CIA activities in Libya
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Contents |
[edit] Libya 1969
Focused on the next six months after the coup that overthrew the monarchy, conclusions estimated: "likely developments in Libyan policy, particularly with regard to issues affecting US interests.
"The young captains and lieutenants who took over Libya four months ago want foreign military installations removed from Libya as soon as possible. Evacuation of the bases in a manner satisfactory to the Libyans will not guarantee good relations between Libya and the US, but any other outcome would seriously prejudice US interests. The members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) are also clearly determined to identify with the militant Arab line toward Israel. In these two desires, they reflect the prevailing mood in Libya itself, and any successor regime probably would follow similar policies.
"Beyond this, we know little concerning the policies of the RCC, and there seem to be potential sources of dissension within the group. Unsure of its own hold on power and lacking clear domestic policy objectives, it will be disposed to look for advice to other Arab countries--especially Egypt, with which the RCC leaders are developing close ties.
Oil operations in Libya netted the US balance of payments over $800 million in 1968... The RCC will press vigorously, and successfully, to increase its income from oil. Nationalization of oil production does not seem likely, but it cannot be entirely ruled out, in dealing with the oil companies, Libya holds a number of high cards.
The RCC probably will contribute financially to the Arab cause even more heavily than did the monarchy. It also may station token contingents of troops in Egypt and perhaps Jordan. If Egypt so desired, the RCC probably would agree to make Libyan airfields available to Egyptian aircraft. Over the longer run, it is possible that Soviet-manned reconnaissance aircraft in some guise might be permitted access to facilities in Libya. The circumstances under which such a contingency might arise will be more fully explored in NIE 11-6-70, "Soviet Policies in the Mediterranean Basin," scheduled for publication in the first quarter of 1970 Properly requested and conducted over flights and port visits by the Soviets would almost certainly be permitted; we doubt, however, that the Libyans would give the USSR access to military installations in Libya on anything like extraterritorial terms. See the NIE for additional detail.[1]
[edit] Libya 1981
A global finding in 1981 orders CIA to take action against Muammar al-Gaddafi, who is thought to be distributing weapons to terrorists throughout Europe and Africa.
[edit] Libya 2005
[edit] Intelligence analysis
In his Senate Intelligence Committee statement, Porter Goss described the status of Libya as a success story in nonproliferation[2] Goss said that Libya, by the end of 2004, had taken a number of significant steps it had promised:
-
- Dismantling key elements of its nuclear weapons program and opened itself to the IAEA.
- Giving up some key chemical warfare assets and opened its former CW program to international scrutiny.
- After disclosing its Scud stockpile and extensive ballistic and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took important steps to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles to the 300-km range threshold of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The US continues to work with Libya to clarify some discrepancies in the declaration.
[edit] References
- ^ “National Intelligene Estimate 36.5-69: Short-Term Prospects For Libya”, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 2, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972, 30 December 1969, NIE 36.5-69, FRUS-50, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5part2/89760.htm>
- ^ Goss, Porter (16 February 2005), Global Intelligence Challenges 2005, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0503/doc09.htm>
|
|||||
|
|||||
