Burma Campaign
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The Burma Campaign in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II was fought primarily between British Commonwealth, Chinese and United States forces against the forces of the Empire of Japan, Thailand, the Burmese Independence Army and the Indian National Army. British Commonwealth land forces were drawn primarily from the United Kingdom, British India and Africa.
A notable feature of the campaign was the use of air transport to move troops and to supply them. Large numbers of American and Canadian transport aircraft were in the region to deliver materiel to China and, at times, these were diverted to sustain allied offensives in Burma, thus heavily tipping the regional logistical advantage to the Allies' favour.
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[edit] Japanese capture of Burma
The Japanese launched an attack against the colonial possessions of Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States of America in South-East Asia, in an effort to gain access to strategic materials (rubber and especially oil). They reasoned that the European nations would be too preoccupied with the war in Europe to send reinforcements to their colonies, and the United States would be too distant. The Japanese Army could spare only eleven divisions for their "Southern Campaign", but would have the advantages of air superiority and experienced troops.
Burma was one objective for the Japanese, partly because of its own resources (including oil and surpluses of rice), but mainly to protect its main objectives in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies from British counter-attacks. The Japanese Fifteenth Army, under Lieutenant General Shojiro Iida, initially consisting of only two infantry divisions, moved into northern Thailand (which had signed a treaty of friendship with Japan), and launched an attack over jungle-clad mountain ranges into the southern Burmese province of Tenasserim.
The Japanese successfully attacked over the Kawkareik Pass, and captured the port of Moulmein at the mouth of the Salween River after overcoming stiff resistance. They then advanced northwards, outflanking successive British defensive positions. The Allied troops (the Indian 17th Division) tried to retreat over the Sittang River, but Japanese parties reached the vital bridge before they did. The commander of the division was forced to blow up the bridge to prevent it being captured intact, with the troops cut off on the far side.
In the opinion of the commanders on the spot, this disaster meant that Rangoon, the capital and principal seaport, could not be defended. General Wavell, the commander-in-chief of the ABDA Command, nevertheless ordered Rangoon to be held as he was expecting substantial reinforcements from the Middle East. Although some units arrived, counterattacks failed and the new commander of Burma Army (General Harold Alexander), ordered the city to be evacuated after its port and oil refinery had been destroyed. The remnants of Burma Army broke out to the north, narrowly escaping encirclement.
[edit] Japanese advance to the Indian frontier
After the fall of Rangoon, the Allies decided to make a stand in the north of the country (Upper Burma), having been reinforced by a Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma. The Japanese had also been reinforced by two divisions made available by the capture of Singapore, and defeated both the newly organised Burma Corps and the Chinese force. The Allies were also faced with growing numbers of Burmese insurgents and the civil administration broke down in the areas they still held. With their forces cut off from almost all sources of supply, the Allied commanders finally decided to evacuate their forces from Burma.
The retreat was conducted in very difficult circumstances. Starving refugees, disorganised stragglers, and the sick and wounded clogged the primitive roads and tracks leading to India. Burma Corps managed to make it most of the way to Imphal, in Manipur in India just before the monsoon broke in May 1942, having lost most of their equipment and transport. There, they found themselves living out in the open under the torrential monsoon rains in extremely unhealthy circumstances. The army and civil authorities in India were very slow to respond to the needs of the troops and civilian refugees.
Due to lack of communication, when the British retreated from Burma, almost none of the Chinese knew about the retreat. Realising that they could not win without British support the Chinese troops committed by Chiang Kai-shek, designated as "X Force", made a hasty and disorganised retreat to India where they were put under the command of the American General Joseph Stilwell. After recuperating they were re-equipped and retrained by American instructors. Many of the rest of the Chinese troops tried to return to Yunnan through remote mountainous forests and out of these at least half died.
[edit] Thai army enters Burma
In accordance with the Thai military alliance with Japan that was signed on December 21, 1941, the leading elements of the Thai Phayap Army crossed the border into the Shan States on May 10, 1942. At one time in the past the area had been part of the Ayutthaya kingdom. The boundary between the Japanese and Thai operations was generally the Salween. However, that area south of the Shan States known as Karenni States, the homeland of the Karens, was specifically retained under Japanese control.
Three Thai infantry and one cavalry division, spearheaded by armoured reconnaissance groups and supported by the air force, started their advance on May 10, and engaged the retreating Chinese 93rd Division. Kengtung, the main objective, was captured on May 27. Renewed offensives in June and November drove the Chinese back into Yunnan.
[edit] Allied setbacks, 1942 - 1943
The Japanese did not renew their offensive after the monsoon ended. They installed a nominally independent Burmese regime under Ba Maw, and reformed the Burma Independence Army on a more regular basis as the Burma National Army under Aung San. In practice, both government and army were strictly controlled by the Japanese authorities.
On the Allied side, operations in Burma over the remainder of 1942 and in 1943 were a study of military frustration. Britain could only maintain three active campaigns, and immediate offensives in both the Middle East and Far East proved impossible through lack of resources. The Middle East was accorded priority, being closer to home and in accordance with the "Germany First" policy in London and Washington.
The Allied buildup was also hampered by the disordered state of Eastern India at the time. There were violent "Quit India" protests in Bengal and Bihar, which required large numbers of British troops to suppress. There was also a disastrous famine in Bengal, which may ultimately have led to 3 million deaths through starvation, disease and exposure. In such conditions of chaos, it was difficult to improve the inadequate lines of communication to the front line in Assam, or make use of local industries for the war effort. Efforts to improve the training of Allied troops took time to become effective, and in the forward areas, poor morale and endemic disease reacted on each other to reduce the strength and effectiveness of the fighting units.
Nevertheless, the Allies mounted two operations during the 1942-1943 dry season. The first was a small scale offensive into the coastal Arakan region of Burma. The Indian "Eastern Army" intended to reoccupy the Mayu peninsula and Akyab Island, which had an important airfield. A division advanced to Donbaik, only a few miles from the end of the peninsula but was halted by a small Japanese force which occupied nearly impregnable bunkers. Japanese reinforcements arrived from Central Burma and crossed rivers and mountain ranges which the Allies had declared to be impassable, to hit the Allies' exposed left flank on and overran several units. The exhausted British were unable to hold any defensive lines and were forced to abandon much equipment and fall back almost to the Indian frontier.
The second action was much more controversial. Under the command of Brigadier Orde Wingate a long-range penetration unit, known as the Chindits, infiltrated through the Japanese front lines and marched deep into Burma with the initial aim of cutting the main north-south railway in Burma, in an operation codenamed Operation Longcloth. Some 3,000 men entered Burma in many columns. They did cause damage to the communications of the Japanese in northern Burma cutting the railway for possibly two weeks, but they suffered heavy casualties. Though the operational results can be questioned, the Chindits proved that British and Indian soldiers could live, move and fight as effectively as the Japanese in the jungle, and this aspect of the campaign was used to great propaganda effect, doing much to restore morale among Allied troops.
[edit] Turning point
The campaign from December 1943 to November 1944 was decisive. The Allies were preparing to invade Burma on several fronts, and the Japanese attempted to forestall them by launching an invasion of India. Although the Allies achieved their objectives in only one sector (the extreme north-east of Burma), the Japanese attack was decisively defeated and the Japanese suffered such heavy casualties on all fronts that their future operations in Burma were crippled.
[edit] Allied plans
In August 1943 the Allies created South East Asia Command (SEAC) a new combined command responsible for the South-East Asian Theatre, under Admiral Louis Mountbatten. The training, equipment, health and morale of Allied troops under British Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General William Slim was improving, as was the capacity of the lines of communication in North-eastern India. An innovation was the extensive use of aircraft to transport and supply troops.
SEAC had to accommodate several rival plans, many of which had to be dropped for lack of resources. Amphibious landings on the Andaman Islands (Operation "Pigstick") and in Arakan were abandoned when the landing craft assigned were recalled to Europe in preparation for the Normandy Landings.
The major effort was to be by American-trained Chinese troops of Northern Combat Area Command under General Joseph Stilwell, to cover the construction of the Ledo Road. Orde Wingate had controversially gained approval for a greatly expanded Chindit force, which was tasked with assisting Stilwell by disrupting the Japanese lines of supply to the northern front. Chiang Kai-shek had also agreed reluctantly to mount an offensive from the Yunnan.
Under British Fourteenth Army, Indian XV Corps was preparing to renew the advance in Arakan province, while Indian IV Corps launched a tentative advance from Imphal in the centre of the long front to distract Japanese attention from the other offensives.
[edit] Japanese plans
About the same time that SEAC was established, the Japanese created Burma Area Army under Lieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe, which took under command the Fifteenth Army and the newly-formed Twenty-Eighth Army.
The new commander of Fifteenth Army, Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi was keen to mount an offensive against India. Burma Area Army originally quashed this idea, but found that their superiors at Southern Expeditionary Army Group HQ in Singapore were keen on it. When the staff at Southern Expeditionary Army were persuaded that the plan was inherently risky, they in turn found that Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo was in favour of Mutaguchi's plan.
The Japanese were influenced to an unknown degree by Subhas Chandra Bose, commander of the Indian National Army. This was composed largely of Indian soldiers who had been captured in Malaya or Singapore. At his instigation, a substantial contingent of the INA joined in this Chalo Delhi ("March on Delhi"). Both Bose and Mutaguchi emphasised the advantages which would be gained by a successful attack into India. With misgivings on the part of several of Mutaguchi's superiors and subordinates, Operation U-Go was launched.[1]
[edit] Northern front 1943/44
Stilwell's forces initially consisted of two American-equipped Chinese divisions with a Chinese-manned M3 Light Tank battalion and an American long-range penetration brigade known after its commander as "Merrill's Marauders".
In October 1943 the Chinese 38th Division (led by Sun Li-jen) began to advance from Ledo towards Myitkyina and Mogaung while American engineers and Indian labourers extended the Ledo Road behind them. The Japanese 18th Division was repeatedly outflanked by the Marauders and threatened with encirclement.
In Operation Thursday the Chindits were to support Stilwell's advance by interdicting Japanese supply lines in the region of Indaw. A brigade began marching across the Patkai mountains on February 5, 1944. In early March three other brigades were flown into landing zones behind Japanese lines by the USAAF 1st Air Commando Group and established roadblocks and defensive strongholds around Indaw.
On March 24, Wingate was killed in an aircrash. His replacement was Brigadier Joe Lentaigne. On May 17 overall control of the Chindits passed from Slim's Fourteenth Army to Stilwell's NCAC. The Chindits now moved from the Japanese rear areas to new bases closer to Stilwell's front, and were given additional tasks for which they were not equipped. They achieved several objectives, but at the cost of heavy casualties. By the end of June, they had linked up with Stilwell's forces but were exhausted, and were withdrawn to India.
Also on May 17, in a daring move, Merrill's Marauders captured the airfield at Myitkyina.[2] The Allies did not immediately follow up this success and the Japanese were able to reinforce the town, which fell only after a siege which lasted until August 3. The airfield had nevertheless already become a vital link in the air supply route over the Hump.
[edit] Yunnan Front
The Chinese forces on the Yunnan front mounted an attack starting in the second half of April, with nearly 40,000 troops crossing The Salween river on a 300km front. Within a few days some twelve Chinese Divisions of 72,000 men, under the command of General Wei Lihuang, were attacking the Japanese 56th Division. The Japanese forces in the North were now fighting on two fronts: the Allies from the North West and the Nationalist Chinese from the North East.
The Chinese Yunnan offensive was hampered by the monsoon rains and lack of air support, but succeeded in annihilating the garrison of Tengchung at the end of May. After overcoming determined Japanese resistance (in which the Japanese were helped when Chinese plans and codes fell into their hands by chance), the Chinese captured Lungling at the end of August. At this point, the Japanese moved reinforcements (amounting to a further division in strength) to Yunnan and counter-attacked, temporarily halting the Chinese advance.
[edit] Southern front 1943/44
In Arakan, Indian XV Corps under Lieutenant General Philip Christison renewed the advance on the Mayu peninsula. Ranges of steep hills channeled the advance into three attacks each by an Indian or West African division. The Indian 5th Infantry Division captured the small port of Maungdaw on January 9, 1944. The Corps then prepared to capture two railway tunnels linking Maungdaw with the Kalapanzin valley but the Japanese struck first. A strong force from the Japanese 55th Division infiltrated Allied lines to attack the Indian 7th Infantry Division from the rear, overrunning the divisional HQ.
Unlike previous occasions on which this had happened, the Allied forces stood firm against the attack, and supplies were dropped to them by parachute. In the Battle of the Admin Box from February 5 to February 23 1944, the Japanese concentrated on XV Corps' Administrative Area, defended mainly by service troops, but they were unable to deal with tanks supporting the defenders, while troops from 5th Division broke through the Ngakyedauk Pass to relieve the defenders of the box. Although battle casualties were approximately equal, the overall result was a heavy Japanese defeat. Their infiltration and encirclement tactics had failed to panic Allied troops, and as the Japanese were unable to capture enemy supplies, they themselves starved.
Over the next few weeks, XV Corps offensive wound down as the Allies concentrated on the Central Front. After capturing the railway tunnels, XV Corps halted during the monsoon.
[edit] Central front 1943/44
Indian IV Corps, under Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones, had pushed forward two divisions to the Chindwin River. One division was in reserve at Imphal. There were indications that a major Japanese offensive was building. Slim and Scoones planned to withdraw and force the Japanese to fight with their logistics stretched beyond the limit. However, they misjudged the date on which the Japanese were to attack, and the strength they would use against some objectives.
The Japanese 15th Army consisted of three infantry divisions and a brigade-sized detachment ("Yamamoto Force"), and initially a regiment from the Indian National Army. Mutaguchi, the Army commander, planned to cut off and destroy the forward divisions of IV Corps, before capturing Imphal, while the 31st Division isolated Imphal by capturing Kohima. Mutaguchi intended to exploit the capture of Imphal by capturing the strategic city of Dimapur, in the Brahmaputra River valley. If this could be achieved, the lines of communication to General Stilwell's forces and the airbases used to supply the Chinese over the Hump would be cut.
The Japanese troops crossed the Chindwin River on March 8. Scoones (and Slim) were slow to order their forward troops to withdraw and the Indian 17th Division was cut off at Tiddim. It fought its way back to Imphal with aid from Scoones's reserve division, supplied by parachute drops. North of Imphal, Indian 50th Parachute Brigade was defeated at Sangshak by a regiment from the Japanese 31st Division on its way to Kohima. Imphal had was left vulnerable to an attack by the Japanese 15th Division from the north but because the diversionary attack launched by Japanese in Arakan had already been defeated, Slim was able to move the Indian 5th Division by air to the Central Front. Two brigades went to Imphal, the other went to Dimapur from where it sent a detachment to Kohima.
By the end of the first week in April, Indian IV Corps had concentrated in the Imphal plain. The Japanese launched several offensives during the month, which were repulsed. At the start of May, Slim and Scoones began a counter-offensive against the Japanese 15th Division north of Imphal. Progress was slow, as movement was made difficult by monsoon rains and IV Corps was short of supplies.
Also at the beginning of April, the Japanese 31st Division under Lieutenant-General Kotoku Sato reached Kohima. Instead of isolating the small British garrison there and pressing on with his main force to Dimapur, Sato chose to capture the hill station. The siege lasted from on April 5 to April 18, when the exhausted defenders were relieved. A new formation HQ, the Indian XXXIII Corps under Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford, now took over operations on this front. The British 2nd Infantry Division began a counter-offensive and by May 15, they had prised the Japanese off Kohima Ridge itself. After a pause during which more Allied reinforcements arrived, XXXIII Corps renewed its offensive.
By now, the Japanese were at the end of their endurance. Their troops (particularly 15th and 31st Divisions) were starving, and during the monsoon, disease rapidly spread among them. Lieutenant-General Sato had notified Mutaguchi that his division would withdraw from Kohima at the end of May if it were not supplied. In spite of orders to hold on, Sato did indeed retreat. The leading troops of IV Corps and XXXIII Corps met at Milestone 109 on the Dimapur-Imphal road on June 22, and the siege of Imphal was raised.
Mutaguchi (and Kawabe) continued to order renewed attacks. 33rd Division and Yamamoto Force made repeated efforts, but by the end of June they had suffered so many casualties both from battle and general sickness that they were unable to make any progress. The Imphal operation was finally broken off early in July, and the Japanese retreated painfully to the Chindwin River.
It was the largest defeat to that date in Japanese history. They had suffered 55,000 casualties, including 13,500 dead. Most of these losses were the result of disease, malnutrition and exhaustion. The Allies suffered 17,500 casualties. Mutaguchi was relieved of his command, as were most of his divisions' commanders.
From August to November, Fourteenth Army pursued the Japanese to the Chindwin River. While the 11th East Africa Division advanced down the Kabaw Valley from Tamu, the Indian 5th Division advanced along the mountainous Tiddim road. By the end of November, Kalewa had been recaptured, and several bridgeheads were established on the east bank of the Chindwin.
[edit] Allied 1944-1945 offensives
The Allies launched a series of offensive operations into Burma during late 1944 and the first half of 1945. The command on the front was rearranged in November 1944. 11th Army Group was replaced by Allied Land Forces South East Asia and NCAC and XV Corps were placed directly under this new headquarters. Although the Allies were still attempting to complete the Ledo Road, it was apparent that it would not materially affect the course of the war in China.
The Japanese also made major changes in their command. The most important was the replacement of General Kawabe at Burma Area Army by Hyotaro Kimura. Kimura threw Allied plans into confusion by refusing to fight at the Chindwin River. Recognising that most of his formations were weak and short of equipment, he withdrew his forces behind the Irrawaddy River.
[edit] Southern Front 1944/45
In Arakan, XV Corps resumed its advance on Akyab Island for the third year in succession. This time the Japanese were far weaker, and retreated before the steady Allied advance. They evacuated Akyab Island on December 31, 1944. It was occupied by XV Corps without resistance two days later.
Landing craft had now reached the theatre, and XV Corps launched amphibious attacks on the Myebon Peninsula on January 12, 1945, and at Kangaw ten days later, to cut off the retreating Japanese. There was severe fighting until the end of the month, in which the Japanese suffered heavy casualties.
An important objective for XV Corps was the capture of Ramree Island and Cheduba Island, to construct airfields which would support the Allies' operations in Central Burma. There was severe fighting on Ramree, in which most of the Japanese garrison died. XV Corps operations on the mainland were curtailed to release transport aircraft to support Fourteenth Army.
[edit] Northern Front 1944/45
NCAC resumed its advance late in 1944, although it was progressively weakened by the return of Chinese troops, and the transport aircraft which supported them, to the main front in China. On December 10, 1944, the British 36th Infantry Division on NCAC's right flank made contact with units of Fourteenth Army near Indaw in Northern Burma. Five days later, Chinese troops on the command's left flank captured the city of Bhamo.
NCAC made contact with Chiang's Yunnan armies on January 21, 1945, and the Ledo road could finally be completed, although by this point in the war its value was uncertain. Chiang ordered the American General Sultan, commanding NCAC, to halt his advance at Lashio, which was captured on March 7. As usual, the British and Americans refused to understand that Chiang had to balance the needs of China as a whole against fighting the Japanese in a British colony.
The Japanese were concentrating on the fighting in Central Burma, and they now abandoned their northern front. From April 1, NCAC's operations stopped, and its units returned to China and India. A US-led guerrilla force, OSS Detachment 101, took over the remaining military responsibilities of NCAC.
[edit] Central Front 1944/45
Fourteenth Army, now consisting of IV Corps and XXXIII Corps, made the main offensive effort into Burma. Although the Japanese retreat over the Irrawaddy forced the Allies to completely change their plans, such was the Allies' material superiority particularly in logistics, that they were able to do so. IV Corps was switched in secret from the right to the left flank of the army and aimed to cross the Irrawaddy near Pakokku and seize the Japanese line-of-communication centre of Meiktila, while XXXIII Corps continued to advance on Mandalay.
During January and February, XXXIII Corps seized crossings over the Irrawaddy River near Mandalay. There was heavy fighting, which attracted Japanese reserves and fixed their attention. Late in February, Indian 7th Division, leading IV Corps, seized crossings at Nyaungu, near Pakokku. Indian 17th Division and 255th Indian Armoured brigade followed them across and struck for Meiktila. In the open terrain of Central Burma, this force outmanoeuvered Japanese defences and fell on Meiktila on March 1. The town was captured in four days, despite resistance to the last man.
The Japanese tried first to relieve the garrison at Meiktila, and then to recapture the town and destroy its defender. Their attacks were not properly coordinated, and were repulsed. By the end of March month the Japanese had suffered heavy casualties and lost most of their artillery, their chief anti-tank weapon. They broke off the attack and retreated to Pyawbwe.
XXXIII Corps had renewed its attack on Mandalay. It fell to Indian 19th Division on March 20, though the Japanese held the former citadel which the British called Fort Dufferin for another week. Much of the historically and culturally significant portions of Mandalay were burned to the ground. With the fall of Mandalay (and of Maymyo to its east), communications to the Japanese front in the north of Burma were cut, and the road link between India and China could finally be completed though far too late to matter much.
[edit] Race for Rangoon
Though the Allied force had advanced successfully into central Burma, it was vital to capture the port of Rangoon before the monsoon to avoid a logistic crisis. In the spring of 1945, the other factor in the race for Rangoon was the years of planning by the liaison organisation, Force 136, which resulted in a national uprising within Burma and the defection of the entire Burma National Army to the allied side. In addition to the allied advance, the Japanese now faced open rebellion behind their lines.
XXXIII Corps mounted Fourteenth Army's secondary drive down the Irrawaddy River valley against stiff resistance from the Japanese 28th Army. IV Corps made the main attack, down the "Railway Valley", which was also followed by the Sittang River. They began by striking at a Japanese delaying position (held by the remnants of 33rd Army) at Pyawbwe. The attackers were initially halted by a strong defensive position behind a dry chaung, but a flanking move by tanks and mechanized infantry struck the Japanese from the rear and shattered them.
From this point, the advance down the main road to Rangoon faced little organised opposition. An uprising by Karen guerillas prevented the Japanese 15th Army reaching the major road centre of Toungoo before IV Corps captured it. The leading Allied troops met Japanese rearguards north of Pegu, 40 miles (64 km) north of Rangoon, on April 25. Kimura had formed the various service troops, naval personnel and even Japanese civilians in Rangoon into the Japanese 105 Independent Mixed Brigade. This scratch formation held up the British advance until April 30 and covered the evacuation of the Rangoon area.
[edit] Operation Dracula
The original conception of the plan to re-take Burma had seen XV Corps making an amphibious assault on Rangoon well before Fourteenth Army reached the capital, in order to ease supply problems. This operation, codenamed Operation Dracula was postponed as landing craft were lacking.
Slim feared that the Japanese would defend Rangoon to the last man through the monsoon, which would put Fourteenth Army in a disastrous supply situation. He therefore asked for Dracula to be re-mounted at short notice. However, Kimura had ordered Rangoon to be evacuated, starting on April 22. The Japanese 105 Independent Mixed Brigade, by holding Pegu, covered this evacuation.
On May 1, a Gurkha parachute battalion was dropped on Elephant Point, and cleared Japanese rearguards from the mouth of the Rangoon River. The Indian 26th Infantry Division landed the next day as the monsoon began, and took over Rangoon, which had seen an orgy of looting and lawlessness similar to the last days of the British in the city in 1942.
The leading troops of the Indian 17th and 26th divisions met at Hlegu, 28 miles (45 km) north of Rangoon, on May 6.
[edit] Final operations
Following the capture of Rangoon, a new Twelfth Army headquarters was created from XXXIII Corps HQ to take control of the formations which were to remain in Burma.
The Japanese 28th Army, after withdrawing from Arakan and resisting XXXIII Corps in the Irrawaddy valley, had retreated into the Pegu Yomas, a range of low jungle-covered hills between the Irrawaddy and Sittang rivers. They planned to break out and rejoin Burma Area Army. To cover this breakout, Kimura ordered 33rd Army to mount a diversionary offensive across the Sittang, although the entire army could muster the strength of barely a regiment. On July 3, they attacked British positions in the "Sittang Bend". On July 10, after a battle for country which was almost entirely flooded, both the Japanese and the Allies withdrew.
The Japanese had attacked too early. Sakurai's 28th Army was not ready to start the breakout until July 17. The breakout was a disaster. The British had placed ambushes or artillery concentrations on the routes the Japanese were to use. Hundreds of men drowned trying to cross the swollen Sittang on improvised bamboo floats and rafts. Burmese guerillas and bandits killed stragglers east of the river. The breakout cost the Japanese nearly 10,000 men, half the strength of 28th Army. British and Indian casualties were minimal.
Fourteenth Army (now under Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey) and XV Corps had returned to India to plan the next stage of the campaign to re-take south east Asia. A new corps, the Indian XXXIV Corps, under Lieutenant-General Ouvry Lindfield Roberts was raised and assigned to Fourteenth Army for further operations.
This was to be an amphibious assault on the western side of Malaya codenamed Operation Zipper. The dropping of the atomic bombs forestalled Zipper, but the operation was undertaken post-war as the quickest way of getting occupation troops into Malaya.
[edit] American and Canadian contribution
The RAF were aided by a number of USAAF units from the Tenth and Fourteenth air forces. The American Volunteer Group (AVG) known as "Flying Tigers" were in the theatre before the war and the unit formed the core of the Fourteenth Air Force. The Royal Canadian Air Force supplied two squadrons, the 435 and 436 Transport Squadrons, flying twin engined Dakotas.[3]
Two other notable units were the No. 490 Bomb Squadron USAAF nicknamed the "Burma Bridge Busters", (part of the 341 Bomb Group USAAF which also included the 11th, 22nd and 491st Bomb Squadrons) and 1st Air Commando Group which was created to support the Chindits. When the Chindit operation ended, the 1st Air Commando Group, renamed the 1st Air Commando Force, stayed to support other units of the British Fourteenth Army.
The strategic need to keep open the supply routes to China dictated the Burma campaign. After the loss of the Burma Road, the British wanted to supply China via the Hump until they could recapture it. The American General Joseph Stilwell thought it better to build a new road through north Burma to link up with the Burma Road close to the Chinese border. He prevailed and this influenced the conduct of the campaign. So that the Ledo Road could be built, he attacked the Japanese northern front with Merrill's Marauders, the Chindits and Chinese troops along the route of the new road. They cleared north Burma after heavy jungle fighting and the prolonged siege of Myitkyina.
The American and Canadian contribution was also vital to the logistics in the theatre. The USAAF provided roughly half the air transport units deployed in Burma, and almost all the aircraft flown by RAF transport squadrons. Specialist American railroad units using imported American and Canadian locomotives increased the tonnage carried by the Northeast Indian Railways to three times their peacetime level.
For more details see Northern Combat Area Command and the China Burma India Theater.
[edit] Medals and honours
Battle Honour: BURMA 1944-1945
- Qualification: For operations during the 14th Army's advance from Imphal to Rangoon, the coastal amphibious assaults, and the Battle of Pegu Yomas, August 1944 to August 1945.
The president of the USA, authorized by Act of Congress, July 20, 1942, has awarded the Legion of Merit to Major General Tai An Lan, Chinese Army. Major General Tai An Lan distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service as the Commander of the 200th Division, Chinese Army during the 1942 operations in Burma.
[edit] Command structure
[edit] Allied command
Initially command problems beset the Burma campaign. Burma was swapped from command to command during the pre-war period and the early months of the war. It was never expected that the Japanese would invade Burma.
- 1937 Burma was politically separated from India and fully responsible for its own military forces.
- 1939 with the outbreak of war Burma forces were placed under British Chiefs of Staff, but financed out of Burmese taxes and locally administered.
- 1940 The Prime Minister and Cabinet decided on a policy of providing direct military assistance to China through Burma. Chinese troops would be trained in Burma as irregulars, war material would be sent into China through Burma and covert American Air units (the AVG) would be moved into China through Burma. The British authorities gave no consideration to adding to the defence of Burma based on these policies.
- November 1940 operational control was transferred to the recently formed Far East Command in Singapore, while administrative responsibility was divided between the Burma Government and the War Office in London, which now contributed to the defence budget of Burma.
- December 12, 1941, when a Japanese attack was seen to be imminent Burma was handed back to India Command under the command of Commander-in-Chief (CinC) in India General Sir Archibald Wavell .
- From January 1, 1941 Burma was operationally controlled by ABDACOM and administered from Delhi. The Supreme Commander of ABDACOM General Wavell (who had transferred from CinC, India), moved his command to Java on January 15, 1942.
- On February 25, 1942 Wavell resigned as supreme commander of ABDACOM, handing control of the ABDA Area to local commanders. He also recommended the establishment of two Allied commands to replace ABDACOM: a south west Pacific command, and one based in India. In anticipation of this, Wavell had handed control of Burma to the India Command. On resigning from ABDACOM Wavell reassumed his previous position, as Commander-in-Chief, India.
The British commander in Burma, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Hutton was removed from command shortly before Rangoon fell in March 1942. He was replaced by Sir Harold Alexander. Hutton became Alexander's chief of staff. The Burma 1st Division and Indian 17th Infantry Division at first had to be controlled directly by Burma Army headquarters, as there was no corps HQ. After the fall of Rangoon, Burma Corps Headquarters was created under Lieutenant General William Slim to control the forces that remained in Burma.
Cooperation with the Chinese proved difficult for several reasons. The American Liaison (Stilwell) was ill-tempered and lacked respect for either the British[4] or the Chinese. Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of Nationalist China, was more interested in fighting the Japanese in China than in attempting to save a disorganised British force in Burma. The Chinese Army also suffered from severe command problems, with important orders having to come directly from Chiang himself if they were to be obeyed. From the Chinese perspective, the Americans and the British were trying to take over command of the Chinese armies to use them for their own purposes. These problems were never completely satisfactorily resolved. They were partially resolved by the Americans in the aftermath of the 1942 campaign re-equipping, re-training and taking over the leadership of the Chinese forces that had made their way to India.
When the retreat from Burma ended in May 1942, Burma Corps was wound up. Operations had entered Eastern Army's area. Eastern Army was primarily an administrative rather than field command, and had perhaps too many responsibilities in addition to control of operations. Eastern Army commanded IV Corps in Assam and XV Corps in the Arakan. Both corps also had extensive rear area and internal security commitments, distracting them from the immediate front. An organisation known as V Force provided a screen of locally-raised guerillas and levies in front of the defensive positions.
On June 20, 1943 Wavell became Viceroy of India and was succeeded as CinC India by General Sir Claude Auchinleck. In August 1943, the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for the theatre. The reorganisation of the theatre command took about two months. On October 4, 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten Supreme Commander of this new command. The American General Joseph Stilwell was Deputy Supreme Commander, among his many other appointments. On November 15 Auchinleck formally handed over responsibility for the conduct of operations against the Japanese in the theatre to Mountbatten.
With the creation of SEAC, Eastern Army was split into two. Under GHQ India, Eastern Command took over responsibility for the rear areas of Bihar, Orissa and most of Bengal. The Fourteenth Army under Slim took over responsibility for operations against the Japanese.
SEAC's land forces HQ was 11th Army Group under General Sir George Giffard. It controlled Fourteenth Army and the Ceylon Army, but Stilwell refused to place the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) under Giffard, using a variety of pretexts. At a meeting to sort out the chain of command for the three fronts in Burma, he astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing". This compromise worked because Slim was able to handle Stilwell. It was essential that there was one operational commander for the three fronts, North, Central and Southern, so that the intended attacks in late 1944 could be coordinated to prevent the Japanese concentrating large numbers of reserves for a counter attack on any one front.
11th Army Group remained in existence until November 12, 1944 when it was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA), still under SEAC. Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese succeeded Giffard in command. 11th Army Group was redesignated because it was felt that an inter-Allied command was better than the purely British headquarters that 11th Army Group was. The change was made just after Stilwell was recalled to the U.S.. Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan became commander of the U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of NCAC, and this change placed his command under ALFSEA.
[edit] Japanese command
Note that in Japanese terminology, an "Army" was equivalent to a British or American "Corps". An "Area Army" was equivalent to an Allied "Army".
The chief command for the Japanese in South East Asia was the Southern Expeditionary Army, under Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi. This HQ was equivalent to an Allied theatre command. Southern Expeditionary army was responsible for operations as far afield as New Guinea, the Philippines and Burma
The initial invasion of Burma was conducted by 15th Army, under Lieutenant-General Shojiro Iida.
In late 1943, a new HQ, "Burma Area Army" was created, under General Masakazu Kawabe. It absorbed 15th Army, now under Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi and responsible for the Central front, and the newly created 28th Army under Lieutenant-General Shoso Sakurai which controlled the Southern front.
In April 1944, another Army, 33rd Army, was created under Lieutenant-General Masaki Honda, to control the Northern front.
After the failure of the Imphal offensive in late 1944, there were several changes in command. At Burma Area Army, Kawabe was replaced by the former Vice War Minister, Hyotaro Kimura. Kimura was a shrewd strategist, but perhaps more of a logistics expert than fighting soldier, so Lieutenant-General Shinichi Tanaka was made his Chief of Staff. (In Japanese formations, the Chief of Staff had a more prominent role in the day-to-day control of operations than in Allied formations).
At the same time, Mutaguchi was removed from command of 15th Army and replaced by Lieutenant-General Shihachi Katamura. Many divisional commanders and Staff Officers also were sacked, removed or transferred.
[edit] See also
- Aung San a Burmese revolutionary who sided with the Japanese.
- The Burmese National Army was originally organised by the Minami Kikan as the Burmese Independence Army in December of 1941, where it then served as an auxiliary of the Japanese Army.
- Indian National Army an Indian army, largely recruited from POWs, who fought with the Japanese for Indian independence.
- Second Sino-Japanese War
- Japanese occupation of Burma
- Chindits
[edit] Notes
- ^ Allen, Burma: the Longest Campaign, pp. 157-170
- ^ Allen, Burma: The Longest War, pp. 364-365
- ^ http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/general/sub.cfm?source=feature/burma/squadron1 Retrieved on 2008-05-01
- ^ Keegan (ed) References pp. 111 & 287
[edit] References
- Jackson, Ashley (2006). The British Empire and the Second World War. London: Hambledon Continuum, pp. 387 - 388. ISBN 978-1-85285-517-8.
- Keegan (ed), John; Duncan Anderson (1991). Churchill's Generals. London: Cassell Military, pp 243-255. ISBN 0-304-36712-5.
- Moser, Don and editors of Time-Life Books World War II: China-Burma-India',1978, Library of Congress no 77-93742
- Slim, William (1956) Defeat Into Victory. Citations from the Cassell 1956 edition, but also available from NY: Buccaneer Books ISBN 1-56849-077-1, Cooper Square Press ISBN 0-8154-1022-0; London: Cassell ISBN 0-304-29114-5, Pan ISBN 0-330-39066-X.
[edit] Bibliography
- Allen, Louis Burma: The Longest War
- Bayly, Christopher & Harper, Tim. Forgotten Armies
- Carew, Tim. The Longest Retreat
- Calvert, Mike. Fighting Mad has content related to the 1944 Chindit campaign
- Dillon, Terence. Rangoon to Kohima
- Drea, Edward J. (1998). "An Allied Interpretation of the Pacific War", In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1708-0.
- Fujino, Hideo. Singapore and Burma
- Grant, Ian Lyall & Tamayama, Kazuo Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion
- Ida, Shojiro From the Battlefields
- Ikuhiko Hata Road to the Pacific War
- Hickey, Michael. The Unforgettable Army
- Hodsun, J.L. War in the Sun
- Latimer, Jon. Burma: The Forgotten War
- Ochi, Harumi. Struggle in Burma
- Reynolds, E. Bruce. Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance
- Rolo, Charles J. Wingate's Raiders
- Sadayoshi Shigematsu Fighting Around Burma
- Smyth John Before the Dawn
- Sugita, Saiichi. Burma Operations
- Thompson, Robert. Make for the Hills has content related to the 1944 Chindit campaign
- Webster, Donovan. The Burma Road : The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II
- Young, Edward M. Aerial Nationalism: A History of Aviation in Thailand
[edit] External links
- Burma Star Association
- national-army-museum.ac.uk History of the British Army: Far East, 1941-45
- Imperial War Museum LondonBurma Summary
- Royal Engineers Museum Engineers in the Burma Campaigns
- Royal Engineers Museum Engineers with the Chindits
- Canadian War Museum: Newspaper Articles on the Burma Campaigns, 1941-1945
- US Center of Military History (USCMH): Burma 1942
- USCMH Centeral Burma 29 January - 15 July 1945
- USCMH India-Burma 2 April 1942-28 January 1945
- World War II animated campaign maps
- List of Regimental Battle Honours in the Burma Campaign (1942 - 1945) - Also some useful links
- London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 37728, pages 4663–4671, 17 September 1946. Retrieved on 2007-11-19. "Operations in Eastern Theatre, Based on India from March 1942 to December 31 1942", official despatch by Field Marshal The Viscount Wavell
- London Gazette: no. 38274, pages 2651–2684, 27 April 1948. Retrieved on 2007-11-19. "Operations in the Indo-Burma Theatre Based on India from 21 June 1943 to 15 November 1943" official despatch by Field Marshal Sir Claude E. Auchinleck, War Office. (or see this html version)
- London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 39195, pages 1881–1963, 6 April 1951. Retrieved on 2007-11-19. "Operations in Burma from 12 November 1944 to 15 August 1945" official despatch by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese
- Sino-Japanese Air War 1937-45, see 1941 and 1942
- Burma Campaign, Orbat for 1942 campaign, Japan, Commonwealth, Chinese, USA
- A Forgotten Invasion: Thailand in Shan State, 1941-45
- Thailand's Northern Campaign in the Shan States 1942-45
- Siam goes to war
- Phayap Army
- Canadians in south east Asia
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