Chinese reunification
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- There is also a specific Chinese reunification of 1928.
Chinese reunification (traditional Chinese: 中國統一; simplified Chinese: 中国统一; pinyin: Zhōngguó tǒngyī) is a goal of Chinese nationalism that refers to the bring together of all of the territories controlled by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) under a single political entity. After Hong Kong and Macau were reunited with mainland China under the rule of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the only outstanding goal for advocates of Chinese reunification is the unification of the mainland China (including Hong Kong and Macao) and Taiwan (including the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu Islands), which has been governed by the Republic of China (ROC) since 1945. Before the 1990s, both the PRC and the ROC claimed to be the legal government of the whole of China. Supporters of Chinese reunification believe it would eliminate the competing factions in an unresolved civil war and re-unify China under a single national government.
The idea of Chinese reunification is controversial, as is the term "reunification" itself, with varying and sometimes conflicting definitions. Supporters of reunification contend that PRC and ROC are the legacy left from the Chinese Civil War, and that both Taiwan (currently under the administration of the ROC) and the Mainland (currently under the administration of the PRC) are parts of China. Supporters of Taiwan Independence contend that Taiwan is not part of China and therefore a Chinese reunification that includes Taiwan is really Chinese expansionism and, for Taiwan, annexation by China.
Chinese reunification is supported in both official policy and in action by the government of the People's Republic of China. The official policy of the Republic of China supports Chinese reunification, but practice often does not follow that policy. Chinese reunification at some point in the future is supported to varying degrees in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party, and the New Party, known collectively as the Pan-blue coalition. It is opposed to varying degrees by the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, known collectively as the Pan-green coalition.
Opponents of reunification generally favor continued independence for the Republic of China or another government controlling the same territories. Many object to the term "reunification" as it implies that Taiwan is part of China. Within the political scene of Taiwan, reunification versus independence plays an important role in defining the political spectrum, although much of the support for either bloc is unrelated to the reunification versus independence issue and most people in Taiwan are in the middle of the spectrum.
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[edit] Development
The concept of One China has been part of the Chinese political orthodoxy since ancient times. Often, if one claimed to be the Emperor of China with the Mandate of Heaven, then all other regimes within the country were either considered rebel or tributary. Accordingly, from the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 until the mid-1970s the concept of reunification was not the main subject of discourse between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China; each formally envisioned a military takeover of one by the other. The Kuomintang (KMT) believed that they would, probably with American help, one day retake the mainland while Mao Zedong's communist regime would collapse in a popular uprising and the Nationalist forces would be welcomed back. The Communist Party of China considered the Republic of China to have been made defunct by the newly-established People's Republic of China and thus regarded the ROC a renegade entity to be eliminated for the sake of reunification. The concept of reunification replaced the concept of liberation by the PRC in 1979 as it embarked, after the death of Mao, on economic reforms and pursued a more pragmatic and less ideological foreign policy. In Taiwan, the possibility of retaking the mainland became increasingly remote in the late 1970s, particularly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and United States in 1980 and the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975.
With the end of authoritarian rule in the 1980s and the shift in power within the KMT away from the Mainlanders who accompanied Chiang to Taiwan, the KMT began to move away from the ideology of Chinese reunification. In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui announced that his government no longer disputed the rule of the Communists on the mainland, leading to semi-official peace talks (under what would be termed as the "1992 consensus") between the two sides. The PRC broke off these talks in 1999 when President Lee proposed in an interview to deal with the PRC on a "special state-to-state" basis.
Until the mid-1990s, supporters of Chinese reunification on Taiwan were also bitterly opposed to the Communist Party of China. Since the mid-1990s there has been a considerable warming of relations between the Communist Party and supporters of Chinese reunification as both oppose the pro-Taiwan independence bloc that has been elected to power in Taiwan. This has brought about the accusation that reunification supporters are attempting to sell out Taiwan. The response of reunification supporters is that closer ties with mainland China, especially economic ones, are in the interest of Taiwan.
After the presidential elections of 2000, which brought the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party's candidate Chen Shui-bian to power, the Kuomintang, faced with defections to the People First Party, expelled Lee Teng-hui and his supporters and reoriented the party back towards reunification. At the same time, the People's Republic of China shifted its efforts at reunification away from military threats (which it has not renounced but which it has de-emphasized) towards economic incentives designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to invest in the mainland and aiming to create a pro-Beijing bloc within the Taiwanese electorate.
Within Taiwan, supporters of reunification generally do not assert that the Republic of China should be the sole Chinese government. They tend to see "China" as a larger cultural entity divided by the Chinese Civil War into separate states or governments within the country. In addition, supporters of reunification also do not oppose localization of culture or a Taiwanese identity but rather see the Taiwanese identity as one piece of a broader Chinese identity rather than as a separate cultural identity. What supporters of Chinese reunification do oppose is desinicization or the effort to emphasize a Taiwanese identity as separate from a Chinese one.
[edit] Current proposals
The People's Republic of China officially asserts itself to be the sole legitimate government of China, and that Taiwan is a province of China. It has proposed reunification with Taiwan under the principle of "One Country, Two Systems", as has been done for both Hong Kong and Macau. According to the proposal outlined by President Jiang Zemin in 1995, Taiwan would also be permitted to keep its armed forces and to send a representative to be the "number two leader" in the PRC central government. Thus, under this proposal, the Republic of China would be made fully defunct. However, changes in the political situation in Taiwan has led the PRC to take a more flexible stance.
Rarely do reunification supporters in Taiwan advocate the position that the Republic of China is the sole and legitimate government of all of China. Proposals among reunification supporters in Taiwan have varied, with more extreme supporters in Taiwan such as Li Ao advocating "One Country, Two Systems" while more moderate supporters arguing to uphold the status quo until the mainland democratizes and industrializes to the same level as Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate James Soong proposed a European Union-style relation with the mainland (this was echoed by Hsu Hsin-liang in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact. In the 2004 presidential election, Lien Chan proposed a confederation-style relationship (though he later moderated his stance amid a tight race). Beijing objected to the plan claiming that Taiwan, being part of China already, is not a state and therefore could not form a federation with the PRC. Proposals for reunification are not actively floated in Taiwan and the issue remains moot since President Chen Shui-bian has refused to acquiesce to Beijing's chief demand for restarting talks, namely agreeing to the One-China policy, which remains unacceptable to the majority of Taiwan citizens.
Under the administration of Hu Jintao, reunification under "one country, two systems" lost emphasis amid the reality of a DPP presidency in Taiwan lasting until at least 2008 when President Chen leaves office. Instead, the emphasis shifted to co-opting the political opponents of the DPP administration in Taiwan to counter the threat of Taiwan independence. A series of high-profile visits in 2005 to mainland China by the leaders of the three pan-blue coalition parties was seen as an implicit recognition of the status quo by the PRC government. Notably, Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan's trip was marked by unedited coverage of his speeches and tours (and some added positive commentary) by the government-controlled media and meetings with high level officials including Hu Jintao. Similar treatment (though marked with less historical significance and media attention) was given during subsequent visits by PFP Chairman James Soong and New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming. The Communists and the Pan-Blue Coalition parties emphasized their common ground in renewed negotiations under the alleged 1992 consensus, opening the three links, and opposing Taiwan independence.
The PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law shortly before Lien's trip. While the Pan-Green Coalition held mass rallies to protest the codification of using "non-peaceful means" to counter Taiwan independence, the Pan-Blue Coalition was largely silent. The language of the Anti-Secession Law was clearly directed at the independence supporters in Taiwan (termed "'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces" in the law) and designed to be somewhat amicable for Pan-Blue Coalition. It did not explicitly declare Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China but instead used the term "China" on its own, allowing flexibility in its definition. It made repeated emphasis of "promoting peaceful national reunification" but left out the concept of "one country, two systems" and called for negotiations in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities" in recognition of the concept of eventual rather than immediate reunification.
[edit] Reactions from the two sides
[edit] Mainland China
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The consensus among most citizens on the mainland seems to be one of support for reunification by all means necessary, as much for reasons of national pride as for economic or geopolitical reasons. Therefore, the method by which reunification is achieved - be it peaceful or not - becomes less relevant to the average mainlander.
As for the government of the PRC, on the one hand, most analysts predict Beijing would be willing to go to great lengths to defeat any declaration of Taiwan independence, even if it meant military action. It seems they would be willing to accept some high level of international isolation, perhaps even economic damage, as a consequence, because the issue has long been ingrained into their concept of Chinese nationalism, and into the expectations of their populace. On the other hand, Beijing also understands keenly that a 'peaceful unification' is in the best interests of the Chinese nation as a whole, and their government in particular; that the resulting fallout from any aggressive move to regain Taiwan will be great - perhaps much greater than most of the populace of the mainland realize, or are truly prepared to endure. The government of the People's Republic already finds the dislocations from the country's rapid economic growth a tricky situation to manage. The people often put demands on the government that it seems sometimes unprepared for. A major downturn in economic fortunes, for whatever reason, and the general suffering that would cause, might be a catalyst for dramatic changes that the government would be even harder pressed to respond to in a positive way. It might even prompt a major reassessment by the people as to whether the government is any longer competent. Thus in that sense, a clumsy effort to keep Taiwan from declaring independence, which in turn has a major negative effect on the PRC's economy (which many analysts believe it almost certainly would) and the lives of its citizens, could eventually create a danger to the continued existence of the ruling government of the PRC itself. In addition, Beijing must consider the possibility that an attack against Taiwan might result in military intervention by the United States.
As a result, Beijing in the last few years has made many efforts to promote cross-strait economic and cultural exchange, hoping that increased economic and cultural interconnection and interdependency will eventually bring about a natural desire for political integration on the part of the citizens of Taiwan. Those initiatives have been accepted in Taiwan on their face, but any deeper goals have thus far been met with a frosty reception - not only by the independence-leaning DPP government, but by the majority of citizens as well.
[edit] Taiwan
Chinese reunification is often viewed as being the ideology of the Mainlanders who are living in Taiwan. The proportion of Mainlanders who support reunification when compared to the native Taiwanese is much higher. The parties which do advocate a stance more sympathetic towards reunification often command considerable support for reasons that have nothing to do with cross-strait relations. Furthermore, even strong supporters of reunification often have deep reservations about its timing and nature.
Throughout much of the last decade, polls consistently suggest that 70% to 80% of all Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo; although the definition of the status quo is an area of intense debate. Immediate reunification is currently a distant notion in Taiwan supported by only about 10% of Taiwanese residents and endorsed by none of the major political parties. The People First Party officially advocates that Taiwan should maintain the status quo. The Kuomintang has been consistently defending the sovereignty of the Republic of China. They often claim that there is one China, that is the Republic of China. Although those two parties and the New Party have often been viewed as supporters of Chinese reunification, in most cases they are so in a traditional sense only. Their main difference with the pan-green coalition is that they believe Taiwan should identify itself culturally with China, and opposes what it views as a switching of national identities. This makes them more sympathetic to the concept of reunification in the future. "One Country, Two Systems" has support only among 6-7% of Taiwanese. The main argument for this is the belief that Taiwan, a small island, ultimately cannot compete with the mainland, and hence will benefit the most by reunifying as early as possible.
Polls in Taiwan have been criticized as being biased and inaccurate, as well as being influenced by threats from the PRC. After the October 10, 2004 speech by President Chen, polls showed as little as 5% support for reunification, with 60% support for maintaining the status quo and 65% opposition to the founding of a Republic of Taiwan in 2008 (the projected date for completion of the 2006 constitutional reforms proposed by President Chen in his speech). An independent opinion poll conducted by United Daily News shortly after in November 2004 indicated that the support for the status quo was 36%, 21% are in favor of immediate independence, only 6% supported the idea of rapid reunification with China.[1]
[edit] See also
- Anti-Secession Law of the People's Republic of China
- Chinese nationalism
- Federal Republic of China
- Legal status of Taiwan
- Political status of Taiwan
- Proposed National Unification Promotion Law
- One China
- Two Chinas
- Taiwan independence
- Zhonghua minzu
[edit] References
[edit] Further reading
- Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0471986771
- Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815712901
- Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1403968411
- Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. Routledge. ISBN 0415365813
- Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0275988880
- Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
- Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815731469
- Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195306090
- Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0415407850
- Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231135645
[edit] External links
- Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan collection of documents and articles.
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