Talk:Battle of Top Malo House

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Is it really necessary to litter this article with {{Fact}} after nearly every sentence? Stephenjh 23:32, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

What's slightly more disturbing is the infiltration of argentinians "facts" - reduction of numbers killed, introduction of nonsensical information. the whole thing could do with rolling back before the Argentinian made their changes, and littered the place with citation needed statements. Any decent counter-arguments? I wouldn't mind, but no attempt has been made to do these corrections in English. I hate to think what the spanish wiki version is like - probably some parallel universe where the Argentinians won :-)--R1pp3r 22:55, 2 April 2007 (UTC)


Note: According to Argentine accounts only two 602 commandos were killed during the battle (Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert) as well as 6 wounded. I believe that Argentine sources are more reliable than British sources, afterall it is they who suffered them. Moreover, the victors are often known inflate the enemy's casualties. Ex. Battle of Goose Green (the British estimated 250 dead Argentines when only 400-500 had truly engaged them in combat) and the firefight at Fanning Head (The British estimated 12 Argentine dead out of 20; according to Argentine reports 17 of the defenders made it back safely.)

I'm well aware that the victors often inflate their accounts, and not only in this campaign. Also, the losers need to make themselves look good in hindsight. With that much Argentinian pride at stake, I'd like to see sources for these numbers, even if the source is in Spanish. "I was there" isn't good enough. Also, the article sorely needs re-doing in English, which I see hasn't been challenged. R1pp3r 14:48, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

This is the first time I have seen the Battle of Top Malo house being discussed on a website and as many of the points are incorrect I would like to add some comments. The information that Top Malo was occupied by Argentineans was passed back by Lt Fraser Haddows patrol not Sgt Stones(the patrol the Hueys nearly landed on in the mist). Stone returned the day before the assault and reported he had seen a lot of helo activity in the area. As as been mentioned previously a Harrier strike was asked for but none were available. The operation to clear Top Malo house was put together at the last minute with very limited information as to numbers/weapons and equipment at Top Malo. Lt Haddows team had seen the Argentinians land at Top Malo at extreme long range through a Swift scope(long range telescope). In fact a number of the buildings that the MAWC assault teams planned to clear turned out to be nothing more than chicken coops. Some "armchair generals" have critisized the use of the MAWC at Top Malo as a potential waist of valuable assets. Also in normal military operations the attacking force should have a 3 to 1 majority. This is in an ideal world, but the Falklands were far from it. The MAWC were the only troops available so it was a case of get on with it. The fact that possible Argentinian Special Forces were at Top Malo was regarded as an extreme threat to the Brigade and had to be dealt with. The group that attacked Top Malo was cobbled together from patrols due to relieve others on the ground and patrols that had just come in. It consisted of three 4 man assault teams and a 5 man fire support group. The MAWC was very lightly equipped with a mixture of M16 and L1A1 SLR rifles,an L42 sniper rifle, M79 Grenade launchers, L2 grenades and a handful of 66mm LAW. The Seaking that was supposed to drop them off just before first light was hours late so the MAWC was dropped off in broad daylight. The pilot that dropped them off flew extemely low literaly feet off the deck. The team shook out in to formation and followed dead ground to Top Malo house. The teams spread out and watched the house undetected for a good 10mins before the OC Capt Boswell gave the order to attack. As the MAWC had seen no movement or sentries they initially thought the place was empty. Boswell fired the green mini flare but no one could see it against the dark background so he fired a red one to start the assault. The assault started by the cover group firing 66 LAW and M79 rounds. The three asault teams moved forward with the centre team firing two 66 LAW and then the full assault began. Three members of the MAWC were wounded in the attack .The assault didn't last long, the right hand team could see the Argentinians exiting the house from the side and moving into a gully. With M79 rounds and high velocity fire dropping around them most began to surrender with a few continuing to put up resistance. This died out after more M79 rounds were fired.

After the assault the MAWC began to disarm the argentinians and deal with their wounded and call for the HELO pick up that was supposed to be on call. Once again it was over an hour late which was worrying for the casualties from both sides and also the MAWC didn't know if there were more Argentinian patrols in the area. The Argentinians thought the force that attacked them was a lot bigger and mistook the LAW's and M79 rounds for Mortars (which a larger formation would normally have). The Argintinians lost two men and had 5 or 6 wounded. They were all taken to Ajax bay either for treatment or debriefing.

The MAWC were all highly trained professional soldiers with years of experience of working and living in harsh environements. Some commentators have made the mistake of thinking that because some of the men were on their ML2 course they were inexperienced recruits. Not so. It amazed the MAWC that Special Forces had occupied an isolated farm house in bare open country side and had no sentries or patrols out. The place was so obvious, when assaulting the place it was like attacking over a golf course. There wasnt any snow on the deck either(or if it was it was minimal). The MAWC found a sheep strung up ready for the pot in one of the sheds. The Argintinians forgot or never put into practice lot of basic infantry skills that day. Regards cliffheadroller1

[edit] By despising the Argentine version, the article contradicts itself

The composition of the Argentinian party was 12 men, according to one of the sources cited (Losito). So is hard to understand why the infobox adds 6 other men to the Argentinian party. It's also absurd to suppose that two published and reliable sources like Ruiz Moreno and Losito (the latter himself a protagonist of the battle) only identify two fatalities. I guess they have no interest in concealing three deaths, specially Losito, since the fallen were his colleagues and very close to him, and 24 years have passed between his book and the war. Had the Argentine's roll of honor been understated, it would be to taunt the families of the missing dead. DagosNavy 23:04, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

Actually rather than despising the Argentine version, I'd done some research and found Argentine material that also corroborated it. One is in the version I self-reverted. The reason for the self-revert was when I checked the official British history [1] it corroborates your version. The edit was based upon the sources quoted, they appear to be wrong, but then if you look on the web most appear to be so - including Argentine sites. It was an edit made in good faith and you really should have assumed so. Justin talk 23:23, 11 November 2007 (UTC)
It's OK. Best regards.

DagosNavy 23:53, 12 November 2007 (UTC)