Chekism

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Prisoners to be shot by NKVD executioners. Painting by Nikolai Getman, provided by Jamestown Foundation
Prisoners to be shot by NKVD executioners. Painting by Nikolai Getman, provided by Jamestown Foundation

Chekism is a term used by historians and political scientists to emphasize the omnipotence and omnipresence of secret political police in the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia.[1][2] Derived from Cheka, the name of the first Soviet secret police organization that conducted Red Terror in Russia, the word emphasizes the importance and political power of Cheka and the successor Soviet and Russian secret police services: the NKVD, KGB, and FSB. Some politologists define Chekism also as an imperial ideology.[3] The term is applied to the Soviet Union or modern Russia, although Russian Empire was also often described as a police state [4]

Contents

[edit] Soviet Union

The idea of the secret political police as a backbone of Soviet society was put forward by a prominent historian, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, who wrote:

"It is not true that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is a superpower (...) An absolute power thinks, acts and dictates for all of us. The name of the power — NKVDMVDMGB. The Stalin regime is based not on Soviets, Party ideals, the power of the Political Bureau, Stalin’s personality, but the organization and the technique of the Soviet political police where Stalin plays the role of the first policeman.

To tell that NKVD is a state secret police — means to tell nothing to the point. Intelligence Service is also a secret police, but in the eyes of the Britons its existence is as natural as the Health Ministry. To tell that NKVD is a body of mass inquisition also means to tell nothing to the point, because Gestapo also was a mass inquisition, although its chief Himmler — would not have fit a sergeant of the State Security Service. To tell that NKVD is «a state in the state» means to belittle the importance of NKVD, because the question allows two forces: a normal state and a supernormal NKVD: whereas the force is the universal Chekism. A state Chekism, a party Chekism, a collective Chekism, an individual Chekism. Chekism in ideology, Chekism in practice. Chekism from top to bottom. Chekism from the almighty Stalin to a paltry." [5]

These ideas were also shared by journalist John Barron[6], retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin [7], and researcher on KGB subjects Evgenia Albats. According to Albats, most KGB leaders, including Lavrenty Beria, Yuri Andropov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, have always struggled for the power with the Communist Party and manipulated the communist leaders. [8]

Commenting on the Soviet regime of early 1980s Yegor Gaidar writes: "Authority of the regime was based on the effective secret police." Along with that, "since 1968, before death of Brezhnev no weapons were used to suppress the dissent. The regime has learnt to do without extreme forms of violence". While a broad dissident movement existed (so, "at least in capital cities, it became indecent for an educated person to be unfamiliar with e.g. forbidden works of A. Sakharov or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn"), at the time "it wasn't a serious threat for a regime" [9] . According to the data provided by Gaidar, "In 1958-1966 people convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda amounted to 3448. In 1967-1975, 1583 people were convicted. In 1971-1974, using terms appropriate in KGB, 63,1 thousand people were 'prophylaxed' — this term was used by authorities to describe activities done with people suspected in thinking differently. Potential dissidents had to realize that their activities are known to the authorities and there's an alternative — to be jailed or to express loyalty to the authorities." [9]

[edit] Contemporary Russia

According to former Russian Duma member Konstantin Borovoi, "Putin's appointment is the culmination of the KGB's crusade for power. This is its finale. Now the KGB runs the country." [10] Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Elites, has found that up to 78% of 1,016 leading political figures in Russia have served previously in organizations affiliated with KGB or FSB [11]. She said: "If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB people were mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are involved in business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture... They started to use all political institutions."[11]

The KGB or FSB members usually remain in the "acting reserve" even if they formally leave the organization ("acting reserve" members receive second FSB salary, follow FSB instructions, and remain "above the law" being protected by the organization, according to Kryshtanovskaya [12]). As Vladimir Putin said, "There is no such thing as a former KGB man" [13]. Soon after becoming prime minister of Russia, Putin also perhaps somehow jokingly claimed that "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission." [10]. Moreover, the FSB has formal membership, military discipline, an extensive network of civilian informants [14], hardcore ideology, and support of population (60% of Russians trust FSB [15]), which according to Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick makes it a perfect totalitarian political party [8]

Some observers note that the current Russian state security organization FSB is even more powerful than KGB was, because it does not operate under the control of the Communist Party as the KGB in the past.[16][11] Moreover, the FSB leadership and their partners own the most important economic assets in the country and control the Russian government and the State Duma. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa,

"In the Soviet Union, the KGB was a state within a state. Now former KGB officers are running the state. They have custody of the country’s 6,000 nuclear weapons, entrusted to the KGB in the 1950s, and they now also manage the strategic oil industry renationalized by Putin. The KGB successor, rechristened FSB, still has the right to electronically monitor the population, control political groups, search homes and businesses, infiltrate the federal government, create its own front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prison system. The Soviet Union had one KGB officer for every 428 citizens. Putin’s Russia has one FSB-ist for every 297 citizens." [17]

However, the number of FSB staff is a state secret of Russian Federation. [18], and the staff of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces is not officially submitted to the FSB [19], although FSB might be interested in monitoring these structures, as they intrinsically involve state secrets and various degrees of admittance to them. [20] The Law on Federal Security Service which defines its functions and establishes its structure doesn't involve such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government. [21]

Andrei Illarionov, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin, describes contemporary Chekism as a new socio-political order (the Power Model), "distinct from any seen in our country before". In this model, members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators [Russian abbreviation KSSS] took over the entire body of state power, follow an omerta-like behavior code, and "are given instruments conferring power over others – membership “perks”, such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of KSSS members. Through these agencies, every significant resource of the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members." The ideology of "Chekists" is "Nashism (“ours-ism”), the selective application of rights", he said. [22]

[edit] Attitudes toward Chekism in contemporary Russia

[edit] Support

Chekists perceive themselves as a ruling class, with political powers transferred from one generation to another [23]. According to a former FSB general, “A Chekist is a breed". "A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged."[23]

The ruling of Chekists is supported by the Russian Orthodox Church. According to a Russian priest, “Thank God there is the FSB. All power is from God and so is theirs”[23]. A former execution site in Moscow, where tens of thousands of people were shot to death, was transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church which built a temple there. A representative of the Church said thanks to FSB staff who "aid the work for immortalizing the memory of those subjected to repressions"[24] [25]

Head of the Russian Drug Enforcement Administration Viktor Cherkesov said that all Russian siloviks must act as a united front:

"We [Chekists] must stay together. We did not rush to power, we did not wish to appropriate the role of the ruling class. But the history commanded so that the weight of sustaining the Russian statehood fell to the large extent on our shoulders... There were no alternatives."[26]

Cherkesov emphasized the importance of Chekism as a "hook" that keeps the entire country from falling apart. According to Cherkesov,

"The country has survived a full-scale catastrophe in early 90-s. ... Some Chekists have quickly fell apart and parted the professional community. Some became traitors. Some have sweepingly become depraved. But a part of the community has nevertheless stayed. I won't discuss again what's the part and why did it remain intact... Falling into the abyss the post-Soviet society cought the 'chekist' hook. And hanged on it." [27] "Someone will say: “We saved the country from chekism!” In actuality, they will not have saved the country, they will have ruined it."[27]

[edit] Criticism

Political scientist Yevgenia Albats found such attitudes deploring:

"Throughout the country, without investigation or trial, the Chekists raged. They tortured old men and raped shoolgirls and killed parents before the eyes of their children. They impaled people, beat them with an iron glove, put wet leather "crowns" on their heads, buried them alive, locked them in cells where the floor was covered with corpses. Amazing, isn't it that today's agents do not blanch to call themselves Chekists, and proudly claim Dzerzhinsky's legacy?"[28]

[edit] References

  1. ^ The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State, Anderson, Julie (2006), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 19:2, 237-288.
  2. ^ The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State Anderson, Julie (2007), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 20:2, 258-316
  3. ^ he said: "Chekism is a neo-Soviet imperial ideology and not just a line in a resume." Faking Left, by Stanislav Belkobsky, The St. Petersburg Times
  4. ^ According to philosopher Peter Struve, "It is only the omnipotence of political police that makes Russian State so exceptional. That is what sets us apart of the remaining world as a matter of our national pride." (Badly informed optimists, by Irina Pavlova, grani.ru)
  5. ^ "Idea which is worth of dying for it", The Chechen Times №17, 30.08.2003
  6. ^ KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1974. [pb] New York: Bantam Books, 1974.
  7. ^ The Triumph of the KGB by retired KGB Major General Oleg D. Kalugin The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies
  8. ^ a b Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia--Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5.
  9. ^ a b E. Gaidar. "Death of the Empire. Lessons for the contemporary Russia.", 2007, ISBN 5-8243-0759-8. Buy, download.
  10. ^ a b The KGB Rises Again in Russia - by R.C. Paddock - Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2000
  11. ^ a b c In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens - by P. Finn - Washington Post, 2006
  12. ^ Interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Russian) "Siloviks in power: fears or reality?" by Evgenia Albats, Echo of Moscow, 4 February 2006
  13. ^ A Chill in the Moscow Air, by Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, Newsweek, February 6, 2006
  14. ^ Slaves of KGB. 20th Century. The religion of betrayal (Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства), by Yuri Shchekochikhin Moscow, 1999.
  15. ^ Archives explosion by Maksim Artemiev, grani.ru, December 22, 2006
  16. ^ Symposium: KGB Resurrection, interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Ion Mihai Pacepa, and R. James Woolsey, Jr., FrontPageMagazine.com, April 30, 2004.
  17. ^ Symposium: When an Evil Empire Returns, interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, R. James Woolsey, Jr., Yuri Yarim-Agaev, and Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, FrontPageMagazine.com, June 23, 2006.
  18. ^ FSB will get new members, the capital will get new land, by Igor Plugataryov and Viktor Myasnikov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2006, (in Russian)
  19. ^ Russian Armed Forces, official site (in English)
  20. ^ Law on State Secrets, 1997 edition (in Russian)
  21. ^ The Law on Federal Security Service, 2003 (in Russia)
  22. ^ Andrei Illarionov: Approaching Zimbabwe (Russian) Partial English translation
  23. ^ a b c Russia under Putin. The making of a neo-KGB state., The Economist, August 23, 2007
  24. ^ Protoiyerey Kirill Kaleda: "As at the Butovo Testing Area Bloodless Sacrifice is being done, the changing of the spiritual situation occurs.", site of the Moscow Patriarchy, February 11, 2007 (in Russian)
  25. ^ Some Stuff Will Never Be Declassified, Vasily Khristoforov, http://Fsb.ru, December 2005 (in Russian)
  26. ^ Viktor Cherkesov: KGB is in Fashion?, Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 28, 2004 (in Russian)
  27. ^ a b Cherkesov, Viktor. One can't admit the warriors to become traders (Нельзя допустить, чтобы воины превратились в торговцев) Kommersant #184 (3760), October 9, 2007. (in Russian)English translation and Comments by Grigory Pasko
  28. ^ Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5, page 95.

[edit] Further reading

[edit] See also