Cox v. New Hampshire
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| Argued March 7, 1941 Decided March 31, 1941 |
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Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941),[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that, although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech, it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech for the public safety.
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[edit] Facts of the case
An ordinance in Manchester, New Hampshire, required that every parade or procession on public streets had to have a license and organizers had to pay a fee. Sixty-eight Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for engaging in a public parade without obtaining a permit. The defendants had assembled at their church and divided into smaller groups that marched along sidewalks, displaying signs, and handing out leaflets advertising a meeting. They claimed that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated including their rights to freedom of worship and freedom of assembly.
[edit] Decision of the Court
The Court unanimously upheld the convictions of the Jehovah's Witnesses for engaging in a public parade without a license.
With Justice Hughes writing the majority opinion, the Court unanimously upheld the convictions of the Jehovah's Witnesses for have a public parade without a license and declared that the ordinance was a reasonable police regulation designed to promote the safe and orderly use of public streets:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.
The Court also ruled that the government has an interest in knowing about parades ahead of time so that it can arrange proper security and policing - regardless of the political or religious content of the message of the parade. Thus the government is justified in taking into account the time, manner, and place of a proposed parade in order to determine whether a license may be granted or denied. Further, the license fee did not amount to a fee or tax upon the views expressed in a parade; rather, it was an administrative fee that was needed to cover the extra costs borne by the community when parades occur. The Court thus rejected the claim that the licensing fee infringed on anyone's right to assemble:
No interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions.
[edit] Significance
This decision allowed states to create licensing fees for people who want to have parades or processions. Because governments face greater costs in policing and overseeing parades, they are allowed to pass some expenses on to the groups conducting the events - and hence also have some regulatory power over the events.
Requiring licenses was thus found to be entirely consistent with also allowing time and place restrictions to prevent a public inconvenience.
[edit] References
- ^ 312 U.S. 569 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
