Demyansk Pocket

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Demyansk Pocket
Part of The Second World War
Date 8 February 1942–21 April 1942
Location Demyansk, Russia
Result German victory
Belligerents
Nazi Germany Soviet Union
v • d • e
Eastern Front
 
Leningrad and Baltics 1941 - 1944
Toropets-Kholm – Demyansk Pocket – Spark – Polar Star – Krasny Bor – Lenino– Leningrad Approaches – Narva – Vilnius – Baltic

Demyansk Pocket (German: Festung Demjansk or Kessel von Demjansk; Russian: Демя́нский котёл) is a name for the encirclement of German troops by the Red Army around Demyansk (Demjansk), south of Leningrad, during the Second World War on the Eastern Front, which existed mainly from February 8 until April 21, 1942. A much smaller pocket was simultaneously surrounded in Kholm, about 100 km to the southwest. These were the results of German retreat following their defeat during the Battle of Moscow.

The encirclement begun as the first phase of the Demyansk Offensive Operation (7 January 1942 - 20 May 1942) by the Northwestern Front's commander's initiative, General Lieutenant Pavel Kurochkin. The intention was to sever the link betweent he German Demyansk positions, and the Staraya Russa railway that formed the lines of communication of the German 16th Army. However owing to the very difficult wooded and swampy terrain, and heavy snow cover, the initial advance by the Front was very modest against stubborn opposition.

On the 8 January 1942 a new Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation begun that incorporated the previous Front planning into the Toropets-Kholm Offensive Operation (9 January 1942 - 6 February 1942) which formed the southern pincer of the operation that, beginning the second phase of the northern pincer Demyansk Offensive Operation (7 January 1942 - 20 May 1942) which encircled the German 16th Army's (Generaloberst Ernst Busch) IInd, and parts of the Xth Army Corps (General der Artillerie Christian Hansen) during winter 1941/1942.

Trapped in the pocket were the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd and 290th infantry divisions, as well as the SS-Division Totenkopf. There were also RAD, Police, Todt organization and other auxiliary units who were trapped and assisted in the battle. In total, about 90,000 German troops and around 10,000 auxiliaries were trapped inside the pocket. Their commander was General der Infanterie Walter Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, commander of the IInd Army Corps.

[edit] Northwestern Front offensives

The Northwestern Front offensive was planned to encircle the entire northern flank of the 16th Army's forces, of which the IInd Army Corps was only a small part, and the Soviet command was desperate to keep the Front moving even after this success. The first thrust was made by the 11th Army, 1st Shock Army and the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps released for the operation from Stavka reserve. A second thrust was executed on 12 February by the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies of the Kalinin Front, with the additional plan of directly attacking the encircled German forces by inserting two airborne brigades to support the advance of the 34th Army. The front soon settled as the Soviet offensive petered out due to difficult terrain and bad weather.

After being assured that the pocket could be supplied with its daily requirement of 270 tons of supplies by the Luftflotte 1, Hitler ordered that the surrounded divisions hold their positions until relieved. The pocket contained two fairly capable airfields at Demyansk and Peski. From the middle of February the weather improved significantly, and while there was still considerable snow on the ground at this time, resupply operations were generally very successful due to weakness of the Red Air Forces in the area. However the operation did use up all of the Luftwaffe's transport capability, as well as elements of their bomber force.

The Northwestern Front grew increasingly desperate to wipe out the pocket, and over the winter and spring launched a number of assaults on the "Ramushevo corridor" that formed the tenuous link between Demyansk and Staraya Russa through the Ramushevo village that were repeatedly repulsed. In total five Soviet Armies composed of 18 infantry divisions and three brigades were tied up for 4 months.[citation needed]

However, by the end of May the Stavka reconsidered the overall situation on the Front sector and decided to shift its attention to the Moscow sector where a new German offensive was expected in the summer.

[edit] Attempted breakout

On 21 March 1942 German forces under the command of Generalleutnant Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach attempted to leave through the "Ramushevo corridor" of the pocket. Over the next several weeks this corridor was widened. A battle group was able to break out of the siege on April 21, but the battle had taken a heavy toll. Out of the approximately 100,000 men trapped there were 3,335 lost and over 10,000 wounded. However, their strong resistance had denied the Soviet High Command numerous units at a critical moment, units that would have otherwise been used elsewhere.

Between the forming of the pocket in early February to virtual abandonment of Demyansk in May, the two pockets (including Kholm) received 65,000 tons of supplies (both through ground and aerial delivery), 31,000 replacement troops, and 36,000 wounded were evacuated. However, the cost was significant. The Luftwaffe lost 265 aircraft, including 106 Junkers Ju 52, 17 Heinkel He 111 and two Junkers Ju 86 aircraft. In addition 387 airmen were also lost[1].

The Soviet Air Forces lost 408 aircraft, including 243 fighters in a bid to crush the pocket. The success of the Luftwaffe's contribution influenced Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Hitler that they had developed the methods and tactics that would guarantee any effective airlift operation on the Eastern front[2]. The experience proved to be a false hope during the Battle of Stalingrad.

Fighting in the area continued until 28 February 1943. The Soviets would not liberate Demyansk until March 1st, 1943 with the retreat of the German troops. For his excellence in command and the particularly fierce fighting of his elite unit, 3rd SS Division Totenkopf SS-Obergruppenführer Theodor Eicke[3] was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross (88th) on May 20, 1942.

The success of the defence of the pocket would later cause Hermann Göring to propose a similar "solution" to supply the 6th Army, trapped in Stalingrad. In theory the outcome could be equally advantageous; with the 6th Army trapped, but still in fighting condition, the Soviet army would have to use up much of its strength to keep them contained. This could allow other German forces to re-group and mount a counterattack. However, the scale of the forces trapped in the two operations differed greatly. While in Demyansk a single army corps (about one third of an army) with about six divisions was encircled, in Stalingrad an entire and greatly reinforced Army was trapped. Whereas the Demyansk and Kholm pockets together needed around 265 tonnes of supplies per day, the 6th Army required an estimated daily minimum of 500 tonnes to be delivered over a much longer distance and faced by a much better organised Red Air Force opposition. The air transport force had already suffered heavy losses, and was working in a location much further away from good infrastructure. The Luftwaffe simply did not have the resources needed to supply Stalingrad, a major reason for its eventual surrender.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Bergstrom 2007, p. 23.
  2. ^ Bergstrom 2007, p. 23.
  3. ^ previously the "inspector of concentration camps". Eicke's attitude of "inflexible harshness" also influenced the guards in the concentration camps; constant indoctrination removed any compassion for the detainees from the guards and created an atmosphere of controlled, disciplined cruelty that lived on even when Eicke was not involved with the concentration camps anymore. Eicke himself was killed on 26 February 1943, shortly after being promoted to SS-Obergruppenführer (equivalent to full general). While performing a battlefield reconnaissance during the opening stages of the Third Battle of Kharkov, his Fieseler Fi 156 Storch was shot down by Soviet troops near Oryol. His division launched a ferocious attack to secure the crash site and recover their commander's body. Eicke was portrayed in the Axis press as a hero, and soon after his death one of the Totenkopf's Infantry regiments received the honorific cuff-title Theodor Eicke.
  • Bergstrom, Christer (2007). Stalingrad - The Air Battle: November 1942 - February 1943. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-276-4 .
  • Kurowski, Franz (2001). Demjansk Der Kessel im Eis. Wölfersheim-Berstadt: PODZUN-PALLAS. ISBN 3-7909-0718-9.
  • http://victory.mil.ru/lib/books/h/nwf/index.html Сборник. На Северо-Западном фронте — М.: «Наука», 1969 (Вторая Мировая война в исследованиях, воспоминаниях, документах) Институт военной истории Министерства Обороны СССР; под редакцией и с предисловием члена-корреспондента АН СССР генерал-лейтенанта П. А. Жилина; cоставил и подготовил сборник кандидат военных наук, доцент, полковник Ф. Н. Утенков; научно-техническая работа проведена подполковником В. С. Кислинским.
  • Group of authors, A collection. On the North-Western Front, Moscow, Science (pub.), 1969 (Second World War in research, memoirs, documents), Institute of military history of Ministry of Defence of USSR, under reduction and with forward from member-correspondent AN SSR, General-lieutenant P.A. Zhilin; compiled and prepared for publication by candidate of military sciences, dozent, Colonel F.N. Utenkov, scientific-technical work undertaken by Sub-colonel V.S. Kislinsky