CIA activities in Morocco
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[edit] Morocco 1966
[edit] Intelligence analysis
"Morocco is also likely to enjoy relative political stability for the next few years. King Hassan II, facing minimal domestic opposition and supported by the security forces, will probably continue to dominate the political scene. In time, however, the combination of rapid population growth and continued economic stagnation is likely to pose a major threat to the nation's social and political order."[1]
[edit] Morocco 1972
[edit] Intelligence analysis
A National Intelligence Estimate on "the outlook for Morocco" had, as major conclusions:
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- Morocco is a poor country with a medieval monarchy facing growing pressures for political, economic, and social change. King Hassan II, who was nearly overthrown in a military uprising in July 1971, has learned little from his narrow escape. He still believes that he can continue to rule in the style of an oriental potentate. This virtually assures that other challenges to the King will take place, but Hassan is in a strong position and could carry on for many years.
- The possibility is slight that the King would reduce his political role, which still might not guarantee a decrease in political tension. "Indeed, there is no assurance that the civilian opposition would cooperate with the King. The relaxation of royal authority might add to the uncertainties and whet politicians' appetites for further power."
- The military establishment is both the chief prop of and potential threat to the crown. Thus far, General Oufkir, who has firm control of the armed forces, has shown no inclination to move against the King", butould be tempted to intervene if the King was not governing well. seemed to be fumbling badly in handling the problems of government. Unrest among "...lower ranking officers, who seem more concerned with the need for basic change in society" us likely to increase. We do not have, however, any concrete evidence of plotting against the King in the Moroccan armed forces.
- Economic and social problems are worsening but are not an immediate threat to governing."Over the longer run, the failure to make basic agricultural and social reforms will promote the radicalization of the Moroccan political scene.
- "In foreign policy, Hassan is principally concerned with improving relations with the other states of the Maghreb and with boosting his stature among African and Islamic nations. While he does not want to antagonize the USSR, he desires friendly relations with the West in general and France and the US in particular. Hassan sees value in continued US operation of the Kenitra communications complex, but his will to preserve present arrangements would weaken if he judged their value to him was waning and if popular pressure mounted, say in the event of a major round of fighting between Arabs and Israel. The close relationship between the US and Morocco would be called into question if the monarchy were overthrown.
The discussion included the summary: "Morocco is a basically conservative and traditional state in which there are increasingly ominous rumblings of change. Its uneven exposure to European ideas and ways has left it a mixture of the traditional and the contemporary. Since the end of the French and Spanish Protectorates in 1956, it has made little progress in developing modern political, economic, and social institutions. The legacy of the French policy of divide and rule, accentuating the differences between the Berbers of the mountains and the Arabized population of the towns and lowlands, has played its part.The Moroccan population is overwhelmingly Berber in origin, and the majority of those who now call themselves Arabs are really Arabized Berbers. Those who are termed Berbers--roughly 25 percent of the population--are so called because of their adherence to Berber speech and folkways. But even more significant have been the effects of the sharply segmented, still partly feudal, Moroccan social system in which power and authority are widely diffused among competing individuals and factions. Though the tribal structure has weakened among the Arabized population, the traditional system still strongly influences political alignments and discourages the rise of effective national parties. Only the monarchy provides cohesion, combining as it does both political and religious authority and attracting the loyalty of both Arab and Berber. See the NIE for additional detail.[2]
[edit] Morocco 2002
Human Rights Watch(HRW), through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, asked The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency should declassify all files pertaining to the kidnap and "disappearance" of Moroccan opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka. The letter was submitted jointly with Institut Ben Barka, a France-based organization dedicated to collecting and preserving documents by and about Mehdi Ben Barka.[3]
According to HRW, Moroccan security officials are believed to have masterminded Ben Barka's abduction in Paris in 1965, and are believed to have killed him shortly thereafter. His body was never found. The failure to identify and punish the principal perpetrators, and the rumored role of foreign intelligence agencies, continue to spark controversy in Morocco.
In response to a 1976 FOIA request, the CIA acknowledged having 1,846 files pertaining to Ben Barka, but cited national security reasons in refusing to release them. The vast majority of these have remained secret ever since. Interest in the CIA files was rekindled last year, when a retired Moroccan secret policeman came forward to allege that, during the 1960s, CIA agents were working in the police bureau that carried out the “disappearance” of Ben Barka. The ex-agent, Ahmed Boukhari, repeated this allegation in a published a book in France earlier this month.
[edit] Morocco 2005
An Ethiopian student who lived in London claims that he was tortured, in Morocco, with the involvement of British and US intelligence agencies. Binyam Mohammed, 27, says he spent nearly three years in the CIA's network of 'black sites'. In Morocco he claims he underwent torture, and that a CIA officer was a regular interrogator.
After his capture in Pakistan, Mohammed says British officials warned him that he would be sent to a country where torture was used. Moroccans also asked him detailed questions about his seven years in London, which his lawyers believe came from British sources. Western agencies believed that he was part of a plot to buy uranium in Asia, bring it to the US and build a dirty bomb in league with Jose Padilla, a US citizen. Mohammed signed a confession but told his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, he had never met Padilla, or anyone in al-Qaeda. Padilla spent almost four years in custody, accused of the plot. In November 2005, after allegations of the torture used against Mohammed emerged, the claims against Padilla were dropped. He now faces a civil charge of supporting al-Qaeda financially.[4]
[edit] References
- ^ National Intelligence Estimate 60-66: The Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), vol. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, 5 May 1966, FRUS-XXIV-1
- ^ “National Intelligene Estimate 61-72: The Outlook for Morocco”, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972, 15 June 1972, NIE 61-72, FRUS-125, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5part2/89760.htm>
- ^ Human Rights Watch (February 26, 2002), Morocco: CIA Should Release Files: Records Sought on 1965 "Disappearance" of Opposition Leader, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/02/26/usint3764.htm>
- ^ Rose, David (11 December 2005), “An Ethiopian claims that his confession to al-Qaeda bomb plot was signed after beatings”, Guardian, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1664612,00.html>
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