Dhofar Rebellion

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The Dhofar Rebellion
Date 1962-1975
Location Oman, Middle East
Result Defeat of insurgents
Modernisation of Oman
Belligerents
Flag of Oman Oman
Iran
Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)
Strength
Flag of Oman Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces 10,000
Imperial Iranian Armed Forces 3,000-3,500[1]
Flag of Oman Firqats irregular groups (1800)
800 "hard core" fighters
1000 local fighters
Casualties and losses
Oman: unknown
Britain and Iran: 500 KIA
unknown KIA
2000 POW

The Dhofar Rebellion was launched in the province of Dhofar against the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and Britain from 1962 to 1975. It ended with the defeat of the rebels, but the state of Oman had to be radically reformed and modernized to cope with the campaign.

Contents

[edit] Background

In 1962, Oman was a British semi-colony and a comparatively backward country in Asia or the Middle East. Under Sultan Said bin Taimur, almost all aspects of twentieth-century development were outlawed. Dhofar itself was a dependency of Oman and it was subjected to severe economic exploitation [2] Moreover, the population of Dhofar, who speak various southern Arabic dialects peculiar to the province, were subjected to even greater restrictions than other Omanis.

The province of Dhofar consists of a narrow, fertile coastal plain, on which stands Salalah, the provincial capital. Behind this are the rugged hills of the Jebel Dhofar. (The western portion of this range is known as the Jebel Qamar, the central part as the Jebel Qara and the eastern as the Jebel Samhan.) From June to September each year, the jebel receives moisture-laden winds (the Khareef or monsoon) and is shrouded in cloud. As a result, it is heavily vegetated, and for much of the year is green and lush. To the north, the hills slope down via rough wadis and cliffs into the gravel plains and sand seas of the Empty Quarter.

[edit] Early Years of the Rebellion

In 1962, a dissatisfied tribal leader, Mussalim bin Nafl, formed the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) and obtained arms and vehicles from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Oman had earlier clashed over ownership of the Buraimi Oasis, and the Saudis had already supported two failed insurrections in the Jebel Akhdar in 1957-59. DLF also received support from Ghalib bin Ali, the exiled Imam of Oman, who had led these earlier revolts.

Bin Nafl and his men made an epic crossing of the Empty Quarter to reach Dhofar. As early as December 1962, Bin Nafl's guerilla band performed sabotage operations on the British air base at Salalah and ambushed oil industry vehicles; however, they then withdrew, having been sent by Saudi Arabia to Iraq for more guerrilla training.

From 1964, the DLF then began a campaign of hit-and-run attacks on oil company installations and government posts. Many of the DLF were trained former soldiers of the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces (SAF), or of the Trucial Oman Scouts in the United Arab Emirates.

An assassination attempt on Sultan Said bin Taimur in April 1966, by Dhofari members of the SAF changed the very nature of the conflict. In response to the attack, he retired to his palace in Salalah never to be seen in public again. This only served to add to rumours that the British were running Oman through the means of a ‘phantom’ Sultan. In response to the assassination attempt, the Sultan launched a full-scale military initiative against the DLF which was against the advice of his trusted British advisors. Search and destroy missions were launched in Dhofar; villages were burnt and wells concreted or blown up. A member of the SAF reported that after receiving heavy resistance it “proved that the position was unattainable, and after blowing up the village wells we evacuated the camp.” [3]

[edit] An Emboldened Movement

From the early days of the rebellion, Nasserite and other left wing movements in Yemen and Aden were also involved. In 1967, two events combined to give the Rebellion a more revolutionary complexion. One was the Six Day War which radicalized opinion throughout the Arab world. The other was the British withdrawal from Aden and the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). From this point, the rebels had a source of arms, supplies and training facilities adjacent to Dhofar, and fresh recruits from among well-indoctrinated groups in the PDRY. However, this also led to a split between those such as bin Nafl who were fighting for local autonomy and recognition, and the more doctrinaire revolutionaries (led by Mohammad Ahmad al-Ghassani) who renamed the rebel movement the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (al-Jabha al-Sha'abiya li-Tahrir al-Khalij al-'Arabi al-Muhtall), or PFLOAG. One of bin Nafl's lieutenants, Said bin Gheer, was an early and influential defector to the Sultan.

PFLOAG Logo
PFLOAG Logo

The move towards Marxism-Leninism ensured that the PFLOAG received sponsorship from both South Yemen and China. China in particular was quick to support the PFLOAG as it was a peasant-based organisation giving it a strong Maoist credence. Chinese support for the PFLOAG also had another benefit; it acted as a counterbalance to increasing Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean. China was quick to establish an embassy in Aden and “the Yemeni regime allowed its territory to be used for channelling weapons” to the PFLOAG. [4] The Chinese also provided members of the PFLOAG with training in uncoventional warfare and indoctrination. The transformation of the DLF, combined with a new supply of weaponry and better training, ensured that the armed wing of the PFLOAG turned into an effective fighting force. The SAF by comparison were ill-trained and under-equipped, and by 1968 numbered approximately 1000 men in Dhofar.[5]

By 1969, the DLF and PFLOAG fighters (known widely as Adoo) had overrun much of the Jebel Dhofar, and cut the only road across it, that from Salalah to "Midway" (Thumrait) in the deserts to the north. The units of the Sultan's Armed Forces were understrength, badly equipped and generally not properly trained to face hardy guerrillas on their own ground. Small detachments of the British RAF Regiment and Royal Artillery had to be deployed to protect the vital airfield at Salalah from infiltrators and harassing mortar and rocket fire.

Other insurgents in the north of Oman formed another organisation, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG). In June 1970 they attacked two SAF posts at Nizwa and Izki. They were repulsed but the incident convinced many (including the Sultan's British advisers and backers) that new leadership was required if Oman was not to collapse into disorder.

[edit] Coup

On July 23, 1970 Said bin Taimur was deposed. (The coup was almost bloodless. Folklore has it that one of the plotters, two of the Sultan's bodyguard and the Sultan were slightly wounded, all by the Sultan himself). He was replaced by his son, Qaboos bin Said, who immediately instigated major social, educational and military reforms. The command was reorganized, with the newly-appointed wali or civilian governor (Braik bin Hamoud) being given equal status to the military commander of the Dhofar Brigade (Brigadier Jack Fletcher to 1972, Brigadier John Akehurst from that date).

Within hours of the coup, more SAS soldiers were being flown into Oman to further bolster the counterinsurgency campaign. They identified four main strategies that would assist the fight against the PFLOAG:

  • Civil Administration and a Hearts and Minds Campaign
  • Intelligence gathering and collation
  • Veterinary assistance
  • Medical assistance[6]

It was not the UK Ministry of Defence, but the military commanders on the ground who suggested the implementation of a Hearts and Minds campaign. This would be primarily put into operation by a troop (25 men) from the 22nd Special Air Service.

The Heath government supported this unconventional approach to the counterinsurgency campaign. It approved the deployment of 20 personnel of the British Royal Engineers, who would aid in the construction of schools and health centres, and drill wells for the population of Dhofar. An RAF medical team would also operate out of Salalah hospital, in order to open a humanitarian front in the conflict. The operation was almost a carbon copy of a system that had proved successful in Malaya some twenty years previously. The British government additionally provided monetary support for the creation of the Dhofar Development Programme. The aim of the organisation was to wrest support from the PFLOAG through the modernisation of Dhofar.

A major effort was made to counter rebel propaganda and induce the Dhofari population to support the government. In particular, appeals were made to Islam, against the rebels' atheist or materialistic teachings. A significant outlet for government propaganda was the many cheap Japanese transistor radios which were sold cheaply or distributed free to Dhofaris who visited Salalah and other government-held towns to sell firewood or vegetables.

British Propaganda - "The Hand of God"
British Propaganda - "The Hand of God"

One step which had a major impact on the uprising was the announcement of an amnesty for surrendered fighters, and aid in defending their communities from rebels. The surrendered rebels formed Firqat irregular units, trained by teams from the British Special Air Service Regiment. Eighteen Firqat units, numbering about 100 each, were eventually formed. They usually gave themselves names with connections to Islam, such as the Firqat Salahadin. These irregular groups played a major part in denying local support to the rebels.

The first serious step in re-establishing the Sultan's authority on the Jebel took place in October 1971, when Operation Jaguar was mounted, involving five Firqat units and a Squadron of the SAS. After hard fighting, the SAS and Firqats secured an enclave on the eastern Jebel Samhan from which they could expand.

Meanwhile, the regular units of the SAF were expanded and re-equipped. Officers and NCO instructors from the British Army and Royal Marines were attached to all units. (There were nominally twenty-two British or contracted personnel with each infantry battalion.) The SAF created fortified lines running north from the coast and up to the summit of the Jebel, to interdict the movement of rebels and the camel trains carrying their supplies from the PDRY. The "Leopard Line" had already been established in 1969. The more effective "Hornbeam Line" was set up in 1971. The Shah of Iran sent a brigade of troops to assist in this task, and set up the "Damavand Line" in 1973.

The lines consisted of fortified platoon and company outposts, some with artillery, on commanding peaks, linked with barbed wire. Anti-personnel land mines were sown on the most likely enemy routes. The SAF soldiers also continually sortied from their outposts to set ambushes on these. Nevertheless, the lines were really effective only in the dry season, when air support was available from BAC Strikemaster and Hawker Hunter aircraft of the Sultan's Air Force.

[edit] The Defeat of the Rebellion

As a result of these combined measures, the rebels were being deprived of support and supplies. To retrieve the situation, they mounted major attacks on the coastal towns of Mirbat and Taqa. At the Battle of Mirbat, 250 Adoo faced 100 assorted Firqat, paramilitary Gendarmes and a detachment of the Special Air Service. In spite of the low Khareef cloud cover, air support was available and helicopters landed SAS reinforcements. The Adoo were repulsed with heavy losses.

From this point on, the rebel defeat was inevitable, although they defeated an offensive by the SAF in 1973 intended to seal the border with the PDRY and capture the main Adoo base in the Shershitti Caves. The SAF gained one success when they made a helicopter landing to capture a position codenamed Simba at Sarfait near the border. This post was held at some cost for two years, and overlooked the rebels' supply lines along the coastal plain although it did not block them. The Adoo earned the respect of their opponents for their resilience and skill.

In January 1974, after several splits and defections, the rebel movement renamed itself the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). This contraction of their aims coincided with a reduction in the support they received from Russia and China. Meanwhile, the Adoo were steadily driven by the Firqats into the western part of the Jebel Al-Qamar.

In July 1975, the SAF launched a second "final" offensive. An attack from Simba, intended to be a diversion, nevertheless succeeded in descending a 3000-foot high cliff to reach the coast, and thus finally cut off the Adoo from their bases in the PDRY. Over the next few months, the remaining fighters surrendered or sought sanctuary in the PDRY.

The Rebellion was finally declared to be defeated in January 1976, although isolated incidents took place as late as 1979.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Badeeb, Saeed B. Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932-82. London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies and Echo, 1993. pp. 130
  2. ^ Halliday, Fred. Arabia Without Sultans. London: Penguin, 1974.
  3. ^ Captain N.G.R Hepworth, ‘The Unknown War’ The White Horse and Fleur de Leys, No. 6 (1970).
  4. ^ J. Calabrese, ‘From Flyswatters to Silkworms: The Evolution of China’s Role in West Asia’, Asian Survey, 30 (1990) p.867
  5. ^ J. Beasant, Oman: the True-Life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab State, (Edinburgh: 2002) p.108
  6. ^ TNA, DEFE 25/186: UK Forces in Oman, 26 July 1971

[edit] Bibliography

  • Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami, by Christin Marschall, 2003, ISBN 0-415-29780-X
  • We won a war, by John Akehurst, M. Russell, 1982, ISBN 0-85955-091-5
  • Arabia withhout Sultans,by Fred Halliday, Penguin, 1974
  • SAS Operation Oman, by Tony Jeapes, William Kimber, London, 1980 ISBN 0-7183-0018-1
  • Armed Forces & Modern Counter-insurgency, edited by Ian Beckett and John Pimlott, St. Martin's, New York, 1985, ISBN 0-312-00449-4
  • Where soldiers fear to tread, by Ranulph Fiennes, New English Library, 1976, ISBN 0-450-02903-4
  • In the Service of the Sultan, by Ian Gardiner, Pen and Sword Military, 2006, SBN 1-844154-67-X

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

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