canada & Australia). The daily loss rates at Arras in 1917 (but of course Allenby was able to achieve great success when transferred to the different circumstances of the Middle East) were actually worse than those of the Somme or Passchendaele, and those of 1918 worse still. The sheer scale of the WW1 Western front often isn't fully appreciated - it needs to be compared to the battles of the Eastern Front in WW2 for a proper comparison. That's not to say that there aren't legitimate debates to be had about whether the British forces adopted new infantry and artillery tactics quickly enough, or whether Germany could have been defeated sooner by making greater effort on other fronts, but there was little alternative to the size of the butcher's bill on the Western Front.

I think the flaw in this arguement of casualites being an inevitable result of 20th century warfare and Haig being subject to this supposition is in the fact that both French And Haig continued to support failing offensives without successful results.Bostoneire 19:06, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The inevitability of a vast butcher's bill is probably nearer a statement of fact than an "argument", unless somebody has an overwhelming tactical advantage which enables them to win a quick victory (Germans in 1940, Israelis in 1967, USA in 1991 etc). In WW2 the Soviets, not the Western Allies did literally 80% of the land fighting - nearly a million Soviet troops were killed (not casualties) in the battle of Moscow (winter 1941/2) alone, and other battles were almost as large. As to why Haig/Robertson carried on with "failing" offensives, it wasn't as obvious in (say) summer 1917 how much longer the war was going to go on as it is with hindsight. The state of German morale was a matter of some debate in western intelligence (it is true they had an inflated idea of German losses at the Somme), Russia had just become a democracy but it wasn't clear yet whether Russia would be invigorated or drop out, the French were being secretive about the extent of their mutinies but might perfectly easily have dropped out (see Terraine: "Road to Paschendaele" for a detailed documentary treatment of the political origins of this offensive). In the end Passchendaele turned into a mess (although, as with the Somme, the Germans were hurt pretty badly by it as well), but the British could hardly sit idly by and wonder whether the French and Russians were or weren't going to carry on fighting, or whether the Germans could have been defeated with one more push. And yes, you can make an argument that Passchendaele should have been called off at least a month sooner. Ultimately you don't often win wars without taking the offensive. Haig was always looking for a spectacular breakthrough - he was wrong in 1916 and 1917, but right in 1918, when the war ended faster than many others thought it would. Conversely Petain was right to be a pessimist in earlier years, but wrong in 1918, and found himself sidelined by Foch. Were there any cheaper ways of fighting? According to Prior & Wilson on Paschendaele, the casualty rates were actually little different when the "skilful" Plumer was in charge from when Gough had been looking for a great breakthrough earlier on. Or, as the French General Mangin put it: "Whatever you do, you lose a lot of men". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.40.200.91 (talk) 20:59, 3 October 2007 (UTC)