Talk:Continental rationalism/Archive 1

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As far as I know, the full quotation from Descartes is: dubito, cogito, ergo sum: I doubt, I think, therefore I am. Although I am not a rationalist myself I believe this should be mentioned as a counterweight for the cool and self-assured reputation (which needs not to be wholly incorrect) of rationalists. Sjoerd de Vries

This has been done, Sjoerd, though not because of their "cool" nature, however much of a Fonz the Rationalists may have been! --Knucmo2 21:59, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Philosophers still use rationalism to talk about the tradition begun by Descartes. This is the sense that, for example, Robert Brandom intends when he describes his philosophy as rationaist. ---- Charles Stewart 08:01, 20 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Indeed, in most of the world this is the more common meaning of the word.

MWAK--217.123.73.210 13:09, 3 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Summary, etc.

It's of course true that the artificial distinction between Rationalists and Empiricists means that describing either group in a summary is going to be extremely difficult, but we have to be careful not to turn the summary into a complex and lengthy disquisition. More importantly, perhaps, Leibniz and Spinoza certainly held that, in principle, all knowledge (and certainly not only "metaphysical knowledge") could be gained through reason alone; they also held that in practice we depend upon other methods, and especially science. Descartes is more complex, and consequently less easy to pin down, and the text of the article needs to bring out that fact. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 08:23 (UTC)

I've started a minor rewrite (mostly rearranging, with a bit of expansion and clarification); does this look better? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 08:39 (UTC)
OK, I see your point. When I refered to "metaphysical" knowledge, I was just trying to express the fact that all the rationalists thought that metaphysics had to be based on reasoning from self-evident axioms, but that they differed on what other kinds of knowledge could be so derived, and were generally (somewhat) less interested in deriving other kinds of knowledge in this manner. Anyway, you're right that my version was repeating in the introduction information that was in other paragraphs. Cadr 6 July 2005 11:31 (UTC)
It would be nice to expand this article, but we have to avoid overlapping too much with the articles on the individual philosophers. Any ideas? Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 6 July 2005 16:08 (UTC)
This is just an idea Mel, and it might sound out of place on this particular page. Nevertheless, Plato was a definite precursor to rationalism, with his many arguments for reason over the senses (knowledge of the world not based on the senses but the forms etc.), and it might be worth mentioning him in a pre-Descartes section along with any other philosophers that ascribed to reason. --Knucmo2 15:49, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
I threw in brief reference to Plato in the Rationalism article recently (though without any serious attention to fact-checking the whole article)-- Plato is yet more pertinent here. The ongoing back-and-forth between rationalism and empiricism may deserve brief further description too. Fact is, even Plato, for instance, regarded the earlier Sophists as quite un-empirical. So the back-and-forth has always occurred in the context of progress towards better understanding of the natural world, with another generation of rationalists coming along and saying, essentially, let's not get hogtied by "positivism" here, and then the speculations get a bit ambitious. Descartes is, of course, the poster child for both rationalism and solipsism (perhaps also for dualism) and in some sense a direct descendant of Plato, the reason being that he was essentially working on his own version of the a priori "Forms". Along came the empiricists and essentially said "we need a reality check here" and ended up going overboard in the opposite direction. So the debate is interesting and it seems to me worthy of mention in this article, perhaps including passing mention of Plato and Aristotle as a similar pair of polarities in the historical debate...Kenosis 17:34, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, Aristotle is just as much an influence, I'd have said, together with mediaeval and renaissance philosophy. Mention of the main influences would be fine, but more would overbalance it.

Making clearer the differences between the "big three" would be a good thing, as would material on philosophers such as Malebranche, Arnauld, Gassendi, et al. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:13, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Why would Descartes be a "poster child" for solipsism? Kenosis' account of the relationship between the so-called rationalists and empiricists is conventional and somewhat simplistic. Leaving aside the fact that, in many ways, Locke et al. were closer to Descartes in many ways than were Leibniz and Spinoza, the relationships between the six big names were much more complex (as were those between Plato and Aristotle). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:46, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
It was intended to be simplistic for these purposes (the introductory content of the article in Wikipedia on Continental rationalism, expected to be read, inter alia, by persons who are unfamiliar with the material). And quite true that there are many overlaps here. The issues I intended to bring forth here are:
(1) Descartes, in the context of his day, falls on the same side of the basic debate as Plato did in his.
(2) Descartes, in this regard along with Spinoza and Leibniz, was presuming (to borrow on Kantian terms a bit) an "underlying" "noumenal" realm that could be accessed by reason alone, with Descartes in particular failing to acknowledge the full extent to which he was in fact building on an empirically derived framework (providing, according to Descartes, that one exercised adequate rational doubt).
(3) Descartes is indeed a "poster child" for dualism
(4) A brief reference to an analogous polarity between Plato and Aristotle seems to deserve brief mention, because, other distinctions aside, Plato was presuming that a priori knowledge is accessible with reason. So was Descartes, at which point the empiricists chose to weigh in.
(5) While I was not advocating such a discussion in the article, Descartes was in fact off on his own spin (hence solipsist). That is an unsustainable mode when it dominates a discussion in any given day, and has a certain tendency to lead to wilder and wilder speculations and "outrun" the ability of one's contemporaries to do "fact checks" or "reality checks."...Kenosis 19:18, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Another thing. It's good to see you here. I appreciate the depth of your insight into the issues as I watch you and Knucmo2 work to develop this article further...Kenosis 19:29, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

"Simple" can be good, but "simplistic" involves oversimplification. With regard to the specific points:

  1. My view is that this is too much of a simplification to be helpful.
  2. The claim that Descartes assumed an underlying noumenal realm involves reading into him something that I don't find there (Spinoza is the closest of the three to a sort of Kantian notion, but even he is very different). Descartes was very clear about the need for experience (mediated by the scientific method).
  3. "Poster child" is presumably North American slang, but in so far as I understand it, it's probably true with regard to dualism — not solipsism, though.
  4. Plato believed in a distinct realm of Forms or Ideas, accessible in experience, after philosophical work, by the philosopher. Descartes believed in nothing like this; for him a priori knowledge is achieved through the use of reason, not by experiencing anything like the Forms. I agree that Descartes was in part influenced by Plato, but not so directly, nor to the exclusion of other influences. (Much more important are the influences of Suarez and others, and that has more claim to be mentioned in the article.)
  5. I'm not sure what you're taking "solipsist" to mean (or "off on his own spin", in fact). Well, actually I don't really understand any of your last point; could you explain further? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 20:55, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

I was the one borrowing on Kant, not Descartes. But the principle is the same; as I recall, his line of reasoning from Meditations arrives at just such a realm (after, of course, he arrives at the famous conclusion that he himself is not a fantasy). Plato, incidentally, arrives at his forms in a way quite similar to that of Descartes. As Aristotle (in his later years) responded to Plato, so the empiricists responded to Descartes. Leaving the editors here with the task of making reasonable decisions how (if at all) to represent these matters in a way that's meaningful. You, however, are the one presently doing the work, along with Knucmo2, so I will need to be content to wish you good regards on it for now...Kenosis 22:25, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you have in mind with regard to a sort of noumenal-world view in the Meditations. Could you specify?
Again, you'll need to be more specific with regard to the comparison between Plato and Descartes; which line of reasoning do you see in both of them?
I certainly agree that the "empiricists" (in common with all other philosophers for the next century or two (or more) responded to Descartes, though I think that the relationship between Aristotle and Plato was somewhat different.
Thanks for your good wishes; I'd decided not to get involved in philosophy articles again, because the acrimony was worse than that encountered in almost any other part of Wikpedia (even in politics and religion it tends to be disguised a little better), so I'm a bit reluctant to continue with this. but we'll see. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:11, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
My take is this: If there are things-in-themselves (noumena) as differentiated from phenomena then Descartes leaves with his schema and even his duality somewhat intact after the damage assessment is over. Same with Plato and his Forms. Slice it however one likes, the philosophal approaches of both Plato and Descartes are highly a priori-oriented, even after they give due credence to the empirical method. Aristotle preferred to see in the whole of nature all the necessary attributes for discovery without reliance on an a priori system, and so did the empiricists (however much of a quandary they themselves got into with their opposite one-sided approach). Centuries later, William James identified the "demarcation line" quite succinctly: "The directly apprehended universe... requires no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a continuous or concatenated structure." And therein lies the rub — start speculating about what lies "beyond" and the door is wide open for all kinds of speculative tomfoolery. Enter, at that point, both Aristotle and the empiricists with stern expectations for reality checks.
But, I believe you've already phrased it well in the article by cautioning the reader about oversimplification, and also acknowledging that the classifications are useful for basic organizational purposes. So far so good, as I see it...Kenosis 18:13, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Expansion

I have expanded this article, pinpointing the thought of the three great Rationalists, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Leibniz's section I believe is a little thin on the ground, and the other two may have room for improvement. I have left Kant in there for now, in that I like the section that was wrote on him. --Knucmo2 12:02, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Note that the principle of pre-established harmony doesn't explain mind-body interaction, as at the level of monads there's no such thing as body (it's a well-founded phenomenon). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 17:38, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

It's important not to turn this into an article about three philosophers; it should be about rationalism (in so far as that really existed). Discussion of content should also take place here, not in long comments in the article itself.

What? Since this a discussion of philosophers' work and the differences between them, the overlap is inevitable. Leibniz was dismayed by the lack of freedom (look at the sources I gave you) in Spinoza's system and its lack of reliance on Catholic theology, and Leibniz, as a pious man (whose project was to try and reconcile his religious beliefs with science) reacted to these radical ideas of Spinoza. It wouldn't bother me at all if either us were to abolish the idea of Leibniz's reaction to other thinkers in the article, but they served as useful contrasts between the thinkers, as I remember you declaring that differences between the philosophers need to be amplified. --Knucmo2 19:05, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Leibniz was Protestant... Moreover, his system lacked freedom to exactly the same extent that Spinoza's did, and for much the same reasons. Why do you think that Leibniz had one project, or that it involved the reconciliation of science and religion?
The philosophers should be examined with regard, not to their specific positions, but to the approach that led to them being called "rationalists" (and to the things that militate against that sort of labelling). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Think before you type. Where did I say that he only had one project? I am fully aware that the man, as a polymath had numerous aims. Don't you think that works such as "The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Founded on Reason" (1714), and Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason (Introduction to the Theodicy) point to a project of some sort of desire to reconciliate faith with science? Mechanics, and the sciences for Leibniz, are rooted in metaphysics; the mathematical and scientific laws of the phenomenal realm point point to the rational God of his system. Science and religion are therefore linked. He also believed reason would contribute to a reconciliation of the schism caused by Reformation. You are right in that Leibniz was a Protestant, but he believed in the validity of Catholic theology also, and as already mentioned, was not hostile to Catholics. --Knucmo2 23:04, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
  1. "whose project was", not "one of whose projects was".
  2. You're confusing reason with science.
  3. Why do you find it impossible to admit that you've made a slip. You said: "Leibniz was dismayed by [Spinoza's system's] lack of reliance on Catholic theology"; that is not consistent with his being a Protestant, no matter how little hostility he felt towards Catholics. That "he believed in the validity of Catholic theology" might be true, but he didn't believe in its truth. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Well, mainly it might be for the very same reason that you are guilty of the same thing, unwilling to accept that you are wrong on any issue whatsoever. I am stating this now before I pen any more responses. You are uncollaborative, and I refuse pointblank to collaborate with such an obstinate editor who enjoys to nitpick over minor issues and then transvalue them to mean something really big. For instance, why didn't you just correct my slip-up on grammar above rather than didactly mention it here? That directly contradicts your point that I refuse to admit mistakes. That is probably you, who is refusing to do that. I also notice you have not bothered to respond to my proposed settlement for this article yet, indicating evermore that you'd rather argue the toss with me than try and approach some settlement as regards this dispute. Correct me if I am wrong, for this point may very well be an argument from ignorance, but I am only going on what I have witnessed this as I write. I could have corrected the typos you made in your posts, but now I do not feel sufficiently charitable enough to do so. As for Leibniz's position, he did obviously believe in the validity and truth of some of the Catholic theology of his time, in that he tried to reconcile their principle of authority with the Protestant's freedom of action. He even wrote a statement of Catholic creeds entitled "Systema Theologicum", a piece of Catholic theology. With Des Bosses he reckoned that he could give an account of transubstantation acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants. Yes, he did think that reason would have been sufficient to heal the breach between the churches. So it is perfectly consistent with Leibniz's approach, in that he wanted a united church. Leibniz was concerned about preference between a doctrine of faith (as he was religious, I imagine) and an observation derived from the laws of nature and reason, and given that Leibniz said: "Science also serves as the foundation for friendship, which is only solid and lasting if it rests on reason" (Phil., VII, 43, 45, 46-7.), its fair to see how he thought science and reason as compatible. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

First:

K: "Where did I say that he only had one project?"
ME: "'whose project was', not 'one of whose projects was'."
K: "why didn't you just correct my slip-up on grammar above rather than didactly mention it here?" (!)
A linguistic slip-up, nothing more. --Knucmo2 17:14, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

Secondly:

K: "Leibniz was dismayed by [Spinoza's system's] lack of reliance on Catholic theology"
ME: "Leibniz was Protestant"
K: "he believed in the validity of Catholic theology"
ME: "that is not consistent with his being a Protestant"
K: "he did obviously believe in the validity and truth of some of the Catholic theology of his time" (my italics, to bring out the slide).

Oh, I can't be bothered with the rest. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:44, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

You can't be bothered because it's unclear as to what you are showing. You simply asserted the case that it's inconsistent, offering no justification for this other than your own oracular pronouncements - whereas I showed you evidence that he did believe in and trust the validity of some of the Catholic theology of his time with several examples, but go ahead, dismiss these too, its your tried and tested method. I didn't assume when I said: "lack of reliance on Catholic theology" that he believed all of it, so no slide can be said to have taken place, this is an illusion supplied by you to buttress your point, nor does it invalidate the examples I gave you, o Holy Oracle. --Knucmo2 17:14, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

With regard to a couple of substantive issues:

  1. The comment on innate ideas is oversimplified (especially given Leibniz's complex and sometimes obscure discussion).
  2. You keep saying that people like Descartes state or declare things; they argue.
  3. Leibniz certainly responded to Descartes, but the extent to which he's responding to Spinoza is much less clear. That he did so in the way and for the reasons that you give (which owes a great deal to a view of the issue developed later) is far less clear.
  4. It's a good idea not to lose your temper quite so early in a discussion. I have indeed read Leibiz, at great length and in depth — not only for both of my graduate degrees, but for papers and books that I've written, and for the teaching that I do, of which Leibniz is a regular part. That we disagree should not immediately be put down by you to my ignorance — that's not a very philosophical attitude. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 18:42, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
1. Point one is of course true - but it is invariably an idea associated with rationalism. If you had bothered to look, it was placed in the introduction, not the place for a lengthy excursus on a subject. A key idea is introduced, and simplified in an introduction, and then elaborated upon elsewhere. If you did an article on historical materialism, would you want to write about the complexity and the difference between Marx/Lenin's conception of it, all in the introduction? Of course not.
Just because something is in the summary doesn't mean that it can be oversimplified. Moreover, it's not clear that it's central or essential to any of three philosophers (though a certain view of them once led to its being exaggerated by historians of philosophy). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Well, innate ideas are essential to Descartes's position. And plus, why do you think the empricists attacked the idea of innate ideas??? If for nothing else it serves as a contrast to the empiricist viewpoint. It is so very obviously part of the rationalist position, and, just as one example, direct yourself to the Rationalism vs. Empiricism page at Stanford, a fine example, which makes judicious mention of it. Again, I think you are making the assumption that I am accused of in that we only disagree because you have superior knowledge of the philosophers in question. Descartes held that innate ideas are attributes of the human mind planted there by God, and these were held to be foundations for all other knowledge (as well as the Cogito). This was disputed by Locke, an empiricist.
No, innate ideas play no essential rôle in Descartes' main arguments, and certainly not as the basis of the cogito. This is a frequent (and sloppy) claim that used to be made by commentators, but you won't find it in Descartes. He mentions innate ideas, and seems fairly clearly to believe in their existence in some form, but that's a different matter.
As for your point about "the empiricists" attacking innate ideas, it depends upon the false and anachronistic assumption that any of these philosophers saw themselves as part of one or other group; that division came later, with Kant. Locke was arguing against a notion, not against a philosophical school whose existence he didn't recognise. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
The cogito is an essential, and supposedly indubitable basis for Descartes' system of knowledge. Descartes writes, of innate ideas: “on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew before”, furthermore, "[W]e come to know them by the power of our own native intelligence, without any sensory experience." Descartes is referring to what happens when the Cartesian method is used to discover innate ideas. Look at this page here too, which I trawled from Stanford: [1], which makes reference to primary and secondary sources by philosophers.
Of course the cogito is an essential and undubitable basis for Descartes' system; it's just not an innate idea. Without references or even context for the Descartes quotations, I can't comment. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Context was there, I was talking about innate ideas (What part about the sentence that precedes it: "Descartes writes that" do you not understand?) and that was not hard to see whatsoever (Innate ideas are grasped by reason. The quotation was from Descartes' Meditations, but I am not in the habit of footnoting quotations on editorial pages. You shall simply have to take my word for it, or open your own copy of it. I was not arguing that the cogito was an innate idea however, though I can understand as to why this misinterpretation has arose. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
If I can be unwise enough to butt in, I think this is a misunderstanding caused by an ambiguity in one of your sentences. You said: "Descartes held that innate ideas are attributes of the human mind planted there by God, and these were held to be foundations for all other knowledge (as well as the Cogito)". One reading of this implies that innate ideas are the foundation of the Cogito. I presume you intended the other reading, where the Cogito is one of the foundations for knowledge. Cadr 16:41, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
That the empiricists attacked innate ideas is not something I dispute. It just so happened that we've (and people before us) historically made a distinction between them in order to perhaps pigeonhole them. That Locke did argue against innate ideas, as an empiricist, shows a contrast with the rationalists. Leibniz argued for innate ideas too, pace Malebranche and Locke, and tried to show how they were possible in New Essays On Human Understanding. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
You seem to have misunderstood what I said about innate ideas. there were various philosophers who held various positions and offered various arguments; it's possible to divide them up in many ways, all equally sensible. Largely because of Kant, one way – rationalists/Empiricists – has become standard, but it's artificial, and often misleading. That Locke argued against and Leibniz for innateness of different kinds (and they were often arguing about very different sorts of thing — innate knoeledge, principles, abilities, dispositions, etc.) is indisutable; to say that "the empiricists" argued against "the rationalists" is anachronistic. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Yes, Locke, as an empiricist argued against them, not because he was an empiricist. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
2. Point two is trivial. You may state or declare things, but that does not of necessity mean them to be true. Germany may state that someone has invaded their territory, or they may declare it, or they may even argue about it. Philosophers do declare matters, in that they reveal things, or make them manifest, or that they affirm things to be true. They also state things in that they set their arguments forth in words. My style therefore is fine. But I'll let you keep thinking that its a "substantive issue"!
The essence of philosophy is argument, but a common misconception is that it's the laying out of "deep" or significant opinions or beliefs. We should make sure that we don't pander to the popular view. yes, as a philosopher I do think that the nature of the philosophivcal enterprise is important; I'm not sure why you don't. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
You're making an irrelevant tempest out of an irrelevant teacup. What's more your mischaracterising my view, in an attempt at setting up a straw man. I have never denied that argument is part of philosophy (Where on earth have I ever said that???). You called to attention my use of verbs, which I showed to be valid in accordance with their definition, and now you want to make the invalid jump from this into accusing me of being non-philosophical!! This is a fine example of fallacious argumentation. For what it's worth, Plato referred to knowledge as "justified true belief", and declaring and asserting things are all done in the course of argument usually. I shall not nitpick over the use of verbs anymore like some sterile linguistic philosopher, and it is not pertinent to the issue WHATSOEVER. If I am grossly ungrammatical, then of course I am at fault for my LANGUAGE, not for my philosophy.
We seem to differ in that you think that one can use whatever words one wants so long as one's heart's in the right place, while I think that using the right word in the right place is an essential part of communication. i don't know what more to say, except to hope that your emotional rsponse has temporarily blinded you to the implications of what you're saying. Incidentally, Plato didn't refer to knowledge as justified true belief; that is one view that he considered in the Theaetetus, to be criticised, though I'm not clear in any case what relevanmce that has. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
I showed you the validity of the words that I used by providing definitions. It is not merely because I think their "heart's in the right place", a curious, if somewhat supercilious dismissal, but one which cannot be said to invalidate my point. If anyone is blind here, it is you who called me unphilosophical in your previous point, because of my usage of words (!) and then illogically inferred that I didn't think argument wasn't part of philosophy (What are we doing here?) The words themselves were not inherently unphilosophical any way. Then, I am accused of "emotional responses" to your posts. Sorry, but I am not wanting to shout you down in anyway, nor have I been the one mischaracterising other's views in an attempt at fallacious argument. That seems to me, an emotional response for you to keep in check also. Indeed, I said Plato referred to knowledge as "justified true belief" (I realised it was not a quotation from the Theaetetus) and that the account shows what a role beliefs play in philosophy. A belief is a conviction about the truth of the proposition. If someone disagrees with this belief, or does not like the justification for it, THEN they engage in argument. Beliefs therefore, are a massive part in philosophy, and they are frequently presupposed by philosophers, when they state or declare them in the course of their argument. I shall nitpick about this no more. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
It's worrying that you took a comment that one of your arguments was unphilosophical as a personal attack on you as unphilosophical. This is another indication that your emotional heat is leading you astray. Similarly, it's disturbing that you take my request that we describe philosophers as arguing rather than merely stating as a claim that you don't think that argument is philosophically important.
That beliefs are propositional attitudes is one view (and one that I broadly sympathise with), but not the only one. Moreover, that knowledge is a kind of belief that meets certain consitions is a view that Plato rejects; he holds that belief and knowledge are distinguished in large part by their objects.
I clearly wasn't claiming that beliefs aren't important to philosophers; I was saying that when one presents the work of philosophers it can be misleading to present them as being primarily defined by their conclusions rather than by the arguments they offer. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
It is worrying that you are now twisting the meaning of your original arguments in order to suit your latest ones; you said: "Yes, as a philosopher I do think that the nature of the philosophivcal [sic] enterprise is important; I'm not sure why you don't." The nature being argument. Thus, you clearly said that I don't take argument as important. My "emotional heat" has not led me astray one etch on this matter, but this is just another example of knee-jerk dismissal by you rather than consideration. As for your last point, you're contradicting yourself yet again. You said: "but a common misconception is that it's the laying out of "deep" or significant opinions or beliefs". Deep, insightful beliefs are laid out in the process of philosophy, and they are part of which lead to arguments and conclusions. Your original point was a minor one about my use of verbs (which you thought was a substantive issue) and you made a sweeping generalisation from this that I didn't care for argument in philosophy. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
3. Point three confirms my point adroitly. Since the time of your dismissal of my sources, and the time you've posted this remark on "issues", no sufficient time will have passed for you to have read any of the sources I've offered to you, let alone any time to consider them, or reconsider your own viewpoint. What's more, you simply say its clear that he definitely did respond to Descartes. Well, please show me this, for this seems just as unclear as the Spinoza reception, which is far more convenient to resolve given the historical information I have given you to read (but which you have not, as of yet). It is granted that Leibniz called Descartes' system "defective".
I'm surprised that you're still talking as though I don't have an intimate knowledge of these philosophers, and that I rely upon your references to inform me of their work. Both Spinoza and Leibniz make many references to Descartes, both making explicit reference to him in developing their own systems of thought; this is beyond debate, a matter of simple fact, and it's surprising that you think it unclear. Leibniz's meeting with Spinoza gave rise to some work on matters such as the ontological argument, and Leibniz was indeed aware of his positions more generally, and largely disagreed with him, but I know of no argument that this played a significant rôle in the development of Leibniz's own thought. (Try looking up "Descartes" and "Spinoza" in the index of a collection of Leibniz's works. The Loemker edition, for example, has twenty-eight entries for Spinoza, all but one single-page mentions, and sixty-four for Descartes, more than half of them spanning multiple pages. While both Spinoza and Leibniz wrote substantial works on the philosophy of Descartes (such as Leibniz's "Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes" (1692) and, of course, Spinoza's "Descartes' Principles of Philosophy" (1663)), Leibniz only wrote one short and fragmentary piece on Spinoza, devoted to the ontological argument and to possibility. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
To talk as if you DID have an intimate knowledge would be to make a false presupposition, as you've given me no other reason to suppose this other than your word and a few corrections about where I've gone wrong on Leibniz, parts that where wrote entirely from memory. I don't doubt you have some knowledge of Leibniz, but you are unwilling to address the sources given. I would say THAT is ignorance. Alfred Weber said: "The life of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, like his doctrine, forms the counterpart of Spinoza's." If you wish to doubt the veracity of the sources I have presented to you, then that is your own separate enterprise. Write to the authors themselves. But I notice you still haven't bothered to read them. You may have better things to do, but until that, don't bother dismissing my contributions please. Note that I presented an actual reference to Leibniz! Perhaps you've addressed these sources in these books of yours? 28 is not enormously smaller than 64. Plato and Zeno perhaps have unequal places in terms of reference in Aristotle's work, but that doesn't lessen the significance of Zeno's arguments against motion and the effect they had on Aristotle does it? Or the course it had on the physics book he wrote. You seem to be arguing that frequency determines significance. Even if Leibniz didn't consciously react to Spinoza, his theory his in contradiction to Spinoza in quite a few ways. Philosophers can work against each other without making it explicit (the conclusions of their theories may imply an objection to a precedessor). It would hard to be deny that their meeting had a great effect thought that is impossible to determine. It is worth mentioning the difference in the article, something YOU specifically appealed for.
  1. Primary sources trump secondary.
  2. As I made clear, it isn't simply a matter of 28 vs 64 (though I'd have thought that more than double was fairly significant). The mentions of Spinoza almost all consist of single lsentences on one page (and closer inspection reveals that some of them are in editorial footnotes); more than half the mentions of Descartes cover more than a page, often significantly more. You go on to appeal to interpretation and surmise, which we can't depend upon. We can say that Leibniz disagreed with Spinoza, but not that (we think it's obvious that) he wrote as he did in response to Spinoza. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
My sources that I gave, as secondary as they are, are more than just interpretation and surmise, and actually, I believe I referred you to a Leibniz source also, whilst quoting some illuminating passages from his work. However, I believe we are approaching a settlement on this matter in that we can mention it was opposed to Spinoza's theory but not wrote directly in response to thereof. That would be fine, from where I stand. --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
4. Point four is pathetic and patronising. I appreciate you may have had a solid education in Leibniz, but your dismissals rather than showing why my sources are not as good as yours did not suggest this. You have clearly not had enough time to comment that the sources I gave are not "clear". It's very possible that we have both read Leibniz but are coming towards it from different angles, which will of course depend on our own individual readings of it. This would be unfortunate. I didn't accuse you of ignorance per se, I simply gave you sources to justify my belief. If you teach in philosophy, then you are a valuable asset to Wikipedia. --Knucmo2 18:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
?? How is it patronising to object to your assumption that, because we disagree, I can't have read Leibniz? Again, the use of words like "pathetic" and "patronising" seem designed merely to raise the emotional temperature; why? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Not at all. I found you accusing me of accusing of something I didn't. I asked you to read the sources I gave to you for my case, but you haven't yet. I have plenty more sources too, and of course my knowledge of Leibniz. The raising of emotional voltage in no way diminishes my commitment to the cause here, nor my capacity to argue, to resolve some sort of dispute. As such your charge is irrelevant here. I can hardly be said to have been uncivil.
Well, actually referring to another's comments as "pathetic and patronising" is uncivil on any account, but I've been trying to avoid accusations of that sort; I'm simply trying to get you to calm down. You might think that your emotional state doesn't affect the clarity and cogency of your arguments, but that would make you non-human. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
I've recognised that an emotional state in my case changes the focus my argument rather than distorts it, though I've never it lost so much on Wikipedia (nor in any debate AFAIK) as to start shouting at others. If I have created a climate of "greater conflict and stress" I will accept responsibility for my part of it, though I hope my recent posts can point the way to some sort of agreement. --Knucmo2 10:54, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
As for Leibniz answering the mind-body problem, yes he did, by simply denying that there was dualism. Mind and body are composed of the same substance (monads). This could be elaborated in the article with some degree of coherence and relevance.
This article is about rationalism; the place for an explanation of Leibniz's philosophical position is in an article on Leibniz, surely. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:58, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Now you wish to deny the significance of Cartesian dualism in relation to rationalist philosophers and that subsequent RATIONALIST philosophers wanted to plug the gap or abolish it? Fantastic. Go ahead and delete the parts on Spinoza's rationalism that deal with it. --Knucmo2 22:49, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Descartes is the only one of the three so-called rationalists to have been a Cartesian dualist; Locke was a Cartesian dualist, and though Hume isn't, he leans towards it more than either Spinoza or Leibniz. You seem to be confusing an important thesis of one philosopher with a defining element of a supposed school. If anything, dualism is significant precisely because it marks one of the ways in which this distinction is faulty. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 08:41, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
Descartes' dualism is clear enough to me as his theories go. He seems to have given it a clear exposition in the Meditations, by separating the mind and the body, so no, there is no confusion here. Indeed, Meditation VI refers to "And Of The Real Distinction Between The Mind And Body Of Man". My point was that the great Rationalists in the article have approached the "problem" by postulating different solutions. Spinoza penned a pan-psychical response to the mind-body problem and Leibniz wanted to do away with it, introducing Monads. As you said, there is significant evidence of Leibniz having read Descartes in his works, so Leibniz must have been aware of the quandary of Cartesian dualism. I didn't mean to say that Leibniz nor Spinoza were Cartesian dualists. --Knucmo2 10:09, 13 April 2006 (UTC) --Knucmo2 10:15, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
  1. But where do you find me arguing that Descartes wasn't a dualist?
  2. He didn't separate mind and body, he argued for a Real Distinction between them; although he believed (as a Christian of a certain sort) that the mind survived the body's death, he recognised that he couldn't demonstrate this. It's logically possible that mind and body be separate (and hence they can't be the same thing — they're really Distinct, are different substances), but it may not be possible given the nature of the world. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 09:18, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
And where did I accuse you of denying Descartes' dualism? I was simply saying that Descartes explains his dualism clearly, not an accusation of your lack of knowledge (I believe I've given you credit enough for your knowledge elsewhere). Separation and distinction should be taken as synonyms in my point above. In talking about the mind, and the body, he gives them separate attributes, and as you say, it's logically possible that the mind and body can be distinct and separate. That notwithstanding, your point above: "It's logically possible that mind and body be separate (and hence they can't be the same thing — they're really Distinct, are different substances)" is not relevant here as its a comment on the truthhood of dualism, not pertinent to the article. This is the end of my involvement forthwith. --Knucmo2 10:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

"Separation and distinction should be taken as synonyms in my point above"! This, together with some almost wilful misreadings of what I've said mean that there's little point continuing with this discussion.

The main point is that whatever is written in the article should be sourced, and involve no original research. Let's make sure that that is the case. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 16:36, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

You've taken the above point and generalised it to most of the other points I made, dismissing them as "wilful misreadings" despite offering no sort of response to them, a wilful false generalisation if ever there was one. If my misreadings were indeed misreadings, they were certainly not misread perversely. That sort of a false presumption isn't very philosophical, nor is it warranted. I have offered, as you have, sources both primary and secondary (actually, you've mentioned barely any throughout this debate) The discussion must cease, for Wikipedia is not an academic battleground --Knucmo2 16:59, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
Arghhh, I'm not gonna bother striking through any of the above, it should be preserved, if only as a reminder to me and others be more civil. I apologise for being frequently uncivil and aggressive during this debate. We've managed to avoid an edit war, a positive, and I shall instead hope to find a consensus based on the principle mentioned above: WP:NOT --Knucmo2 14:12, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
We've both been getting over-heated. Perhaps we can put all the above behind us and start again. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 22:11, 16 April 2006 (UTC)