Buad Thif Allah Al Atabi

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Bijad Thif Allah Al Atabi
Born: August 23, 1971(1971-08-23)
Saajer, Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Abdullah al-Tayabi
ID number: 122
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status repatriated

Bijad Thif Allah Al Atabi is a citizen of Saudi Arabia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] Al Atabi's Guantanamo detainee ID is 122. According to Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts Al Atabi was born on August 23, 1971 in Saajer, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 122 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bijad Thif Allah Al Atabi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 7 August 2004.[7] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a Taliban fighter:
  1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
  2. The detainee lived at a Taliban guesthouse in AF before going to a [[Afghan training camp|training camp near Kabul, where he trained with an AK-47 and grenades.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee fought on the front lines with the Taliban.
  2. The detainee fought on the front lines until the Taliban order [sic] him to surrender to General Dostum's Northern Alliance Alliance forces at Nasar-e-Sharif [sic] .

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Al Atabi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[8]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bijad Thif Allah Al Atabi's first annual Administrative Review Board in 2005.[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. The detainee is a Taliban fighter:
  1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Pakistan to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
  2. The detainee lived at a Taliban guesthouse in AF before going to a training camp near Kabul, where he trained with an AK-47 and grenades.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee fought on the front lines with the Taliban.
  2. The detainee fought on the front lines until the Taliban order him to surrender to General Dostum’s Northern Alliance forces at Mazari Sharif.
c. Based upon a review of recommendations from US government agencies and classified and unclassified documents, Enemy Combatant is regarded as a threat to United States and it’s Allies.
  1. Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee has a past history of aggressive behavior. The detainee has multiple reports of assaults and fails to comply with rules.
  2. Commander ((‘ABD AL-HADI)) AL-IRAQI. ‘ABD AL-HADI is one of Usama ((BIN LADEN))’S closest commanders and the person in charge of Al-Qaida fighters in the Afghani Northern Front.
  3. Detainee knew Al-Iraqi very well.
  4. Detainee was the assistant commander to (Abu Turab) in the Arab Brigade.
  5. Usama Bin ((Laden))(UBL) could be considered the commander-in-chief of the Arab Brigade.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

  • Testimony of Enemy Combatant has provided the only information lending evidence favoring his release.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bijad Thif Allah Al Atabi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 January 2006.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee heard of a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia by Sheik Hamood al Aqla and Sheik Abu Abdullah to go and fight the jihad in Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee believed he was going to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against Ahmed al Masoud, and Afghani of the Northern Alliance, whom he was told was allied with the Russians.
  3. The detainee advised that he obtained a visa to travel to Pakistan from the Pakistani embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. When he applied fro the visa, he advised the person at the embassy that he was going to Pakistan for the Daawa, when meant he was going to fight in the jihad for Islam.
  4. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Peshawar, Pakistan and then to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad for two days and then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed at a Taliban guesthouse.
  6. The detaiene was identified as the "second man in charge" of a military group in Afghanistan and was responsible to feed the group, assist in planning attacks and would take charge of the group when the "number one man" was away until the number one man returned.
  7. The detainee is identified as an al Qaida expert on explosives and weapons who has received extensive training.
  8. The detainee is identified as a mid-level commander who is well known by al Qaida fighters, as he fought in the Kabul and the Khawaj Alghar regions of Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee admitted to being part of the prison uprising in Mazar-E-Sharif [sic] .
b. Training
The detainee went to a training camp run by the Taliban which was close to the frontline and not far from Kabul where he trained with the AK-47 and hand grenades.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was identified as knowing al Iraqi very well because he always went to al Iraqi's office. He was also seen twice with al Iraqi and with information [sic] that was needed on the north [sic] line.
  2. Al Iraqi was one of Usama Bin Laden's closest commanders and the person in charge of al Qaida fighters on the Afghani Northern Front.
  3. The detainee's name was found on computer media that was collected in a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.
d. Other Relevant Data
The detainee was told by the Taliban to go to Mazar-E-Sharif [sic] and surrender to General Dostum. After his surrender the detainee was placed in a prison at Mazar-E-Sharif. Dostum's soldiers opened fire with their weapons and began killing many of the prisoners. The detainee was wounded in the head. After the riots were over, the detainee and the survivors surrendered to Dostum's men again.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated he did not see any combat action and never shot at or killed anyone.
b.

The detainee stated he never trained with explosives, chemicals, biological agents or nuclear material nor is he aware of anyone who trained in these areas.
c.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

[edit] Repatriation

A captive Saudi authorities called Bjiad Al-Otaibi was repatriated to Saudi custody, with fifteen other men, on July 16, 2007.[11]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  3. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  4. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  5. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  6. ^ Andy Worthington. "Who are the 16 Saudis Released From Guantánamo?", Huffington Post, July 18, 2007. 
  7. ^ OARDEC (7 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Atabi, Bijad Thif Allah page 35. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-03.
  8. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  9. ^ OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Atabi, Bijad Thif Allah pages 51-52. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-03.
  10. ^ OARDEC (20 January 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Atabi, Bijad, Thif Allah pages 97-99. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-03.
  11. ^ Raid Qusti. "More Gitmo Detainees Come Home", Arab News, July 17, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-07-17.