Dead Hand (nuclear war)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Dead Hand (or perimetr[1]) is a Cold War era nuclear control system used by the USSR. It is an example of fail-deadly deterrence, whereby an overwhelming response is automatically triggered if the USSR's leadership were to be killed in a decapitation strike.

Contents

[edit] Motivation

The purpose of the "dead hand" system (named after the book[2][3]) is to maintain a second strike capability, by ensuring that the destruction of the Soviet leadership does not prevent the Soviet military from releasing its weapons. This issue became prominent with the development of highly accurate Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems in the 1980s.

Prior to the 1980s, most nuclear weapons would have been delivered by long range bomber or ICBM. Earlier US SLBM systems like the 1960's vintage UGM-27 Polaris and 1970's vintage UGM-73 Poseidon missiles were considered too inaccurate for a counterforce or first strike, that is an attack against an opponents weapons. SLBMs were thus reserved for attacking cities, where accuracy was of less importance. In the first case, an opponent with effective radar and satellite surveillance could expect 30 minutes warning of an attack before the first detonation. This made an effective first-strike difficult, because the opponent would have time to launch on warning with little risk of his forces being destroyed on the ground. The development of highly accurate SLBMs, such as the Trident C4 and later the D5 upset this balance. The Trident D5 is considered to be as accurate as any land based ICBM. Therefore, US or UK Trident submarine systems that could stealthily approach an enemy's coast and launch highly accurate warheads at close range would reduce the available warning to less than 3 minutes making a counterforce first strike or a decapitation strike viable.

Game theorists argued that if an enemy believed he could successfully defeat your command and control system in a first strike, he would attempt to do so. The USSR therefore took steps to ensure that nuclear retaliation (and hence deterrence) remained possible even if its leadership was destroyed in a surprise attack.

[edit] Operation

Communications between the Soviet leadership and the general staff, as well other assets such as radar stations, missile silos and command centres, were continuously monitored. In the event of nuclear explosions and an unexplained communications failure, relatively junior officers were authorized to release their weapons without higher approval.

[edit] Current usage

It is not known whether Russia continues to use the system, and it is possible that it is still in place.[4] However, since deterrence is only achieved by advertising in advance that the dead hand system is in place, it is reasonable to speculate the system is no longer active. Some commentators state the system never operated in fully automatic mode.[5][6]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Dr. Bruce G. Blair Preface to C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation
  2. ^ Harold Coyle, Dead Hand, 384 pages, publisher Forge Books ISBN 0812575393 ISBN 978-0812575392
  3. ^ See also: Doomsday: On The Brink, a Learning Channel documentary from 1997. Dead Hand was referenced along with the Norweigan weather rocket incident of 1995, and nuclear proliferation in the Muslim world, to show that Doomsday did not go away with the Berlin wall.

    "That order will ultimately be obeyed, even if nobody is left alive to obey it.
  4. ^ Ron Rosenbaum, Slate Magazine , Did the Soviets really build a "doomsday device"? August 31, 2007
  5. ^ Michael Jasinski, Russia: Strategic Early Warning, Command and Control, and Missile Defense Overview March 2001
  6. ^ Soviet Doomsday Device Still Armed and Ready September 07, 2007