Dnepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive Operation

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The Dnepr-Carpathian Strategic Offensive Operation (24 December 1943 - 17 April 1944) was a strategic operation executed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Ukrainian, and the 2nd Byelorussian Fronts intended to liberated all of Ukrainian and Moldovian SSR occupied territories. The operation was divided into two phases, and at its conclusion brought the Red Army Fronts into Poland and Romania. By the end of the operation, the Stavka had succeeded in completely destroying 18 Wehrmacht divisions. Another 68 had been reduced to at least half of their establishment strength.[1]

The constituent parts of the strategy were

First phase
  • Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive Operation (24 December 1943 - 14 January 1944)
  • Kirograd Offensive Operation (5 January 1944 - 16 January 1944)
  • Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive Operation (24 January 1944 - 17 February 1944)
  • Rovno-Lutsk Offensive Operation (27 January 1944 - 11 February 1944)
  • Nikopol-Krivoi Rog Offensive Operation (30 January 1944 - 29 February 1944)
Second phase
  • Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Operation (4 March 1944 - 17 April 1944)
  • Uman-Botosani Offensive Operation (5 March 1944 - 17 April 1944)
  • Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka Offensive Operation (6 March 1944 - 18 March 1944)
  • Polesskoe Offensive Operation (15 March 1944 - 5 April 1944)
  • Odessa Offensive Operation (26 March 1944 - 14 April 1944)

Contents

[edit] First phase

The offensive was launched on December 24, 1943, against the German 4th Panzer Army[2] By January 6, 1944, the right flank of the attack had reached Gorodnitsa, Poland. Afterwards, the right flank continued on, coming near to the important supply centers of Lvov and Ternopol.[3] The main effort, however, was to the south. The 1st and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts advanced against the 4th Panzer Army and the 6th Army. A 110 mile gap was created between Army Group South and Army Group Center.[4] Due to German reinforcements, the Soviet advanced were slowed. The Wehrmacht did have some success by managing to extricate the remnants of XI and XXXXII Panzer Corps from where they were trapped. While the 30,000 troops with these formations were saved, 80,000 troops were lost by the Germans in total, as well as important mining operations at Krivoi Rog and Nikopol.[5] While the offensive temporarily petered out in late February, the Soviets were preparing for the second phase of the strategic operation, on an even larger scale.

[edit] Second phase

After the slackening of the Soviet effort at the end of February, the German High Command believed any further offensive effort in that sector unlikely. However, the Soviets had, by this time, brought in all six of their elite tank armies to prepare for the second phase. Once this was launched, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts proceeded 200 to 300 miles, along a front 800 miles wide in the first 42 days.[6] The German front was completely split in half, and was never to recover. On March 10, the 2nd Ukrainian Front destroyed two Panzer Corps by capturing them at the fall of Uman. By March 25, the Prut had fallen and the 3rd Ukrainian Front was dispatched to secure Odessa. The offensive lead to the first reinforcement of the Eastern Front at the expense of the Western Front since November 1943, when II SS Panzer Corps was transferred from France. This was unknown to the Soviets, and the new reinforcements were able to assist the 1st Panzer Army in breaking out of their entrapment.[7] It was a great victory for the Soviets, and their only mistake was in allowing 1st Panzer Army to escape entrapment at the Dniester.[8]

[edit] Modern view

Currently, the operation is not very widely recognized for the great victory that it is in Western history.[9] After the end of the war, some of the commanders involved were disgraced, and Stalin widely eliminated most references of the operation. Also, many Western historians, at least until the end of the Cold War, focused on the small German successes in the extrication of the 1st Panzer Army.[10]

[edit] References

  1. ^ Willmott, p. 374
  2. ^ Ibid., p. 371.
  3. ^ Ibid.
  4. ^ Ibid.
  5. ^ Ibid., p. 372
  6. ^ Ibid.
  7. ^ Ibid., p. 374.
  8. ^ Ibid., p. 373
  9. ^ Ibid.
  10. ^ Ibid.

[edit] Sources

  • Willmott, H.P., Western Ukraine Offensive in The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War, New York: The Free Press. 1989