Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

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The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), previously known as the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), is best described as the governmental nuclear energy and materials watchdog in Canada.

In addition to nuclear power plants and nuclear research facilities, the CNSC regulates numerous other uses of nuclear material. Some examples include radioisotopes used in the treatment of cancer, the operation of uranium mines and refineries, and the use of radioactive sources for oil exploration and in instruments such as precipitation measurement devices.

The regulatory system is designed to protect people and the environment from human-made radiation resulting from the use of nuclear energy and materials at licensed sites. This is accomplished through a licensing process that requires the licensee to prove that their operations are safe. At the basis of the regulatory system is the principle that no technology is fail proof, so licensees must incorporate multiple layers of protection whenever radioactive materials are used. The CNSC also licenses the import, export and transportation of nuclear materials and other prescribed substances, equipment, technology and dual-use items.

CNSC staff play an important role in protecting health, safety, security and the environment by monitoring and inspecting licensed activities. As part of that role, CNSC staff evaluates the performance of nuclear power plants. Staff also contributes to the development of international nuclear safety standards and nuclear non-proliferation fora.

Nuclear safety and security have always been a CNSC priority and became even more significant following the events of September 11, 2001.

The CNSC is an independent agency of the Government of Canada and operates in a transparent manner. Its operations are open to formal public scrutiny.

The CNSC reports to the Parliament of Canada through the Minister of Natural Resources.

[edit] Political storm over dismissal of CNSC chair

In November 2007, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), acting upon the advice of the CNSC that it was in violation of its site operating licence for Chalk River Laboratories (CRL), voluntarily chose to extend a routine shutdown of the NRU nuclear reactor pending completion of certain safety upgrades. The situation arose from a significant misunderstanding between AECL and the CNSC regarding the level of completion of these safety upgrades, which formed a condition of the CRL licence. The misunderstanding extended, in fact, to a fundamental disagrement over whether the unfinished work constituted a violation of the operating license in the first place.

The issue involved two of NRU's eight coolant pumps which, upon completion of several safety upgrades, would be credited as being able to withstand severe external hazards such as a major earthquake. Before and after the awarding of CRL's October 2006 operating license fo CRL, AECL reported that these two pumps had not yet been connected to a seismically-qualifed backup power supply (separate from NRU's normal backup power supplies); however, in November 2007 this fact was recognized by the CNSC as evidence of a license violation, leading AECL to extend the NRU's maintenance shutdown until the seismically-qualified backup power connection could be completed.

The extended shutdown created a shortage of medical radioisotopes; Canada produces about 60 per cent of the world's supply. CNSC required that a safety case be made [as per its mandate] to modify AECL’s license in order to allow it to operate the NRU reactor with a single pump connected to seismically qualified backup power supplies, but AECL's submission was not accepted by the CNSC.

Parliament passed emergency legislation overriding the “independent” regulator CNSC on the issue of the two pumps at NRU, winning all-party support to order the reactor to be restarted, and NRU resumed operations on December 16, 2007.

Subsequently, federal Conservative Energy and Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn indicated in a letter that he wished to fire CNSC chair Linda Keen over the matter. The Ottawa Citizen obtained and published Lunn's letter to Keen on January 8, 2008. Keen responded by going public with her own questioning of Lunn, publishing a letter on CNSC's website on January 9 and requesting the Police and the Privay Commissioner investigate the leaking of in-confidence documentation. [1] The media worldwide further developed the story.

Auditor General Sheila Fraser, upon request from Keen, had investigated AECL's situation, and issued a report to AECL's board of directors in late August, 2007, indicating also that Lunn, who oversees AECL at the political level, should be informed. Fraser's report pinpointed serious government funding deficiencies for AECL, which had held back necessary expansion, upgrading, and replacement of its facilities. Opposition politicians defended Keen, called for Lunn to be fired, and for the report to be made public (Auditor-General's report identified 'deficiency' at AECL, by Juliet O'Neill, The National Post, January 10, 2008, p. A1).

Prime Minister Stephen Harper backed Lunn, (http://www.theglobeandmail.com, January 10, 2008) and Linda Keen was dismissed as chair of the CNSC at 10pm Tuesday January 15th - 12 hours before she was to appear before a parliamentary committee. She remains a member of the CNSC board. EdmontonSun, CBC News

On January 29, 2008, the former President of the CNSC, Linda Keen, testified before a Parliamentary Committee that the risk of fuel failure in the NRU reactor was "1 in 1000", and claimed this risk to be a thousand times greater than the "international standard of one in one million". These claims are refuted by AECL. [2]

[edit] Official website

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

[edit] References

  1. ^ Untitled
  2. ^ 2008 News Releases - AECL Clarifies Inaccurate Statements by Former CNSC CEO Linda Keen
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