Talk:Battle of Moscow/Comments

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Your second paragraph is at odds with conversations I had back in the 50s with a man who had served as a captain in a panzergrenadier division in Army Group Center. His recollection was that when Army Group Center got to Smolensk it was stalled not by Russian resistance, but by having to come to a decision (made by Hitler himself) whether to proceed to Moscow, or to split AGC into 3 parts, one to hold the Dnepr River line while the main part went south to assist Army Group South (von Rundstedt) surround the Russians at Poltava, and the third part went north to assist Army Group North, which was behind schedule getting to Leningrad.

This was in late July/early August, and by the time AGC reassembled at Smolensk it was late September.

What made this so controversial is that many German generals believed that the failure to proceed directly to Moscow cost the Germans the war. As it was, AGC got across the Moscow-Volga Canal and came down the east side towards Ostankino, but by that time it was early November, a very hard winter set in, and the Russians faced them down. AGC had to pull back to defensive positions.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to make, and if it weren't for Hitler they wouldn't have been there in the first place.

If someone will take the time to read Guderian's book cited in your footnotes (by the way, its title in German when I read it was 'Errinerungen eines Panzerchefs', not as you have it) you will find Guderian, who at the end of the war served as Chief of Staff to the Wehrmacht, tells it as my source did. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.109.19.219 (talk) 05:51, 9 March 2008 (UTC)