Talk:Concept and object
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article is within the scope of the WikiProject Philosophy, which collaborates on articles related to philosophy. To participate, you can edit this article or visit the project page for more details. | ||||||||
| ??? | This article has not yet received a rating on the quality scale. | ||||||||
| ??? | This article has not yet received an importance rating on the importance scale. | ||||||||
|
|||||||||
I was wondering about the addition of context, the phil. of language, to this article. I wanted to post something here instead of just change it. I'm not sure why either the distinction itself or the difficulties Frege faced with the distinction should be situated in philosophy of language. The distinction itself was, arguably, part of Frege's metaphysics (although it is true that those that have Wittgensteinian readings of Frege might disagree). The difficulty or awkwardness he faced as a result of trying to articulate this distinction in natural language ( the "concept horse" problem) is a problem that is best situated in philosophical logic. Cvalenzu 22:30, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
I am surprised this is not listed in the references:
Geach, P. (1976), 'Saying And Showing In Frege And Wittgenstein', Acta Filosophica Fennica 28, pp.54-70.
And Hartley Slater's essay is now available in print in his The De-Mathematisation Of Logic (Polimetrica, 2007).
Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 15:57, 7 February 2008 (UTC)
