Condorcet loser criterion
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In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion is a measure for differentiating voting systems.
A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win.
A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against every other candidate. (Not all elections will have a Condorcet loser since it is possible for three or more candidates to be mutually defeatable in different head-to-head competitions.)
Contents |
[edit] Complying methods
[edit] Noncomplying methods
- Plurality voting
- Supplementary voting
- Sri Lankan contingent vote
- Approval voting
- Range voting
- Bucklin voting
- Minimax Condorcet
[edit] Plurality voting system
Plurality may elect the Condorcet loser. The simplest example is where two similar candidates split the vote.
100 voters | 80 voters | 60 voters |
---|---|---|
1. Concentrated Opposition | 1. Divided Favorite 1 | 1. Divided Favorite 2 |
2. Divided Favorite 1 | 2. Divided Favorite 2 | 2. Divided Favorite 1 |
3. Divided Favorite 2 | 3. Concentrated Opposition | 3. Concentrated Opposition |
By Plurality, Concentrated Opposition has more first place votes than either of the divided favorites, and so he wins. But one-on-one, 140 voters prefer either of the divided favorites to Concentrated Opposition, whereas only 100 voters have the opposite one-on-one preference. Hence, Concentrated Opposition, which Plurality elected, is the Condorcet loser.
[edit] Ranked Pairs
Ranked Pairs work by "locking in" strong victories, starting with the strongest, unless that would contradict an earlier lock. Assume that the Condorcet loser is X. For X to win, Ranked Pairs must lock a preference of X over some other candidate Y (for at least one Y) before it locks Y over X. But since X is the Condorcet loser, the victory of Y over X will be greater than that of X over Y, and therefore Y over X will be locked first, no matter what other candidate Y is. Hence X cannot win, which was what we wanted.
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Electoral methods: standards and criteria by Blake Cretney
- Voting methods: definitions and criteria by James Green-Armytage