Dispositional and occurrent belief
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In philosophy, the term dispositional belief refers to a belief that is not currently being considered by the mind, but is stored in memory of other concepts and will be recalled to conclude in occurrent belief. The term occurrent belief refers to a belief that is currently being considered by the mind. It can be contrasted with the concept of dispositional belief.
It may also be defined as: "Unconcluded wisdom of stored knowledge"
An analogy can be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a computer hardware: -What is on its hard disk might be like the dispositional belief, and what is on its screen might be like the occurrent belief. This analogy, however, does not complete the idea of dipositional belief. An analogy can also be drawn between these two types of belief by using the example of a simple mathematics: You believe the system of numbers, -you know the definition of the numbers 2, 3 and 5, and even though you never have heard or seen it before you will understand that the combined value of the numbers 2 and 3 will equal the value of the number 5. Then you have used your occurrent belief of a system of numbers to get dispositional belief to occur to you. (That 2+3=5 is now occurrent belief).
Dispositional beliefs can be formed without ever having been an occurrent belief - for example, if a vehicle passes by whilst a person is engaged in conversation, it may become a dispositional belief that "a vehicle passed by" immediately, as the matter was never consciously considered. To extend the computer analogy, this could be seen as being like downloading files directly to the hard disk without opening them.
Literature:
Robert Audi, 'Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe' Noûs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 419-434