Bensayah Belkacem

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Belkacem Bensayah
Belkacem Bensayah from his OARDEC dossier
Born: September 10, 1962(1962-09-10)
Wargala, Algeria
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 10001
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status still in captivity
Occupation: clergyman

Bensayah Belkacem was born in Algeria, and arrested in his home in Bosnia, on October 8, 2001, shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001.[1]

Belkacem and five other men, charity workers, who were colleagues of his, who were also born in Algeria, were under suspicion of plotting to bomb the American embassy in Bosnia.[2] American intelligence officials had grown alarmed by an increase in the "chatter". After his extrajudicial capture it was reported that a search of his home turned up pro-jihadist material.[3]

Main article: Algerian Six

Contents

[edit] Detention in Cuba

Bensayah was one of the first Guantanamo detainees who was able to get a letter out describing the conditions there. In a letter his wife received in June 2002 he said that the detainees no longer had to defecate and urinate into plastic bags. The camp authorities had provided them with toilets.[4]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunals

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Bensayah declined to participate in his own Combatant Status Review Tribunal

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Bensayah Belkacem would have faced, during his Tribunal, were:[5]

a. The detainee is an al Qaida member:
  1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Bosnia-Herzegovina during November 1995.
  2. Detainee is linked to Usama Bin Laden's operational network.
  3. The detainee was in possession of Abu Zubaydah [sic] cell phone number in Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee had phone conversations with Abu Zubaydah, a senior al Qaida aide to Usama Bin Laden pertaining to procuring passports.
  5. The detainee made 70 phone calls to Afghanistan between September 11, 2001 and the time he was arrested.
  6. The detainee was being investigated under the criminal acts [sic] for international terrorism in Bosnia.
  7. The detainee was identified as the primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
  8. In late September 2001 the detainee in Bosnia Herzegovina planned to join jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the United States/coalition invasion and encouraged other Algerians to do the same.
  9. On 1 October 2001, the detainee applied for a visa in Sarajevo, Bosnia - Herzegovina for onward travel to Afghanistan.
  10. The detainee, prior to planned departure to Iran/Afghanistan, was to assist the mid-October 2001 arrival of unidentified travelers from Afghanistan.
  11. The detainee planned to coordinate from Tehran, Iran the late October 2001 travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina of an additional 30-40 travelers from Afghanistan.

[edit] Detainee election form

Bensayah Belkacem's Detainee election form states his Personal Representative met with him for two hours on September 27, 2004 -- one day before his Tribunal first convened.[6] The only comment his Personal Representative recorded from that two hour meeting was:

Detainee will not attend Tribunal. There were no witnesses requested.

The Unclassified summary of basis for Tribunal decision records that his Personal Representative made no comments, and asked no questions during either the classified or unclassified sessions of the Tribunal.[7] And, when asked to comment on the Tribunal his Personal Representative had no comments.

[edit] Unclassified summary of basis for Tribunal decision

Bensayah Belkacem's Tribunal first convened on September 28, 2004.[7] He did not choose to attend his Tribunal. His status was confirmed by Tribunal panel 6.

According to the Unclassified summary of basis for Tribunal decision his Tribunal considered six unclassified documents which included allegations that were not summarized on the Summary of Evidence presented to him beforehand[7]:

The initial session of this Tribunal was held on 28 September 2004. The Recorder presented Exhibits R-1 through R-6 during the unclassified portion of the Tribunal. The Unclassified Summary of Evidence (Exhibit R-1) indicates, among other things, that: the detainee is an Al Qaida member and is linked to Usama Bin Laden's operational network; he had phone conversations with Abu Zubaydah, a senior Al Qaida aide to Usama Bin Laden pertaining to procuring passports; he was identified as the primary Al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia; in late September 2001 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he planned to join Jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the U.S./coalition invasion, and encouraged other Algerians to do the same; he was going to assist the mid-October 2001 arrival of unidentified travelers from Afghanistan to [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]; and he planned to coordinate from Tehran, Iran, the late-October 2001 travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina of an additional 30-40 travelers from Afghanistan. The recorder called no witnesses.

Two of documents were segments of newspaper articles. The articles were initially unidentified. The Recorder was directed to find the source of those documents. The Recorder was able to find the whole context of just one articles.[8][9] The decision basis memo says the Tribunal ignored the other document. The identified newspaper article seems to be the source of the additional allegations the Tribunal considered.

The Unclassified summary of basis for Tribunal decision recorded that the recorder submitted seven classified documents during the classified session of the Tribunal, and that[7]:

After the Tribunal read all of the classified exhibits, the Tribuanl requested additional information and recessed until the Recorder could obtain it.

The recorder prepared seven additional classified documents, and the Tribunal reconvened on October 1, 2004.

An article from Time magazine, from its November 12, 2001 issue, contained a sidebar entitled, "The Suspects: A Bosnian Subplot".[8][9] This sidebar contained the additional allegations that Bensayah Belkacem's Tribunal took seriously, specifically:

  • it alleged that records of a wiretapped conversation between Belkacem and another Bosnia.

"'The conversation was in code', but to trained ears it was easily understood. Picked up by U.S. listening devices on Oct. 16 in Sarajevo, it ranged in topics from the bombing in Afghanistan to 'what the response should be here,' a senior Bosnian official told TIME. U.S. and British targets in Bosnia were mentioned. But it was the sign-off that got listeners' attention: 'Tomorrow we will start.'"
  • It stated:

"Direct links to bin Laden focus on just one man, the apparent leader of the Algerian cell, Bensayah Belkacem."
  • It stated investigators found:

"...on a small piece of paper the number of a senior bin Laden aide, Abu Zubaydah, himself a veteran of the Bosnian war."

Senad Slatina, who, like Time magazine reporter Andrew Purvis, wrote with a Sarajevo byline, of Belkacem's arrest.[10] Slatina wrote:

"The case was referred to the Federation's supreme court. But it was at this point problems started to emerge. The court complained it had not been furnished with evidence to support the charges. In particular, it lacked tapes of a wiretapped conversation which reportedly indicated that the group was planning an attack."

Slatina's article reported that Time, and other reports, had stated that Belkacem had made 70 mobile phone calls to Afghanistan.[10] Time had written that these calls had been made between the al Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001 and his arrest on October 8, 2001. Slatina's article said other media reports had stated that the mobile phone calls had been spread over the previous calendar year.

Slatina wrote that the Bosnian Police investigation found no sign that Belkacem owned a mobile phone.[10] Slatina wrote that Belkacem, who "lived modestly", shared his landlord's landline. And that his phone bill had not exceeded $9 per month in any month in the previous year.

Concerning the report that a slip of paper found in his apartment contained Abu Zubaydah's mobile phone number Slatina wrote[10]:

"Later some media reported that a piece of paper found in his flat bore the 12-digit telephone number of an Afghanistan resident with the name Abu Zubaydah written in Arabic underneath. Belkacem stated he had never seen the paper or the number on it. He said he did not know anyone called Abu Zubaydah.

"The original police report after the search of Belkacem's apartment only mentions a 'paper with Arabic content written on it', without specifying any names or numbers."

Slatina quoted Tomislav Limov, Bosnia's deputy interior minister, who was confident Bosnia had sufficient evidence to justify the Bosnian's arrest[10].

[edit] Additional documents

On 22 November 2004 James R. Crisfield wrote an "Addendum legal sufficiency review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for detainee ISN # #####"[11]:

During a search of the files of another government agency, Combatant Status Review Tribuna personnel discovered new information related to the detention of Detainee ISN ######'. See enclosure (1). This information was forwarded to the Tribunal, which was reconvened to review the information. See enclosure (2). The Tribunal reconvened, reviewed the information, and found it unpersuasive. Therefore, their prior finding remained unchanged. See enclosure (3).

[edit] Bensayah Belkacem v. George W. Bush

A writ of habeas corpus, Bensayah Belkacem v. George W. Bush, was submitted on Bensayah Belkacem's behalf.[12] In response, on 12 October 2004 the Department of Defense released 40 pages of unclassified documents related to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Declined to testify on behalf of Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar

Another detainee from Bosnia, Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar, asked his Personal Representative to ask Bensyah Belkacem to testify at his Tribunal.[13] Bensayab declined.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[14]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bensayah Belkacem's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 28 December 2005.[15] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee supported himself and several other naturalized former Bosnian mujahidin and their families.
  2. The detainee planned to coordinate and assist with the travel and arrival of a number of travelers from Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee was identified by a foreign intelligence service as being suspected of terrorist activities.
  4. The detainee has been identified as a primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
  5. The detainee was one of several Mujahidin Fighters who remained in Bosnia and was known for his ties to the Chechen Movement.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was arrested and possessed numerous phone numbers that linked him to Usama bin Laden's operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni Extremist Network.
  2. The detainee denied ties to a senior al Qaida member whose phone number was found in a book in the detainee's possession.
  3. A senior al Qaida member reported he has known the detainee since 1993 when the detainee went to Afghanistan from the war in Tajikistan.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. According to a news article, the detainee was supposed to be in charge of coordinating terrorist attacks to take place after 11 September 2001 and was to become the chief of operations for al Qaida.
  2. The detainee was discovered to have 3.5 million marks in Bosnian currency deposited in a Bosnian bank.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was adamant that he is known by an alias that is associated with Abu Zubaydah.
b.

The detainee adamantly denied involvement in the plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee reported that he was told that there was no case against him and that he would be sent back to Algeria.
c.

The detainee stated he never associated with any terrorists or anyone who want to hurt the United States. He never worked with al Haramayn or al Furquan, although he has heard of al Furguan.
d.

The detainee denied that he ever had a bank account in Sarajevo nor in Bosnia.
e.

The detainee denied being involved in the facilitating of fraudulent passports for other; the only involvement the detainee had with fraudulent passports was that concerning his own fraudulent Yemeni Passport.
f.

The detainee denied any knowledge of the al Farquan [sic] and Haramay organizations. He stated the Saudi High Commission could not be a bad organization.
g.

The detainee reported he heard of al Qaida and that Usama bin Laden was the leader but he knew this from the media reports

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bensayah Belkacem's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 November 2006.[16] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. In September 2001 the detainee directed a group of naturalizaed former Bosnian Mujahedin of Algerian decent [sic] and supported himself and several other former Mujahedin families in Bosnia.
  2. In September 2001 the detainee planned to travel to join jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the United States/Coalition invasion and the detainee encouraged his Algerian friends to do the same. The detainee applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo, Bosnia for onward travel to Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee was identified and detained by a Foreign government on suspicion of terrorist activities.
  4. The detainee was identified as the primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
  5. The detainee was known for his ties to the Chechen movement during 1999 and reportedly had a connection to an Usama bin Laden operative.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. When the detainee was detained in October 2001, he possessed numerous phone numbers that linked him to Usama bin Laden's operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.
  2. When the detainee was detained in Octobre 2001, he also possessed the number of a Bosnian locksmith who was employed at the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Further investigation revealed that the locksmith was the father-in-law of a known Armed Islamic Group member.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. An open source reported that the detainee, also known to be the leader of a group in Algeria, had 3.5 million Marks of Bosnian currency deposited in a bank of Sarajevo, Bosnia, and several other members of the group had millions also deposited in banks. The open source reported that an investigation revealsed the High Saudi Committee had on its payroll almost all of the members of the group from Algeria, which had links to international terrorism.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied that he has ever used [sic] name Abu Majd.
b.

The detainee stated he never associated with any terrorists or anyone who wanted to hurt the United States. The detainee never worked with al Harman [sic] or al Furquan, although he has heard of al Furquan.
c.

The detainee stated he never had any problems with the police anywhere aside from his arrest in Bosnia in October 2001 for allegedly plotting to attack the United States Embassy there.
d.

The detainee denied involvement in a plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee stated the Bosnian Government said that there was no case against him and that he would be sent back to Algeria.
e.

The detainne denies every having a bank account in Bosnia.
f.

The detainee denied being involved in the facilitating of fraudulent passports for others; the only involvement he had with fraudulent passports was that concerning his own fraudulent Yemeni passport.
g.

The detainee stated he did not know much of anything about the al Farquan [sic] and Haramayn [sic] organizations, and that he never heard of either organization being extremist. The detainee stated the Saudi High Commission could not be a bad [sic] because it was run by the Saudi Royal Family.
h.

The detainee stated he knew from the media reports of al Qaida and that Usama bin Laden was the leader, but he never heard of al Qaida operating in Bosnia.
i.

The detainee stated he would swear on the Koran again that he had nothing to do with al Qaida and has been telling the truth throughout his interrogations.
j.

The detainee denies any involvement with a Usama bin Laden operative, Bosnian Mujahedin members and other Algerian-Bosnians suspected of involvement with planning an attack against the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Man linked to Bin Laden arrested in Bosnia, The Guardian, October 8, 2001
  2. ^ Bosnia: Algerian Trial Jeopardised, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 7, 2001
  3. ^ Terrorist material found in Sarajevo charity raid, The Guardian, February 23, 2002
  4. ^ Michael Elliott. "The Next Wave: Dirty-bomb, car-bomb, boat-bomb, bomb plots—meet the new al-Qaeda men, less polished than the 9/11 crew, but any less lethal?", Time magazine, June 16, 2002. Retrieved on 2007-12-19. 
  5. ^ Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (September 24, 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Belkacem, Bensayah pages 115. Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-08-19.
  6. ^ author redacted. Detainee election form pages 46. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  7. ^ a b c d Tribunal panel 6. Unclassified summary of basis for Tribunal decision pages 42-45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  8. ^ a b Andrew Purvis. "The Suspects: A Bosnian Subplot", Time magazine, Monday, November 12, 2001. Retrieved on 2007-12-24. 
  9. ^ a b Michael Elliott. "Hate Club", Time magazine, Monday, November 12, 2001. Retrieved on 2007-12-24. 
  10. ^ a b c d e Senad Slatina. "Bosnia: Algerian trial jeopardized", Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 10, 2001. Retrieved on 2005-12-26. 
  11. ^ James R. Crisfield. Addendum legal sufficiency review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for detainee ISN # ##### pages 73. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  12. ^ Bensayah Belkacem v. George W. Bush pages 35-74. United States Department of Defense (12 October 2004). Retrieved on 2007-12-24.
  13. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Sabir Mahfouz Lahmar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 16-24
  14. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  15. ^ OARDEC (28 December 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Belkacem, Bensayah pages 19-20. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  16. ^ OARDEC (19 November 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Belkacem, Bensayah pages 92-94. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.


[edit] External links