Talk:Bucklin voting

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[edit] removing FairVote reference.

FairVote is not a "reliable source" for Wikipedia, being an advocacy organization (at least for facts; it is a reliable source for arguments being used by IRV advocates) and the page cited, which was the source for material in the article which I have also removed, was argumentative. The reason given for voters not to add second rank votes is simply an opinion, it appears, one designed to promote Instant Runoff Voting. As a note for further research, I found this reference: [1] which then cites other relevant cases. It appears that Brown v. Smallwood, in particular, was cited by other courts in outlawing the Hare system. I.e., STV. I have written elsewhere that Brown v. Smallwood would appear to apply to IRV as well as to Bucklin, and that the argument that Brown v. Smallwood was only about the additional votes involved in the Approval-like Bucklin method is spurious, apparently based on a shallow reading of the case, which appears to have disallowed all kinds of alternative votes. This is a current controversy in Minnesota, as it appears the IRV elections set up there are headed for judicial review.

This is what I removed:

Like other variants of approval voting, in Bucklin voting indicating support for a lesser choice will count against a higher choice -- for example, if both your first choice and second choice advanced to the second round, your ballots would cancel each other out. For this reason, in high stakes elections in which voters have strong favorites, most voters opted to "bullet vote" and protect the interests of their favorite choice be withholding any alternate choices. In Alabama, for example, in the 16 primary election races that used Bucklin Voting between 1916 and 1930, on average only 13% of voters opted to indicate a second choice. Even in hotly contested multi-candidate gubernatorial primaries, over two thirds of voters selected only a single choice. Between 1916 and the system's repeal in 1931, in no case did the addition of the second choice votes give the winner a majority.[1]

Note that the primary purpose in major elections of a system like Bucklin (or IRV) is to eliminate the "spoiler effect," and to do this, in a two-party system, it is only necessary for a relatively small percentage of voters to use additional preference expressions. In the election invalidated by Brown v. Smallwood, however, many voters did use the additional preferences, and they turned the election. The bugaboo of second choices hurting your first preference is only relevant if your first and second preferences are both frontrunners, in which case an ordinary voter would quite easily and properly vote for one only. So low usage of second preference votes is not an argument against Bucklin at all. It would be expected in a two-party system, where third party supporters are at most a few percent of the electorate. In any case, my point is not to establish *my* argument here, but to note that FairVote was presenting *their* argument, not known facts, presented in a balanced way. --Abd 02:33, 11 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Problem with the example

The use of the geographical example is one which has value because it shows an underlying rationale for voting; indeed, it assumes that voters will follow distance as a basis for their votes. However, that example really is designed for Range voting; if voters vote to minimize their distance, and if they vote sincerely, the overall distance traveled to the capital by all voters will be minimized.

However, in real public elections, multiple majorities will be quite unusual. Normally, in most public elections, there are no more than two front-runners, and for a multiple majority to occur, as with the geographical voting example, there must be a large number of voters who vote for *both* front-runners, which is, shall we say, extremely unlikely; this would be the equivalent of having voted for Bush and Gore in U.S. Presidential 2000. The article notes that there is an advantage to "bullet voting," under some circumstances, but then the example shows all voters voting all ranks. Which is implausible for political elections; we can expect that if voters are free to vote as few ranks as they like, that many will vote for one only, and that is perfectly rational, and perfectly legitimate. No voter should be forced to vote for anyone, and requiring full ranking requires that all voters essentially vote (conditionally) for all candidates except one, the one they bottom-rank. Bucklin is not designed for that. Like Approval voting, its pure-rating cousin, bullet voting would be the *norm*, and it is the supporters of candidates not likely to win who would add additional votes for candidates more likely to be real contenders.

I do not think that the Memphis voters would add second rank votes. However, the voters in other cities might. The Nashville voters would likewise know that adding second rank votes might hurt them, if they second rank Memphis, since the front-runners (for first preference) are Memphis and Nashville. However, the other two cities would be likely to add second preferences; Knoxville and Chattanooga might add each other. And then they might add Nashville as a third preference. The result would be, again, that the counting would go to the third round, with Nashville winning. Unless the Knoxville and Chattenooga voters refused to add Nashville third, in which case there would be majority failure. If the rules allow a plurality win at that point (as IRV generally would), Memphis would win, an undesirable result for Knoxville and Chattanooga, which is why I think they would cast those extra votes. Basic rule for Approval (and it applies to Bucklin): vote for one of the two front-runners, at least somewhere in your preferences. --Abd 04:03, 11 November 2007 (UTC)

The source of the example was before I started editing, and was designed for a simple example to use in multiple election methods. There was a discussion about it (somewhere), about its usefulness, I don't remember, but it was moved for all method to a common article now called Effects of different voting systems under similar circumstances. Anyway I have no great affection for the example. I probably did originally add it to Bucklin, and yes with any specific method, sincere ranking may not be the best strategy, so the example must be more considered as a demonstration rather that a serious analysis on how people might vote - WHICH would anyway be original research perhaps, so it can't really be much more than it is! Tom Ruen 06:19, 11 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Unconstitutional Why?

Any details as to why it was found to be unconstitutional? (i.e. What constitutional principles did it breach?) -- 00:02, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

See 1915 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Smallwood: :Tom Ruen (talk) 00:18, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

Those are both FairVote propaganda pages about Bucklin and Brown v. Smallwood. If you want the real skinny, read Brown v. Smallwood itself! You can find it from an article on the case that I wrote and then Warren Smith edited, at [4]; there is a link there to a PDF of the actual case.
Meanwhile, the first source (FairVote) has this on Bucklin:
"In the United States, IRV election laws were first adopted in 1912. Four states -- Florida, Indiana, Maryland, and Minnesota -- used versions of IRV for party primaries. Seven other states, used a different version of preference voting known as the Bucklin system. Bucklin was found to be defective as it allowed a voter’s second-choice vote to help defeat a voter’s first-choice candidate. With Bucklin voting, most voters refrained from giving second choices, and the intent of discovering which candidate was favored by a majority of voters was thwarted."
The claim that "most voters refrained from giving second choices" is false for nonpartisan elections, and the best counterexample was the election of a judge which was the basis for Brown v. Smallwood. As to *partisan* elections, in the context of a two-party system, we would expect most voters, voting sincerely, to vote for only one, there is no reason to do otherwise, it would be moot at best. Only for what is, by definition, a minority, would additional votes become important. An example would be Nader supporters in Florida in 2000. As to major party supporters, what would we expect, additional votes from a Gore supporter for Bush? Now, *some* major party supporters might indeed add some additional votes, say a Democrat for Nader if the voter wanted to push the favored party in the Green direction, or a Republican for Badnarick (or whoever the Libertarian was in Florida that year) who wanted to push the party in a Libertarian direction. (And some Democrats might like to do that too!)
The primary motive for election reform is to deal with the spoiler effect, and Bucklin quite handily deals with it. The argument given by FairVote above is a red herring, and, in addition, I've seen no proof for it. They simply assert it without sourcing, other than to their own research (not to sources from the time, beyond Brown v. Smallwood, which they radically misinterpret).
FairVote is interested in promoting IRV, hence this claim: "Bucklin was found to be defective as it allowed a voter’s second-choice vote to help defeat a voter’s first-choice candidate." That is not what Brown v. Smallwood says, beyond *one* passage in the decision which can be read that way. Given the rest of the decision and the reconsideration, however, that was not the intended meaning. Now, does Bucklin behave in this way? Sure, *in theory*. In practice, the problem only arises for a voter if the first and second choice are both frontrunners! Have you ever felt that way about an election? I haven't, not with any public elections for major offices! It would take a practically insane voter to vote first choice, one frontrunner, and second choice, another, in most contexts. Yes, in nonpartisan elections, it could happen; likewise a voter who has no idea about "frontrunners" and who imagines that the voter's first and second choices are both frontrunners. We should be so lucky! (I feel that way about the Democratic primaries, actually, I like *every* major candidate on the Democratic side, I'd be tempted to approve them all. But Bucklin would encourage me to single out a favorite and second favorite, and then the third rank would allow me to approve everyone one whom I actually would support. If these later votes "hurt" my favorite, I'd still be quite happy. I actually want the party to nominate the candidate -- among this set -- most likely to win the general election, and this implies choosing the candidate whom the party can most effectively unite behind. This is more important to me than choosing my personal favorite. In other years, it might be different.
Now, as to the second source given, it's to an article by Tony Anderson Solgård and Paul Landskroener. Who are these people? Well at the end of the article, we have, helpfully: "TONY ANDERSON SOLGARD is chair of the board of FairVote Minnesota, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization educating the public about voting systems and their effect on the quality of democracy. PAUL LANDSKROENER is a lawyer and graduate of Valparaiso University School of Law. He practices in Edina."
On the other hand, there exists legal review by at least one presumably neutral attorney that Brown v. Smallwood *does* apply to IRV, and that is my own reading of the case. Solgard and Landskroener argue that this phrase from Brown v. Smallwood controlled the decision:
"The preferential system directly diminishes the right of an elector to give an effective vote for the candidate of his choice. If he votes for him once, his power to help him is exhausted. If he votes for other candidates he may harm his choice, but cannot help him.'
Now, this is not a reference to one-person, one-vote, it is to a tactical voting decision. But there is lots more in Brown v. Smallwood. In particular, the reconsideration of the case included this very specific language, which applies to IRV as much as to Bucklin:
"We reached the conclusion that a system of voting, giving the voter the right to vote for the candidate of his first choice, and against the first choice of another voter, and, in addition, by a manipulation of second and additional choice votes, vote for different candidates all against the first choice of another voter to a number of times limited only by the number of candidates, was contrary to the intent of the Constitution; and that it was none the less so because such other voter was permitted to engage in a like manipulation of second and additional choice votes. [...] We do right in upholding the right of the citizen to cast a vote for the candidate of his choice unimpaired by second or additional choice votes cast by other voters." (Brown v. Smallwood, 130 Minnesota Reports, p. 508.)
This is *not* an argument proceeding from a claim that a voter is going to hurt his first choice by casting a second choice vote. FairVote wants to read the case that way because, they claim, IRV never does this. However, in some circumstances, it does; for example, the IRV legislation proposed for Vermont by Terrill Bouricius must face a majority election requirement in the Vermont Constitution, and the "last round majority" that IRV necessarily generates is not a true majority; if a majority *of ballots cast* -- including exhausted ballots -- is not attained by the end of the process, the top three candidates go to the Legislature for a secret ballot *plurality* election. Thus adding additional votes *can* hurt your first choice, by allowing a majority to form for your second choice, whereas if there is majority failure, your first choice will still have a chance.
The legal opinion issued by the FairVote authors is corrupt and disregards the clear text of Brown v. Smallwood. I would guess that it was calculated to encourage Minneapolis decision-makers to go ahead and go for IRV. It may have been a smart political move, since there is, in fact, a good chance that Brown v. Smallwood will be reversed, it was a thoroughly corrupt decision as well, in my opinion. The dissent in the decision points that out quite well. A Michigan court, I noticed a reference just now, appears to have tossed out the "Hare system" of proportional representation in 1920, with reference to Brown v. Smallwood. That's STV, the methodological foundation for IRV, quite explicitly on point.
The majority in Brown v. Smallwood was considering all marks on the ballot to be "votes," and thus Bucklin -- and any preferential voting system -- would violate one person, one vote.
(In the article I originally wrote, Warren Smith comments that the first U.S. Presidential elections were "Approval," but that is an error which can be traced back to the same set of "theorists." He fell for it, apparently. But *Bucklin* is essentially "instant runoff Approval," it clearly satisfies the Majority Criterion, no matter how you slice it (there is argument about that for Approval). The additional approvals are only brought in if there is majority failure in the first round. Thus it behaves like Plurality except when there is majority failure, which is also true for IRV. Yet Bucklin is a much simpler method to count than IRV, it is precinct summable, unlike IRV, and there are no nasty surprises due to candidate eliminations. *It was working, from all accounts I've been able to find, the reasons FairVote gives for its abandonment are not based on known facts, they are simple opinions stated by FairVote, beyond what is seen in Brown v. Smallwood, which I would conclude was about politics, not fairness in elections. Somebody wanted Bucklin dead. Too dangerous to the status quo. Third parties might actually start to get traction, that was a major fear in those days. You know, communists, anarchists, farm and labor parties, Negroes, etc.)

[edit] Absolute majority?

There is a sentence in the article that states "A majority is defined as half the number of voters, similar to absolute majority." I believe this to be factually incorrect for two reasons:

  1. A majority, whether simple or absolute, requires more than half, not just half.
  2. An absolute majority is defined as being based on the total number of possible voters, whether present or not. This is not a requirement of the Bucklin system as far as I can tell, nor is this really common to the theory of voting systems in general.

As such, I am correcting what I believe to be errors. Please discuss here if you disagree with the changes. Derelk (talk) 22:44, 31 March 2008 (UTC)