Bombing of Iraq (December 1998)

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Operation Desert Fox
Date December 16, 1998–December 19, 1998 Location Persian Gulf Result Cease fire; much of Iraqi infrastructure destroyed.
Belligerents
United States, United Kingdom	Iraq
Commanders
General Tony Zinni	Saddam Hussein
Strength
30,500	Unknown
Casualties and losses
None	600-2,000 dead

The December 1998 bombing of Iraq (code-named Operation Desert Fox) was a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from December 16-December 19, 1998 by the United States and United Kingdom. These strikes were undertaken in response to Iraq's continued failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with United Nations Special Commission inspectors.

It was a major flare-up in the Iraq disarmament crisis. The stated goal of the cruise missile and bombing attacks was to disrupt Saddam's ability to maintain his grip of power.

On October 31, 1998 US President Bill Clinton signed into law H.R. 4655, the "Iraq Liberation Act." [3] [4] The new Act appropriated funds to Iraqi opposition groups in the hope of removing Saddam Hussein from power and replacing his regime with a democracy.

The Act also said that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as provided in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this Act." Section 4(a)(2) states "The President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training for [Iraqi democratic opposition] organizations."

The bombing campaign had been anticipated since February 1998 and incurred criticism from Anti-war movements and abroad.^[1][2] Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates initially announced they would deny US military the use of local bases for the purpose of air strikes against Iraq.^[3] Democracy Now! reported about an alleged secret policy, stating that "the Clinton administration has quietly changed U.S.nuclear-weapons policy to permit for the first time the use of tactical atomic warheads" against adversaries employing the use of WMDs^[3], under the top-secret Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60.^[4]

Contents 1 "Degrading", not eliminating 2 Military operations 3 Reaction 4 Criticism 4.1 Distraction from Clinton impeachment scandal 4.2 Accusations of US interference in the UN inspection process 4.3 Inspectors not thrown out 4.4 Facilities not known to be producing WMD 5 See also 6 References 7 External links

[edit] "Degrading", not eliminating

Clinton administration officials said the aim of the mission was to "degrade" Iraq's ability to manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction, not to eliminate it. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked about the distinction while the operation was going on:^[5]

"I don't think we're pretending that we can get everything, so this is - I think - we are being very honest about what our ability is. We are lessening, degrading his ability to use this. The weapons of mass destruction are the threat of the future. I think the president explained very clearly to the American people that this is the threat of the 21st century. [. . .] [W]hat it means is that we know we can't get everything, but degrading is the right word."

Main targets of the bombing included weapons research and development installations, air defense systems, weapon and supply depots, and barracks and command headquarters of Saddam's elite Republican Guard. Also, one of Saddam's lavish presidential palaces came under attack. Iraqi anti-air batteries, unable to home in on the American and British jets, began to blanket the sky with near random bursts of flak fire. The air strikes continued unabated however, and cruise missile barrages launched by naval vessels added to the bombs dropped by the planes. By the fourth night, most of the specified targets had been damaged or destroyed and the Operation was deemed a success. U.S. Special Forces members who had been on the ground in northern Iraq to protect Kurdish settlements from retaliation withdrew, and the air strikes ended.

[edit] Military operations

U.S. Navy aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Three (CVW 3), flying from USS Enterprise and from Carrier Air Wing Eleven (CVW 11), flying from USS Carl Vinson, flew combat missions from the Persian Gulf in support of ODF. Of significance, the operation marked the first time that females flew combat sorties as U.S. Navy strike fighter pilots [5][6] and the first combat use of the B-1 bomber.

[edit] Reaction

In reaction to the attack, three of five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, France, and the People's Republic of China) called for lifting of the eight-year oil embargo on Iraq, recasting or disbanding UNSCOM, and firing its chairman, Australian diplomat Richard Butler.

According to published reports that some say^[who?] have been discredited, Saddam Hussein sought revenge against the United States. These reports claim that Saddam sought to direct terrorist organizations to attack U.S. targets. Farouk Hijazi, Iraq's ambassador to Turkey, reportedly met with bin Laden. ([7], [8]) Corriere della Sera, a Milan newspaper, translated by the CIA, reads: “Saddam Hussayn and Usama bin Ladin have sealed a pact. Faruk Hidjazi, the former Director of the Iraqi Secret Services and now the country’s Ambassador to Turkey, held a secret meeting with the extremist leader on 21 December.” The newspaper had direct quotes from Hijazi without specifying the source of the quotes. (Page 328)(PDF) Former CIA counterterrorism official Vince Cannistraro notes that bin Laden rejected Hijazi's overtures, concluding that he did not want to be "exploited" by Iraq's secular regime.[9] Hijazi, arrested in April 2003, has been cooperating with U.S. intelligence, and has offered no evidence of such cooperation. The Boston Globe reported, "Indeed, intelligence agencies tracked contacts between Iraqi agents and Al Qaeda agents in the '90s in Sudan and Afghanistan, where bin Laden is believed to have met with Farouk Hijazi, head of Iraqi intelligence. But current and former intelligence specialists caution that such meetings occur just as often between enemies as friends. Spies frequently make contact with rogue groups to size up their intentions, gauge their strength, or try to infiltrate their ranks, they said." (3 August 2003).

On January 11, 1999 Newsweek magazine reported an Arab intelligence officer, reported to know Saddam personally, told Newsweek: "very soon, you will be witnessing large-scale terrorist activity by the Iraqis." The planned attacks were said to be Saddam's revenge for the "continuing aggression" posed by the no fly zones that show the countries are still at war since Operation Desert Fox.[10] On January 31, 1999, Russian newspaper Novosti claimed that "hundreds of Afghan Arabs are undergoing sabotage training in Southern Iraq and are preparing for armed actions on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. They have declared as their goal a fight against the interests of the United States in the region." [11]

No such attacks ever materialized. The 9/11 Commission report notes that after American missiles destroyed Iraqi intelligence headquarters in 1993 as punishment for a bungled assassination plot against George H.W. Bush, "no further intelligence came in about terrorist acts planned by Iraq." [12] It also reported that the Commission's investigation had uncovered no "evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States," and no evidence of any "collaborative operational relationship." [13]

See also: Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 1997-2000 and Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

[edit] Criticism

[edit] Distraction from Clinton impeachment scandal

See also: Lewinsky scandal and Impeachment of Bill Clinton

Some critics of the Clinton administration expressed concern over the timing of Operation Desert Fox. Hitchens, Christopher (1999). No One Left to Lie To: The Triangulations of William Jefferson Clinton. Verso, 21. ISBN 1-85984-736-6.  The four-day bombing campaign occurred at the same time the U.S. House of Representatives was conducting the impeachment hearing of President Clinton. Clinton was impeached on December 19, the last day of the bombing campaign. A few months earlier, similar criticism was leveled during Operation Infinite Reach, wherein missile strikes were ordered against suspected terrorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan, on August 20. The missile strikes began three days after Clinton was called to testify before a grand jury during the Lewinsky scandal and his subsequent nationally televised address later that evening in which Clinton admitted having an inappropriate relationship.

The Operation Infinite Reach attacks became known as "Monica's War" among TV newspeople, due to the timing. ABC-TV announced to all stations that there would be a special report following Lewinsky's testimony before Congress, then the special report was pre-empted by the report of the missile attacks. The combination of the timing of that attack and Operation Desert Fox led to accusations of a Wag the Dog situation.

Other critics, such as former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said the attacks didn't go far enough: "I would be amazed if a three-day campaign made a decisive difference," Kissinger said just after the operation ended. "[W]e did not do, in my view, enough damage to degrade it [Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction] for six months. It doesn't make any significant difference because in six months to a year they will be back to where they are and we cannot keep repeating these attacks.[...] At the end of the day what will be decisive is what the situation in the Middle East will be two to three years from now. If Saddam is still there, if he's rearming, if the sanctions are lifted, we will have lost, no matter what spin we put on it." Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser for President Jimmy Carter, thought the strikes were useful. He said he thought the bombings would set back Iraq's WMD programs for a time, but continued sanctions and containment, coupled with future bombing, could contain any threat from Iraq.^[6]

According to Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq, Desert Fox was successful in largely persuading Iraq to abandon WMD programs. U.S. intelligence, he contends, was just not aware of its success until after the 2003 invasion. However, the Duelfer Report concluded that "Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and Saddam ended Iraq's nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War."

[edit] Accusations of US interference in the UN inspection process

Iraq stopped cooperating with the UN special commission in the first month of the year, but diplomacy by Kofi Annan brought fresh agreement and new modalities for the inspection of sensitive sites.^[7] Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz had earlier accused UNSCOM officials of acting as spies for the United States,^[8] charges later supported by Scott Ritter and Bill Tierney.^[9][10]

According to Ritter, inspectors acted covertly on behalf of the United States to deliberately provoke Iraq into non-compliance, thus providing US warplanners with a Casus belli.^[9]

Ritter accused Butler and other UNSCOM staff of working with the US, in opposition to their UN mandate.^{[citation needed]} He claimed that UNSCOM deliberately sabotaged relations with Iraq by insisting on gathering intelligence unrelated to prohibited weapons,^{[citation needed]} some of which was to be used in the forthcoming bombing.^{[citation needed]}

Butler has since denied Ritter's allegations,^{[citation needed]} questioning why Ritter did not raise them until several years after the bombing.^{[citation needed]}

(In the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, advocates of invasion pointed towards Iraq's refusal to re-admit UN inspectors following the 1998 bombing, citing it as evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its WMD programs.^{[citation needed]} Ritter attacked this assertion, arguing that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UN inspectors was understandable given the infiltration and corruption of UNSCOM leading up to Operation Desert Fox.^{[citation needed]} Iraq eventually re-admitted UN inspectors before the 2003 invasion, http://www.unmovic.org/ but the US invaded Iraq regardless of their work and they were withdrawn. [ibid. see specifically Briefing of the Security Council, 7 and 19 March 2003]

[edit] Inspectors not thrown out

UNSCOM weapons inspectors were not expelled from the country by Iraq as has often been reported. Rather, according to Richard Butler himself, it was U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the forthcoming U.S. and British air strikes: "I received a telephone call from US Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission... Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be 'prudent to take measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.' ... I told him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq."^[11]

[edit] Facilities not known to be producing WMD

Former U.S. Army intelligence analyst William Arkin contended in his Washington Post column January, 1999 that the operation had less to do with WMD and more to do with destabilizing the Iraqi government.

It is clear from the target list, and from extensive communications with almost a dozen officers and analysts knowledgeable about Desert Fox planning, that the U.S.-British bombing campaign was more than a reflexive reaction to Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM's inspectors. The official rationale for Desert Fox may remain the "degrading" of Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction and the "diminishing" of the Iraqi threat to its neighbors. But careful study of the target list tells another story. Thirty-five of the 100 targets were selected because of their role in Iraq's air defense system, an essential first step in any air war, because damage to those sites paves the way for other forces and minimizes casualties all around. Only 13 targets on the list are facilities associated with chemical and biological weapons or ballistic missiles, and three are southern Republican Guard bases that might be involved in a repeat invasion of Kuwait. The heart of the Desert Fox list (49 of the 100 targets) is the Iraqi regime itself: a half-dozen palace strongholds and their supporting cast of secret police, guard and transport organizations.^[12]

According to Department of Defense personnel with whom Arkin spoke, Central Command chief Anthony Zinni insisted that the U.S. only attack biological and chemical sites that "had been identified with a high degree of certainty." And the reason for the low number of targets, said Arkin, was because intelligence specialists "could not identify actual weapons sites with enough specificity to comply with Zinni's directive."

Dr Brian Jones was the top intelligence analyst on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons at the Ministry of Defence.^[13] He told BBC Panorama in 2004 that Defence Intelligence Staff in Whitehall did not have a high degree of confidence any of the facilities identified, targeted and bombed in Operation Desert Fox were active in producing weapons of mass destruction. Jones' testimony is supported by the former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, John Morrison, who informed the same program that, before the operation had ended, DIS came under pressure to validate a prepared statement to be delivered by then Prime Minister Tony Blair, declaring military activity an unqualified success. Large-scale damage assessment takes time, responded Morrison, therefore his department declined to sign up to a premature statement. "After Dessert Fox, I actually sent a note round to all the analysts involved congratulating them on standing firm in the face of, in some cases, individual pressure to say things that they knew weren't true," he disclosed. Later on, after careful assessment and consideration, Defence Intelligence Staff determined that the bombing had not been all that effective.^[14] Within days of speaking out on the program, Morrison was informed by former New Labour cabinet minister Ann Taylor that he was to lose his job as Chief Investigator to the Intelligence and Security Committee.^[15][16]

[edit] See also

• Bombing of Iraq (September 1996)

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• Overview of Operation Desert Fox - DefenseLink
• Operation Desert Fox - BBC News
• Transcript of President Clinton's speech announcing the attack - CNN
• Iraq attacked in 'Operation Desert Fox' - CNN
• Strike on Iraq - Operation Desert Fox - CNN
• Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness With Unintended Effects
• Operation Desert Fox
• Tony Holmes (2005). US Navy F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Osprey Publishing Limited.