Talk:Battle off Samar

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[edit] Note regarding Class B

I haven't read the entire article, but while it cites references at the end of the article, there are no in-article citations, which is important to move up the assessment ladder. I need to see citations before I make any reccommendations for Class A.--Daysleeper47 20:20, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

Here is my position. You have a ton of references, but no inline citations. Wikipedia:Inline citation has information on how to cite inline, which, if you look at FA-class articles, is the norm for citations for articles of high quality. --Daysleeper47 16:09, 22 August 2007 (UTC)\
Actually, the Military History Project just changed the requirements for B-Class under Criteria I. As a result, I'm going to have to demote this one to "Start" class. I hate to, but no inline citations results in a failure under that criteria.Cam (Chat) 04:31, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
Agreed. Inline citations are critical here and this article will go nowhere without them. --Daysleeper47 (talk) 12:20, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] POV

Not so much because of any major disputable facts but because of a multitude of unobjective adjectives and phrases that are completely unworthy of an encyclopaedia.--Cancun771 20:11, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, that is pretty vague for a POV tag. A POV tag helps others to fix the problem but when there are no specific issues, then how can others do anything about it? Instead, why not just remove those adjectives that you object to rather than tag it?--Blue Tie 09:27, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
As you can see, I started today. A comparison should make clear what kind of language I am getting at. It's a long article however and I do have to earn a living.
Basically, I do think it is very clear for those who want to see it what makes this text biased.
Apart from that I noticed that plenty of the events are accounted for two or more times. The whole text could possibly do with some restructuring and overall pruning.--Cancun771 18:05, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
I have looked at the first half of your edits and generally I think they are good. Some I do not really think are an improvement but these are a minority. On the other hand though, I do not really see you changing the POV. Instead, what I see you doing in changing somewhat more dramatic language for more dispassionate and detached language. That is more a style choice than an issue with POV. --Blue Tie 03:49, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
So let me make it plain: This article had been written completely from the US of A's point of view, glorifying their military victory. I hardly think Wikipedia is the place for that but rather for depicting the facts.
It is going to read more boring once I'm finished, I'm the first one to admit that. Then again, people don't come here to read a gripping yarn. There are other places for that.--Cancun771 14:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Sensationalism is a form of POV that should be removed as per WP:NPOV. I support Cancun771's edits, though we should be careful to preserve any useful information. Incidentally, this propagandist writing style has crept up in several articles related to the Pacific War. However, it is generally accompanied by seemingly credible information(I spot checked some figures and description of events against the DANFS), so it may be best to just weed out the POV and try to retain a neutral narrative despite the extra effort. -- Vyn 11:36, 11 May 2007 (UTC)

Just noticed that some information was moved instead of removed. Will make adjustments to that then. -- Vyn 11:40, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
Again, just because it reads more interestingly does not make it have a non-neutral POV. I do not believe it should be written from one country's point of view and sometimes the article was written from that view. But just because the writing is vivid, that does not make it pov. And no, WP:NPOV does not support "sensationalism" but I do not recall seeing it condemned either. I tend to be a stickler for NPOV. But it is possible to make an article worse by being to slavish to a policy so that you strip the language of brightness. THAT is not what WP:NPOV is about.--Blue Tie 04:22, 12 May 2007 (UTC)
My opinion is that stripping sensationalism from this article can only improve its quality. I do not believe it is worth sacrificing NPOV just to make an article read more interestingly. We are of course, both working with inherently subjective standards when trying to evaluate sensationalism. If you feel strongly about this issue, why not insert some edits so we can get a better feel about your preferences and go from there? (WP:NPOV's position on sensationalism seems quite clear to me by the way, seeing as how it is clearly noted under section 1.2 as a form of bias) -- Vyn 08:52, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

(Unindent)Well, as I said before, I am mostly ok with your edits. But once in a while I feel like in the interest of "dispassion" you remove a word or phrase that is correct but brighter for a word that is also correct but less interesting. Individual instances seem a bit petty. I may come and take a look and make an edit or two and we can see if we are really far off. --Blue Tie 14:48, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

I think that I understand NPOV. One of the underlying study-values of the historical incident in question, though, pertains to the extent that a critical mass and combination of individual bravery and inspirational command leadership can daunt rational, normally skilled and disciplined opponents and result in objectively inexplicable military-conflict outcomes. I'm not sure how one can explore this interesting aspect of the history of military conflicts, and more generally human psychology, without describing the most notable and relevant instances of bravery and inspirational behavior. It would be a fundamental error to categorize descriptions of bravery and inspirational behavior in a conflict context as inherently sensationalist...though of course language and bias limits are appropriate.
One also has the conceptual problem that in almost all military conflicts, the prevailing side records the history, and the opposing side has both fewer witness-survivors as sources, and a lesser motivation to focus on the details of the most notable defeats. It's easy to agree that the present article contains unbalanced extents of American-viewpoint and Japanese-viewpoint description, but given the broad dismay and even shame at the outcome of the battle within IJN, in the context of Japanese social and military-cultural norms of the time, it's understandable that little comparable Japanese-viewpoint history exists. There were assassination threats against the Japanese task force commander Takeo Kurita following his return to Japan, and one can reasonably surmise that historians were not eager to expose themselves to the same threats by recording the history in question.
Military history always is most densely concentrated around victories and inspiring behavior, and it appears from the body of existing history that this battle represents an extreme case of disproportion in regard to that historical-concentration consideration. That fact may preclude creation of an article exhibiting the sort of content-balance that seems to be called for above. In that case, would substantive description of the American actions during this event be impermissible? JWilly48519 04:01, 17 May 2007 (UTC)
Note BTW that there are apparent factual errors, at least in relation to the usually accepted history, in the brief and less "sensational" description of the Samar action in the article on Takeo Kurita. Whatever the language and bias failings of the pre-edits article here, at least it appears to be factually consistent with the usually accepted history. JWilly48519 04:24, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

"The Yamato alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined." This line, quoted from the article, says it all. Was this event not fantastic? Was it not the proverbial David versus Goliath at sea? It was what it was. It was an astounding event and rhetoric any less-so would simply be remiss and fall far from the mark. I'm left trying to decide whether objections as stated above are simply petty jealousies or a concerted effort towards revisionism. The jury is still out. Xl five lx 17:07, 4 August 2007 (UTC)

The battle was actually fairly even. 300+ aircraft (U.S.) versus large surface ships (Japanese) who didn't have reliable air support, only their guns. One U.S. carrier was sunk by gunfire, one by kamikaze, and several destroyers/destroyer escorts by gunfire. The Japanese lost three? heavy cruisers to air attack when they didn't have any cruisers under construction to replace them. So who do you think won the battle? To say that the U.S. won the battle isn't POV, it's the truth. The Japanese had a (at least) tactical opportunity and failed to capitalize. The fact that their battleships and cruisers scored so few hits is apparently due to their laid up status at Truk and Brunei for so much time, in some cases years. They couldn't hit the broadside of a barn. The Japanese should have killed the "Taffeys" and destroyed the invasion forces. The fact that they didn't means that they the had lost the strategic opportunity to decide the course of the war in the Pacific. The Battle off Samar was at least a tactical draw, and a strategic U.S. victory. It finished the Japanese combined fleet once and for all as an effective fighting force. If anyone disagrees with me I expect to see some very credible sources, either in English, Japanese, or in any other langauge. Cla68 17:56, 4 August 2007 (UTC)
  • "The fact that their battleships and cruisers scored so few hits is apparently due to their laid up status at Truk and Brunei for so much time, in some cases years."

- Truk hadn't been in use for major fleet units since the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which rendered it untenable. If you read Admiral Ugaki's diary, you would see just how frequently and intensely the IJN fleet units were exercizing between the summer through the Battle off Samar in preparation for what they called 'the decisive battle'. During this period, their fleet exercizes and at sea training could be deemed nothing short of adequate.

  • "They couldn't hit the broadside of a barn."

- Would it shock you to learn that Gambier Bay, the single ship 'hit' most often, did not sink as a result of any of those numerous hits? According to the Bureau of Ships, Design Division, Preliminary Design Section, War Damage Assessment Team, headed by Capt. Les Kniskern no single hit on Gambier Bay was fatal. Nor was her loss the result of the cumulative effect of any two or more hits - of which, mind you, she had taken scores. What dealt her fatal blows were two near misses. One opened a gaping hole in one of her engine rooms, the other in the machinary space that separated the two engine rooms. These two breaches in her hull alone had the area enough to overwhelm the pumping capacity aboard ship. In fact, the one fatal near miss didn't even open up a hole, per se, but merely a split in her shell strake that ran from the turn of her bilge up to the hangar deck.

Perhaps an irrational interpretation might employ this knowledge to support just how poorly IJN shooting was that morning. But bouyancy isn't determined by hits or misses, accuracy nor inaccuracy - you either have it - or you sink like a stone. Period.

- Or, let's examine the fate of CVE-68 Kalinin Bay. A dozen (12) documented, later verified by damage assessment, direct HITS by medium caliber shells. These were a combination of both 6" and 8" shells obviously fired from light and heavy cruisers, respectively. Much like Gambier Bay, none of these hits were enough to sink her. But she was indeed nearly lost. Ok, you've by now guessed. Two large caliber, 14" or greater, shells exploded close aboard under her counter. Close aboard. That means near misses, again. It wasn't any of the twelve HITS that got her in trouble and left her lagging behind the other four retreating carriers, it was the two near misses. Only an hour an one-half later, after Sprague had reduced the formation's speed was Kalinin Bay able to catch and rejoin. Had the engagement lasted perhaps just minutes longer, before Kurita got the eebees and turned away, Kalinin Bay would certainly be on the bottom as well as Gambier Bay.

  • "The Japanese should have killed the "Taffeys" and destroyed the invasion forces."

- Clearly, they would have "killed the Taffys" had Kurita chosen to finish the job. There is no doubt in my mind. As for the invasion forces as well? That, in my opinion, is highly speculative - much moreso than the Taffys. Xl five lx 22:58, 4 August 2007 (UTC)

You make some good points and that should teach me not to comment on military controversies after a few draughts of junmai ginjo. Anyway, Yamato fired more than 100 18-inch shells and apparently didn't score a single hit on anything. Perhaps if she had actually had some main battery gunfire practice in the preceeding two years her crew could have done better. Similar situation with the other Japanese battleships involved. I don't think that it's coincidence that most, if not all, of the hits on Gambier and Kalinin came from cruiser gunfire. The Japanese cruisers, in contrast to the battleships, had seen much more action during the war and their experience showed in this battle. Therefore, the loss of three of them in this battle is significant. Cla68 06:30, 5 August 2007 (UTC)

IJN BB Kongo did exemplary shooting all that morning. Hits on CVEs Gambier Bay, Kalinin Bay, Fanshaw Bay, DEs Dennis, Samuel B. Roberts, DDs Johnston and Hoel, (which she practically destroyed single-handedly) all were attributed to Kongo.

As for Yamato, I have never learned anything to the contrary of what you claim. Spending all that time combing DD Heerman's torpedoes pretty much took her out of the battle, along with Nagato. Naturally, therefore, it would follow that their shooting (from extremely long ranges) would have a very low percentage of hits.

The one IJN BB I think should be singled out to illustrate your point would be BB Haruna. Haruna was inboard of Kongo, so how in the world did Kongo manage to hit everything that moved while shooting over Haruna whereas the latter apparently hit nothing all day despite being at closer range to the targets?

Point being: At least Yamato and Nagato have plausible excuses. They were under direct torpedo attack and effected radical evasive maneuvers to avoid being hit. OK. I can buy that. But was anyone aboard Haruna even in the Navy? Xl five lx 02:15, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

There is ONE thing I strongly object to regarding this article. But first, I'd like to say that this piece is extremely well done - extremely. It has obviously been researched to an extent above the caliber normally found here on wiki. A sad commentary, I know, but factual.

The one thing that concerns me is the inclusion of pure conjecture. Every Secondary source ever written cites Seki as having been the pilot to hit and sink the St. Lo. I realize this. But every Primary source says no, he didn't. In fact it is still an argument being waged to this day. The Japanese sent observer planes along with the Kamikazes. This was true on this particular flight. In fact, one observer was dedicated to documenting the results of Seki's attack specifically that day. This observer reported Seki glanced off a carrier and his bomb did not explode. His report then added that subsequent to Seki's attack a second plane struck the same carrier.

The observer was no less than Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, Japan's leading fighter ace.

The CO of St. Lo, Captain McKenna, reported a single plane did the damage to his ship. Also, McKenna reported the plane was carrying a bomb under each wing. Seki carried a single 250kg bomb. With very clear evidence of contradiction such as these, how is it possible to conclude with any modicum of certainty that Seki did indeed sink St. Lo, as this article states? In fact, there is more primary source evidence to show that Seki did not dive on St. Lo at all, but rather another of the CVEs attacked at that same time - Kitkun Bay, or Kalinin Bay, being the most likely. Xl five lx 16:44, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] 2008

I am completely FOR TRUTH and accurate details. However, if you let the Japanese poiont of view run this, it will be a case of US aggression against the poor, poor Japanese. Don't you people know that they are completely rewriting their history books with less than truth. They blackmailed Clint Eastwood into doing Letters From Iwo Jimo so he could do Flags of Our Fathers. I think the Japanese are less than truthful about their past and even current events prove this. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.250.12.42 (talk) 09:41, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Folks I can't understand why there is still a {{NPOV}} tag and now the article doesn't seem to mention St. Lo being sunk in the narrative. I'm going to take off the tag and say St. Lo was sunk after a plane with a single bomb crashed into the flight deck during the 10:47 kamikaze attack. Anynobody 06:38, 7 June 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Mistake

In the Battle section, a bit of info doesn't fit with the Leyte Gulf article. Halsey had not left with 4 carrier groups. He left with 3. The fourth was away on resupply and was not in the area during most of the battle.ParallelPain (talk) 08:32, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Inconsistency

The article first claims that St. Lo is credited with "the only hit in naval history known to have been made on an enemy surface vessel by gunfire from a carrier", then soon after states that not only that she score two more hits, but that Kalinin Bay hit a heavy cruiser, not once but twice, and a destroyer as well. Which is correct? Clarityfiend (talk) 17:50, 6 April 2008 (UTC)