Commons dilemma
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Commons dilemmas represent a specific class of social dilemmas in which people’s short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests. The commons dilemma, also known as the common pool resource (CPR), the resource dilemma or the take-some dilemma, was inspired by the metaphor of the Tragedy of the Commons that Garrett Hardin discussed in his seminal 1968 Science article. This story describes a group of herders having open access to a common parcel of land on which they could let their cows graze. It is in each herder’s interest to put as many cows as possible onto the land, even if the commons is damaged as a result. The herder receives all the benefits from the additional cows but the damage to the commons is shared by the entire group. Yet if all herders make this individually rational decision, the commons is destroyed and all will suffer.
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[edit] Examples
The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today such as water, land, fish, and non-renewable energy sources like oil and coal. When water is used at a higher rate than the reservoirs are replenished, fish consumption exceeds its reproductive capacity or oil supplies are exhausted then we face a tragedy of the commons. In the 1980s researchers created an experimental game version of the commons dilemma involving a common resource pool (filled with money or points that could be converted into money or lottery tickets) from which a group of individuals could harvest. If the sum of their harvests per round of the game is lower than the replenishment rate the pool is maintained. Yet for each individual it is tempting to harvest as much as possible, but all suffer if they do and the resource is depleted upon which the game ends.
[edit] Research on commons dilemma
Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or overharvest the common resource in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to commons management.
Motivational factors First, the research shows that some people are motivated than others to manage the common resource responsibly. Using the commons dilemma game, researchers found that people with prosocial value orientations harvest less from a resource during a period of scarcity. Prosocial individuals are also more inclined to engage in sustainable environmental behaviours such as taking public transport (instead of the car), conserving energy and water, as well as explain their decisions in terms of environmental impact.
Motivation to conserve a common resource is also promoted by people’s group ties. When people identify with their group they are more likely to exercise personal restraint as well as compensate for greedy harvest decisions of ingroup members more so than outgroup members. Similarly, in the field strongly knit communities are usually better at managing resource shortages than communities with weak social ties. It might be that group identity promotes a long-term perspective on resource management which makes it easier for people to sacrifice their immediate interest on behalf of their local community. It could also be that group identification increases the social interdependencies between community members so that they care more for the social rewards and punishments of their community. This needs further investigation.
The state of the common resource can also shape motivations. One motivational factor is people’s attributions of the state of the commons. Research has manipulated the reasons people were given for resource overuse. When greedy people were seen as causing the depletion participants were more greedy than when there was deemed to be a natural cause (like a sudden drought). Resource uncertainty further contributes to overharvesting. In commons dilemmas uncertainly about the pool size tends to increase individual harvesting and expectations about how much other people harvest. When there is uncertainty people overestimate the size of the resource and perceive greater variability in how much other people take. Similarly uncertainty about the replenishment rate of the pool also increases harvesting. The most likely explanation is that people have an optimistic bias.
Strategic factors Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence—first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter games: The harvests of those who come first--the leaders--are higher than the harvest of those coming later—the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. Whereas with simultaneous play, people may adopt an equality rule, with sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule. Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations. Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.
Structural factors Much research has focused on when and why people would like to structurally rearrange the commons to prevent a tragedy. Hardin stated in his analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons that “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (p. 1244). One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the commons. Not surprisingly groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task. Interestingly, groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. There is a general aversion against autocratic leadership--although it is quite an effective solution--possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption. Another structural solution is the privatization of the commons and this has been very effective in experimental and field research. It is difficult to imagine how common moveable resources such as fish, water, and clean air can be privatized. Privatization also raises concerns about social justice as not everyone may be able to get an equal share. Finally, privatization might erode people’s personal and social motivations to cooperate in preserving a resource.
The provision of rewards and punishments might also be effective in preserving common resources. Selective punishments for overuse can be effective in promoting domestic water and energy conservation, for instance, through installing water and electricity meters in houses. Selective rewards also work provided that they are open to everyone. An experimental carpool lane in the Netherlands failed because car commuters did not feel they were able to organize a carpool. Hence they showed reactance against this pro-environment intervention. There has been much field research on commons dilemmas which has combined solutions obtained in experimental research. The seminal work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues is worth mentioning. They have looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farm lands and came up with a number of factors conducive to successful resource management. One factor is the resource itself. Resources with definable boundaries (land) can be preserved much easier. A second factor is resource dependence. There must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion and it must be difficult to find substitutes. The third is the presence of a community. Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better. A final condition is that there are appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse.
Conclusions As populations grow and resources become scarcer there is a need for policies to avoid commons tragedies. It is encouraging that commons dilemma research is increasingly applied to local and global environmental problems. The emphasis is shifting from pure laboratory research towards research testing combinations of motivational, strategic, and structural solutions.
[edit] References
- Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., & Hogg, M. (1999). Resolving social
dilemmas. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
- Messick, D. M., Wilke, H. A. M., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P.
E., & Lui, L. (1983). Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 294 309.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Vugt, M. (2001). Community identification moderating the impact of
financial incentives in a natural social dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1440-1449.
- Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Meertens, R. M. and Joireman, J. A. (1996).
Why structural solutions to social dilemmas might fail: A field experiment on the first carpool priority lane in Europe. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59, 364-374.
