City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 |
||||||||||||
| Argued October 5, 1988 Decided January 23, 1989 |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
| Holding | ||||||||||||
| Court membership | ||||||||||||
| Chief Justice: William Rehnquist Associate Justices: William J. Brennan, Jr., Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy |
||||||||||||
| Case opinions | ||||||||||||
| Majority by: O'Connor Joined by: Rehnquist, White Concurrence by: Stevens Concurrence by: Scalia Concurrence by: Kennedy Dissent by: Marshall Joined by: Brennan Dissent by: Blackmun Joined by: Brennan |
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the city council of Richmond's minority set-aside program, giving preference to minority business enterprises (MBE) in the awarding of municipal contracts, was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the city failed to identify both the need for remedial action and that other non-discriminatory remedies would be insufficient.
Croson involved a minority set-aside program in the awarding of municipal contracts. Richmond, Virginia, with a black population of just over 50 percent had set a 30 percent goal in the awarding of city construction contracts, based on its findings that local, state, and national patterns of discrimination had resulted in all but complete lack of access for minority-owned businesses. The Supreme Court stated:
"We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race. To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs. [Citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke:] Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classification. We think such a result would be contrary to both the letter and the spirit of a constitutional provision whose central command is equality."
[edit] See also
[edit] References
Williams, Patricia J. "The Alchemy of Race and Rights", Harvard University Press. Cambridge: 1991, Pg. 105
[edit] External links
|
||||||||||||||
This article related to the Supreme Court of the United States is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.
