Damascus Spring
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The Damascus Spring was a period of intense political and social debate in Syria which started after the death of President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000 and continued to some degree until autumn 2001, when most of the activities associated with it were suppressed by the government.
Under Hafiz al-Asad, president of Syria from 1970 until his death in 2000, political activity had been strictly controlled, and from 1980 on effective opposition activity had been almost impossible, as was any sort of free expression of opinion. Five principal security agencies served primarily to monitor political dissent. A state of emergency had existed since 1963, with military courts applying martial law and special courts trying political cases with little regard for human rights or due process. Prisoners were routinely tortured and held in appalling conditions.
There remained, nonetheless, a considerable appetite for political debate in the country, as well as a good deal of dissatisfaction with the government and the system. From 1998 on, the level of repression diminished noticeably, and when in June 2000 Hafiz al-Asad died and his son Bashar was installed as president, a number of Syrian intellectuals attempted to engage in political discussion.
The Damascus Spring was characterised above all by the emergence of numerous muntadat, referred to in English as "salons" or "forums". Groups of like-minded people met in private houses, with news of the occasion spread by word of mouth, and discussed political matters and wider social questions. The phenomenon of the salons spread rapidly in Damascus and to a lesser extent in other cities. Long-standing members of the Syrian opposition were notable in animating the movement, as were a number of intellectuals who resolutely declared themselves apolitical, such as film-maker Omar Amiralay. Members of the Syrian Communist Party and reform-minded Ba'th Party members also took part in debate.
The Damascus Spring can be seen as having mobilised around a number of political demands, expressed in the "Manifesto of the 99" signed by prominent intellectuals. These were, principally, the cancellation of the state of emergency and abolition of martial law and special courts; the release of all political prisoners; the return without fear of prosecution of political exiles; and the right to form political parties and civil organisation. To these was often added the more precisely political demand that Article 8 of the Syrian constitution be repealed. This article provides that "the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party leads the state and society".
The Damascus Spring made a major impact across the Arab world, and initially there was considerable optimism that it would lead to real change. The editor of the Syrian state Tishrin newspaper announced his intention of forming a committee, to comprise prominent intellectuals such as Maher Charif, Ahmad Barqawi and Yusuf Salameh, to edit a new opinion page, but this never came about. The salons debated many political and social questions to a wider nature, from the position of women to the nature of education methods and the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.
Initially, the regime seemed unsure how to respond to the Damascus Spring. In November 2000, hundreds of political prisoners were released as the infamous Mezze prison was closed. Eventually, however, the regime fell back on its tried methods of repression and in 2001 a number of jailings coupled with the forced closure of the salons brought it to an end. However, some aspects of it remain: Syrian intellectuals have released further statements echoing that of the 99; some small demonstrations have taken place in Damascus; and until 2005 one salon, the Jamal al-Atassi National Dialogue Forum, was still permitted to function. The Atassi forum was shut down after a member had read a statement from the banned Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamist organization which had rebelled against the government of Hafiz al-Assad in the early 1980s. The regime has made clear that any collaboration with the Brotherhood, which despite the exile of its leadership is considered to be by far the strongest opposition movement in Syria, is a "red line" not to be crossed.
Recently, following the intense international pressures on the Syrian regime after the death of Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri and the release of the UN Mehlis report, intellectuals have again grown more outspoken. In late October 2005, a declaration calling for democratic reform was issued by most of the opposition, notably including the Muslim Brotherhood, and the government has so far refrained from any serious actions against the signers. On January 18, 2006, the government released 5 political prisoners linked to the Damascus Spring, in what analysts [1] have called an attempt to rally support for the beleaguered government after unprecedented international pressure in the wake of the assassination.
