Talk:Confederate government of Kentucky

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Contents

[edit] Merger with Russellville Convention

It seems like a good idea to merge Russellville Convention into this article. The Russellville Convention article is a stub, and most of the information has already been included in this article.

[edit] Bethel College

While there was a Bethel College in Hopkinsville[1], I think it is more likely that the convention moved to the Bethel College that was in Russellville at the time. I don't have access to the reference to see if it mentions the city. Griffinity 04:33, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

Actually, it doesn't mention the city. Originally, I had thought it was talking about the Bethel College in Tennessee. Wonder how we could find out for sure? Acdixon 13:31, 31 May 2007 (UTC)
Seems you are right. I contacted Dr. Lowell H. Harrison via a librarian at Western Kentucky University, and he confirms that the meeting was moved to the institution in Russellville. Thanks for the heads-up! I've corrected the text. Acdixon 16:56, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Albert Sydney Johnston

I have found references that spell his middle name Sidney here and Sydney here and here. Annie Catron 17:12, 20 June 2007 (UTC)

I see. I was just going with the spelling in his Wikipedia article. I'm not actually sure which is correct. Acdixon 17:16, 20 June 2007 (UTC)
I think we should leave it with the Wikipedia article. I've been delved into my family ancestry, and I've noticed there are many variations on names, and it seems that spelling of names wasn't as important in the past. For example, many censuses show multiple variations on given names, whereas the surname is almost always correct. -- Steven Williamson (HiB2Bornot2B) - talk 15:03, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Rewrite of Background

The following is a hurried, rough draft of how I would expand the background section and smooth out the transition to the next section. The message that my sources as well as Harrison (I obtained "Civil War in Kentucky" and "Kentucky's Governors" from the library) seem to make is that the main force in Kentucky was not really the Unionists or the Secessionists but the larger majority that was primarily concerned with peace and security. Over the course of half a year this position became more closely associated with Union and the secessionist minority was given no choice but acquiescence or secession by September 1861. Two of the references I use (Heck and Shortridge) are old journal articles and the other two (Catton and Nevins) are books that are part of multi-volume works on the war. I found your reference to the participation in the June elections was incorrect and have corrected it -- Harrison in "The Civil War in Kentucky" (page 11) does say that the vote was "over half the 1860 canvas", but he says the total votes cast were 125,000. However on page 4-5 the total votes cast in 1860 come to 138,000 which makes the actual percentage about 85%.

[edit] Background

Unionist traditions within Kentucky had remained strong throughout her brief history. The state had strong economic ties with Ohio River cities like Pittsburg and Cincinnati while at the same time sharing many cultural, social, and economic links with the South. Many slaveholders felt that the best protection for slavery was within the Union. The presidential election of 1860 reflected Kentucky’s mixed heritage when the state gave Bell 45% of the popular vote, Breckinridge 36%, Douglas 18%, and Lincoln less than 1%. Historian Allan Nevins read the results as strong opposition to both secession and coercion against the secessionists. The majority coalition of Bell and Douglas supporters was seen as a solid moderate Unionist position that opposed precipitate action by extremists on either side. (ref Nevins pg. 129-130) This moderate position, that followed the “great Henry Clay tradition of compromise and peaceful adjustment” and was exemplified by the efforts of Senator John J. Crittenden during the secession winter of 1860-61, would hold sway for the first half of 1861. (Catton pg. 366)

In response to the election of Abraham Lincoln, on December 9, 1860, Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin sent a circular letter to his fellow slave state governors advocating a constitutional amendment to outlaw Northern personal liberty laws, extend the Missouri Compromise Line to cover all new territories, grant free access to the Mississippi River, and provide the South with the power in the United States Senate “to protect itself from unconstitutional or oppressive legislation upon slavery. (ref Shortridge pg 285)

Magoffin next called a special session of the Kentucky General Assembly on December 27, 1860.[1] At issue was Kentucky's response to the secession, and Magoffin asked legislators to call a convention of Kentuckians to decide the Commonwealth's course.[1] When the legislature met on January 17, Magoffin attempted to set the tone by declaring:

We, the people of the United States are no longer one people, united and friendly. The ties of fraternal love and concord, which once bound us together, are sundered. Though the Union of the States may, by the abstract reasoning of a class, be construed to exist, it is really and practically, to an extent at least, fatally impaired. … Kentucky will not and ought not to submit to the principles and policy avowed by the Republican Party, but will resist to the death if necessary. (Shortridge pg 290)

The Louisville Morning Courier on January 25 articulated the position that the secessionists faced in the legislature, “Too much time has already been wasted. The historic moment once past, never returns. For us and for Kentucky, the time to act is NOW OR NEVER.” (ref Shortridge pg.290.) The Unionists, on the other hand, were unwilling to surrender the fate of the state to a convention that might “in a moment of excitement, adopt the extreme remedy of secession.”(ref Heck pg. 333) The legislature was roughly evenly divided between the Bell-Douglas factions and the Breckinridge faction, however the Unionist position carried when many in the Breckinridge group, opposing the calls for immediate secession, voted against the convention.(ref Shortridge pg. 290-291) The Assembly did, however, send six delegates to a February 4 Peace Conference in Washington, D.C., and asked Congress to call a national convention to consider potential resolutions to the secession crisis, including the Crittenden Compromise, authored by Kentuckian John J. Crittenden.[1]

On April 2 Breckinridge addressed the Kentucky legislature and proposed a conference of the border slave states to discuss a resolution to the secession problem. The meeting was set for late May in Frankfort, and both the Unionists and the States Rights Party fielded a full slate of candidates for the election. However the attack on Fort Sumter changed the situation and the States Rights Party withdrew participation in the election, leading to a lopsided Unionist victory of 106,863 to 4,262. The Unionist vote exceeded the total votes cast in the presidential election (93,073) for Bell, Douglas, and Lincoln.(ref Shortridge pg. 293)

As a result of Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln sent a telegram to Governor Magoffin requesting that the Commonwealth supply supply four regiments as its share of the overall request of 75,000 troops for the war.[2] Magoffin, a Southern sympathizer, replied "President Lincoln, Washington, D.C. I will send not a man nor a dollar for the wicked purpose of subduing my sister Southern states. B. Magoffin"[3]

Magoffin’s policy was to establish armed neutrality that would reject both secession and coercion. Magoffin originally tried, on his own authority, to borrow from Kentucky banks a half a million dollars for the arming of the state, but his efforts fell far short and all his efforts accomplished was apprehension among Unionists that the governor was attempting to bypass the legislature in order to create a pro-Confederacy military force.(Shortridge pg 296) Both houses of the General Assembly met on May 7 and passed declarations of neutrality in the war, a position officially declared by Governor Magoffin on May 20, 1861:

I hereby notify and warn all other States, separate or united, especially the United and Confederate States, that I solemnly forbid any movement upon Kentucky soil, or occupation of any part or place therein, for any purpose whatever, until authorized by invitation or permission of the legislative and executive authorities. I especially forbid all citizens of Kentucky, whether in the State guard or otherwise, from making any hostile demonstration against any of the aforesaid sovereignties; to be obedient to the orders of lawful authorities; to remain quietly and peaceably at home when off of military duty, and refrain from all words and acts likely to provoke a collision, and so otherwise to conduct themselves that the deplorable calamity of invasion may be averted; but, in the meantime, to make prompt and efficient preparation to assume the paramount and supreme law of self-defence, and strictly of self-defence alone.(refCatton pg. 367.)

The legislature rejected his renewed calls for a state convention and for arming the state guard. (Shortridge pg. 297)

In a special congressional election held June 20, 1861, Unionist candidates won nine of Kentucky's ten congressional seats.[4] Confederate sympathizers won only the Jackson Purchase region,[4] which was economically linked to Tennessee by the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.[5] Believing defeat at the polls was “certain”, many Southern Rightists had boycotted the election; of the 125,000 votes cast, Unionists captured close to 90,000.[6] Southern sympathizers were dealt a further blow in the August 5 election for state legislators. This election resulted in veto-proof Unionist majorities of 76–24 in the House and 27–11 in the Senate.[4]

Historian Wilson Porter Shortridge made the following analysis of the election results:

These elections demonstrated that a majority of the people of Kentucky were opposed to secession, but they could not be interpreted as an approval of the war policy of the Lincoln administration, as was quite generally done at the north at that time. Perhaps the best explanation at that time was that the people of Kentucky desired peace and thought that the election of the union candidates was the best way to get it.(Shortridge pg. 297)

The state continued its official policy of neutrality. Inspector General Simon B. Buckner, commander of the State Guard, reached an agreement with Union General George B. McClellan and Tennessee Governor Isham Harris so that both sides would respect Kentucky neutrality. [6] Both Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln found it in their own interests to accept the official status quo for the present. However both sides within the state were making efforts to arm themselves. The State Home Guard was being organized and equipped by the Governor and was widely viewed as a pro-Confederate unit. Pro-Union home guards were also being prepared throughout the state and armed by the national government.(ref Catton pg. 368-370)

With actual secession no longer considered to be a viable option, the pro-Confederate forces became the strongest supporters for neutrality, although Unionists simply dismissed this as a front for their true secessionist agenda. Unionists, on the other hand, struggled to find a way to move the large, moderate middle to a “definite and unqualified stand with the Washington government.” The maneuvering between the two finally reached a decisive point on September 3 when Confederate forces were ordered from Tennessee to the Kentucky towns of Hickman and Columbus, and Union forces responded by occupying Paducah.(Shortridge pg. 298-300)

Governor Magoffin had already been struggling with the Unionist legislature. Most of Magoffin's vetoes to protect southern interests were overridden in the General Assembly.[7] On September 11 the legislature passed a resolution instructing Magoffin to order the Confederate forces (but not the Union forces) to leave the state. The Governor vetoed it and the General Assembly overrode its veto. The process was repeated the next week when the assembly officially requested the assistance of the Union, and asked the governor to call out the state militia to join the Federal forces.(ref Shortridge pg. 300)

[edit] Formation

A pro-Confederate peace meeting, with John Breckinridge scheduled as a speaker, was scheduled for September 21. Fearing this would lead to actual military resistance, troops were dispatched from Camp Dick Robinson to disband the meeting and arrest Breckinridge.(refHeck pg. 343) Breckinridge, as well as many other state leaders identified with the secessionists, including future state governors under the Confederacy, Richard Hawes and George Johnson, fled the state and eventually served as the nucleus for a group that would create a shadow government for Kentucky. In his October 8, 1861 "Address to the People of Kentucky," Breckinridge declared "The United States no longer exists. The Union is dissolved."[8]

[edit] Compromise attempt

[edit] Background

Unionist traditions within Kentucky had remained strong throughout her brief history. The state had strong economic ties with Ohio River cities like Pittsburg and Cincinnati while at the same time sharing many cultural, social, and economic links with the South. Many slaveholders felt that the best protection for slavery was within the Union. The presidential election of 1860 reflected Kentucky’s mixed heritage when the state gave Bell 45% of the popular vote, Breckinridge 36%, Douglas 18%, and Lincoln less than 1%. Historian Allan Nevins read the results as strong opposition to both secession and coercion against the secessionists. The majority coalition of Bell and Douglas supporters was seen as a solid moderate Unionist position that opposed precipitate action by extremists on either side. (ref Nevins pg. 129-130)

John Breckinridge represented the states rights position in Kentucky and nationally
John Breckinridge represented the states rights position in Kentucky and nationally

In response to the secession of South Carolina from the United States, Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin called a special session of the Kentucky General Assembly on December 27, 1860.[1] At issue was Kentucky's response to the secession, and Magoffin asked legislators to call a convention of Kentuckians to decide the Commonwealth's course.[1] The Louisville Morning Courier on January 25 articulated the position that the secessionists faced in the legislature, “Too much time has already been wasted. The historic moment once past, never returns. For us and for Kentucky, the time to act is NOW OR NEVER.” (ref Shortridge pg.290.) The Unionists, on the other hand, were unwilling to surrender the fate of the state to a convention that might “in a moment of excitement, adopt the extreme remedy of secession.”(ref Heck pg. 333) The Unionist position carried when many of the states rights legislators, opposing the idea of immediate secession, voted against the convention.(ref Shortridge pg. 290-291) The Assembly did, however, send six delegates to a February 4 Peace Conference in Washington, D.C., and asked Congress to call a national convention to consider potential resolutions to the secession crisis, including the Crittenden Compromise, authored by Kentuckian John J. Crittenden.[1]

As a result of the firing on Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln sent a telegram to Governor Magoffin requesting that the Commonwealth supply supply four regiments as its share of the overall request of 75,000 troops for the war.[2] Magoffin, a Southern sympathizer, replied "President Lincoln, Washington, D.C. I will send not a man nor a dollar for the wicked purpose of subduing my sister Southern states. B. Magoffin"[3] Both houses of the General Assembly met on May 7 and passed declarations of neutrality in the war, a position officially declared by Governor Magoffin on May 20, 1861.

In a special congressional election held June 20, 1861, Unionist candidates won nine of Kentucky's ten congressional seats.[4] Confederate sympathizers won only the Jackson Purchase region,[4] which was economically linked to Tennessee by the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.[5] Believing defeat at the polls was certain, many Southern Rightists had boycotted the election; of the 125,000 votes cast, Unionists captured close to 90,000.[6] Southern sympathizers were dealt a further blow in the August 5 election for state legislators. This election resulted in veto-proof Unionist majorities of 76–24 in the House and 27–11 in the Senate.[4]

Historian Wilson Porter Shortridge made the following analysis of the election results:

These elections demonstrated that a majority of the people of Kentucky were opposed to secession, but they could not be interpreted as an approval of the war policy of the Lincoln administration, as was quite generally done at the north at that time. Perhaps the best explanation at that time was that the people of Kentucky desired peace and thought that the election of the union candidates was the best way to get it.(Shortridge pg. 297)

With actual secession no longer considered to be a viable option, the pro-Confederate forces became the strongest supporters for neutrality, although Unionists simply dismissed this as a front for their true secessionist agenda. Unionists, on the other hand, struggled to find a way to move the large, moderate middle to a “definite and unqualified stand with the Washington government.” The maneuvering between the two finally reached a decisive point on September 3 when Confederate forces were ordered from Tennessee to the Kentucky towns of Hickman and Columbus, and Union forces responded by occupying Paducah.(Shortridge pg. 298-300)

[edit] Formation

A pro-Confederate peace meeting, with John Breckinridge scheduled as a speaker, was scheduled for September 21. Fearing this would lead to actual military resistance, troops were dispatched from Camp Dick Robinson to disband the meeting and arrest Breckinridge.(refHeck pg. 343) Breckinridge, as well as many other state leaders identified with the secessionists, fled the state. These leaders eventually served as the nucleus for a group that would create a shadow government for Kentucky. In his October 8, 1861 "Address to the People of Kentucky," Breckinridge declared "The United States no longer exists. The Union is dissolved."[8]

On October 29, 1861, 63 delegates representing 34 counties met at Russellville, Kentucky to discuss the formation of a Confederate government for the Commonwealth, believing the Unionist government in Frankfort did not represent the will of the majority of Kentucky's citizens.[8] Trigg County's Henry Burnett was elected chairman of the proceedings.[8] Scott County farmer George W. Johnson chaired the committee that authored the convention's final report, and introduced some of its key resolutions.[2] The report called for a sovereignty convention to sever ties with the Federal government.[2] Both Breckinridge and Johnson served on the Committee of Ten that made arrangements for the convention.[8]

[edit] Response to Compromise Effort and Further Suggestions

Here is the bibliographical information from my suggestion:

Allan Nevins, “The War for the Union: The Improvised War 1861-1862”, (1959) SBN 684-10426-1, Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Bruce Catton, “The Coming Fury”, (1961), Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York.

Frank H. Heck, “John C. Breckinridge in the Crisis of 1860-1861”, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 21, No. 3, (August 1955).

William Porter Shortridge, “Kentucky Neutrality in 1861”, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 9, No.4 (March 1923).

Here’s my current problem. My original objections to the article were that specific statements alluding to the reasons for secession were in the article without discussing the accuracy of the observations or alternative POVs. My suggested remedy was a background section that provided this information. I did not think you addressed this adequately in your attempt to provide a background section and your latest proposed expansion still leaves us far apart. Ironically, while I think your changes have all significantly improved the article, I also find that the improvements raise a lot of additional issues.

There was another way you could have responded to meet my initial objections. You could have totally eliminated this paragraph:

“On November 26, 1861, Governor Johnson issued an address to the citizens of the Commonwealth blaming abolitionists for the breakup of the United States.[7] He asserted his belief that the Union and Confederacy were forces of equal strength, and that the only solution to the war was a free trade agreement between the two sovereign nations.[7] He further announced his willingness to resign as provisional governor if the Kentucky General Assembly, which was overwhelmingly Unionist, would agree to cooperate with elected governor Beriah Magoffin, a Southern sympathizer.[7] Magoffin himself denounced the Russellville Convention and the provisional government, stressing the need to abide by the will of the majority of the Commonwealth's citizens.”

I still fail to see the issue with this paragraph. Magoffin supported the Confederate position and the General Assembly supported the Union position. This is sufficient to inform the reader (who is presumably interested in the state's Confederate government) as to why the two clashed. If they want more information, it is available in Magoffin's article. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

And eliminate this sentence:

“The origin of the movement to create a Confederate government for Kentucky remains unknown. The inspiration may have been derived from the actions of Missouri Confederates in forming a shadow government for their state.”

Done; I've replaced the first two paragraphs of the Formation section with the paragraphs in my compromise attempt above. There is now no mention of uncertainty regarding the formation of the government. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

And eliminate this phrase:

“… believing the Unionist government in Frankfort did not represent the will of the majority of Kentucky's citizens.”

I have reworded this to use Harrison's term ("deluded"), as you point out below. Ironically, I did not use that word originally in order to avoid POV concerns. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

With these eliminated (unless I missed something else) you will have totally eliminated the “why questions” (the can of worms that those sections open) and will have an article that limits itself to describing what the secessionists did, what type of government they created, and what that government accomplished. There would be no need for a background section. I suppose you can still do that now.

Absent that, here is my response to your proposed compromise. It seems to me that an integral part of an article addressing the Confederate government of Kentucky is to describe who formed it, why they formed it, and who supported it. You deleted from my proposal information that contributes to that understanding, leaving an article that departs from NPOV. Specifically:

1. You deleted the section regarding Magoffin’s letter. The section demonstrates that a specific motivation for the CA sympathizers was the issue of slavery – three out of the four proposals by Magoffin relate directly to slavery. Without the information provided here, the reader asking why there was a movement for a secession convention is left in the dark.

I disagree. I believe the larger issue here was states' rights. Slavery was just the mechanism for manifesting the issue. Magoffin was opposed to coercion. His letter seems to have been intended to stave off the immediate concerns over slavery, but even if his compromise had been accepted, the states' rights issue would have remained. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
You may personally disagree, but historians disagree. For example, from Harrison's "Civil War in Kentucky, "He [Lincoln]was a native of Kentucky, but his 'house divided' speech speech had alarmed many slaveholders who would not accept the curtailment of slavery expansion that he and his party demanded." (pg. 4) and "The election of a sectional president by a sectional party committed tto halting the expansion of slavery was, to them, a call for action." (pg. 5) Tom (North Shoreman) 12:58, 19 July 2007 (UTC)
I've added this information as one of several attempts by Kentuckians to stave off the coming conflict. Acdixon 14:47, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

2. You include colorful and specific language from Magoffin on his reason for denying Lincoln’s troop requests. However you delete the section from his January 17 address that refers to additional reasons that explain secessionist motivations (i.e. “Kentucky will not and ought not to submit to the principles and policy avowed by the Republican Party, but will resist to the death if necessary.”)

3. Elsewhere in the article (this has been discussed on the FA discussion page) you write that the secessionists believed that the existing government did not represent the will of the people of the state. (What Harrison wrote in “Kentucky Governors” was “George Johnson and other Kentucky Confederates DELUDED themselves into believing that the government in Frankfort did not represent the wishes of the majority of the state’s citizens” – the “deluded” part was left out and probably should be included) You have deleted the section that describes the May vote for the delegates to the Frankfort Convention and the impressive vote total against secessionists – a POV necessary to provide balance.

As mentioned above, I have changed to Harrison's wording. As to the Frankfort Convention, the article already mentions two lopsided victories for Unionists at the polls. I don't see why this additional defeat is necessary to balance POV concerns. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
It is necessary because of the lopsided nature of the votes and the fact that it is another instance that contributes to the overall picture of the feelings of the majority of Kentuckians. You are shooting for an FA rating and including these results adds to the comprehensiveness of the article. Tom (North Shoreman) 12:58, 19 July 2007 (UTC)
This adds little if anything to a comprehensive understanding of the Confederate government. That they were self-constituted, in the minority, and lacking in legitimacy can be well understood from the existing information. Adding yet another lopsided election defeat just belabors the point and further expands a Background section that is becoming too long already. Acdixon 14:47, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

4. Elsewhere in the article (also discussed on the FA discussion page) you included a statement that the legislature was not cooperating with the governor as justification by Johnson for secession. You have deleted a section referring to Magoffin’s attempt to bypass the legislature in order to raise troops that (allegedly) would be pro-CSA. Without specific information regarding the nature of the disagreements the reader is left wondering what the issues were. Readers are left without the information to evaluate whether or not Johnson and the secessionists had a valid point or not.

5. You delete an additional section relating to the implementation of neutrality by Buckner and problems with it, again focusing on the military aspects. While this section is not crucial by itself, it does provide valuable information with respect to several other sections that you deleted.

I still maintain that this has little if anything to do with the formation or activity of the government itself. It belongs in Kentucky in the American Civil War. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

6. You delete the paragraph regarding the governor’s and the legislature’s reaction to the Polk “invasion”. This is the event that directly led to the secessionists taking their actions to form a new government. It is also a very important example of the non-cooperation of the legislature with the government alluded to by Johnson.

I can see your point here. Would you say that the pro-Confederate peace meeting headed by Breckinridge was a response to the legislature's actions? Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

In the FA discussion you mentioned that you thought the “Background” section was too long in comparison to the actual article on the government itself. While I would normally, like you, question such a disparity, this is an unusual situation. The fact is, as you recognize, that the Kentucky CSA government spent very little time actually governing. I think an article on the CSA government itself would be similarly skewed if the war had ended, as some thought it would, after 120 days or so. The political debates, compromises, and changes relating to the decision by some to form a new government occurred, as it usually does, before the government was created. Unlike the situation in Virginia, for example, the Kentucky convention had only one side represented so you have to look elsewhere for the substance of the debate.

Having said that, there is information and details omitted from the main body of the work that you could include and, in my opinion, should include in order to meet the “comprehensive” requirement (“It is well written, comprehensive, factually accurate, neutral and stable.”) of a FA article. I imagine it could add 8-10 paragraphs just based on what I have in my home library. Examples:

1. In the lede you write, “…General Braxton Bragg attempted to install the provisional government as the permanent authority in the Commonwealth. However, Union General Don Carlos Buell ambushed the inauguration ceremony …” You say basically the same thing in the body under “Richard Hawes as Governor”. There is much more that can be said about the decisions leading up to this “ambush”. In Noe’s “Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle” Noe starts on page 124 with, “With the major battle for control of Kentucky seemingly about to occur west of Frankfort, Bragg abruptly turned to other matters and quickly made a stupendously illogical decision.” The reason for this decision, of course, relates to the importance of establishing a CSA state government on the soil of Kentucky and Noe has information that could be incorporated into your article.

2. Noe also has very useful information on the details of the inauguration ceremony itself that would be relevant to your article.

3. You mention Bragg’s desire to implement conscription. Noe has additional details on page 104.

1–3 sound pretty relevant to the article, but I don't have access to that book, rural libraries being what they are. I can try to get it on interlibrary loan at some point, but if you have specific additions you'd like to contribute, please do. Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
I will be glad to add it at some point, but I am reluctant to do it now with so much up in the air. Tom (North Shoreman) 12:58, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

4. The overall issue of military enlistment by Kentuckians during the war, like the voting information prior to the war, is an indicator of popular support (or lack thereof) for Kentucky’s secessionist government. Freehling’s book “The South vs. the South” has useful information (i.e. twice as many Kentuckians enlisted with the Union rather than the CSA yet 71% of eligible white males fought for neither side) that could be used to expand your mention of CSA recruitment problems.

5. You write, “The legislative council voted to endorse Bragg's plan, and on August 27, Governor Hawes was dispatched to Richmond to favorably recommend it to President Davis. Davis was non-committal, but Bragg proceeded, nonetheless.” William Cooper Jr. in “Jefferson Davis, American” has a different take. On page 400 he writes of the Kentucky invasion, “Eager to reverse that circumstance, Davis emphasized to Bragg and Smith the importance of popular support by Kentuckians for the Confederate Army.” He then describes specifics on the political goals of the invasion that can be incorporated into the article.

6. You mention very little about Kentucky’s congressional delegation. It is my recollection that part of the general influence of congressmen from occupied states was a tendency to reinforce a “no compromise” attitude towards the war. Noe (page 26) makes reference to a “Kentucky bloc” in Richmond of Confederate expatriates that “refused to allow anyone to give up the dream of a Confederate Kentucky. He provides no further details but does refer to a work by Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones (“The Politics of Command”) who elaborate on this subject (I don’t have that book).

My idea was to focus on the state government, but this probably would be a good addition if, again, I could get a hold of the book(s). Acdixon 16:11, 17 July 2007 (UTC)
I can also at some point add this. I located two other sources that have references to this. Tom (North Shoreman) 12:58, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

7. You provide numbers for the counties represented at the secession convention but don’t really provide geographical information concerning where the secessionist drew their supporters (other than the Jackson Purchase reference elsewhere). Freehling describes a Kentucky “black belt” covering ¼ of the state that included the Blue Grass region running from Lexington to Bowling Green. It would seem like there should be more information out there on the geographical concentration of secessionist leaning folks (i.e. county voting records). Tom (North Shoreman) 15:47, 15 July 2007 (UTC)


I believe I have sufficiently addressed your three major concerns:

  1. The nature of Magoffin's disagreements with the legislature have been elaborated upon in enough detail for the reader to have his or her most basic questions answered. If they want a more in-depth view, they can see Kentucky in the American Civil War and Beriah Magoffin.
  2. The fact that the Confederate government was acting without the sanction of the majority of Kentuckians is clear from the results of three separate elections (complete with commentary by historians) and the reluctance of Kentuckians to volunteer for Confederate military service. A balancing POV that the Commonwealth's economic interests, spirit of compromise, and tradition of Unionism contributed to the strong Union sympathy has been provided.
  3. Language about the uncertainty of the origin of the idea to create a Confederate government has been replaced with analysis of the political landscape that led someone at some time to propose the idea.

Perhaps there is more that could be written about various topics in the article (including the facts you bring up from Noe above), but I believe everything that has to be written for the article to meet the comprehensiveness requirement has been written. Acdixon 14:47, 19 July 2007 (UTC)

Your most recent additions help, but still do not address the slavery issue adequately. You still have as the primary reason for the Governor calling for the legislature as the secession of South Carolina, when there is a clear quote available showing that the reason was the election of Lincoln. You added the circular letter, but not in its proper chronological order which was in early December -- before South Carolina had seceded. If you have gone as far as you intend to, let me know and I will write a brief note on the FA discussion page to modify my previous objections. Tom (North Shoreman) 12:32, 25 July 2007 (UTC)
The botched chronology was just an oversight on my part; I've corrected it and added the date of the letter. I've also removed the reference to secession being the motivation for Magoffin's special session. However, it does seem from what I've read that the primary purpose of the session was deciding whether or not to call a sovereignty convention. The fact that Magoffin expressed strong opposition to Lincoln and his party in his opening remarks – I'm assuming that's the "clear quote" you're referring to – may indicate his personal beliefs, but the hallmark of his administration was to abide by the will of the people, even when it disagreed with his own. This leads me to believe that he wanted the sovereignty convention to ascertain the will of the people, although he may have used the platform of his opening remarks to try and sway the assembly and the people to his way of thinking. Perhaps there is more in the remarks omitted by the ellipsis that would discount my belief.
Regardless, please do update your feelings on the FA nom page to show that we are still working on this article. I'm afraid it will be prematurely closed otherwise. Acdixon 14:23, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Special election?

An odd but unexplained detail: why did Kentucky hold a special election for all of its Congressional representatives in mid-1861? Wouldn't there have just been an election the previous November? --Jfruh (talk) 05:13, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

[edit] The central star? Main Page versus this page....

Shouldn't the excerpt from Confederate government of Kentucky that appears on the Wikipedia Main Page be an excerpt from this page?

The current Main Page says the following:

Kentucky was represented by the central star on the Confederate battle flag.

No such assertion appears on this page. I don't see any recent edits that added or deleted this statement. Here are the versions at the moment: [2] [3]

I'd like to know if this statement is true, but there are no footnotes on the Main Page. — Lawrence King (talk) 08:28, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Hacker has defiled the page, can someone please restore it? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.47.154.36 (talk) 11:17, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

I have restored the info based on the source cited. Acdixon (talk • contribs • count) 11:44, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

[edit] "provisional government" or "shadow government" a better term?

Provisional government: "A provisional government is an emergency or interim government set up when a political void has been created by the collapse of a previous administration or regime. A provisional government holds power until elections can be held or a permanent government can otherwise be established."

Shadow government: "A shadow government is a "government-in-waiting" that remains in waiting with the intention of taking control of a government in response to some event."

Based on these two definitions, I think the term "shadow government" is much more accurate and "shadow" should be used instead of "provisional" throughout this article. (Currently "provisional" is used most everywhere and "shadow" is used right at the beginning, in the definition.) Tempshill (talk) 16:35, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

As author of a good bit of this article, I would say that the sources used as references seem to prefer "provisional" to "shadow," although both are used. From the Confederate viewpoint, the government was provisional; the succession of Kentucky (which they recognized as valid) had created a political void, and they were filling it until elections could be held. From a practical standpoint, the government could not exert its desired influence until the elected government had been deposed. In this sense, it was also a shadow government. I don't see either as being inaccurate. Acdixon (talk • contribs • count) 16:48, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
Since the victors write history, then, "shadow" is more accurate. Without knowing anything about the sources you're referring to, I'd guess that the they use "provisional" because either (a) the authors are sympathetic, or (b) the authors think "shadow" has an unwarranted negative connotation. What do you think? I'd prefer the use of "shadow"; "provisional" was jarring to me as I read through the article (and so I was jarred a lot). I don't think the negative connotation is significant (if it exists); it's simply accurate, as I see it. Tempshill (talk) 17:25, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
Most of the sources are both modern and authored by well-respected historians (Harrison is among the elite in the field of Kentucky history IMO.) I find it hard to believe that they all preferred "provisional" to "shadow" because they were sympathetic to the Confederacy. I believe Wikipedia should reflect the tenor of already published works on the subject, provided that they meet the criteria for WP:RS, which these do. Inasmuch as I contend that both terms are accurate, I would like to see more comments from other Wikipedians on the subject before making any kind of change. Acdixon (talk • contribs • count) 17:39, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
I'm leery of weighing in on this debate, since it touches a sensitive topic in U.S. history (whether or not the CSA was legitimate), but I support Tempshill. The Kentuckian government didn't actually collapse, so technically there was no void to fill. Brutannica (talk) 19:21, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
Inasmuch as Kentucky was admitted to the Confederacy and needed a government recognized by the Confederacy, there was a void to fill. The state had representation in both the USA and CSA national legislatures and, at least in some measure, had two state governments, one of them being a provisional Confederate state government. Acdixon (talk • contribs • count) 21:03, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
I'll state that I think that either term can be used and that I don't have a problem with which one. I also think that it should be either one term or the other, but not both. I personally would tend to lean toward "provisional", simply because I've never heard the term Shadow government prior to reading it here. Either way, it's a good article, you guys did a good job. Sf46 (talk) 21:45, 3 June 2008 (UTC)