Crack epidemic (United States)

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Crack Cocaine
Crack Cocaine

The crack epidemic refers to a six year period between 1984 and 1990 in the United States during which there was a huge surge in the use of crack cocaine in major cities, and crack-houses all over the USA. Fallout from the crack epidemic included a huge surge in addiction, homelessness, murder, theft, robbery, and long-term imprisonment. The first effects of the epidemic started in the early 1980s, but the DEA officially classifies the time of the epidemic starting in 1984 and ending in 1990, in what can be considered to be the height of the epidemic.

The epidemic affected all major American cities. Among the cities most severely impacted were Chicago, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and New York. According to New York Senator Charles Schumer, "Twenty years ago, crack was headed east across the United States like a Mack truck out of control, and it slammed New York hard because we just didn't see the warning signs."

Contents

[edit] History

In the early 1980s, the majority of cocaine being shipped to the United States, landing in Miami, was coming through the Bahamas.[1] Soon there was a huge glut of cocaine powder in these islands, which caused the price to drop by as much as 80 percent.[1] Faced with dropping prices for their illegal product, drug dealers made a shrewd business decision to convert the powder to "crack," a solid smokeable form of cocaine, that could be sold in smaller quantities, to more people. It was cheap, simple to produce, ready to use, and highly profitable for dealers to develop.[1] As early as 1980, reports of crack were appearing in Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, and in the Caribbean.[1]

Initially, crack had higher purity than street powder (until crack later became "blow-up" or "whip dope").[2] Around 1984, powder cocaine was available on the street at an average of 55 percent purity for $100 per gram, and crack was sold at average purity levels of 80-plus percent for the same price.[1] In some major cities, such as New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Philadelphia, one dosage unit of crack could be obtained for as little as US$2.50.[1] Never before had any form of cocaine been available at such low prices and at such high purity. More important from a marketing standpoint, it produced an instant high and its users became addicted in a very short time.

Crack first began to be used on a massive scale in Los Angeles in 1984.[1][3] The distribution and use of the drug exploded that same year and by the end of 1986, was available in 28 states and the District of Columbia. According to the 1985-1986 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, crack was available in New York City, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Atlanta, Oakland, Boston, Kansas City, Miami, Newark, San Francisco, Buffalo, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Phoenix, Seattle, and Portland, OR.

In 1985, cocaine-related hospital emergencies rose by 12 percent, from 23,500 to 26,300. In 1986, they increased 110 percent, from 26,300 to 55,200. Between 1984 and 1987, cocaine incidents increased fourfold. By 1987, crack was reported to be available in the District of Columbia and all but four states in the US.[1]

Some scholars have cited the crack "epidemic" as an example of a moral panic, noting that the explosion in use and trafficking of the drug actually occurred after the media coverage of the drug as an "epidemic." [4]

[edit] Iran-Contra Affair

Main article: CIA and Contra's cocaine trafficking in the US

Beginning with the Iran-Contra Affair, some politicians and journalists began suggesting that the CIA contributed to the rise of the epidemic. Allegations ranged from the presence of drug ties to the Contra rebels, to possible direct involvement in drug trafficking by the Contras and even members of the CIA. The exact degree of awareness and involvement on the part of the CIA itself continues to be disputed. However, on April 17, 1986, the Reagan Administration released a three page report acknowledging that there were some Contra-cocaine connections in 1984 and 1985, arguing that these connections occurred at a time when the rebels were "particularly hard pressed for financial support" because U.S. aid had been cut off. [5]

[edit] Kerry Committee report

Main article: Kerry Committee report

The Kerry Committee report was an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding charges of Contra involvement in cocaine and marijuana trafficking. Lasting two and a half years, the Subcommittee released their final report on April 13, 1989. They found that "it is clear that individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking... and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers."[6]

The report cited legal cover provided by the CIA to anti-Sandinista rebels in the drug trade as well as accounting for $806,000 paid by the State Department to "four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers."[7] The Subcommittee found that the Contra drug links included:

  • "Involvement in narcotics trafficking by individuals associated with the Contra movement."
  • "Participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply operations through business relationships with Contra organizations."
  • "Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics traffickers, including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air supply services and other materials, on a voluntary basis by the traffickers."
  • "Payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies."[7]

The committee’s findings provoked little reaction in the media and official Washington. A Columbia Journalism Review article noted that "the Washington Post ran a short article on page A20 that focused as much on the infighting within the committee as on its findings; the New York Times ran a short piece on A8; the Los Angeles Times ran a 589-word story on A11."[8]

[edit] Gary Webb

Main article: Gary Webb

San Jose Mercury News journalist Gary Webb sparked national controversy with his 1996 Dark Alliance series which alleged that the influx of Nicaraguan cocaine started and significantly fueled the 1980s crack epidemic. Investigating the lives and connections of Los Angeles crack dealers Ricky Ross, Oscar Danilo Blandon, and Norwin Meneses, Webb alleged that profits from these crack sales were funneled to the CIA-supported Contras.[8] Although Webb never claimed that the CIA directly aided drug dealers, it echoed the Kerry Committee conclusion that the CIA was aware of large shipments of cocaine into the U.S. by Contra personnel.[8]

Interest in the series occurred outside the mainstream press, as the story spread through black talk radio and the Internet.[8] Hits to the Mercury Center’s website escalated dramatically, some days reaching as high as 1.3 million.[8] Protests across the country were channeled through the Black Caucus in Washington who pushed both the CIA and the Justice Department to initiate internal investigations into charges of government complicity in the crack trade.[9]

Rebuttals to Webb’s argument came from the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. The Columbia Journalism Review states that “it was public pressure that essentially forced the media to address Webb's allegations” noting the contrast between coverage of the Kerry Committee report and “the newspapers’ lengthy rebuttals to the Mercury News series seven years later -- collectively totaling over 30,000 words.”[8] Outside pressure eventually led the editorial board of Mercury News to concede that they had presented “only one interpretation of complicated, sometimes-conflicting pieces of evidence” .[10]

[edit] Aftermath of Dark Alliance

At the conclusion of its internal investigation, CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz testified to the House Committee on Intelligence in 1998:

"We have found no evidence in the course of this lengthy investigation of any conspiracy by CIA or its employees to bring drugs into the United States. However, during the Contra era, CIA worked with a variety of people to support the Contra program. These included CIA assets, pilots who ferried supplies to the Contras, as well as Contra officials and others. Let me be frank about what we are finding. There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity or take action to resolve the allegations."[11]

The CIA's investigation was released in two volumes. The first volume reported finding no information relating Ross, Blandon, or Meneses to the Contras or the CIA. The volume did, however, admit to intervening in Department of Justice prosecution of a San Francisco-based crack dealer with ties to the Contras.[12] The second volume identified more than 50 Contras and Contra-related entities implicated in the drug trade.[13] It also outlined an instance in 1981 when CIA headquarters became aware of a Contra group that decided to "engage in drug smuggling to the United States in order to finance its anti-Sandinista operations" as well as being made aware of an "initial trial run" in which drugs were transported by this organization via plane to Miami.[13]

Also in 1998, Rep. Maxine Waters introduced into the Congressional Record a February 11, 1982 correspondence between Attorney General William French Smith and CIA Director William J. Casey. The "letter of understanding" had explicitly exempted the CIA from "formal requirements regarding the reporting of narcotics violations".[14] This was a technicality which freed CIA field agents from having to report narcotics violations if they witnessed them.[15]

[edit] Impact by region

The drug's worst impact was on the Northeastern and Middle Atlantic States. Crack was also found to be a much bigger problem in big cities than in smaller cities. 70% of the impact of crack was felt in large cities, and the rates per capita were 10 times higher in larger cities than in the rest of the nation. [16]

Researchers found that during the time period studied, cities with the worst crack problems were, New York, NY; Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; Newark, NJ; Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles, CA; Oakland, CA; Philadelphia, PA; New Orleans, LA; Boston, MA; San Francisco, CA; Newport News, VA; Seattle, WA; and Portland, OR. The states with the worst problems were Maryland and New York. [16]

[edit] Crime

Rather than the drug use itself, the greatest social costs of crack were associated with prohibition-related violence. Research by two prominent economists from the University of Chicago, Steven Levitt (co-author of Freakonomics and winner of the 2003 John Bates Clark Medal) and Kevin Murphy (winner of the 1997 John Bates Clark Medal) suggest that crack was the most prominent factor contributing to the rise and fall of social ills in the African American and Latino communities between 1980 and 2000.

"Between 1984 and 1994, the homicide rate for black males aged 14 to 17 more than doubled, and the homicide rate for black males aged 18 to 24 increased nearly as much. During this period, the black community also experienced an increase in fetal death rates, low birth-weight babies, weapons arrests, and the number of children in foster care."[16]

The reasons for these increases in crime was due mostly to the fact that distribution for the drug occurred mainly in low-income inner city neighborhoods. This gave many inner city residents the opportunity to move up the "economic ladder" in a drug market that allowed dealers to charge a low minimum price. The basic reason for the rise of crack was economic. [17]

"Evidently, crack cocaine use and distribution became popular in cities that were in social and economic chaos such as Los Angeles and Atlanta. 'As a result of the low-skill levels and minimal initial resource outlay required to sell crack, systemic violence flourished as a growing army of young, enthusiastic inner-city crack sellers attempt to defend their economic investment.' (Inciardi, 1994) Once the drug became embedded in the particular communities, the economic environment that was best suited for its survival caused further social disintegration within that city. An environment that was based on violence and deceit as an avenue for the crack dealers to protect their economic interests."[17]

[edit] End of the epidemic

Violence from the crack epidemic ended as suddenly as it had begun. Reasons for the drop in crime are not officially known. According to some reports,[who?] increase in police had nothing to do with the end of the epidemic as cities with no police change saw the effect of the epidemic appear suddenly. According to Alan Fox, dean of the college of criminal justice at Northeastern University, "Probably the most important factor [in the drop in crime] was the change in drug markets -- that is, dealers no longer needed to fight over turf for selling the new product, because the boundary lines were now established." [18]

Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, posit in their book Freakonomics that the reason behind the sudden drop in crime in the early 1990s was due to the Roe v. Wade outcome in 1973 and the subsequent legalization of abortions. The poor and young women who did not want their babies were allowed to have abortions and thus stopped the birth of a generation of socioeconomically disadvantaged children being born into a life more inclined towards crime. The end of the crack epidemic in 1990 coincides with the time when all those born after the Roe v. Wade outcome would have been in their late teens, a time when young men enter their criminal prime. As the years passed, more and more kids who would have been born into a life more inclined to crime were simply not there, and crime dropped nation wide. To test for causality rather than correlation, the statistics the authors compiled show that the 5 states which allowed abortions before Roe v. Wade (California, New York, Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington) had their crime drop earlier than the rest of the country. Also the states with the higher rates of abortion had the larger crime drops and vice versa. This was, however, one of several reasons put forward for the observed drop in crime. In another chapter dealing with the economics of crack dealing, they suggest that the falling price of the drug made it no longer worthwhile for low-level dealers to risk injury while aspiring to rise higher in their gangs' pecking orders.

Other reports say that the crack epidemic ended because many young kids had seen the effects on their parents and older siblings. During the 1990s, being called a crackhead became an insult in urban culture. Many young kids from the new generation stayed away from crack and never tried it themselves. Alfred Blumstein, a criminologist from Carnegie Mellon University stated the following factors for the end of the epidemic:

"There are four major factors in the drop in crime," he says. "No. 1 has been getting guns out of the hands of kids, No. 2 has been the shrinking of the crack markets and their institutionalization. Third is the robustness of the economy. There are jobs for kids now who might otherwise be attracted to dealing." In last place, Blumstein says, is the criminal justice response, or as he puts it, "incapacitation related to the growth of incarceration." [18]

[edit] Notes and citations

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h "DEA History Book, [[1876 - 1990" (drug usage & enforcement), US Department of Justice, 1991, USDoJ.gov webpage: DoJ-DEA-History-1985-1990.
  2. ^ The word "street" is used as an adjective meaning "not involving an official business location or permanent residence" such as: "sold on the street" or "street people" in reference to people who live part-time along streets.
  3. ^ The CIA, Contras, Gangs, and Crack
  4. ^ Reinarman, C. and Levine, H., The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in America's Latest Drug Scare. In J. Best (Ed.). Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989; see also Reeves, J. L. and Campbell, R., Cracked Coverage: Television News, the Anti-Cocaine Crusade, and the Reagan Legacy, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994.
  5. ^ "U.S. Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved," Associated Press (17 April 1986).
  6. ^ Cockburn, Alexander; Jeffrey St Clair (October 1, 1999). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press. Verso. ISBN 1-85984-258-5. 
  7. ^ a b Senate Foreign Relations Committee (April 1989). [http://www.pinknoiz.com/covert/contracoke.html Selections from the Senate Committee Report on Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy] (HTML). U.S. Senate. Retrieved on February 12, 2008.
  8. ^ a b c d e f Peter Kornbluh (Jan/Feb 1997). Crack, the Contras, and the CIA: The Storm Over "Dark Alliance" (HTML). Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved on February 10, 2008.
  9. ^ Norman Solomon (Jan/Feb 1997). Snow Job: The Establishment’s Papers Do Damage Control for the CIA (HTML). Extra!. Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  10. ^ Barbara Bliss Osborn (Mar/Apr 1998). Are You Sure You Want to Ruin Your Career? (HTML). FAIR. Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  11. ^ Frederick P. Hitz (March 16, 1998). Prepared Statement of Frederick P. Hitz inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency Before The House Committee On Intelligence subject - Investigation Of allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras In Drug Trafficking to the United States (HTML). Federal News Service. Retrieved on April 22, 2006.
  12. ^ Office of Inspector General Investigations Staff (January 29, 1998). Volume I: The California Story (HTML). CIA. Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  13. ^ a b Office of Inspector General Investigations Staff (October 8, 1998). Volume II: The Contra Story (HTML). CIA. Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  14. ^ AG William French Smith (February 11, 1982). Personal Correspondence Between Attorney General William French Smith and CIA Director William J. Casey (HTML). CIA. Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  15. ^ Craig Delaval (2003). Cocaine, Conspiracy Theories & The CIA in Central America (HTML). Retrieved on February 11, 2008.
  16. ^ a b c How bad was Crack Cocaine? The Economics of an Illicit Drug Market. Researched by Steven D. Levitt and Kevin M. Murphy [1].
  17. ^ a b CRACK:INNER CITY DECAY IN AMERICA [2].
  18. ^ a b Cracked Up. [3].

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[edit] References

[edit] See also

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