Constructive empiricism
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In philosophy, constructive empiricism is a form of empiricism. Bas C. van Fraassen is nearly solely responsible for the initial development of constructive empiricism; its historically most important presentation appears in The Scientific Image (1980). Constructive empiricism states that scientific theories are semantically literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their acceptance involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about observable entities is "true" (or well-established). A theory is semantically literal if and only if the language of the theory cannot be reinterpreted in non-theoretical terms without some change in meaning.
Constructive empiricism is thus a normative, semantic and epistemological thesis. That science aims to be empirically adequate expresses the normative component. That scientific theories are semantically literal expresses the semantic component. That acceptance involves as belief only that a theory is empirically adequate expresses the epistemological component.
Constructive empiricism opposes scientific realism, logical positivism (or logical empiricism) and instrumentalism. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism agree that theories are semantically literal, which logical positivism and instrumentalism deny. Constructive empiricism, logical positivism and instrumentalism agree that theories do not aim for truth about unobservables, which scientific realism denies.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- van Fraassen, Bas. (1980) The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-824427-4
- Godfrey-Smith, Peter Theory and Reality p. 184-186, 234. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-30063-3
