Talk:Battle of Midway

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[edit] Battleships

The page for William Satterlee Pye states that Admiral Pye ordered seven battleships sortied from San Fran to Midway, but they are not mentioned here. Does anyone have any information on this? --Daysleeper47 16:16, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

The information on that page is incorrect. Pye order Task Force One, comprised of six battleships, to sortie from San Francisco and patrol the California coast during the Midway operation. There was still a concern that either Hawaii or California might be the actual target. Dallan007 19:32, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

Not as clear as that. Nimitz had them available, but knew they were too slow to keep up with Fletcher, so he decided not to attach them. Too bad he wasn't so clearheaded about his sub dispositions. (And him a sub engineer officer. For shame.) Trekphiler 20:10, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Department of corrections

I added "(because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March)" and "(thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste)". I question the accuracy of "This information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior". Willmott's Barrier and the Javelin suggests Nagumo had not picked up the signals from Tokyo, & Yamamoto would not re-radiate it for fear of giving away the position of his Covering Force. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

After "California Here I Come", I'm inclined to add "(probably a deception, in case Japan still had active spies on Oahu.)" It's speculation, tho.

I deleted "By any analysis, a loss of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific." This is by no means certain. It might have forced Nimitz to change focus, increasing emphasis on submarines, thus compelling a cure to the problems with the Mark XIV torpedo (historically not cured until September 1943), which would have increased damage to Japanese trade and thus shortened the war. This would almost certainly have put paid to "guerrilla submarine" missions. In addition, it's likely to have undercut MacArthur's operations in the South West Pacific Area and his mania for return to the Philippines. (Unfortunately, this falls into "original research"...) The whole "impact" section smells of speculation; I'm inclined to delete.

Also, "Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis". Was he? I've read it was shingles, & the sources I've seen can't seem to agree.

Finally, I added, "At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo." This is based on Willmott's B&J. Trekphiler 15:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

The sites:

http://www.psoriasis.org/about/psoriasis/

and

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/shingles/shingles.htm

point out that the first is chronic and itchy and some palliative anti-malarials were available at the time, the second is episodic, painfull (think 50 to 100 recurring cigarette burns) and untreatable at that time since there were no anti-viral meds. It is unlikely that Adm. Halsey would have been incapacitated by the first, but quite likely by the second.

68.100.243.51 16:28, 14 April 2007 (UTC) Uveges 12:25, 14 April 2007 (DST)

I have a suspicion the psoriasis idea comes from the film, where Mitchum is itching like crazy. Just goes to show, you can't trust Hollywood... Trekphiler 20:05, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Codebreaking

I'm rather surprised that this article doesn't even contain a cursory reference to American cryptanalysis. It's surely not controversial to assert that breaking the JN-25 naval code was a major factor in the American victory, is it? Shouldn't there be at least a few links, if not a paragraph in the before-the-battle section? NewEnglandYankee 19:30, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Not having noted any objections, I've added a brief paragraph summarizing these events, with links to more detailed articles. If this information would be better presented elsewhere, feel free to move it. Also, I don't have my books handy, so more citations couldn't hurt. NewEnglandYankee 21:33, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

I am surprised that an interesting story about the codebreaking was not included. According to several sources, the American codebreakers had decoded messages that Japan was about to attack an island with the code word "AF". They were pretty sure that "AF" meant Midway, but because of the state of the US navy they had to make certain. To do this, an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders that the Commandant should send a message {in a code that they knew the Japanese had broken} to the effect that Midway's water distillation plant had broken down. Three days later the codebreakers intercepted a message from the Japanese at Kawajalein Atoll that "AF" was short of water, and this enabled Nimitz to commit his forces to the plan. User: Plerdsus 20:03 7 June 2007

"an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders". Well, no. There's debate who's idea it was (some credit Joe Rochefort, others Jasper Holmes), but the orders were sent via cable. And what I've seen leaves some doubt whether it was a compromised cypher (one captured at Wake) or en clair; it wasn't "a code that they knew the Japanese had broken", because AFAIK, Japanese cryppies were incompetent to break even the simplest codes. It is one more example of how a single brilliant officer can tip the balance; had Rochefort not twigged to AF, the signal would never have gone on the cable. Unfortunately, it gives rise to the myth (which I've had a history prof spout) intel & radar won Midway. Sheesh. Give more credit to bad planning by Yamamoto, & even more to the PBY guys who gave Fletcher the eyes Nagumo didn't have. (Thanks to Ann Medina for calling my attention to that one.) Trekphiler 19:57, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Jargon

what does "Spotting" in the sentence "Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish." mean?

I believe its similar to spotting in weight-lifting, where someone is there watching from the outside making sure nothing goes wrong. -wizzard2k (C•T•D) 16:15, 8 June 2007 (UTC)
Putting the aircraft on the flightdeck, making them ready for immidiate take-off. --89.54.185.75 12:08, 17 June 2007 (UTC)
As in "on their spots", ready to be moved for launch as needed. They weren't all "ready for immediate takeoff"; they had to be spotted to make it possible to select what was needed & move those to ready positions. Gerry Carroll describes it "like a Chinese fire drill", & he'd know; the deck of a carrier is just short of complete chaos at the best of times, & it seems like everything is constantly in motion in all directions. It is; as Gerry notes, it's all too easy to FOD a sailor & not realize it til the engine loses power. Trekphiler 19:43, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Midway Movie

Not challenging, but would like to know why the romance in the movie would/should be considered a "preposterous romance". Thx.

Besides the fact the writing was terrible, it was extremely convenient considering who was involved... And I'm far from convinced interracial romance was as common, or accepted, in 1942 as in 1976. Also, honestly, what was the idea of putting it in a war movie? (Yeah, I know, the producer wanted to bring women into the theatre...) Trekphiler 19:33, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Operation AL?

Excellent article. Perhaps this is a nit, but did the Japanese call their attack against the Aleutians "Operation AL"? "Operation MI" is a little more believable, but were the Japanese war plans drafted in English? How would you spell "AL" in kana? 65.114.23.6 19:12, 1 September 2007 (UTC)

The Japanese (habitually) used the first two letters of the Japanese name, which (as I understand it) was a close translation of the English. Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Cut and print?

I deleted this

"Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis to teach pilot trainees the techniques they would use to defeat Japan."

and this

"In the subsequent battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition despite roughly equal losses on both sides;"

and this

"Although wartime Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became worse as increasingly potent U.S. fighters became available that outmatched Japanese aircraft."

as irrelevant to Midway; put it in Pacific War, if you think it's of value. I also deleted this

"(Had there been a defeat at Midway, the U.S. might not have struck at such an early date or had the same degree of success.)"

and this

"The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the destruction of the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet. With only two carriers (USS Saratoga and USS Wasp) available, the U.S. would have been forced onto the strategic defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence-class carriers became available in appreciable numbers.
"A hypothetically longer Pacific War does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable, but there is little question losing at Midway would have narrowed U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term.[1] A defeat at Midway, by implicitly jeopardizing Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, might have put the "Germany First" priority of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs in grave political peril.[2] Had the United States been obliged to focus its efforts on Japan, American intervention in Europe might well have been delayed, with incalculable implications for Germany and the Soviet Union."

as speculation. It's equally probable it would have shifted forces out of the SWPA, away from MacArthur, as FDR realized he didn't have the luxury of a "dual road" strategy; moving Oz submarines to Pearl would have significantly shortened the war, as would the preclusion of MacArthur's obsessive "return" to the Philippines. It would also have freed up landing craft, which would have made it possible to execute ANVIL and NEPTUNE similtaneously, as originally intended, which would (probably) have shortened the war. It might also have freed up Oz & AUS troops, making it more likely (if not extremely so) NEPTUNE might go off in 1943, instead; now, it's speculation about whether the Italian campaign would have happened, & whether a "disaster" at Midway would've given FDR leverage with Winston to call off Italy: that would indubitably have shortened the war. The bigger question is, would Japan have been defeated without use of the Bomb; it it wasn't, it's been suggested there might have been a major nuclear war, as the Soviets (or Stalin) doubt the West's willingness to actually use it. (I have a suspicion this was Spinrad's vision in Iron Dream.) And there's enormous flexibility in planning, economic & military; loss of two carriers, against the number actually built, was trivial. (The Essexes wouldn't arrive until 1943 in any case, but it might have put pressure on the earlier development of bulk carrier MAC-conversions, & on the priority for LCs; realizing carriers could not be built faster without significant diversion, LCs might have ended up with higher priority than historically, with results like above, plus the ability to land more men at ANVIL and NEPTUNE: a French corps, say...?) Regardless, this is no place for speculation; want to speculate, write a novel. (Don't bet on FDR replacing Nimitz; he wasn't near as quick to fire people as Winnie was.) Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Nagumo's decisions

"Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force"

I was reading Decision at Sea by Craig L. Symonds, and I think he actually says the time between Nagumo's demand for a confirmation from the scout plane and the plane actually finding a carrier was 10 minutes rather than 40. I may have to check again, though Masterblooregard 10:38, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

It was about 30, IIRC, between the two reports. Nagumo, when he passed the information along, suggested they were nearly similtaneous. Trekphiler 14:10, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Invasion of Hawaii

A source is given for This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as an invasion of Hawaii. it is "For a detailed discussion of anticipated follow-on Hawaiian operations, see Parshall & Tully, pp. 43–45, & Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun." But what does the source say for example what was the name of the contingency plan if it existed for an invasion or was it just a contingency plan for a raid? Or is it speculation by the author that the Japanese might have been planning an invasion or a raid. --Philip Baird Shearer 10:43, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Looks like I'll be hunting down a copy of that book so I can see what the name of the notional operation(s) would have been. I understand Parshall and Tully uncovered a true invasion, not a raid. Personally, I think it would have been the Japanese's Bridge Too Far as they had no way to stream materiel out to Hawaii in greater quantity than the US could have. Binksternet 20:20, 10 October 2007 (UTC)
"Bridge to Far"? Raid or putative invasion (it was a dream of Yamamoto's for years, from what Stephan sez) doesn't make any difference, because invading Hawaii was a fantasy beyond IJA means to execute, in manpower or shipping. If you want to read fantasy, read Stephan. Trekphiler 21:51 & 22:16, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Attacks on the Japanese fleet

Changed: 'Despite their horrific sacrifices' => 'Despite their losses' Removed for use of weasel words: 'It is generally agreed the valor of the torpedo squadrons was responsible for the success of the dive bombers' —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.117.50.2 (talk) 17:58, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

"...the Japanese had never had an opportunity to spot their reserve strike force for launch." What is that sentence fragment telling me?
"History would show the submarine had already made a more important contribution." I don't get this statement either.
Thanks, Daniel.Cardenas (talk) 16:30, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
"reserve strike force for launch" Nagumo had birds in reserve, but couldn't get them ready to launch before the DBs arrived.
Re Nautilus, read the article: she fired on a CV & was counterattacked by the DD the DBs (McClusky?) followed back. Trekphiler (talk) 07:31, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Untrained melody?

The "untrained" pilots remark got del, but it's not completely wrong. Some of the crews hadn't completed training yet. I just can't recall if they came from Midway or 1 of Fletcher's airwings... I think they were from Midway's Windindicator squadrons. Can somebody check? Trekphiler (talk) 13:38, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Factcheck.com

"the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier." It's fact-tagged, but I've read it somewhere, too.

"Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers." It's sourced, but I call that POV; carriers without aircrews are expensive toys, not fighting units. Trekphiler (talk) 17:23, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Number of a/c lost in infobox

It's important to understand that none of Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, or Hiryu's aircraft survived the battle so whatever number of carrier aircraft we say should match the number going in. As it was the infobox listed 248 a/c + 16 float planes at the start, and 228 destroyed. Even if we assume all float planes survived, which I don't think all did, that would still leave four unaccounted for aircraft. The source citing 228 is unavalable to me, so i don't know if that's the same number it used for a starting figure. I do know that at the time Nimitz figured 275 were lost, so I cited that figure as the available. I'm not saying these figures should stay as they are, All carrier aircraft sounds unprofessional, but it beats nonsense.

So does anyone know where we can get a good figure on aircraft #s both from the beginning and end? (I'm also assuming that Nimitz's figure has been changed since its first writing.) Anynobody 05:42, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

Since none of the float scouts were operated from carriers, it's likely most did survive; I'm unaware if Mogami's were lost. I wouldn't take Nimitz's number as best, since postwar research is liable to have revised it. And didn't Lundstrom say 248, which would account for all 228 CV birds plus a # assorted others? Also, how solid is the 248 for a starting fig? Is it counting only CV birds, or all of them in the operation, including the cruiser VSs (which I' d bet on)? Trekphiler (talk) 10:46, 10:48 & 10:51, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

I could've sworn reading something about US forces shooting down a floatplane, and Japanese reports of one failing to return. I also seem to recall planes on either Mikuma or Mogami being lost (Mogami didn't sink but took like six bomb hits, which could've wrecked some scouts). On the 248 number, I honestly don't know about any sources but something tells me it's too few. This is just my OR but Nimitz's figure was likely his/intel's best estimate. By the numbers, if all four carriers had full compliments there would have been around 300 (I know that total space available was more, around 322, but generally carriers didn't sail with all the planes they could carry just in case another carrier sinks or planes from it, need to land). 248 whether it includes cruiser planes or not seems too light, given the IJN's successes they probably weren't thinking about taking many casualties. Anynobody 02:33, 13 February 2008 (UTC)

Perusing the USSBS interrogations I happened to note that there is a pretty good source for how many carrier aircraft were there. Interrogation of Captain Takahisa Amagi, Kaga's air officer during the battle who gives these figures for all carriers: 21 Zekes 27 Vals and 18 Kates. 66 per ship x 4 = 264 Anynobody 05:23, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

Without a source to hand, the 66 per sounds high; IIRC, the usual was nearer 54. Recall, the U.S. usual for the period was about that, & IJN CVs had smaller airwings. Just don't ask for a source.... Trekphiler (talk) 10:33, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

I'm a bit confused, the source is Interrogation of Captain Takahisa Amagi,:
Q. What was the composition of the Kaga's Air Group?
A. It was composed of 21 fighters (0) Type: 27 VB (99 Type); 18 VT (97 Type); same as all other carriers. Anynobody 01:10, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

As I said, no source at hand & my memory's been really bad lately... I will, naturally, bow to a published source, I'd just want something else to confirm it, 'cause that sounds pretty hi. Was that before the battle? Standard fit or max overload? Trekphiler (talk) 09:44, 10 March 2008 (UTC)

Oh I see you meant you have no source at hand, thought you meant we didn't. Anynobody 05:59, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Spruance Changing Course Night of June 4

The article currently reads:

As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell.

But Prange and other authors mention that Spruance withdrew to the east until midnight and then turned back west. This decision was critical because it avoided a possible night engagement with Kondo's battleships, who were pursuing the Americans at the time. Should this not be corrected? Dallan007 (talk) 22:42, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

It's true. Spruance turned east in response to Murphy's sighting, which led Spruance to believe the Invasion Force was inbound still, when in fact Yamamoto had ordered his cruisers (which Murphy spotted) to turn back. Murphy's signal was at 02.15 (Blair, p.246-8). Trekphiler (talk) 10:39, 9 March 2008 (UTC)


[edit] The dive bombers

More mention here should be made that Midway was won with fantastic luck and skill by a small group of diver bombers lead by Wade McCluskey.

It was McCluskey decision to go further then they should have. It was then his decision to go north-west where they were lucky to sight the Japanese destroyer Arashii. Following the direction this destroyer was going, the US diver bombers found the Japanese fleet then they perfectly executed an assault.

Also mention here should be made of Lt. Richard Best miracle shot that took out the Akagi.

Solomon is Wise (talk) 14:47, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

And if Nautilus hadn't fired on Soryu (?), Arashi would never have been there to chase... Trekphiler (talk) 17:22, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

[edit] References and Further reading

I have renamed External links Further reading and moved all the books that are not cited out of "References" into "Further reading" and copied all the books I could find in Notes into References sorting them on the surname of the author. See WP:CITE and WP:LAYOUT, I was surprised that as this is a Featured Article this had not already been done.

Some of the entries in the reference list now need additional information such as: edition/year of publication, publisher, and ISBN--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:07, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Maj. Lofton Henderson

Would someone add in information about the squadron of Marine dive bombers based on Midway? It was led by Major Lofton Henderson, who was killed during the attack on the Japanese fleet, and for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named. This is a pretty big omission. 74.194.82.219 (talk) 02:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)