Cuban intervention in Angola (1975-1991)

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On the eve of Angola’s independence three liberation organisations, FNLA and UNITA, mainly backed by the United States, and MPLA, backed by the Soviet Union, competed for control of the country.^[1] South Africa invaded from Namibia in support of UNITA and FNLA to prevent the MPLA from taking power, thus triggering Cuba’s intervention and deployment of 36,000 troops in support of the beleaguered MPLA. ^[2] The MPLA alone declared independence and formed the government of Angola while UNITA staged an insurgency war supported by the US and South Africa. A reduced detachment of Cubans remained stationed in Angola to stabilize the government in the continuing Angolan Civil War.

In 1988, the Cubans intervened a second time, sending 55,000 troops into battle to support the Angolans against UNITA-rebels and South Africans in southern Angola. Preventing a South African victory, Cuban involvement was instrumental in the independence of Namibia and in the decline of the Apartheid regime. ^[3][4][5][6] Cuban military engagement in Angola ended in 1991.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 Failure of the Alvor Agreement / Civil War 1.2 Foreign interference 1.3 Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War 1.4 South Africa intervenes 1.5 The Cuban military mission 2 Cuba's first intervention 2.1 Operation Carlota 2.2 The northern front 2.3 The south: SADF advance is stopped 2.4 The world takes notice 2.5 Withdrawal of official US-support 2.6 South Africa and UNITA withdraw 3 Proxy War, UN Resolutions and Negotiations (late 1970s and 1980s) 4 Cuba's second intervention 4.1 Cuito Cuanavale 4.2 Three Powers Accord 5 Aftermath 6 See also 7 Further reading 8 References

[edit] Background

[edit] Failure of the Alvor Agreement / Civil War

It has been suggested that this article or section be merged into Angolan War of Independence. (Discuss)

Main article: Angolan War of Independence

See also: Carnation Revolution

The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 in Portugal took the rest of the world by surprise. Unprepared, Portugal’s last two African colonies, Mozambique and Angola, were granted independence without further struggle. After smooth negotiations Mozambique’s independence was granted on 25 June 1975, but Angolan control remained disputed between the three rival liberation movements: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola-proper and FLEC (Cabinda Independence Organisation) in Cabinda.

Until independence the liberation movements’ priority lay in fighting the colonial power and they initially had no clear alliances. With the disappearance of Portugal as the their common foe ethnic and ideological rivalries moved to the fore. The disunity of the three main movements postponed the handing over of power. The Alvor Agreement, which the three and Portugal signed on 15 January, proved to be no solid foundation for the procedure. The transitional government the agreement provided for was equally composed of the three big liberation movements and Portugal. It was sworn in on 31 January, 1975; independence day was set for 11 November 1975, the same day of the cease fire.^[7][8][9] FLEC was not part of the deal because it fought for the independence of Cabinda, which the Portuguese had administratively joined as an exclave to Angola.

Fighting in Luanda (referred to as the “Second war of liberation” by the MPLA) broke out only two weeks after the transitional government took office. FNLA troops flown in from Zaire, had been taking positions in Luanda in October 1974. The MPLA had followed later in smaller numbers.^[10] Encouraged by Mobutu and the US the FNLA moved into northern Angola from Zaire and they attacked the MPLA in the capital. By March the FNLA was driving on Luanda joined by units of the Zairian army which the US had encouraged Mobutu to provide. ^[11] To that point the MPLA and UNITA “had given every sign of intending to honour the Alvor agreement”. ^[12]

The initially weaker MPLA retreated south but with supplies arriving from the Soviets then succeeded in driving the FNLA out of Luanda by 9 July. The FNLA took up positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of the capital, from where it kept up its pressure, and eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.^[13][14]

The fighting quickly spread throughout the whole country. The liberation movements attempted to seize key strategic points, most importantly the capital on the day of independence. In a meeting by the National Security Council (NSC) on 27 June 1975 US President Ford stated that, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, referring to then UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi being in control of Luanda before the elections. A comment by Secretary Schlesinger at this meeting was made that the US “might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources”. ^[15]

[edit] Foreign interference

Starting in the 1960s the three big liberation movements enjoyed support from a wide range of countries, in some cases even from the same. By the time of independence FNLA and UNITA received aid from the US, Zaire, South Africa, China and North Korea. Support from China and North Korea soon ceased and FNLA and UNITA became firmly established in the western camp. Although being leftist, Neto was interested in an ideological balance in his foreign support, but in spite of "overtures" well into 1975, he was unable to procure support for the MPLA from the US, thus becoming solely dependent on the eastern camp. ^[16] As the CIA was suspicious of the left-leaning MPLA it “had no wish to see the US government deal with the MPLA” and it did not want them to be part of the transitional government. ^[17]

The FNLA had its base in Zaire from where it received the bulk of its support. FNLA leader Holden Roberto was linked to Mobutu by marriage and obligated to him for many past favours. Over the years the FNLA had become little more than an extension of Mobutu’s own armed forces. Much of Zaire’s support came indirectly from the US, which Zaire’s leader Mobutu had close ties with. Zaire was the first country to send troops to Angola in March 1975 and to engage in fighting against the MPLA by the summer of that year.^[18]

In the summer of 1974 China was first to act after the Portuguese Revolution and posted 200 military instructors to Zaire where they trained FNLA troops and supplied military assistance. Chinese involvement was a measure against Soviet influence rather than that from western countries. On 27 October 1975, they were also the first to withdraw their military instructors. UNITA, which split away from FNLA in 1965/66 was initially Maoist and received some support from China.^[19]

North Korea had been training Mobutu’s elite division, the Kamanyola, also trained the FNLA but withdrew their support for Zaire and the FNLA by the end of December 1975.^[20]

US support for the FNLA was taken up by the Kennedy administration in 1960. Holden Roberto had been on the CIA’s payroll since 1963. ^[21] In late January 1975, just before the provisional government of Angola was to take office according to the Alvor agreement, the US National Security Council’s “40 Committee”, which oversaw clandestine CIA operations, authorized 300,000 US$ in covert aid to the FNLA.^[22][23] According to “the former chief of the CIA’s Angola Task Force, John Stockwell, and from various other sources, it is now known that the US, far from seeking peaceful solutions, was instrumental in touching off the final round of fighting in 1975” that led to the Cuban intervention. ^[24]

The US increased its support for the FNLA and for the first time took up funding of UNITA. On 18 July 1975 Ford approved covert CIA operation "IAFEATURE" to aid FLNA and UNITA with money (30 million US$), arms and instructors. US military instructors (CIA) arrived in southern Angola in early August where they closely cooperated with their South African counterparts who arrived around the same time. The support involved the recruitment of mercenaries and an expanded propaganda campaign against the MPLA. The American public was not informed. The US “was publicly committed to an embargo against the delivery of arms to Angolan factions while it was secretly launching a paramilitary programme”. ^[25]

Other western countries with their own clandestine support for FNLA and UNITA were Great Britain and France.^[26]

The East bloc countries first established ties with the MPLA during its struggle against the Portuguese. This support remained clandestine, came in trickles and sometimes ceased altogether. This was the case in 1972, when the MPLA came under strong pressure from the Portuguese and was torn apart by internal strife (struggle between MPLA leader António Agostinho Neto and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The trickle of Soviet and Chinese aid, which they had received through the 1960s was suspended in 1973 with the exception of a few limited shipments in 1974 to counter Chinese support for the FNLA; only Yugoslavia continued to send supplies to the MPLA.^[27][28] In response to US and Chinese support for the FNLA, Soviet support for the MPLA was resumed in March 1975 in the form of arms deliveries by sea and air via Brazzaville and Dar-es-Salaam.^{[29] [30]} Soviet assistance to the MPLA was always somewhat reluctant; they never fully trusted Neto and their relationship was to remain ambivalent through the following years. Even after the South African incursions the Soviets only sent arms, but no instructors for the use of the sophisticated weapons. ^[31] Among the other Eastern Bloc countries the MPLA had well established contacts with East Germany and Romania. The former shipping large amounts of non-military supplies.

[edit] Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War

It has been suggested that this article or section be merged into Angola-Cuba relations. (Discuss)

Cuba’s first contacts to the MPLA dated back to the 1960s, when Cuba took up support in 1963/1964, while the MPLA had its headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville (formerly French Congo). In 1966 Agustinho Neto himself, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the commander in chief of the MPLA who was later to die in the war, made a trip to Cuba where they met Castro. The encounter in Congo-Brazzaville ended in disappointment for both sides and relations cooled. A few MPLA guerrillas continued to receive military training in Cuba but apart from that contacts between Cuba and the MPLA remained distant ^{[32] [33]}

In a memorandum of 22 November 1972 by Cuban Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro it says: “For some time now we have discussed the possibility of entering Angola and Mozambique with the objective of getting to know the revolutionary movements in those countries. These movements have been a mystery even for those socialist countries that give them considerable aid. This research would help us give more focused aid to those movements. I don’t consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: South Africa, Rhodesia, Zaire, and the Portuguese colonies.

Our comrades in the MPLA solicited us this May for the following:

• a) That we train 10 men in Cuba in guerrilla warfare ….
• b) That we send a crew to fly a DC-3 ….
• c) They want to send a high level delegation to Cuba ….

… Both movements will coordinate with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia for safe passage of our comrades through their territories".^[34]

These considerations in 1972 bore no fruit and Cuba's attentions remained focused on Guinea-Bissau. It was only after the Portuguese Revolution that an MPLA delegation brought a request for economic aid, military training and arms to Cuba on 26 July, 1974. In early October Cuba received another request, this time more urgent, for 5 Cuban military officers to help organise the MPLA army, FAPLA. In December 1974 / January 1975 Cuba sent Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo on a fact finding mission to Angola to assess the situation.^[35] In a letter of 26 January, 1975, handed to Cadelo and Morales, Neto listed what the MPLA wanted from Cuba:

“1. The establishment, organization, and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to train military staff. 2. A ship to transport the war materiel that we have in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if it were in a Cuban ship, could take place outside of territorial waters. 3. Weapons and transportation for the Rapid Deployment Unit (Brigada de Intervencion) that we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions. 4. Transmitters and receivers to resolve communication problems of widely dispersed military units. 5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men. 6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic. 7. Assistance in training trade union leaders. 8. Assistance in organizing schools to teach Marxism… 9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially instruction manuals. 10. Financial assistance while we are establishing and organizing ourselves.“ ^[36]

Although Cuba was considering the establishment of a military mission (military training) in Angola, again there was no official response to this request. It was only reiterated by the MPLA in May 1975 when Cuban commander Flavio Bravo met Neto in Brazzaville while the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their African colonies.^[37]

The MPLA’s hopes for aid were turned to the eastern Bloc countries from where not enough help materialised according to their wishes. Neto is quoted in a Cuban report complaining about Moscow's lacklustre support. He also expressed hope that the war in Angola would become "a vital issue in the fight against imperialism and socialism". But neither the USSR nor the MPLA itself expected a major war to break out before independence.^[38] In March 1975 the MPLA sent ca. 100 members for training in the Soviet Union and the requested financial assistance (100,000US$) it received from Yugoslavia.

[edit] South Africa intervenes

Portugal’s sudden retreat from Angola and Mozambique in 1974 ended a history of South African military and intelligence cooperation with Portugal against the Angolan and Namibian liberation movements dating back to the 1960s.^[39] It also ended economic cooperation, for example with regard to the Cunene hydro-project at the Angolan-Namibian border, which South Africa had financed.^[40]

South African involvement, subsumed under what Pretoria called the “South African Border War”, started in 1966 when the conflict with SWAPO, which had it's bases in Ovambo and Zambia, first flared up. With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the establishment of pro-SWAPO communist rule in the two former colonies South Africa lost highly valued sections of its “cordon sanitaire” (buffer zone) between itself and black Africa. ^{[41] [42][43][44]} In the following years South Africa engaged in numerous military and economic activities in the region, backing a contra war in Mozambique, undertaking various measures at economic destabilization against Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, backing an unsuccessful mercenary intervention in the Seychelles in 1981 and supporting a coup in Lesotho in 1986. It was behind a coup attempt in Tanzania in 1983, provided continuous support for insurgency in Zimbabwe since independence, carried out retaliatory raids against ANC offices in Maputo, Harare and Gabarone and conducted a counterinsurgency war in Namibia against SWAPO. ^[45] SWAPO retreated to and operated from bases in Angola and South Africa was confronted not only with the issue of having to cross another border in pursuit of SWAPO but also of another leftist government in the region. Unlike the other countries in the region, South Africa had no economic leverage on Angola, thus making military action the only possible means to exert any influence on the course of events. ^[46]

On 14 July, 1975 South African Prime Minister Vorster approved weapons worth 14 million US$ to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA.^[47][48] First arms shipments for FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August 1975.

On 9 August, 1975 a 30-man patrol of the South African Defence Force (SADF) moved some 50km into southern Angola and occupied the strategic Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric complex and other installations on the Cunene River after they were threatened by the factions in the escalating Angolan War of Independence.^[49][50] The defence of the Calueque dam complex in southern Angola was South Africa’s justification for the first permanent deployment of regular SADF units inside Angola.^[51][52]

On 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical support. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fighting SWAPO.^[53][54] In addition, on 22 August 1975 the SADF launched operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola. Due to the recent MPLA’s successes UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola,^[55][56][57] and it became clear to South Africa that independence day would find the MPLA in control of Luanda; “neither the United States nor South Africa were willing to accept that.” ^[58]

On 14 October, the South Africans secretly launched Operation Savannah when the first of several South African columns (task force Zulu) crossed into Angola from Namibia, advancing very quickly. A second task force, Foxbat, entered Angola in mid-October.^{[59][60] [61]}The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.^[62][63][64]

The United States had known of South Africa's covert plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as at odds with the version in his memoirs and in contrast to what President Ford told the Chinese, who supported the FNLA but were worried about South African engagement in Angola.^[65] According to Stockwell, “there was close liaison between the CIA and the South Africans” ^[66] and “’high officials’ in Pretoria claimed that their intervention in Angola had been based on an ‘understanding’ with the United States”. ^[67]

[edit] The Cuban military mission

Until late August Cuba only had a few technical advisors in Angola, which the CIA took note of.^[68] Neto had repeatedly requested 100 Cuban instructors but it was only after careful assessment of the situation Cuba decided to establish four military training centres, "Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria" (CIR) in Angola.

On 3 August a Cuban delegation traveled for the second time to Angola to assess the situation. In a memorandum of 11 August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explained the reasons for the visit and briefed on the contents of the talks. He underlined that the aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November was taken into account and the awareness that “the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power”. The delegation handed over 100,000 US dollars.

Neto had complained “of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and “that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs”. Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola “clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces.^[69][70]

After the return of the delegation the Cubans considered the options of their instructors in Angola in case of an invasion by South Africa or Zaire which would be either “guerrilla war” or withdrawal to Zambia, where Cuba proceeded to open an embassy.^[71] On August 15, Castro urged the USSR to increase support for the MPLA and offered to send special troops. The Russians declined.^[72]

In view of the first South African incursion, the CIRs were staffed by almost 500 Cubans instead of the requested 100, which were to train about 5,300 Angolans in three to six months. These 500 men included 17 in a medical brigade and 284 officers.^[73][74] The dispatch started in late August and the most urgently needed specialists used international commercial flights; the remaining were brought on ships and two Cuban planes. The arrival of two Cuban ships in Angola in early October with instructors on board was reported by the CIA^[75] without raising any alarm in Washington.^[76]

The dispatch started in late August and the most urgently needed specialists used international commercial flights. The remaining arrived aboard the Cuban cargo vessel "Vietnam Herioca" in September.^[77]

The CIRs were placed in Cabinda, Benguela, Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar). The CIR in Cabinda accounted for almost half of the total, 191 men, while the others had 66 or 67 each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country The reason for the stronger detachment in Cabinda was the perceived threat from Zaire either to Cabinda or to the Congo.^[78] By the time the training centres were fully staffed and operational on 18-20 October, unnoticed by the world, Operation Savannah was already in full swing.

[edit] Cuba's first intervention

In contrast to the continuing successes in the south, where by mid October the MPLA had gained control of 12 of Angola’s provinces and most urban centres, they only barely managed to keep the well equipped FNLA and its allies abreast on the northern front just east of Luanda.^[79] The FNLA received arms and equipment from the U.S. via Zaire starting in the end of July.^[80][81] The Zairian troops fighting for the FNLA were strengthened in September by the arrival of the Fourth and Seventh Zairian Commando Battalions.^[82] From July to November the front moved back and forth between Caxito and Kifangondo. Netu asked the Soviet Union for more support which had no intention to send any staff before independence and only reluctantly sent more arms.

Forty instructors from the CIR Salazar were the first Cubans to become involved in the defence of Kifangondo on October 23. A second group supported the MPLA on October 28 along the same defence line to the east of Kifangondo.^[83]

The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. South African advisors and antitank weapons had helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October. By 20 October Zulu took Rocadas, by 24 October Sa da Bandeira, by October 28 Mocamedes. On 2-3 November, Cuban instructors for the third time got involved in the fighting, this time 35 to 40 men from the CIR Benguela, when they unsuccessfully tried to help the MPLA stop the Zulu advance near Catengue. On 6 November Zulu took the abandoned harbour city of Benguela, thus seizing control of the terminal of the Benguela railroad, and on 7 November Lobito. In central Angola, combat unit Foxbat with a squadron of armoured cars had moved 800 km north toward Luanda.^[84] The MPLA could not prevent the SADF and UNITA from occupying all of southern Angola and coming within 100 km of Luanda. With the FNLA attacking from the east the situation for the MPLA only a few days before independence looked dim.^[85]

[edit] Operation Carlota

It was only after the MPLA debacle at Catengue that the Cubans became fully aware of the South African invasion and that Luanda would be taken unless they took immediate action. On 4 November Castro decided to send in troops. The same day, a first plane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first two Cuban planes arrived in Luanda with the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces. Operation Carlota had started with only three medium range Bristol Britannia turboprop planes, which had to refuel twice along the way. An artillery regiment was following by sea.^[86][87] The first priority of the Cubans was helping the MPLA to keep hold of Luanda. The MPLA had not officially requested an intervention. The matter had only been discussed with the Cuban military mission.

Fidel Castro explained the Cuban intervention: "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, we offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola".^[88] see also: ^[89]

Unlike the Cuban foreign engagements in the sixties this was no secret operation. Castro decided to support Angola in all openness, sending special forces and 35,000 men infantry by the end of 1976, deploying them at their own expense from November 1975 to January 1976. Thus, with Operation Carlota, named after the leader of a revolt against slavery in Cuba on 5 November 1843, Cuba became a major player in the conflict.

The deployment of troops was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, it also took the USSR by surprise.^[90] The Soviets were forced to accept the Cuban troop deployment so as not to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the United States. Instead, they had in mind to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to a degree of support by arranging for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola.

The Cuban troops able to intervene on the side of the MPLA before the declaration of independence were basically the ones posted in the three CIRs, the 100 specialists that arrived in Luanda on 7 November and the first 158 special forces of Operation Carlota arriving on two planes on 9 November. The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were immediately dispatched to the nearby front at Quifangondo (Kifangondo) where a the Battle of Quifangondo was already raging. They supported 850 MPLA, 200 Katangas and one Soviet advisor. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on 7 November, among them canons, mortars and 6 of the infamous BM-21 (Katyusha) multiple rocket launchers.

[edit] The northern front

Main article: Battle of Quifangondo

Two days before independence the most imminent danger for the MPLA came from the FNLA east of Quifangondo (Kifangondo), supported by three battalions of Zairian infantry troops, Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent and a South African group led by General Ben de Wet Roos. They had broken through the first line at Porto Quipiri, about 50 km from Luanda.^[91]

On 10 November the MPLA and the Cubans warded off the last big attack of the FNLA and its allies, thus securing the capital for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power “to the people of Angola” and shortly after midnight Neto proclaimed the independence of Angola.^[92] Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo.^[93] Yet, UNITA and FNLA could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.^[94][95][96]

It was several days before the US realised the severity of the FNLA defeat at Quifangondo, but even then they didn't appreciate the full significance of the Cuban involvement since the news from the southern front was, in their view, still positive.^[97] Kissinger, like the South Africans, was shaken by the scale of the Soviet and Cuban response. The CIA’s Angolan task force at CIA headquarters at Langley had been so confident of success by the Zairian and South African regulars, that on November 11 the members had celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their crepe paper decorated offices.^[98]

The US had not commented on the South African invasion of Angola but denounced the Cuban intervention when it first acknowledged Cuban troops in Angola in an official statement on 24 November 1975. Kissinger said “that US efforts at rapprochement with Cuba would end should ‘Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate’ continue.” ^[99] On 28 February, 1976, Ford called Castro “an international outlaw” and the Cuban intervention a “flagrant act of aggression”. ^[100]

Gabriel García Márquez wrote that Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez: ‘Our intelligence services have grown so bad that we only found out that Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already there.’ At that moment, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola — more even than Kissinger imagined. Indeed, there were so many ships anchored in the bay of Luanda that Neto said to a functionary close to him: ‘It’s not right’, if they go on like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves.’ It is unlikely that even the Cubans had foreseen that their solidarity aid to the Angolan people would reach such proportions. It had been clear to them right from the start, however, that the action had to be swift, decisive, and at all costs successful.^[101]

Due to the hostility between the USA and Cuba the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted ^[102]. The US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference.^{[103] [104]} The Americans also depicted the motivations and timings of the Cubans differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in Vietnam War. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf.^[105]

Castro regarded the US response to the Cuban intervention: “Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before November 11th? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism.^[106]

On the day of independence the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola inland toward Zaire and Cabinda. By 8 November around 1000 FAPLA troops and 232 Cubans had managed to hold Cabinda, where, with US consent, Zairian troops, FLEC guerrillas and French mercenaries had launched an attack.^[107]

On 3 December 1975, in a meeting with officials from the US and China including Deng Xiaoping (Vice Premier and deputy of Mao Zedong), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State / Foreign Minister), Brent Scowcroft (Assistant to the President for NSA) and George H. W. Bush (Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed, one of them being Angola. Although China had supported the MPLA in the past, they now sided with the FNLA and UNITA. China was especially concerned about African sensitivities and pride and considered South African involvement as the primary and relative complex problem. Kissinger responded, that the US is prepared to “push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created”.^[108] It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in”.^[108] He also said that he had approved 35 million US dollars more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. They discussed and agreed who should support the FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner taking into account the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.^[108]

Cuba operated independently through December and January bringing their troops in slowly, but steadily. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota the Soviets agreed to ten charter flights on long-range IL-62 jet airliners, starting on 8 January.^[109] The bulk of the troops arrived on Cuban ships. By early February, with increasing numbers in Cuban troops and sophisticated weaponry, the tide changed in favour of the MPLA. The final offensive in the North started on 1 January and by late February the MPLA and 300 Cubans completely annihilated the FNLA and drove what was left of them and the Zairian army out of the country.^[110] The last mercenaries already left the north by 17 January.^[111] The South African contingent on the northern front led by General Ben de Wet Roos had already been evacuated by ship on 28 November.^{[112][113][114][115]}

[edit] The south: SADF advance is stopped

Through November and December 1975, the South African Defence Force (SADF) presence in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 personnel.^[116] Despite concerted efforts to advance north to Novo Redondo, the SADF was unable to break through FAPLA defences. With more Cuban troops and supplies arriving by the day, Luanda was to remain out of reach.^{[117][118][119][120]} In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops took Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December. ^[121] By mid-December it became necessary to extend military service and to call in reserves.^[122][123] “An indication of the seriousness of the situation …. is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place”.^[124] By late December Cuba had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda ^[125] and eventually the tide turned in favour of the MPLA. ^[126] Apart from being “bogged down” on the southern front,^[127] there were two other setbacks for the South Africans: the international press took note of the operation and US-policies shifted.

[edit] The world takes notice

The South Africans had managed to keep their invasion hidden from world view for quite some time. It even took the MPLA until 23 October to notice that not white mercenaries but the SADF was advancing on Luanda. Yet it took another whole month for the world press to take notice: On 23 November a major western newspaper, the Washington Post, announced that regular South African troops were fighting inside Angola. Although other papers were still slow to follow, e. g. the New York Times on 12 December, the fact eventually became internationally known. Even the South African population itself had been kept in the dark and it was only on 19 December that the people learned more about what was called the “Border War”, when papers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and the Cubans. As a result the few “friends” South Africa still had strived to distance themselves from the apartheid regime and with international pressure building up Pretoria became increasingly isolated. Even UNITA made an attempt to save face, branding the South African “invaders”.^[128]

[edit] Withdrawal of official US-support

It was only when the US administration asked Congress for 28 million US$ for IAFEATURE that Congress really paid attention to the events in Angola. By then “the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the stench of US-collusion with Pretoria hung in the air. Worse, the growing numbers of Cuban troops had derailed the CIA’s plans and the administration seemed at a loss what to do next.”^[129] The money was not approved and on 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment banning covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill sponsored by Dick Clark extended the ban. (Clark Amendment) ^[130]

The US administration resorted to other means of support for FNLA and UNITA of which one was raising mercenaries. The CIA initiated a covert programme to recruit Brazilians and Europeans, mostly Portuguese and British, to fight in the north of Angola. Altogether they managed to enlist around 250 men, but by the time meaningful numbers arrived in January 1975 the campaign in the north was all but over.^[131]

A report by Henry Kissinger of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:^[132]

"2. There follows an updated situation report based on classified sources.
A: Diplomatic

• (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded OAU meeting, one delegation, headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba’s ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
• (2) In late December early January a MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.

B: Military

• (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of US dollars 30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and material, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
• (2) Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization).
• (3) Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
• (4) Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda’s airport complex.
• (5) Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-42 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-42 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL ? which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-42 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.

C: Other:

• All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.

"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola."^[133] "Cuban sources, however, indicate that the number hovered around 3,500 to 4,000."^[134] This more or less would have put the Cubans at par with the South Africans on the southern front.

[edit] South Africa and UNITA withdraw

In light of these developments Pretoria had to decide whether it would stay in the game and bring in more troops. In late December 1975, there were heated debates between Vorster, foreign minister Muller, defence minister Botha, head of BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) van den Bergh and a number of senior officials as to withdraw or to stay. Zaire, UNITA and the US urged South Africa to stay. But the US would not openly endorse the South African invasion and assure continuing military assistance in case of an escalation. Sobered by the Cuban’s performance and by the West’s cold shoulder, Pretoria chose to fold.^{[135][136][137][138]} On 30 December Vorster decided to withdraw after the OAU emergency session in Addis Ababa on 13 January to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border.^[139][140]

The sentiment of the Pretoria government at the time was expressed in a speech by Botha before South African parliament on 17 April, 1978, in which he charged the US with "defaulting on a promise to give them all necessary support in their campaign to defeat the MPLA” ^[141] : “Against which neighbouring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years, when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story: the story must be told and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch”.^[142] During January, the SADF abandoned the towns of Cela and Novo Redondo ^[143] and FAPLA and the Cubans started first small offensive probes to the south. But apart from a few skirmishes the Cubans stayed well behind the retreating South Africans. By early February 1976 the SADF had retreated to the far south of Angola, leaving behind mine fields and blown up bridges. Four to five thousand troops were to hold a strip along the Namibian border up to 80 km deep until Angola at least gave assurance that it wouldn’t supply bases for SWAPO and that it would continue supply electricity to Namibia from the Cunene dams.^[144] While the Cubans and FAPLA were slowly approaching the southern border, South Africa and Angola took up indirect negotiations about South African withdrawal brokered by the British and Soviet governments. Neto ordered FAPLA and the Cubans to halt at a distance to the border, forestalling a “clash that some feared might trigger an all-out black war to ‘liberate’ white-ruled southern Africa”. ^[145] In exchange for South African recognition he offered to guarantee the safety of South Africa’s 180 million US$ investment in the Cunene hydroelectric complex. ^[146] On 27 March Botha announced the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 27 March 1976. ^[147] On that day the last 60 military vehicles crossed the border into Namibia.

With the withdrawal of South Africa, FNLA and UNITA resistance crumbled and the MPLA was left in sole possession of power. ^[148] Whatever remained of UNITA retreated into Zaire. African countries publicly discredited UNITA for its links with the apartheid regime, the CIA and white mercenaries. “Savimbi's political career appeared to be over. But he was saved by the cold war and his usefulness to the US and South Africa”.^[149]

The United Nations Security Council met to consider “the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People’s Republic of Angola” and on 31 March 1976, branded South Africa the aggressor, demanding it compensate Angola for war damages. Internationally South Africa found itself completely isolated.

[edit] Proxy War, UN Resolutions and Negotiations (late 1970s and 1980s)

Main article: Angolan civil war

At the height of the deployment in 1976 Cuba had 36,000 military personnel stationed in Angola.^[150] The FNLA had all but disappeared from the scene and UNITA mainly receded to Zaire. In addition to the military, around 6,000 Cuban technical, medical and educational staff came to fill the gaps the Portuguese had left behind. Angola’s health system was almost completely run by Cuban doctors, Cuban teachers taught at Angolan schools and Cubans were working on the few construction sites Angola could afford. According to Cubateenica, the government office for non-military foreign assistance, there were more Cuban volunteers than could be accepted and long waiting lists. ^[151] At their March 14 meeting in Conakry, when victory was already assured, Castro and Neto decided that the Cubans would withdraw gradually, leaving behind for as long as necessary enough men to organize a strong, modern army, capable of guaranteeing Angola's future internal security and national independence without outside help. By the end of May, more than 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba, and many more were on the way.^[152] By the end of the year the Cuban troops had been reduced to 12,000 and the MPLA government had been internationally recognized, albeit not by the US. ^[153]

The Cubans had high hopes that after their victory in Angola, in co-operation with the USSR, they could free all of southern Africa from the influence of the US and China.^[154] In Angola, they put up a training camp for Namibian, Rhodesian and South African guerrillas. An SADF intelligence report in 1977 conceded “that SWAPO’s standard of training had improved significantly because of the training they had received from the Cuban instructors”. ^[155]

But one result of the events in Angola in 1976 was the American’s heightened attention to African affairs, especially in the south of the continent. Kissinger worried, “if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.” With the need to distance themselves from outcasts in the eyes of black Africa this also meant the US would drop support for the white regime in Rhodesia, a price it was willing to pay to “thwart communism”.^[156][157] Within five years of Angola’s independence, Rhodesia emerged as the next independent black-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, something Ian Smith, the former Rhodesian prime minister vowed would not happen within a century.

In the following years, Cuba kept itself engaged in a number of other African countries. In 1978, Cuba sent 16,000 troops to Ethiopia Ogaden War, but this time in close coordination with the Soviets. Smaller military missions were active in the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Cuban technical, educational and medical staff in the tens of thousands were working in even more countries: Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, the Congo and Benin. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on full Cuban scholarships per year on the island.^[158][159]

Towards the end of the 1970s, Angola slipped away from wider international public attention. UNITA was able to continue its insurgency operations in the south because of military and logistical support from South Africa and the Angolan government still had not gained control over the whole country. Cuban presence in Angola, initially greatly reduced after the retreat of the South Africans, soon again was increased due to tensions between Angola and Zaire in March 1977 (see Shaba I). Mobuto accused Angola of instigating and supporting an attack of the FNLC (Front National pour la Libération du Congo on the Zairian province of Shaba and Neto charged Mobutu with harbouring and supporting the FNLA and FLEC. Only 2 months later the Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and foiling the Nitista Plot when Nito Alves and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster, which is another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Neto as well as the differing interests between the Soviets and the Cubans.^{[160] [161]} Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened.^[162]

Soon after its retreat from Angola, South Africa waged a war from neighbouring Namibia against South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) operating from bases in southern Angola, now supported by the Angolan government. ^[163] To this end, South Africa continued to support UNITA, which not only fought the Angolan government but also helped the South Africans hunt down SWAPO, denying it a safe zone along Angola's southern border. They SADF established bases in Cuando Cubango Province in south-eastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) supplied UNITA with air cover from bases in Namibia.^[164] South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi’s image abroad, especially in the US. Apart from being a friend to African tyrants Savimbi became the toast of the Reagan White House and was feted by the rightwing establishment in many countries.^[165][166]

In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the ‘’’Contact Group’’’, to work with South Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favour of the installation of a SWAPO government in Namibia.^[167][168]

Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions and UNITA’s northward expansion in the east forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military personnel from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba.^[169]

The first large scale incursions by the SADF occurred in May 1978 (Operation Reindeer), and included an airborne assault on a heavily populated SWAPO camp at Cassinga (also: Kassinga). SADF intelligence believed the camp to be a PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of SWAPO) camp. The operational order was "to inflict maximum losses", but where possible, to "capture leaders".^[170] In the attack (SADF-terminology: Battle of Cassinga) over 600 people were killed, including many women and children. In addition, some 150 Cubans rushing to the camp’s aid from their post 15 km to the south lost their lives on the way. Thus, Cuba suffered its highest single-day casualty of its Angolan intervention. According to the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the camp most likely served civilian as well as a military purposes and the raid constituted a breech of international law and the “commission of gross human rights violations”.^[171] SWAPO and the international media branded the incident a massacre turning it into a political disaster for South Africa. The ensuing international outcry led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on 29 September 1978, calling for Namibia’s independence and, to that end, for the establishment of a “Transition Assistance Group”. ^{[172] [173]} Nevertheless, by the end of 1979, following the bombing of Lubango, an undeclared war was in full swing.^[174]

In Resolution 447 of 28 March, 1979, the UN Security Council concluded "that the intensity and timing of these acts of armed invasion are intended to frustrate attempts at negotiated settlements in southern Africa" and voiced concern "about the damage and wanton destruction of property caused by the South African armed invasions of Angola launched from Namibia, a territory which South Africa illegally occupies". It strongly condemned "the racist regime of South Africa for its premeditated, persistent and sustained armed invasions ... of Angola", its "utilization of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard for armed invasions and destabilization of ... Angola" and demanded that "South Africa cease immediately its provocative armed invasions against ...Angola". ^[175] On 2 November, 1979 the UN Security Council passed yet another resolution (454), branding South Africa in a similar fashion for its aggression, calling upon South Africa "to cease immediately all acts of aggression and provocation against ... Angola" and "forthwith to withdraw all its armed forces from Angola" and demanding that "South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity ... of Angola" and that "South Africa desist forthwith from the utilization of Namibia, a territory which it illegally occupies, to launch acts of aggression against ... Angola or other neighbouring African States". ^[176]

Neto died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow and was succeeded by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Barely one month later Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, immediately taking a harder line with Angola: The Cubans were absolutely to be driven out of Angola.^[177]

In the early 1980s, the United States, in their endeavour to get the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, became directly involved in negotiations with Angola. Angola pointed out it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it wasn’t for the continuing South African incursions and threat at its southern border. The most obvious solution was an independent Namibia which South Africa had to give up. After having to accept a leftist regime in Angola, Pretoria was reluctant to relinquish control of Namibia because of the possibility that the first elections would bring its “traditional nemesis”, SWAPO, to power. It continued to attend negotiating sessions of the Contact Group throughout the early 1980s, always prepared to bargain but never ready to settle.^[178] Cuba, not involved in the negotiations, basically agreed to such a solution paving the way to Namibia’s freedom. Yet, towards the end of Reagan’s second term in office, the negotiations had not born any fruit.^[179]

After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia failed in January 1981, South African military aggression increased against Angolan targets and SWAPO guerrillas. In August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea with eleven thousand troops penetrating 120 kilometres into south-western Angola and partially occupying the provinces of Cunene and Cubango (holding the territory until 1988). The South Africans not only fought SWAPO but openly intensified assaults on Angolan economic targets. The US vetoed a UN Resolution condemning the invasion, instead insisting on Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola. ^[180][181]. Through 1982 and 1983 the SAAF also participated in operations by UNITA, which gained more and more control the countryside. The attacks by far exceeded the previous hit and -run operations and were aimed primarily at the Benguela Railway. The UNITA insurgency and South African attacks had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure, and the hostilities created hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA guerrillas also took foreign technicians as hostages.^{[182] [183]}

In 1984 US Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Angolans and South Africans in Lusaka, Zambia. The resulting Lusaka Accords detailed the disengagement of Angolan and South African forces in southern Angola. In November 1984 Cubans and Angolans presented a plan calling for the retreat of all Cubans to positions north of the 13th. parallel and then to the 16th. parallel, going into effect as South Africa pulled out of Namibia and respected Resolution 435. The Lusaka Accord soon failed when South Africa broke the cease fire. In May 1985 it sent a commando team to blow up a Gulf Oil facility in northern Angola violating the truce and showing that Pretoria was “not interested in a cease-fire agreement or the Namibian settlement to which a cease-fire was supposed to lead.” ^[184]

In 1985 the US Congress rescinded the 10-year-old Clark Amendment. Within a year at least seven bills and resolutions followed urging aid to UNITA, including overt military support and some 15 million US dollars. As of 1986 the US openly supported UNITA. ^[185] By 1986 the war reached a stalemate: FAPLA was unable to uproot UNITA in its tribal stronghold and UNITA was no serious threat to the government in Luanda. ^[186]

[edit] Cuba's second intervention

[edit] Cuito Cuanavale

Main article: Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

In September 1987, the FAPLA, with Soviet support, launched an offensive against the UNITA-stronghold in south-eastern Angola. Cuba’s strategic opinions differed considerably from those of the Soviets and Angolans and Cuba had strongly advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. When the offensive first succeeded and UNITA suffered heavy losses, the SADF, still controlling the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened massively in October, stopped and threw back the Angolan forces. The US sent supplies to UNITA and SADF through the reactivated Kamina Airbase in Zaire. Unlike the Cubans, the Soviet leadership was inexperienced in the African theatre and in spite of considerable aid FAPLA was unable to turn the tide. UNITA and SADF inflicted one defeat after the other. Near the Lomba River, FAPLA was routed and left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died and a part of the Angolan army was cut off from support.^[187]

By early November, the SADF had cornered FAPLA units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them.^[188] Cuito Cuanavale, only a village, was important as a forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola and considered an important gateway to the north. For several weeks the town was shelled from a distance of 30 to 40 km by 155mm artillery and largely destroyed. ^{[189] [190]}

The United Nations Security Council demanded the SADF’s unconditional withdrawal from Angola, but the US ensured that there were no repercussions for South Africa. US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.” ^[191]

The situation for the besieged Angolans became critical. Observers expected Cuito Cuanavale to fall into South African hands any time soon and UNITA prematurely announced the town had been taken. ^[192] Cuba felt impelled to intervene as not to let their Angolan and Soviet allies suffer total defeat. In it’s view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Although not responsible for the dismal situation of the FAPLA, on 15 November 1987 Castro reluctantly decided to intervene and to reinforce the troops stationed in Angola in order to prevent a total disaster for the Angolans by sending fresh detachments of 15,000 troops, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Around mid-January Castro let the Angolans know that he was taking charge and the first Cubans were deployed at Cuito Cuanavale. ^[193] Eventually Cuban troop strength in Angola doubled to about 55,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to counter SAAF air supremacy, which was a critical factor in repelling the South Africans. Castro wanted to “deliver a decisive blow against the South African Forces” and push them out of Angola for good and viewed preventing the fall of Cuito as imperative. ^{[194] [195]}

As in 1975, Cuba again did not inform the USSR in advance of it’s decision to intervene, one reason being that the relationship had become pretty strained. Castro was especially suspicious of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of détente with the US.^[196]

Cuito Cuanavale became the major battle site between Cuban, Angolan, Namibian and South African forces. It was the biggest battle on African soil since World War Two and in its course around 20.000 soldiers were killed. Cuban planes and 1,500 Cuban soldiers reinforced the Angolans at Cuito and the town and the base did not fall. On 23 March 1988, after several unsuccessful assaults the SADF sat back and bombarded the town from a distance of 30 to 40 km. ^[197] As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault “was brought to a grinding and definite halt” by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. ^{[198] [199] [200]}

While the situation at Cuito remained at a stalemate, on 10 March, Cubans, FAPLA and SWAPO units advanced from Lubango to the Southwest towards the Namibian border, retaking the Provinces of Cunene and Mocamedes and meeting virtually no resistance. At Cahama and Xangongo they constructed two forward airbases. Advance units came as far as Chipa, 50 km north of the Caleque dam site.

On 26 May, 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that “heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border”. The SADF forces at Cuito Cuanavale were now in danger of being closed in. In the beginning of June 1988 the SADF called up 140,000 men of the reserves, giving an indication of how serious the situation had become. ^[201] The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on 26 June that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SAAF. He added that “the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety” in South Africa.^[202]

In case of serious South African counter attacks, Castro gave orders to be ready to destroy the Ruacana reservoirs and transformers and attack South African bases in Namibia. But the South Africans refrained from larger operations. Instead, on 26 July they bombarded Cuban units near Chipa with long-range artillery. On 27 June, 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions around the Calueque dam, 11 km north of the Namibian border, also damaging the dam. ^[203] The CIA reported that “Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defences” highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after the Cuban’s air strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, “to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend.” ^[204] The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle “involved serious risks” withdrew.^[205]

[edit] Three Powers Accord

Main article: New York Accords

Soon after the fighting in southern Angola broke out, negotiations for a settlement intensified. Luanda refused any contact with UNITA, instead looking for direct talks with Savimbi’s sponsors in Pretoria and Washington. Diplomatic initiatives had been taken up after Cuba offered to withdraw in 1987. Chester Crocker had initially been quite taken with Cuba’s proposal for a withdrawal but when he presented it to Botha it was flatly rejected. In order to “torpedo” the initiatives Malan “innocently” suggested direct negotiations with Moscow so that the Angola conflict could be solved after the example of Afghanistan. The Kremlin responded mockingly that Angola and Afghanistan hardly had more in common than the initial letters in their name. ^[206] A year later the Cuban proposal was all but forgotten. It was only after the battle at Cuito Cuanavale that the Botha government showed a real interest in peace negotiations. ^[207]

The Reagan administration’s first priority was to get the Cubans out of Angola. In its terminology, by supporting UNITA the US was conducting “low-intensity-warfare”. According to a western diplomat in Luanda, the US “first wanted to get the Cubans out and afterwards wanted to ask the South Africans to kindly retreat from Namibia”. ^[208] Crocker was unable to convince anyone in Europe of this concept, not even his British colleagues. On the contrary, the European Union was ready to help with Angolan reconstruction. This possibly explains Angola’s invitation of the German right-wing politician Franz Josef Strauss, a known friend of Apartheid South Africa who was touring southern Africa in January/February 1988, visiting Pretoria and also meeting with Savimbi. ^[209]

It was agreed, that this time only governments were to take part in the negotiations, which excluded participation by UNITA. The two paramount issues were whether South Africa would finally accept implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, prescribing Namibia’s independence, and whether the parties could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.

The Cubans so far had not participated in any negotiations and the Americans did not have in mind to include them. Castro let the Americans know that negotiations including the Cubans would be much more promising. Hereupon US foreign minister George Schultz authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia but not the US-embargo of Cuba.^[210] Cuba’s calculations were simple: Once the South Africans were out of Namibia and Resolution 435 was implemented, the Boers would be without a safe base to operate from and to destabilize Angola. The Luanda government could hold off UNITA without Cuban help. Cuba also figured that SWAPO, their regional ally, would pipe the tune in Namibia. ^[211]

The Cuban government joined negotiations on 28 January, 1988. Thus for the first time it participated in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia. The South African government joined negotiations in Cairo on 3 May expecting Resolution 435 to be modified. Defence Minister Malan and President P.W. Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only “if Russia and its proxies did the same.” They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On 16 March, 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was “offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon.”

But the Cubans in Angola had reversed the situation on the ground. In fact, the US wondered whether the Cubans would stop their advance at the Namibian border.^[212] Thus, Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation, responded to the South African demands: “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over… South Africa is acting as though it was a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” ^[213][214] Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that the talks had taken place “against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic.”^[215]

With reference to the high casualty rates of their adversaries the South Africans claimed victory at Cuito Cuanavale and that they never intended to take the town and the base. The continuous onslaught of the SADF during the battle pointed in a different direction and former SADF General Jannie Geldenhuys’ views were met with serious doubts when he presented them at a Namibia Conference 1992 in Freiburg, Germany. ^[216]

A ceasefire was agreed upon on 8 August, 1988.^[217] The South Africans were out of Angola by 30 August 1988, before the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola had been discussed. On 22 December 1988, one month before Reagan’s second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the Three Powers Accord in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and, within 30 months, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

The accord ended 13 years of Cuban military presence in Angola which was finalized in stages one month early on 25 May 1991. At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo) and Ethiopia.

[edit] Aftermath

Cuban intervention had a substantial impact on Southern Africa. As W. Freeman, ambassador, US state department, department for African policies, put it into words: “Castro could regard himself as father of Namibia’s independence and as the one who put an end to colonialism in Africa. Indeed, Cuba demonstrated responsibility and maturity. This should have been acknowledged by the USA as an important gesture and merited a respective answer. But American politics concerning relations with Cuba are absolutely poisoned, hence Cuba, which had acted really responsibly, was denied the slightest appreciation it had deserved” ^[218]. At least Crocker had admitted when he cabled Shultz during the negotions, on 25 August, 1988: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”^[219]

In a national ceremony on 7 December, 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. According to Cuban government figures, during all of the "internationalist" missions carried out in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola on May 25, 1991, a total of 2,077 Cubans were killed. Historians estimated the Cuban casualties were around 10,000.^[220] In the years of Cuba's engagement 450,000 Cuban soldiers and development workers had been to Africa.

At the negotiations in 1988 the South Africans had been asked for the release of Nelson Mandela as a sign of goodwill, which was denied.^[221] Mandela remained in captivity until 2 February 1990 when the ANC African National Congress ban was lifted.

Free elections in Namibia were held in November 1989 with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote in spite of Pretoria’s attempts to swing it in favour of other parties.^[222] Namibia gained independence in March 1990. The situation in Angola was anything but settled and the country continued to be ravaged by civil war for more than a decade. In spite of free elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms. Peace only returned to Angola following Savimbi’s death in 2002.

[edit] See also

• South African Border War
• Angolan Civil War

[edit] Further reading

• George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Routledge. ISBN 0415350158. 
• "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
• ICAIC (Instituto cubano del arte e industria cinematograficos)
• Gleijeses, Piero: Kuba in Afrika 1975–1991. In: Bernd Greiner /Christian Th. Müller / Dierk Walter (Hrsg.): Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg, 2006, ISBN
• Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), new ed., 2002.
• Gleijeses, Piero, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988", Journal of Cold War Studies 8.4 (2006) 98-146 Copyright © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
• Arte TV: Fidel, der Che und die afrikanische Odyssee
• Departement Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Hamburg über den Krieg in Angola(Hamburg University)
• Afrika-Bulletin Nr. 123, August/September 2006 mit Schwerpunktthema Angola
• Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt zur Geschichte Angolas(German foreign ministry)
• Welt Online: Wie Castro die Revolution exportierte
• Christine Hatzky: Kuba in Afrika(Duisburg University)
• The National Security Archive: Secret Cuban Documents on Africa Involvement
• Saney, Isaac, "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117.
• Nelson Mendela & Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! (New York:Pathfinder Press, 1991)
• Pazzanita, Anthony G, "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 29 No 1 (March 1991): pp. 83-114.
• Stockwell, John, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978)
• Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two: Repression and Resistance
• Crocker, Chester A., High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. W.W. Norton, 1992.
• Peter Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations 1969–1994 (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1999).
• Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999)
• Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003)
• Willem Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War, 1966–1989 (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989)
• Roger Ricardo Luis, Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale (Havana: Editora Politica, 1989)

[edit] References

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