Talk:Buddha-nature/Archive

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It is good that the Buddha-dhatu doctrine (usually, although unhappily, translated as "Buddha Nature", whereas "Buddha Element" or "Buddha Principle" might perhaps be preferable) is at last beginning to gain the serious attention it merits. For too long it has been either ignored or relegated very much to the sidelines of the important teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. The trend nowadays seems to be to acknowledge that there is such a doctrine within Buddhism, but to dismiss it as a form of "tame" Buddhism for the spiritually pusillanimous or timorous - despite the fact that the Buddha in the "Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra" and other "Tathagata-garbha" sutras states the very opposite of this! The teaching of the Buddha-dhatu/Tathagata-garbha is, the Buddha says in the Tibetan version of the "Nirvana Sutra", "the absolutely final culmination" of the Dharma, and he laments the lack of spiritual insight of those "ungrateful people" who reject the teaching of the Buddha-dhatu, and states that, like people who commit suicide, they will "cause themselves extreme misery".

The student and especially the practitioner of Mahayana Buddhism needs to be aware that, despite the unfounded claims of some schlars, the "Mahaparinirvana Sutra" and related sutras (if we take them on their own terms) are not delivered by the Mahayana Buddha as some kind of watered-down or concessionary version of Buddhism, but as the very ultimate level of the teaching. Non-Self and Emptiness are not rejected by such sutras, but are viewed from a different perspective: that which is impermanent and generative of unhappiness is non-Self and empty, whereas the Buddha-dhatu within each being is the eternally unchanging, uncreated, unshakeable and deathless essence ("svabhava") which, when seen and known, transforms a person into a Buddha. In fact, the Tathagata-garbha is the essence of the Buddha himself. It is his "Self" ("atman"). Furthermore, the Buddha-dhatu is "empty", in the sense of being non-tangible and ungraspable (by the hand or the intellect or by logic alone), and is also empty of all that is characterised by suffering and impermanence. But it is replete with wondrous Buddha-qualities and is the realest of the real. It is that which makes a Buddha possible. Yet it is extremely difficult to see and experience, because it is obscured by the "kleshas" - the mental and moral afflictions (especially greedy desire, hatred and delusion). Even the most advanced, 10th-level Bodhisattvas (so the "Nirvana Sutra" teaches) have difficulty in discerning the existence of the Buddha-dhatu, seeing it only dimly, as if at nighttime. Only a Perfect Buddha has full vision of this Buddhic Element or Buddhic Realm within each sentient being.

It is to be hoped that Buddhists and students of Buddhism in the coming years will begin to recognise that (whether they personally like the teaching or not) the "Buddha-dhatu" doctrine is presented by the Buddha in the "Tathagata-garbha" sutras as a truly high (indeed the highest) level of the Dharma, rather than one which is aimed at spiritual neophytes or the faint-hearted. The "Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra" in particular is described by the Buddha as giving the "uttarottara" meaning of the entire Mahayana - that is to say, the very ultimate of significations - and it would seem wise (if one is a practising Mahayana Buddhist) not to distort or dismiss out of hand these very clear pronoucements by the Buddha of the Mahayana himself. - Dr. Tony Page

Also, you can hardly fault translators for rendering it "Buddha-nature" as dhatu is really one of those nasty Sanskrit terms for which there is no adequate translation, and it will probably never be able to have the untranslated recognizability of other, equally difficult-of-translation terms like "dharma". :) -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

Response from Tony Page: thanks very much for some useful and valid points. On the question of mentioning that the various sutras are only "attributed to the Buddha" - yes, to be really precise, this is of course true; but it would be tedious for both writer and reader, I think, to have to reiterate this each time one refers to a sutra or quotes the words of "the Buddha". I myself am at heart a "faith-based" Mahayana Buddhist practitioner, but if one wants to take a more academic approach to this matter, one could argue that "the Buddha" is in any case a literary construct or character in religous literary texts called "sutras", and so it is quite valid to refer to what "the Buddha" - as the leading character in those literary works - says. Whether the historical Buddha actually taught the various doctrines of the agamas and Mahayana sutras can never be ascertained with certainty, so this leaves room open for faith and practice, as well as for study, of course. Thanks again for the other comments, which I shall try to bear in mind! TonyMPNS

A lively, not-very-pertinent debate.

BTW, on a personal note, I have to admit I've never seen the point of the Buddha-nature doctrine; it seems to me to be (a) contrary to anatta and (b) superfluous in light of any strong presentation of pratityasamutpada. Nagarjuna, for example, says that (pardon the lack of accurate diacritics) "Tathagato yat svabhavas tat svabhavam idam jagat; tathatagato nihsvabhavas nihsvabhavam idam jagat," "What is the essence/nature of the Buddha, that is the essence/nature of the world; the Buddha is devoid of essence/nature; the world is devoid of essence/nature." I.e., the Buddha and everything else are equally empty of all nature; therefore nirvana and samsara are not distinct in any interesting way; therefore no additional principle beyond emptiness (which is the same as pratityasamutpada) is required to explain enlightenment. I've always thought that adding the concept of some extraneous metaphysical principle was rather inelegant.

Also, I really ought to take a look at the Mahaparinirvana Sutra; according to your page on it, it's not extant in the Sanskrit, which is too bad, since I have no background with Chinese or Tibetan. But I did poke around a bit in secondary sources, and I note that Gethin's introductory text, which is reasonably standard, suggests that it's at an extreme end of the spectrum on the Buddha-nature question... -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:52, 22 Nov 2004 (UTC)

The purpose of the Buddha-nature doctrine, and similarly Yogācāra doctrines, is to counter the potentially nihilistic outcome to a strict application of the emptiness doctrine as favoured by some Mādhyamikas. One area of difficulty centres on the two truths doctrine which, due to their utter disjunction, suggests that liberation is impossible since unenlightened beings on the level of conventional truth have no access to enlightenment. One function of the tathāgata-garbha or Buddha-nature doctrine and the Yogācāra three natures doctrine is to remedy this problem. The dangers inherent in a blanket application of non-self and emptiness is well expresses in the Mahā-parinirvāna-sūtra thus: "By having cultivated the absence of self (anātman) regarding the tathāgata-garbha and having continually cultivated emptiness, suffering will not be eradicated, but one will become like a moth in the flame of a lamp."

A strict application of emptiness as favored by the Madhyamikas is never nihilistic, but rather resembles western empiricism, pragmatism, and in some cases existentialism--i.e., it is a radical critique of essence but not of existence. Similarly, to take the two-truths doctrine (which I think Wikipedia still lacks a page on) as an impediment to enlightenment is preposterous; upaya clearly opens the way for conventional truth to lead to enlightenment, and on several convincing recent interpretations (McCagney, Garfield, etc.) the Madhyamika interpretation of the two-truths doctrine actually debunks the concept of higher truth entirely. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

But do you not find it curious that many contempory philosophers in India, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, came to exactly that conclusion – that Madhyamika either is actually nihilistic or liable to result in nihilism ? Do you really think that all these people were so stupid that they did not really understand Madhyamika ? It seems likely to me that they understood it all too well, unpalatable though this conclusion may be to you, and came to an accurate evaluation of it. Based on what data we have, it would seem obvious that Madhyamika was rather much a minority interest in medieval Buddhism as a whole. Similarly, it is certainly not preposterous to suggest that the two truths doctrine was seen as an impediment to enlightenment – this well accounts the soteriological device of Buddha-nature etc and the Yogacara three nature doctrine. You personally may not see any problem in the two truth concept, but obviously a lot of people did in India during the medieval period, people who would have been in direct contact with many of the pioneering proponents of Madhyamika – I would imagine that they would have been in a far better position to judge the practical effects of the two truth doctrine than we are today.--Stephen Hodge 01:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

A few years of reasonably intense study of eastern philosophy and religion, including encounters with Hindu and Buddhist texts in the original Sanskrit and Pali, and a few encounters with modern proponents of traditional Indian philosophies have given me a profound respect for the capacity of Indian philosophy to be stupid. Also, there's no context in which the argument "Many people think x, therefore there must be something to it," would ever sway me. Would it really sway you? Indeed, I imagine far more people have thought Buddhism as a whole to be nihilistic than have thought Madhyamaka in particular to be so. And I'm not at all sure it's a question of stupidity--in my experience, people often have difficulty grapsing an argument based on an approach or perspective that is very different from their own, even if they're very intelligent. Also, Gomez in his "Proto-Madhyamika" in the Pali Canon," McCagney in her, "Nagarjuna and the Philosophy of Openness," and Kalupahana in his translation of the MMK have argued convincingly for a basic continuity between Nikaya Buddhism and Nagarjunian Madhyamaka. (Kalupahana's argument that Nagarjuna is therefore not a Mahayanist is less persuasive because, as McCagney points out, it begs the question whether there is not continuity between (some forms of) Mahayana Buddhism and the essentials of Nikaya Buddhism.) Similarly, key Madhyamaka concepts like sunayata have continued to influence later Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism (the influence of Madhyamaka on Yogacara, for example, is something that has seen a lot of action in the RS journals over the last couple of decades); Madhyamaka is not an isolated or marginal part of the Buddhist tradition by any means. Now, you say, "It is certainly not preposterous to suggest that the two truths doctrine was seen as an impediment to enlightenment -- this well accounts the soteriological device of Buddha-nature etc."--my claim was no tthat the two-truths doctrine was not seen as an impediment to enlightenment but that it should not be and that to take it as such is preposterous; many, many preposterous things have actually happened, and I do not doubt that this is one of them. :) Also, I find no special value in the argument that ancient philosophers were better critics of each other than we are of them; modern scholarship has both greater perspective and a better analytical toolkit. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Thus there is no problem to be solved by the introduction of a new metaphysical principle. I suppose the best way for me to interpret Buddha-nature is as an upaya for those who are incapable of understanding emptiness. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

Though the terms "buddha-nature" or "tathagata-gabha" may have indeed themselves been new but what they attempt to denote seems to have a very old history in Buddhism. Taking the Pali nikayas as exemplars of the earliest level of Buddhist teachings, one can note a considerable ambivalence surrounding the Buddha's reported position on anatta / atta. That is to say, there are a fair number of passages that only make sense if understood to affirm the existence of some kind of real self. Again, this should have nothing to do with personal preferences – even if they make uncomfortable reading for one's preferred understanding of Buddhism, their existence ought not be denied. Indeed, it may be that the kind of position you seem to espouse may be a complete distortion of what the Budha actually taught, though we have no way of knowing this either way. Also, it goes without saying that you are free to interpret Buddha-nature in any way you wish. That is also the position of the Gelukpas, who as traditional Buddhists, are thus guilty of apavāda with regards Buddha-vacana. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note that the MPNS says that emptiness is just an upaya for those incapable of understanding Buddha-nature and, even then, liable to be misunderstood by them.--Stephen Hodge 01:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Well, no one doubts that from the earliest times Buddhism has spoken in terms of persons, and often used the word "Atman" or its equivalents in other dialects or its derivatives, just as it has also used personal pronouns, etc.; and certainly the person is a pragmatic reality that Buddhism has had to deal with. But this does not mean that a metaphysically substantial self need be introduced or need be introduced, if an alternative is available. As to different texts declaring different traditions to be upayas, this is merely a polemical device for providing a lesser but included place for traditions different from one's own or to which one objects--which of course is how I was using, and how it was used in most of the early Mahayana texts. It is only after upaya is turned in on itself and on the traditions and writings that have previously used it critically does it begin to become a truly important principle with serious philosophicla consequences. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Despite your Nāgārjuna quote, there is considerable contrary evidence even in the early Pāli suttas that the anatta doctrine and its later intrinsic emptiness formulation is not the whole story, but only applies to conditioned entities in samsāra. Throughout Buddhism, one can find positive hints and allusions to some kind of permanent intrinsically existent self akin to that posited by the Tathāgata-garbha sutras, contradicting the popular view that the Buddha taught the non-existence of a self in all respects. In other words, one can find many passages that contradict Nāgārjuna, so why should one particularly heed what he has to say ? Indeed, some of Nāgārjuna's key sophistic sleights of hand and philosophical short-comings have been well exposed in Emptiness Appraised by David Burton (Curzon 1999).

Well, there are a lot of problems with Burton's approach, as I understand it--he basically adopts a western analytic approach and discards out of hand certain possible routes of inquiry. (I haven't had a chance to read it myself, but I've seen several reviews). But my claim wasn't that Nagarjuna is representative of all Buddhism, but rather that he provides, for Mahayana Buddhism, a sufficient route to solving several problems including the problem of enlightenment without introducing new principles beyond the identity of pratityasamutpada and sunyata, and the consequent breakdown of the metaphysical distinction between nirvana and samsara. Certainly one can find throughout Buddhism attempts to re-instantiate the self--in fact, many of the schisms throughout Buddhist history have been on account of schools re-introducing the self in one guise or another. I'm just saying I don't see the need for it. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

As I said above, it is not clear historically whether these people are actually trying to re-instantiate the self. There is good evidence that it was always a part of teachings attributed to the Buddha. We can go into this in more detail in an entry for anātman / ātman in Wikipedia at a later date. But looking at the data without preconceptions, it might be argued that those who adopt a blanket non-self understanding of the Buddha's teachings are the ones in error. Often scholars of various persuasions, ancient and modern, seem to have preconceived ideas about what the Buddha really taught and then tailor the scriptural evidence to suit their position. For myself, I think it is better to let the basic texts talk for themselves and recognize that there is a plurality of possible valid interpretations that may at times be contradictory. Hence, for me, any other approach is intellectually dishonest. --Stephen Hodge 01:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Well, I agree that there is a problem with texts being forced into line with various interpretations; however, it is not clear to me that there is ever any interpretation of a text which is truly "basic" or "without preconceptions"; often, when people speak of finding the "real" meaning of a text, they are using it as a foil for their own agenda and thus demonstrating a very high degree of "intellectual dishonesty." A better approach is to recognize bias and take it into account in interpretation, and most of all to be transparent about the process by which one interprets a text. (This is not to say, of course, that there are not better or worse interpretations of a text, or more or less factual ones--certainly there are, but there are no innocent ones and the pursuit of "objectivity" does not always result in better or more factual interpretations, and often produces the contrary.) Now, as to the question of whether the substantial self was always part of Buddhism, I'd be interested in the evidence you mention; I have seen none (and heard of none before), and I certainly cannot see how anatta, which no one I know of doubts was a basic principle of Buddhism from the earliest times, can be reconciled from an initial rejection of the atman! -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I also would not rely upon Gethin as an authority for the Mahāyāna-mahāparinirvāna-sūtra. As far as I know, he is a Pāli scholar with some knowledge of Sanskrit and hence is in no position to comment accurately on the text which has not extant Sanskrit version. I find that many people like to talk about the MPNS without having actually read it, Gethin's opinion (as reported by you) being a good example of this. In fact, what the MPNS teaches is no more extreme than any of the other Tathāgata-garbha sūtras – with perhaps the exception of its understanding of the icchantika doctrine. --Stephen Hodge 02:15, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Well, I'm not relying on Gethin as an authority on the MMPS in particular, but referring to his work as an accepted general text on the history of Buddhism, which it is. And I'm sorry, but there's no way you're going to sell me on a re-introduction of the "Atman" as being no less extreme than other versions of Buddha-nature. It's not by that point invalid; it just happens to be at one end of things. (And my personal distaste for the doctrine has no bearing, of course, on its presentation in the WP article, any more than anyone's enthusiasm for it does.) -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:40, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Once again I would argue that the atman doctrine is not necessarily being re-introduced but that it was there all along for those who have eyes to see. What you believe personally or find distasteful is of little interest to me – that is your own affair. For myself, I have neither distaste nor enthusiasm for the atman or Buddha-nature doctrine, but I try to look at the matter dispassionately without preconceptions. --Stephen Hodge 01:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Well, since this is all just a conversation betwen two or three people about personal views (virtually none of what we've discussed can have any significance for how we edit Wikipedia articles, since it's POV), I don't see why you're involved in it if you're not interested in my views--though I would say that I find the atman in Buddhism to be not so much "distasteful" as confusing and possibly a bit silly, since Buddhism is basically an upstart against astika Indian philosophy, which is where the atman has its proper home. Now, there is no such thing as a thought process without preconceptions--if there is a state free of them, it is one in which speech and argument are not operative. Nor am I sure that dispassion is of any special value, any more than "disinterest" is; nor do I believe that these things are actually achievable, even were they clear goods. However, I should say I do not have any special interest or commitment here, as I am not a Buddhist; I'm simply a sympathetic observer, a student of religion, interested in various philosophies and the questions they raise. I simply find certain arguments convincing and others. I wasn't trying to disqualify a certain view or convert others from it, but simply taking an opportunity to start a lively conversation. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽ 18:58, 24 Nov 2004 (UTC)

The discussion so far is highlighting a very important distinction of approaches to Buddhist Truth: Kukkurovaca, you are basically coming (and I hope that I am not misrepresenting you here) from the Madhyamika or (in some respects) Theravada position, which is widely familiar territory as found in many books and courses on Buddhism,

You're not (mis!)representing me; my sympathies are definitely with the Madhyamaka school, which is (on this particular point) closer to Theravada than it is to some other forms of Mahayana Buddhism. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

whereas Stephen is giving voice to less well-known (in detail) but certainly no less valid Buddha-dhatu or Yogachara doctrines.

I'm not sure they're really less well-known--in fact, I think the concept of Buddha-nature is much better known than the concept of sunyata, by and large. But certainly they are valid. And I should make clear that I agree with you that they should be better-represented on Wikipedia. I'm just voicing some personal kibbitzes. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

I think Stephen is simply pointing out - as I am also always hoping to - that there are other ways of understanding Dharma other than along the Madhyamika route. As Stephen indicates, there is not a conflict between the “anatta” (non-Self) doctrine and that of the Tathagta-garbha/Buddha-dhatu, if one understands non-Self (as taught by the Buddha in the Tathagata-garbha sutras) to refer to our five contingent, worldly “skandhas” (bodily and mental constituents) and not to our quintessence (“atman”). This is a key difference between Madhyamika and Tathagata-garbha Buddhism, as you very rightly indicate: the former seems loath to accept the notion of an Absolute or Essence, whereas the Tathagata-garbha teachings do strongly point towards just such an Essence in all sentient beings. According to these teachings, there IS a core Reality within and beyond the five skandhas, and unlike those skandhas, that quintessence of any being constitutes what the Buddha of the “Garbha” sutras variously terms “the True Self”, “the Great Self”, the “Tathagata-garbha” or “the Buddha-dhatu”. It is essentially the innate “bodhi” (Awakened-ness) which is already inside us but occluded by layers and layers of ignorance and negative karma. To be informed (by the Mahayana Buddha) that this is the situation in which we (unawakened beings) find ourselves is thus to provide us with a diagnosis of what ails us and with indications of how we can divest ourselves of our oppressive dis-ease and enter into Liberation (“moksha”). That realm of Liberation (which is Awakening/Nirvana) is free from all conditionality and compoundedness and therefore is not the sphere in which the pratityasamutpada (conditioned co-arising) holds sway (so the Buddha of the “Nirvana Sutra” teaches). If there were only pratityasamutpada and no unconditioned dimension, then - as the Nikayan Buddha indicates - there would be no escape from the world of conditionality and suffering (the cycle of pratityasamutpada would contain nothing within itself which could break free from itself - it would just go on forever).

Actually, Nikaya Buddhism has support for unconditioned Nirvana, or so I thought. Madhyamaka Buddhism does not, but Madhyamaka is within the Mahayana. However, I find this interpretation of pratityasamuptada confusing--pratityasamutpada, as a conditioned arising process, cannot be eternalized...all that is needed is to break a chain, and the motivation for breaking the chain is contained within the chain itself--i.e., suffering. As to the means to break the chain, knowledge will suffice, and as long as one does not elevate liberatory knowledge to some transcendental state, then relatively mundane knowledge will suffice. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

It is precisely because there IS an unconditioned and uncompounded, but obscured, element within each being (according to the Buddha-dhatu teachings) that the desire for Liberation and the attainment of it are rendered possible. Otherwise, a skandha would be a skandha would be a skandha (unstable, always generating conditions of unhappiness and always expressive of un-awakenedness), and pratitityasamutpada would remain precisely as ever-recurring, unawakened pratitityasamutpada and as samsara (which is what it is – a vicious circle of delusion). Furthermore, it is vital to understand that there is a difference in mindset in the approach to truth as between the Mahdyamika and the Buddha-dhatu form of Buddhism: the former (especially in its Prasangika Madhyamika manifestation) places great emphasis on reasoning, disputation and logic, whereas the Tathagata-garbha/Buddha-dhatu approach is more mystical and stresses the ineffability of Nirvana, the need to “see and know” it directly, and its ultimate transcendence of words and computation.

You're on to something here, though I don't think Madhyamaka is opposed to mystical experience, since mystical experience is the root of all Buddhism. But certainly it is oriented toward logical acuity, while the Buddha-nature school tends more toward potent metaphors than potent ideas--perhaps it would be fair to say that it seeks to elucidate mystical experience through poetry, while the Madhyamaka and related disciplines do so through philosophy. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽

Even the relatively early Mahayana text, the “Lalitavistara Sutra” (not a Buddha-dhatu scripture), has the Buddha tell of the utter incomprehensibility and inexpressibility of the Dharma-Wheel of Truth (whereas, one might add, the pratityasamutpada is very clearly described, step by step). He states: “This Wheel is immeasurable, surpassing every measure; incalculable, outside every calculation; it is inconceivable, unencomapassable by the mind; inconceivable, ineffable, completely unequalled”. He is not talking here of samsara (which is the sphere of pratityasamutpada). He is talking of that which is Beyond all such deluded process … As for the Tathagata-garbha’s being an upaya (skilful method) for those unable to accept Emptiness: this view is clearly rejected by the Buddha of the “Nirvana Sutra”, since it is precisely those of his followers who are thoroughly schooled in non-Self and Emptiness (and great advocates of these doctrines) whom he then has to instruct in Tathagata-garbha. Also, in a sense, ALL verbalised Buddhism is an “upaya”, since Ultimate Truth is beyond the reach of words anyway. All of the spoken formulations of the Dharma by the (alleged) Buddha - including the shunyata (Emptiness) teaching – are so many upayas (skilful tactics) to get us to draw close to, and enter, Truth. This, of course, does not mean that those tactics are fundamentally untrue (whether they concern shunyata or Buddha-dhatu). Hope this helps a little. Best wishes to you - Tony. TonyMPNS 21:04, 23 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I agree with the interpretation that all Buddhism is upayic in nature; there's considerable justification for this position in Madhyamaka thought, and also in Zen. -- कुक्कुरोवाच|Talk‽