CIA activities in Afghanistan

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Main article: CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan, War in Afghanistan (disambiguation), and Inter-Services Intelligence#Afghanistan Undated

See also: CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities#Southwest Asia

The Black Book of Communism is frequently cited in this section. See its article for criticism, including the attribution of victims to Communist regimes, who were not victims of Communism at all so that the Book can arrive at a set target of total victims.^[1]

Contents 1 Afghanistan 1973 2 Afghanistan 1978 3 Afghanistan 1979 3.1 Intelligence analysis 3.2 Covert Action 4 Afghanistan 1980 4.1 Intelligence analysis 5 Afghanistan 1985 5.1 Covert action 6 Afghanistan 1987 7 Afghanistan 1989 7.1 Intelligence analysis 7.2 Covert action 8 Afghanistan 1990 8.1 Covert action 9 Afghanistan 1991 10 Afghanistan 1992 11 Afghanistan 2001 12 Afghanistan 2005 12.1 Intelligence analysis 13 References

[edit] Afghanistan 1973

Roger Morris, a former US Foreign Service officer and National Security Council staff member under presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, writing in the Asia Times, argues that as early as 1973-74, the CIA began offering covert backing to Islamic radical rebels in Afghanistan premised on the claim that the right-wing, authoritarian government headed by Mohammed Daoud Khan, might prove a likely instrument of Soviet military aggression in South Asia. Morris argues that this premise was without basis in fact; Daoud had always held the Russians, his main patron when it came to aid, at arm's length, and had purged local communists who supported him when he overthrew the Afghan monarchy in 1973. The Soviets had also shown no inclination to use the notoriously unruly Afghans and their army for any expansionist aim.^[2] Morris claims that during this period U.S. foreign policy leaders saw the Soviets as always being "on the march." This apprehension resulted in a rash of U.S. secret wars, assassinations, terrorist acts and manifold corruptions. U.S. secret backing of radical Islamic rebels ceased following an abortive rebel uprising in 1975.^[2]

[edit] Afghanistan 1978

See also: Soviet war in Afghanistan

One of the American intelligence community's biggest operations and initially considered a major success was the funding of the Mujahedeen (Islamist fighters) in Afghanistan and their training, arming, and supplying. The program was initiated under President Jimmy Carter and greatly expanded following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Under Reagan funding reached levels of $600 million/year.

Roger Morris, writing in the Asia Times, states that in April 1978, the crackdown by the regime of Daoud on Afghanistan's small Communist Party provoked a successful coup by Communist Party loyalists in the army. The coup occurred in defiance of a skittish Moscow, which had stopped earlier coup plans^{[citation needed]}.

According to Morris, by autumn 1978, an Islamic insurgency, armed and planned by the U.S., Pakistan, Iran and China, and soon to be actively supported, at Washington's prodding, by the Saudis and Egyptians, was fighting in eastern Afghanistan. U.S. planners continued funding the radical Islamic insurgency to "suck" the Russians into Afghanistan.^[2]

The Black Book of Communism instead puts the blame on the Soviet Union who feared that Afghanistan was escaping its domination. There was little Muslim extremism before the Communist coup. After the coup, according to the Black Book, several antireligous campaigns by the Communist regime, as well as the harsh repressions, soon caused a fierce insurgency.

[edit] Afghanistan 1979

[edit] Intelligence analysis

The CIA National Foreign Assessment Center completed work on a report entitled "Afganistan: Ethnic Divergence and Dissidence" in May 1979, although it was not formally published until March 1980. It is not known if the information was readily available to policymakers at the time of the December 1979 invasion. ^[3]

Tribal insurgency, according to this report, began in 1978, with the installation of a pro-Soviet government. Even though the government tilted toward the Soviet Union, the analysis said that many tribal groups, especially Uzbek, saw the government as ethnically Pashtun, with hostility on ethnic and political grounds.

[edit] Covert Action

With instability and civil strife in a country on their border, the Soviets invaded in December 1979, according to the Asia Times report, fulfilling the hopes of Washington as expressed by National Security Adviser Brzezinski.^[2][4]

The CIA provided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through the Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. Somewhere between $3–$20 billion in U.S. funds were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons, including Stinger surface-to-air missiles.^[5]

[edit] Afghanistan 1980

[edit] Intelligence analysis

A memorandum spoke of continued tribal rivalries as adding to the resistance to the Soviets. ^[6]

[edit] Afghanistan 1985

While the actual document has not been declassified, National Security Decision Directive 166 of 27 March 1985, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan" defined a US policy of using established the US goal of driving Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available", including the provision of Stinger missiles.^[7]

Initially, this involved close cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan. This cooperation was already in place in 1984, prior to NSDD-166. Indeed, it was evident to residents in Islamabad and Peshawar in the 1980's that large numbers of Americans were present.

[edit] Covert action

However, one of the main features of NSDD-166 was to allow CIA to enter Afghanistan directly and establish it's own separate and secret relationships with Afghan fighters.^[8] The funding by ISI and CIA of Afghan anti-Soviet fighters created linkages among Muslim fighters worldwide.^[9]

At first, the US supported the effort cautiously, concered that the Soviet Union would act against Pakistan. "Some time into the war, however, the US began to take a much more overt position, and US-supplied technology played a key role in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan.

[edit] Afghanistan 1987

On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988.^[10]

According to the "Progressive South Asia Exchange Net", claiming

The neutrality or factuality of this article or section may be compromised by unattributed statements. You can help Wikipedia by removing weasel worded statements.This section has been tagged since December 2007.

to cite an article in Le Nouvel Observateur, U.S. policy, unbeknownst even to the Mujahideen, was part of a larger strategy "to induce a Soviet military intervention." National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stated:

"According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise." "That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap.... The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War."

"There are at least two editions of this magazine; with the perhaps sole exception of the Library of Congress, the version sent to the United States is shorter than the French version, and the Brzezinski interview was not included in the shorter version. The above has been translated from the French by Bill Blum author of the indispensible, "Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II" and "Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower"^[11][12]

[edit] Afghanistan 1989

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1989-1992)

[edit] Intelligence analysis

A Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective",^[13] estimated that Najibullah government was "weak, unpopular, and factionalized", but would probably remain in power, with the war at a near impasse. It drew key judgments including:

• The mujahedin hold the military initiative, as long as they stay in the countryside, where government troops do not hinder them and they choose when and where to fight. As long as Soviet supplies continue, they will remain a guerilla force unable to seize major garrisons.
• As an insurgency, regime fragility, mujahedin disunity, and local tribal factors are as important to the outcome as strictly military aspects.
• While there is extensive popular support, the resistance will remain highly factionalized.
• The Afghan Interim Government and most major commanders will refuse direct negotiations with Najibullah, but indirect negotiations are possible.

Pakistan and the USSR remain the most important external powers. Pakistan will continue to support the resistance regardless of who is in power. The Soviets will seek a political settlement while providing massive support. Gorbachev would like to resolve the issue before the US summit next year.

Any of a number of changes in foreign support could break the impasse:

• Cessation of US support to the resistance
• Cessation of Soviet support to the govenment
• Mutual cuts by the US and USSR would be more harmful to the government

Aid cuts, however, will not stop the fighting.

[edit] Covert action

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, CIA's objective was to topple the government of Mohammad Najibullah, which had been formed under the Soviet occupation, according to author Steve Coll.^[14] Among others, the two main factions that CIA was supporting were:

• Ahmed Shah Massoud, unilaterally.
• Gulbadin Hekmatyar, through the ISI.
• Jalaluddin Haqqani, through the ISI.

According to Coll, during this period of time, there was disagreement between CIA and the U.S. State Department regarding which Afghan factions to support. U.S. State Department Special Envoy to Afghanistan Edmund McWilliams, after numerous tours of the interior of Pakistan, found that Afghan people were unhappy with the Wahhabist-leaning and anti-American Hekmatyar contingent, and recommended pulling back support for fighting in favor of a political settlement involving more of the ex-pat Afghan professional class. In this McWilliams was supported by British Intelligence. CIA station chief Milton Bearden felt that McWilliams was misreading U.S. policy. Bearden did not want to get involved in Afghanistan internal politics, trusted the ISI to establish a stable regime in Afghanistan which was favorable to Pakistan, felt that Afghanistan was historically divided from Pakistan only by a line drawn by the British, and felt that the British didn't know what they were talking about, since they had lost two wars in Afghanistan already. The argument between Bearden and McWilliams in Islamabad was curtailed when Bearden cabled the State Department a "request for curtailment" of duty tour on McWilliams behalf, and McWilliams found himself called away.

[edit] Afghanistan 1990

BBC News reported "Al-Qaeda, meaning the base, was created in 1989 as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues began looking for new jihads. The organisation grew out of the network of Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight under the banner of Islam against Soviet Communism. During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA."^[15] a charge denied by American and Pakistan intelligence officials and journalist Peter Bergen. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, has discussed U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in several magazines.^[16][17]

[edit] Covert action

The discussion below draws on author Steve Coll's account.^[18]

The policy dispute between CIA's Near East Division and the U.S. State Department, regarding political settlement versus continued fighting in Afghanistan, which was initiated between McWilliams and Bearden in 1989, continues with new protagonists, CIA's Thomas Twetten and State's new special envoy to the Afghan resistance, Peter Tomsen.^[19]

Civil war develops as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and CIA-supported Gulbadin Hekmatyar seeks to violently eliminate all rivals, including the CIA-supported Ahmed Shah Massoud. In spite of this internecine warfare, ISI and CIA formulate a plan to topple the Najibullah government in a winter offensive on Kabul. As part of this offensive, CIA pays Massoud $500,000, over and above his monthly stipend of $200,000, to close the Salang Highway. Massoud fails to do so, and in consequence, his allowance is reduced to $50,000 per month.

In Spring of 1990, ISI hopes to install Gulbadin Hekmatyar contingent on defeating the Najibullah government. Hekmatyar also acquires milllions of dollars in additional funding from Osama bin Laden, thus placing ISI, CIA and bin Laden in joint venture. On March 7, 1990, Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Shahnawaz Tanai attempts a coup, with Tanai, a member of Najibullah's government, orchestrating an attack using Najibullah's own forces against Najibullah's palace, with Hekmatyar's forces to follow up from outside Kabul. The money to buy the loyalty of Najibullah's troops comes in part from Osama bin Laden. This attempt fails.

At the same time, ISI asks "bin Laden for money to bribe legislators to throw Benazir Bhutto out of office". "That winter, then, bin Laden worked with Pakistani intelligence against both Najibullah and Bhutto, the perceived twin enemies of Islam they saw holding power in Kabul and Islamabad", according to author Steve Coll. Regarding the issue of whether bin Laden was acting alone or as an agent of Saudi intelligence, Coll writes (see the concept of plausible deniability):

"Did bin Laden work on the Tanai coup attempt on his own or as a semi-official liaison for Saudi intelligence? The evidence seems thin and inconclusive. Bin Laden was still in good graces with the Saudi government at the time of the Tanai coup attempt; his first explicit break with Prince Turki and the royal family lay months in the future. While the CIA's Afghan informants named bin Laden as a funder of the Hekmatyar-Tanai coup, other accounts named Saudi intelligence as the source of funds. Were these separate funding tracks or the same? None of the reports then or later were firm or definitive. "It was the beginning of a pattern for American intelligence analysts: Whenever bin Laden interacted with his own Saudi government, he seemed to do so inside a shroud."

Note that, in a grand historical coincidence, in the investigation following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, Pakistan's Interior Minisry has laid the blame on "Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander who holds sway across a large part of South Waziristan",^[20] i.e. on an Al Queda-linked group, while Bhutto herself, in a letter she wrote prior to her death and subsequent to two prior attempts, laid the blame at the ISI's doorstep. In light of the above, perhaps both assertions are correct.

[edit] Afghanistan 1991

According to Human Rights Watch,^[21] there was a dispute, inside the US government, with the State Department on one side, and the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, ISI, on the other. HRW said the The New York Times, in January 1991, said Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt had "battled with [CIA] officials who would like to unleash the guerrillas in Afghanistan in one last effort," while United States Secretary of State James Baker worked to "coax the rebels and the Najibullah regime into democratic elections." In the interview, Kimmitt complained that agency officials were "just bucking policy." In February, as negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained stalled, HRW again cited The New York Times reported that "the [CIA], in a long policy dispute with the State Department that it now appears to be winning, has been arguing that negotiations cannot end the war and that Washington should step up its efforts to help the guerrillas win a military victory."

Since the early 1980s, according to HRW, the ISI and CIA has used their control over the arms pipeline to run the war and favor abusive mujahedin parties, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction, which used U.S.- and Saudi-financed weapons to launch indiscriminate attacks on Afghan cities, killing countless civilians.

[edit] Afghanistan 1992

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1992-1996) and Civil war in Afghanistan (1996-2001)

[edit] Afghanistan 2001

See also: War in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Timeline of the War in Afghanistan (2001-present)

[edit] Afghanistan 2005

[edit] Intelligence analysis

Speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, Porter Goss^[22] said Afghanistan is on the "road to recovery after decades of instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district councils--tentatively scheduled for this spring--will complete the process of electing representatives. President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.

"The development of the Afghan National Army and a national police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.

[edit] References

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