Talk:Correspondence theory of truth

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This really needs an advanced wikipedi-ite to edit and format

Not advanced by any standards, but I did my best. Also, I may have replaced some iff with if, mistaking it for a typo. Please check and fix any mistakes I may have made. --Dangerous Angel 22:36, 10 May 2005 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] I've made two small changes to the lead paragraph

I've made two small changes to the lead paragraph. I broke up a long sentence into two smaller sentences. I then moved the first sentence after the second and reworded it a little to try and clarify the point it was making for the reader. This is my first edit so I hope that I did good and that I'm not over explaining myself!

Seferin 19:31, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "the truthmaker principle"

Can someone please confirm if "the truthmaker principle" is the same as the "correspondence theory of truth"? If it is, please redirect any such searches to this page.

[edit] unsourced logic

I am pasting a big glob of content here from the article... it is not only unsourced, I believe it to violate WP:NOR.

A careful analysis of what Kant is saying here can help to explain why there are so many theories of truth on the contemporary scene. In other words, why would thinkers who examine the question of truth not be satisfied to rest with this very first theory that usually comes to mind? The formulation of this thesis that is commonly taken up and debated within analytic philosophy and its successors is expressed in the form:

  • The proposition that P is true if and only if P corresponds with the facts.
So truth means correspondence with the facts. This is the traditional formulation of the theory. For example, it is true that some dogs bark if the proposition "Some dogs bark" corresponds with the fact that some dogs bark. For another example, the proposition that God exists is true if and only if the existence of God corresponds with the facts. To get around this problem, we can easily see that in order for a proposition to be true according to the correspondence theory, there must exist some fact to which it corresponds: the proposition P has to correspond with the fact that P, if the proposition P is true. So, we can say that it is true that P if, and only if, there exists a fact that P. In this case, it is true that some dogs bark if, and only if, there exists a fact that some dogs bark.
  • The proposition that P is true iff it is a fact that P.
So the correspondence theory could be revised as:
  • P is true when it is a fact that P.
For example:
  • The proposition that dogs bark is true if it is a fact that some dogs bark.
  • The proposition that God exists is true if it is a fact that God exists.
  • The proposition that snow is white is true if it is a fact that snow is white.
This solves the problem of defining correspondence by stating that if there is a fact that P, then that fact corresponds with the proposition that P. Basically, "true proposition" means "factual proposition." However, this reformulation of the theory faces now a different problem: what are facts, and what does it mean to say that facts exist, or that there is some alleged fact? The theory now has to give some definition of what facts are. There are at least three different ways to reply to this objection. The first way is to offer a theory of what facts are, which philosophers in the twentieth century have attempted to do. For example, facts are basically combinations of objects together with their properties or relations; so the fact that Fido barks is the combination of an object (i.e., Fido) with one of Fido's properties (that he barks). The second way to reply is to note that the fact that Fido barks is only one type of fact. There are other types of facts, which may be facts about all dogs, or about the relation of dogs and cats. More importantly, it is possible to specify and categorize all those different kinds of facts. Therefore, a fact exists if all of its component parts exist. For example, if Fido exists, and Fido's barking exists, then the Fido barks exists. A third way is to declare something a fact when it can be measured as belonging to a defined set of attributes. Using Fido, we can make measurements that determine that sound is coming from the location of Fido's mouth; that his mouth and body are making particular motions; and that the audio wave form of the sound has particular characteristics. These measurements then would either meet or not meet the attributes required for belonging to the set of any and all barks. If belonging, then it is a fact that Fido barks. This is similar to the second way above--fact if component parts exist--except make measurement is substituted for observe exists and attributes are substituted for components. Peace, MPS 03:35, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Crossing the road example

I'm don't feel I'm qualified to fix it, since I'm not even sure my point is valid, but for me the example of teaching a child to cross the road is not very persuasive. I don't think language or teaching has anything to do with it; this sort of judgment rests on some fairly old circuitry in the brain. In fact, most mammals and quite a few lower orders are capable of pretty similar behaviors -- although some don't seem to be very good at the "crossing the road" part, do they? Another example: have you ever considered the mechanics of a dog leaping up to grab a Frisbee(tm)? It actually requires some astonishingly sophisticated computing of fast-changing integrands and ... well, you get the idea, I hope. Kids, like all animals, know how to stay out of the way of an oncoming thing; all we teach them is to remember to do it. Or maybe I'm completely off-base. I dunno; one thing Wikipedia has taught me is that I'm no master logician. :) Eaglizard 05:25, 2 September 2007 (UTC)