Computational theory of mind

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In philosophy, the computational theory of mind is the view that the human mind is best conceived as an information processing system and that thought is a form of computation. The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1961 and developed by Jerry Fodor in the 60s and 70s.^[1] This view is common in modern cognitive psychology and is presumed by theorists of evolutionary psychology.

In the first half of the 20th century, behaviorists and social constructionists addressed the problem of inner mental events indirectly, either by focusing on behavior or on culture.^[2] Beginning in the 1950s, cognitive psychology developed the computational theory of the mind, explaining inner mental events as information, computation, and feedback.^[2] Beliefs and memories are information, thinking and planning are computation, while wanting and trying are feedback mechanisms.^[2]

Evolutionary psychologists describe the computed mind as modular, composed of structures (roughly, instincts) that each evolved to solve a particular problem in our evolutionary past. These evolved psychological mechanisms (EPMs) define a fundamental human nature. Social constructionists describe the mind as more homogeneous, each with the capacity to be shaped, or programmed, by culture into almost any personal identity.

1 "Computer metaphor"
2 Prominent scholars
3 Computationalism and the simulation hypothesis
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References
7 External links

[edit] "Computer metaphor"

Computational theory is not the same as the computer metaphor, according to which the mind literally works like a computer.^[2] Computational theory just uses some of the same principles as those found in digital computing.^[2]

[edit] Prominent scholars

Richard Dawkins affirmed sociobiology's description of human instincts as evolved, and proposed "memes" as a units of cultural replication, analogous to genes. These memes replicate under selection pressure, as genes do, and memes have co-evolved with genes for millions of years. Memes are like software for the computational mind.
Daniel Dennett proposed the "Multiple Drafts" hypothesis, in which consciousness seems linear but is actually blurry and gappy, distributed over space and time in the brain. Consciousness is the computation, there is no extra step or "Cartesian Theater" in which you become conscious of the computation.
Jerry Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is codified in the brain, not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
David Marr proposed that cognitive processes have three levels of description: the computational level (which describes that computational problem (i.e., input/output mapping) computed by the cognitive process); the algorithmic level (which presents the algorithm used for computing the problem postulated at the computational level); and the implementational level (which describes the physical implementation of the algorithm postulated at the algorithmic level in biological matter, e.g. the brain). (Marr 1981)
Ulric Neisser coined the term 'cognitive psychology' in his book published in 1967 (Cognitive Psychology), wherein Neisser characterizes people as dynamic information-processing systems whose mental operations might be described in computational terms.
Steven Pinker described a "language instinct," an evolved, built-in capacity to learn speech (if not writing). His work is directly contradicted by renowned linguist Noam Chomsky, who describes the language instinct not as evolved directly but as arisen as a by-product of some other evolved feature, probably involving brain size and structure.
Hilary Putnam proposed functionalism to describe consciousness, asserting that it is the computation that equates to consciousness, regardless of whether the computation is operating in a brain, in a computer, or in a "brain in a vat."

[edit] Computationalism and the simulation hypothesis

The Computational Theory of Mind is relevant to the simulation hypothesis in that it illustrates how a simulation could contain conscious subjects, as required by a "virtual people" simulation. For example, it is well known that physical systems can be simulated to some degree of accuracy. If computationalism leads us to discover principles which allow us to overcome the problems in generating artificial consciousness, it would raise questions about the possibility of a simulated reality. However, the relationship between cognition and phenomenal consciousness is disputed. It is possible that consciousness requires a substrate of "real" physics,^{[citation needed]} and simulated people, while behaving appropriately, would be philosophical zombies.