Chinese Civil War

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Nationalist-Communist Civil War
Part of the Cold War
Victorious Soldiers of the People's Liberation Army entering Beijing, June 1949
Soldiers of the victorious People's Liberation Army enter Beijing in June 1949.
Date Full scale fighting lasted from April 1927 to December 1936, and clashes from January 1941 resuming full conflict from August 1945 to May 1950; war declared over by the ROC in 1991; [1] no legal document has been signed to end the war, technically continuing from 1927 until today
Location China
Result Communist victory. Republic of China (ROC) retreats to Taiwan, while the People's Republic of China (PRC) is established
Belligerents
Nationalists:
Republic of China under Kuomintang government		 Communists:
1927-1931 & 1934-1949:
Flag of the Communist Party of China Communist Party of China
1931-1934:
Chinese Soviet Republic
After 1949:
People's Republic Of China
Commanders
Flag of the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek Flag of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong
Strength
4,300,000 (July 1945)[2]
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)		 1,200,000 (July 1945)[2]
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)
v • d • e
Chinese Civil War
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The Chinese Civil War (traditional Chinese: 國共內戰; simplified Chinese: 国共内战; pinyin: Guógòng Neìzhàn; literally "Nationalist-Communist Civil War") or (traditional Chinese: 解放戰爭; simplified Chinese: 解放战争; pinyin: Jiefang Zhanzheng; literally "Revolutionary War"), which lasted from April 1927 to May 1950, was a civil war in China between the Kuomintang (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC).[3] The war began in 1927, after the Northern Expedition.[4] The war represented an ideological split between the Western-supported Nationalist KMT, and the Soviet-supported Communist CPC.

The civil war carried on intermittently until the looming Second Sino-Japanese War interrupted it, resulting in an organized and temporary Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion. The Japanese assault and occupation of Eastern China was an opportunistic attack made possible by China's own state of internal turmoil. Japan's campaign was defeated in 1945, marking the end of World War II, and China's full-scale civil war resumed in 1946. Hostilities ended after 23 years in 1950, with an unofficial cessation of major hostilities, with the CPC controlling mainland China (including Hainan Island) and the KMT restricted to their remaining territories of Taiwan, Pescadores, and the several outlying Fujianese islands. To this day, no official armistice has ever been signed, although the two sides have close economic ties.[5]

Contents

[edit] Background

The Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911.[5] China was left under the control of several major and lesser warlords in the Warlord era. To defeat these warlords, who had seized control of much of Northern China since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the anti-monarchist and national unificationist Kuomintang party and its leader Sun Yat-sen sought the help of foreign powers. His efforts to obtain aid from the Western democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the Soviet Union. For political expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun and the newly established Communist Party of China. The Soviets hoped for Communist consolidation, but were prepared for either side to emerge victorious. Thus the struggle for power in China began between the KMT and the CPC.

In 1923, a joint statement by Sun and Soviet representative Adolph Joffe in Shanghai pledged Soviet assistance for China's unification.[6] The Sun-Joffe Manifesto was a declaration for cooperation among the Comintern, KMT and the Communist Party of China.[6] Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the KMT along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPC joined the KMT to form the First United Front.[2]

In 1923, Sun Yat-sen sent Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun's lieutenants from his Tongmeng Hui days, for several months' military and political study in Moscow.[7] By 1924, Chiang became the head of the Whampoa Military Academy, and rose to prominence as Sun's successor as head of the KMT.[7]

The Soviets provided much of the studying material, organization, and equipment including munitions for the academy.[7] The Soviets also provided education in many of the techniques for mass mobilization. With this aid Sun Yat-sen was able to raise a dedicated "army of the party," with which he hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. CPC members were also present in the academy, and many of them became instructors, including Zhou Enlai who was made a political instructor of the academy.[8]

Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis.[6] The CPC itself was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925.[9] The KMT in 1923 had 50,000 members.[9]

[edit] Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and KMT-CPC split

Just months after Sun Yat Sen's death in 1925, Chiang-Kai-Shek, as commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, set out on the Northern Expedition[9]. By 1926, however, the KMT had divided into left and right wing factions.[9] The Communist bloc within it was also growing. In the March 1926 Zhongshan Warship Incident, after thwarting an alleged kidnapping attempt against him, Chiang imposed restrictions on CPC members' participation in the top KMT leadership and emerged as the pre-eminent KMT leader.

Government troops rounding up prisoners.
Government troops rounding up prisoners.

In early 1927, the KMT-CPC rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CPC and the left wing of the KMT had decided to move the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to Wuhan, where Communist influence was strong.[9] But Chiang and Li Zongren, whose armies defeated warlord Sun Chuanfang, moved eastward toward Jiangxi. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand and Chiang denounced the leftists for betraying Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People by taking orders from the Soviet Union. According to Mao Zedong, Chiang's tolerance of the CPC in the KMT camp decreased as his power increased.[10]

On April 7, Chiang and several other KMT leaders held a meeting arguing that communist activities were socially and economically disruptive, and must be undone for the national revolution to proceed. As a result of this, on April 12, Chiang turned on the CPC in Shanghai. The incident purged the KMT leftists by arresting and executing hundreds of CPC members.[11] The incident was called April 12 Incident or Shanghai Massacre by the CPC.[12] The massacre widened the rift between Chiang and Wang Jingwei's Wuhan. Attempts were made by CPC to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, Shantou, and Guangzhou. An armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising was staged by peasants, minors and CPC members in Hunan Province led by Mao Zedong.[13] The uprising was unsuccessful.[13] There now were three capitals in China, the internationally recognized republic capital in Beijing;[14] the CPC and left-wing KMT at Wuhan;[15] and the right-wing KMT regime at Nanjing, which would remain the KMT capital for the next decade.[14]

The CPC had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing KMT allies, who in turn were toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT resumed the campaign against warlords and captured Beijing in June 1928.[16] Afterwards most of eastern China was under the Nanjing central government's control, and the Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The KMT government announced that in conformity with Sun Yat-sen's formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy.[17]

[edit] CPC vs KMT and the Long March (1927–1937)

During the 1920s, Communist Party of China activists retreated underground or to the countryside where they fomented a military revolt, beginning the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927.[18] They combined the force with remnants of peasant rebels, and established control over several areas in southern China.[18] The Guangzhou commune was able to control Guangzhou for three days and a "soviet" was established.[18] KMT armies continue to suppress the rebellions.[18] This marked the beginning of the ten year's struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten Year's Civil War" (simplified Chinese: 十年内战; pinyin: Shínían Nèizhàn). It lasted until the Xi'an Incident when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the Second United Front against the invading Japanese.

A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.
A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.

In 1930 the Central Plains War broke out as an internal conflict of the KMT. It was launched by Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Wang Jingwei. The attention was turned to root out remaining pockets of Communist activity in a series of encirclement campaigns. There were a total of five campaigns.[19] The first and second campaigns failed and the third was aborted due to the Mukden Incident. The fourth campaign (1932-1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang’s armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao’s Soviet Chinese Republic. During these campaigns, the KMT columns struck swiftly into Communist areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold.

Finally, in late 1933, Chiang launched a fifth campaign that involved the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet region with fortified blockhouses.[20] Unlike in previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the KMT troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by five or so miles to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food source.[20]

In October 1934, the CPC took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the troops of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than the KMT themselves) to escape Jiangxi. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of wasting their own men, and did not pursue the CPC with much fervor. In addition, the main KMT forces were preoccupied with annihilating Zhang Guotao's army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered 12,500 km (25,000 Li), and was known as the famous Long March.[21] The march ended when the CPC reached the interior of Shaanxi. Zhang Guotao's army, which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim ally, the Ma clique. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 90,000-100,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000-8,000 made it to Shaanxi.[22] The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CPC, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Communist Party of China.

[edit] Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)

Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (pictured here in March 1945) was severely weakened in power by the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (pictured here in March 1945) was severely weakened in power by the Second Sino-Japanese War.

During the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek, who saw the CPC as a greater threat, refused to ally with the CPC to fight against the Japanese. On December 12, 1936, KMT Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to a truce with the CPC. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident.[23] Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fighting against the Japanese.[23] In 1937, Japanese airplanes bombed Chinese cities and well-equipped troops overran north and coastal China.

The alliance of CPC and KMT Second united front was in name only.[24] The CPC hardly ever engaged the Japanese in major battles but proved efficient in guerrilla warfare. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CPC and KMT during World War II was minimal.[24] In the midst of the Second United Front, the CPC and the KMT were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e. areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by Japanese puppet government).[24] The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when there were major clashes between the Communist and KMT forces. In December 1940, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that the CPC’s New Fourth Army evacuate Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied. In 1941 the New Fourth Army Incident led to several thousand deaths in the CPC.[25] It also ended the Second united front formed earlier to fight the Japanese.[25] In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the CPC. The KMT's resistance to the Japanese proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek. In 1944 the last major offensive, Operation Ichigo was launched by the Japanese against the KMT.[26]

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In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the Communists. Kuomintang's resistance to the Japanese proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek. The war against Japan greatly sapped the KMT's military resources, and Chiang's own central army was never to recover from the devastating losses it had sustained in the early stages of the war. In addition, in the last major Japanese offensive, Operation Ichigo of Fall 1944, the Japanese were able to manoeuver far inland and destroy much of what remained of Chiang's material strength. In contrast, thanks to the brutal mass retaliation policies of the Imperial Japanese Armies, huge numbers of dispossessed villagers were able to be recruited to the Communist ranks. Although the guerrilla operations conducted by the Communists inside occupied China were of limited military value, they greatly heightened popular perception that the Communists were at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese. By the end of the war, large portions of the peasant masses of occupied China were politically mobilized in support of the Communists; however, the Communists had a severe shortage of war material, including small arms.

[edit] Immediate post-war clashes (1945–1946)

From left to right: US diplomat Patrick J. Hurley, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Shi Jie (王世杰), Mao Zedong
From left to right: US diplomat Patrick J. Hurley, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Shi Jie (王世杰), Mao Zedong

Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.[26] Under the terms of the Japanese unconditional surrender dictated by the United States, Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to KMT troops and not to the CPC present in some of the occupied areas.[27] In Manchuria the Japanese surrendered to the Soviet Union. However the KMT had no forces in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Japanese troops to keep fighting the CPC through September, a full month after their surrender.[27]

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The dropping of the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender much more quickly than anyone in China had imagined. Under the terms of the Japanese unconditional surrender dictated by the United States, Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to Nationalist troops and not to the Communists present in some of the occupied areas, especially in Manchuria. However, as the Nationalists had no forces in Manchuria and very few or no forces in the most of the rest of the Japanese occupied area, while the communist guerrillas were the only Chinese force present in the area, the communists were able to takeover most of Manchuria before the Nationalists could send troops there. Even after sending sufficient forces, it would still take the Nationalists months of fighting to drive the communists out of major cities in Manchuria. As the communists were the only Chinese forces left in the region that had engaged the Japanese in guerrilla warfare, it was difficult for the Nationalists though to receive local popular support in Manchuria and other parts of China,because local Chinese residents blamed the Nationalists for allowing the Japanese invaders to conquer the local area, such as in the case of Manchuria 14 years previously.

Immediately after World War II, Chiang Kai-shek made a fatal mistake in trying to simultaneously solve the warlord problem and exterminate communism. Many of the warlords who sided with the Nationalists were only interested in keeping their own power, and defected to the Japanese side when the Japanese offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their cooperation. After World War II, these former Japanese puppet regimes once again joined the Nationalists.

Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good, as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined the Nationalists, because such a move would alienate other factions within the Nationalists; furthermore, these former warlords could still provide much-needed military assistance to the Nationalists.

As Chiang had neither sufficient force nor sufficient time to deploy his own troops in the former Japanese controlled regions, these warlords were given titles and ranks in the Nationalist forces and ordered to "keep order" in their areas of control by not surrendering to the communists, and by fighting off the communists if necessary. Chiang and his followers had hoped that these warlords would be able to resist the communists and hold on to the former Japanese-occupied regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops there. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still be of benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plaguing China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, the communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have an easier time taking control. The ensuing battles between the communists and these warlords resulted mostly in communist victories, exactly as Chiang and his followers had predicted, and their attempt to greatly reduce the problem of the warlords resulted in success.

However, this success came at a huge cost in the Nationalists' loss of popular support in these Japanese dominated regions, because the local population already blamed them for losing the regions to the Japanese, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as Nationalist forces to fight alongside of Japanese soldiers against the communists only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment towards Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.

The first post-war peace negotiation was attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in Chongqing from Aug 28, 1945 to Oct 10, 1945.[28] Both sides stressed the importance of a peaceful reconstruction, but the conference did not produce any concrete result.[28] Battles between the two sides continued even as the peace negotiation was in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full scale confrontations between the CPC and Chiang's own troops were temporarily avoided.

In the last month of World War II in East Asia, Soviet forces launched the mammoth Operation August Storm to attack the Japanese in Manchuria.[29] This operation destroyed the fighting capability of the Kwantung Army and left the USSR in occupation of all of Manchuria at the end of the war. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year, Chiang Kai-shek realized that he lacked the resources to prevent a CPC takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure. He therefore made a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern material into the region. KMT troops were then airlifted by the United States to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the CPC. The Soviets spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to 2 billion dollars) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.[30]

The truce fell apart in June 1946, when full scale war between CPC and KMT broke out on June 26. China then entered a state of civil war that lasted more than three years.[31]

[edit] Post-war power struggle (1946–1947)

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American General George Marshall arrived in China and was part of negotiations over a ceasefire between the KMT and the CCP, the terms of which would build a coalition government that would include all of the contending political/military groups in China. Neither the Communists (represented by Zhou Enlai) nor Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were willing to compromise on certain fundamental issues or relinquish the territories they had seized in the wake of the Japanese surrender.

The Nationalists demilitarized 1.5 million troops, ostensibly to support the Marshall Mission; this turned out to be a fatal mistake for Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. Chiang and his associates used this excuse to reduce the power and influence of warlords who were allied with Nationalists: almost none of the 1.5 million troops discharged belonged to Chiang's own forces, most of them belonging to warlords, including those who had collaborated with the Japanese during the war and later pledged their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. This move alienated many within the Nationalists. As for the ordinary soldiers who were discharged, their prospects changed for the worse as nothing effective was done to help them integrate into civilian life. Many protests and riots by the discharged soldiers broke out, particularly in Chongqing by discharged former soldiers of the Sichuan warlords. Faced with such desperate situations, these former soldiers turned against Chiang and the Nationalist government, and while some turned to banditry, most of them decided to join the Communists. The Communists welcomed these new recruits because their resentment towards the Nationalists made them sympathetic to the Communist cause. The largest Nationalist defection to the Communists occurred in Manchuria, where over half a million discharged Nationalist soldiers (mostly former Japanese puppet government troops) joined the Communist force, which previously had never exceeded 50,000--a more than 1000% boost for Lin Biao's forces.

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In addition to this, the Nationalist demilitarization also provided Communists with much needed weaponry. When Chiang Kai-shek attempted to solve the problem of the warlords by discharging their troops, the action backfired badly for him and the Nationalists in Manchuria when it was combined with other critical mistakes the Nationalists made. The Japanese wartime strategy had been to give up Japan rather than give up Manchuria because the latter was so industrially vital, and thus, they had stockpiled large amounts of weaponry (enough to sustain more than 700,000 troops for several years) in hidden remote and hard-to-reach areas all over Manchuria. Although the Soviets captured a large quantity of Japanese weaponry, the majority of the Japanese stock survived. The Nationalists were infatuated with obtaining as many urban centers as possible; therefore, the rural and hard-to-reach areas were ignored. Militarily, the Nationalist did not have any incentive to recover this large stockpile of weaponry because the American weaponry used by Nationalist forces was superior. More importantly, since operating modern weaponry needed considerable knowledge and training, the Nationalists believed that even if these weapons were to reach Communist hands, it would be impossible for the Communists to use them because most of their troops were uneducated and illiterate. Therefore, the Nationalist regime generally ignored the information on these Japanese secret depots because they deemed it not worth the effort to recover or destroy the weapons. Furthermore, since the information was provided by former warlords' troops, and they were to be discharged, the Nationalists considered their actions no other than attempting to show their importance and to ask for financial rewards, and thus failed to take proper actions to prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands. Chiang and the Nationalists were correct on the matter originally but when Nationalist demilitarization began, things turned out to be completely opposite. Because the discharged troops had the experience and training needed to handle the weaponry, communists in Manchuria had hit a gold mine when these troops joined them en masse. Not only were these valuable troops able to teach the rest of communists how to operate these weapons, but more importantly, these new troops knew exactly where the Japanese secret depots were. Unlike the Nationalists, the communists were extremely appreciative of the information and weaponry obtained, because what was less advanced to the Nationalists was of great value to the poorly equipped Communist troops.

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Contrary to the Nationalist propaganda that the Soviets had given huge quantity of weapons to the Communists in Manchuria, the actual amount was extremely low: the total Soviet weaponry and Japanese weaponry captured by the Soviet Union that was given to the communists was only enough to equip 30 infantry regiments and 2 mountain gun battalions, equipping a mere 20,000 communist troops out of a total of 400,000 (as of the end of 1947), and the Soviet aid to Communists completely stopped by the end of 1947. The Communists originally expected the Soviets to play a much larger role and Lin Biao personally wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin on June 25, 1947, asking for Japanese weaponry to be turned over to the Communists, even as he asked for captured German weaponry. Stalin, however, did not even bother to respond. On December 28, 1947, Lin Biao wrote another letter directly to Stalin, asking for more weaponry. Again, Lin Biao appealed to Stalin in the letter that if such demand could not be met with captured Japanese weaponry, then captured German weaponry could fill the gap. Stalin, just like he had done previously, did not respond. However, the nearly nonexistent Soviet help proved not to be a problem for the Communists; in the mean time, the huge Communist need was filled by an unexpected source: their adversaries, the Nationalists. Due to the fatal mistake the Nationalists made in their demilitarization, the Communists were able to pinpoint nearly every Japanese secret depot with the help of former Nationalist troops in their ranks, and the total amount of Japanese weaponry recovered was enough to sustain the Communists for 2 years before relying on captured American weaponry from the Nationalists in the later stage of the war. For example, a single secret depot typically contained as much as 150,000 artillery rounds. By February 1947, hundreds of artillery pieces were recovered by the communists, including: 49 howitzers, 300 heavy mortars, 137 anti-aircraft artilleries, 141 anti-tank guns, 108 mountain guns, 97 cannons, and many other smaller artillery pieces, almost one-third of the Nationalist weaponry. More importantly, due to the rapid expansion of their ranks, filled by former Nationalist troops discharged from the demilitarization, the sudden increase of troops of the Communists meant that the original Communist peasantry army that was largely illiterate had suddenly became an army with 90% of its force being well trained, technically capable and combat hardened veterans that were more than a match for the Nationalist forces, who now had only three-quarters of the amount of Communist weaponry, with a handful of tanks and aircraft. However, even at this stage, Nationalist troops still greatly underestimated their Communist counterparts because the American weaponry used by Nationalist troops was superior to the Japanese weaponry used by the Communist troops. Thus, the huge qualitative advantage of the Nationalist would, they believed, be more than enough to make up for the numerical superiority of the Communists, a bad miscalulation for which they would have to pay later.

During the Nationalist demilitarization, the Communists did not sit idly either; it also reduced its troops by a million both in the regular army and in militia to ostensibly support the Marshall Mission. However, such reduction was the result of Mao Zedong's class struggle theory; in fact, most were discharged due to political persecution and "rectification" campaigns. As a result, the Communist force reduction was much harsher than that of Nationalist because it was a political purge. Most of those targeted in the Communist force reduction were from the wealthy, land owning and middle classes, and despite their loyalty to the Communists, they were considered unreliable due to their class background and thus were purged. These unfortunates did not have the luxury like those discharged Nationalist soldiers who at least were able to live on the streets. Those discharged by the Communists were considered "class enemies" and were targeted by their former comrades, and were often executed, jailed, or forced to commit suicide.[citation needed] As a result, most Communist members from well-to-do family backgrounds chose to desert, with the majority defecting to the Nationalist and becoming ardent anti-Communists. The defection rate was particularly high in those Communist-controlled regions where the struggles of persecutions were brutal, and in Mao's own admission, "in Shandong alone, over 300,000 (former Communists) were driven to the enemy (Nationalist) side."[citation needed] In addition to joining the regular Nationalist force, Communist defectors also formed their own militias to help the Nationalist to exterminate the Communists in the civil war that soon followed. The Communists also used the cease-fire period ushered by Marshall to arm and train huge numbers of peasants who had joined the People's Liberation Army during the war with Japan. The political persecution and purges during this era was an extension of Mao's Rectification Movement and was kept secret by the Chinese government, and it was not until the 1990s that the bloody details were allowed to surface in the domestic Chinese media.

The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full scale war broke out on June 26, and although negotiations continued, Marshall was recalled in January 1947, the same time when the last Communist envoys in Nationalist controlled regions were recalled back to Yan'an.

[edit] Fighting on mainland China (1946–1950)

The PLA enters Beiping in the Pingjin Campaign and control the capital
The PLA enters Beiping in the Pingjin Campaign and control the capital

With the breakdown of talks, an all out war resumed. This stage is referred to in Communist media and historiography as the "War of Liberation" (simplified Chinese: 解放战争; pinyin: Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng). The United States assisted the KMT with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new surplus military supplies and generous loans of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment.[32] They also airlifted many KMT troops from central China to Manchuria. Nevertheless, the CPC, who had already situated themselves in the north and northeast, were poised to strike.

General Marshall himself stated that he knew of no evidence that the CPC were being supplied by the Soviet Union.[33] The CPC did benefit indirectly from the elimination of the Japanese Kwantung Army but the Soviets did not provide direct support to the CPC during this period as they expected either a power-sharing arrangement or a KMT victory. The CPC were able to capture a number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese and KMT including some tanks but it was not until large numbers of well trained KMT troops joined the communist force that the CPC were finally able to master the hardware.[34] Anti-Japanese Koreans also played an important role, with 30-40 thousand Korean troops participating in the war on the Communist side. Koreans are also credited with repairing Manchurian railroads and bridges which were used by Mao.[35]

In March 1947 the KMT seized the CPC capital of Yenan. By late 1948 the CPC eventually captured the northern cities of Mukden and Changchun.[36] The economy between the years 1946-1949 witnessed the growth of enterprises offering welfare services to sustain workers standard of living during the hyperinflation crisis that afflicted the KMT.[37] The KMT position was bleak. Chiang Kai Shek attempted to eliminate the CPC in the North by using troops belonging to northern warlords who had sided with Chiang during the Civil War and then switched sides to join the Japanese during the invasion. This strategy backfired as the effort to suppress the CPC who the peasants remembered as the enemies of the Japanese by using troops who had assisted the hated invaders further eroded any base of popular support which Chiang might have hoped for. Although the KMT had an advantage in their numbers and weapons, and benefited from considerable international support, their low morale hindered their ability to fight. Furthermore, though they administered a larger and more populous territory, their corruption effectively stifled any civilian support.

The CPC were ultimately able to seize Manchuria after struggling through numerous set-backs while trying to take the cities, with the decisive Liaoshen Campaign.[38] The capture of large KMT formations provided them with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to prosecute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. By April 1948 the city of Loyang fell, cutting the KMT army off from Xi'an.[39] Following a fierce battle, the CPC captured Jinan and Shandong province on September 28, 1948.[39] The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CPC.[38] The outcome of these encounters were decisive for the military outcome of the civil war.[38] The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China lasting 64 days from November 21, 1948 to January 31, 1949.[40] The People's Liberation Army suffered heavy casualties from securing Zhangjiakou, Tianjin along with its port and garrison at Dagu, and Beiping.[40] The CPC brought 890,000 troops from Manchuria to oppose some 600,000 KMT troops.[39] There were 40,000 CPC casualties at Zhangjiakou alone. They in turned killed, wounded or captured some 520,000 KMT during the campaign.[40]

On April 21, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, capturing Nanjing, capital of the KMT's Republic of China.[21] In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces southwards in southern China.

[edit] CPC establish People's Republic of China / KMT retreat to Taiwan island

Mao Zedong proclaiming the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.
Mao Zedong proclaiming the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China with its capital at Peking, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and approximately 2 million Nationalist Chinese retreated from the mainland to the island of Taiwan.[41] There remained only isolated pockets of resistance, particularly in the far south. A PRC attempt to take the ROC controlled island of Kinmen was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan.[42] In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of the Republic of China and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China. The last of the fighting ended with the Landing Operation on Hainan Island which resulted in the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in April 1950 and Choushan island in May 1950.[43] However, no legal document to officially end the Chinese Civil War has ever been signed. Legally speaking, with both contending governments PRC and ROC still existing, the Chinese Civil War has not been resolved.

[edit] Relationship between the two sides since 1950

Main article: Political status of Taiwan

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the United States initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. At this point, allowing a total Communist victory over Chiang became politically impossible in the United States, and President Harry S. Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Taiwan straits to prevent ROC and PRC from attacking each other.[44]

In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered from a point north of the mouth of Min river in Fujian province to the mouth of the Liao river in Manchuria.[45] Since the mainland's railroad network was underdeveloped, north-south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland fishermen.

After losing the mainland, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China. Their leader, General Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times.

After the Republic of China complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union supporting the CPC, the UN General Assembly Resolution 505 was adopted on February 1, 1952 to condemn the Soviet Union.

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to retake the mainland. On September 3, 1954, the First Taiwan Strait crisis began when the PLA started shelling Quemoy and threatened to take the Dachen Islands.[45] On January 20, 1955, the PLA took nearby Yijiangshan Island, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On January 24 of the same year, the United States Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.[45] The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the Bandung conference.[45]

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on August 23, 1958 with air and naval engagements between PRC and ROC forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Quemoy (by the PRC) and Amoy (by the ROC), and ended on November of the same year.[45] PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the United States rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On September 7, the United States escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing. On October 25, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire" — the PLA would only shell Quemoy on odd-numbered days. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96 escalated tensions between both sides when the PRC tested a series of missiles not far from Taiwan.[46]

Since the late 1980s, there has been growing economic exchanges on both sides while the Taiwan straits remain a dangerous flash point.[5] Beginning in the early 21st century, there has been a significant warming of relations between the KMT and the Communist Party of China with high level exchanges such as the 2005 Pan-blue visit.

[edit] Commanders during the Civil War

[edit] Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)

[edit] Communist Party of China

[edit] Warlords

[edit] List of Chinese Civil War weapons

Handguns

Rifles

Submachine Guns

Machine Guns

Heavy Machine Guns

Anti-Tank Weapons

Grenades

Misc, Nationalist

[edit] See also

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[edit] Notes

  1. ^ News.bbc.co.uk
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  3. ^ Gay, Kathlyn. [2008] (2008). 21st Century Books. Mao Zedong's China. ISBN:0822572850. pg 7
  4. ^ Hutchings, Graham. [2001] (2001). Modern China: A Guide to a Century of Change. Harvard University Press. ISBN:0674006585.
  5. ^ a b c So, Alvin Y. Lin, Nan. Poston, Dudley L. Contributor Professor, So, Alvin Y. [2001] (2001). The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Greenwood Publishing. ISBN 0313308691.
  6. ^ a b c March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific. [1996] (1996). Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275955664. pg 205.
  7. ^ a b c Chang, H. H. Chang. [2007] (2007). Chiang Kai Shek - Asia's Man of Destiny. ISBN:1406758183. pg 126
  8. ^ Ho, Alfred K. Ho, Alfred Kuo-liang. [2004] (2004). China's Reforms and Reformers. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275960803. pg 7.
  9. ^ a b c d e Fairbank, John King. [1994] (1994). China: A New History. Harvard University Press. ISBN:0674116739.
  10. ^ Zedong, Mao. Thompson, Roger R. [1990] (1990). Report from Xunwu. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804721823.
  11. ^ Brune, Lester H. Dean Burns, Richard Dean Burns. [2003] (2003). Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations. Routledge. ISBN:0415939143.
  12. ^ Zhao, Suisheng. [2004] (2004). A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804750017.
  13. ^ a b Blasko, Dennis J. [2006] (2006). The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. Routledge. ISBN:0415770033.
  14. ^ a b Esherick, Joseph. [2000] (2000). Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN:0824825187.
  15. ^ Clark, Anne Biller. Clark, Anne Bolling. Klein, Donald. Klein, Donald Walker. [1971] (1971). Harvard Univ. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese communism. Original from the University of Michigan v.1. Digitized Dec 21, 2006. p 134.
  16. ^ Guo, Xuezhi. [2002] (2002). The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275972593.
  17. ^ Theodore De Bary, William. Bloom, Irene. Chan, Wing-tsit. Adler, Joseph. Lufrano Richard. Lufrano, John. [1999] (1999). Sources of Chinese Tradition. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231109385. pg 328.
  18. ^ a b c d Lee, Lai to. Trade Unions in China: 1949 To the Present. [1986] (1986). National University of Singapore Press. ISBN:9971690934.
  19. ^ Lynch, Michael Lynch. Clausen, Søren. [2003] (2003). Mao. Routledge. ISBN:0415215773.
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  22. ^ Bianco, Lucien. Bell, Muriel. [1971] (1971). Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804708274. pg 68
  23. ^ a b Ye, Zhaoyan Ye, Berry, Michael. [2003] (2003). Nanjing 1937: A Love Story. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231127545.
  24. ^ a b c Buss, Claude Albert. [1972] (1972). Stanford Alumni Association. The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon. United States.
  25. ^ a b Schoppa, R. Keith. [2000] (2000). The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231112769.
  26. ^ a b Lary, Diana. [2007] (2007). China's Republic. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:0521842565.
  27. ^ a b Zarrow, Peter Gue. [2005] (2005). China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949. Routledge. ISBN:0415364477. pg 338.
  28. ^ a b Xu, Guangqiu. [2001] (2001). War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929-1949. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0313320047. pg 201.
  29. ^ Bright, Richard Carl. [2007] (2007). Pain and Purpose in the Pacific: True Reports of War. Trafford Publishing. ISBN:1425125441.
  30. ^ Lilley, James. China hands : nine decades of adventure, espionage, and diplomacy in Asia , PublicAffairs, New York, 2004
  31. ^ Hu, Jubin. [2003] (2003). Projecting a Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949. Hong Kong University Press. ISBN:9622096107.
  32. ^ p23, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, William Blum, Zed Books 2004 London.
  33. ^ New York Times, 12 Jan 1947, p44.
  34. ^ Zeng Kelin, Zeng Kelin jianjun zishu (General Zeng Kelin Tells his story), Liaoning renmin chubanshe, Shenyang, 1997. p. 112-3
  35. ^ Tikhomirov, V.V., & Tsukanov, A. M., "Komandirovka v Manchzhuriyu" (Assignment to Manchuria), in Akimov
  36. ^ Lilley, James R. China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia. ISBN:1586481363.
  37. ^ Howard, Joshua H. Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenals, 1937-1953. [2004] (2004). Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804748969. pg 363.
  38. ^ a b c Westad, Odd Arne. [2003] (2003). Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Stanford University Press. ISBN:080474484X. p 192-193.
  39. ^ a b c Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. Routledge. ISBN:0415214734.
  40. ^ a b c Finkelstein, David Michael. Ryan, Mark A. McDevitt, Michael. [2003] (2003). Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949. M.E. Sharpe. China. ISBN:0765610884. p 63
  41. ^ Cook, Chris Cook. Stevenson, John. [2005] (2005). The Routledge Companion to World History Since 1914. Routledge. ISBN:0415345847. p 376.
  42. ^ Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. [2003] (2003). The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231130023. pg 2
  43. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. [1991] (1991). The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:0521243378. pg 820.
  44. ^ Bush, Richard C. [2005] (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN:081571288X.
  45. ^ a b c d e Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950-1958. [2006] (2006). I.B. Tauris. ISBN:1850438420. p 155, p 115-120, p 139-145
  46. ^ Behnke, Alison. [2007] (2007). Taiwan in Pictures. Twenty-First Century Books. ISBN:082257148X.

[edit] External links

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