Talk:Battle of Isandlwana

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Contents

[edit] BATTLE OF YELLOW FORD COMPARISON

I disagree that this battle can be compared to Isandlwana.

1. Both sides were similarly matched in respect of weaponry at Yellow Ford, whereas at Isandlwana the British, man for man, enjoyed overwhelming firepower superiority and this, indeed, accounted for the heavy Zulu losses. 2. The disparity in numbers at Yellow Ford was not comparable to Isandlwana where the British column, even with Natives, was outnumbered around 12-1. 3. The terrain (and heat) of South Africa was alien to the British whereas Ireland is far more similar. 4. Although the Irish were regarded as inferior by the British and attrocities committed against them, there were White and Christian and were not regarded as "savages" to the same extent as were the Zulus.

The justification for this comparison is, therefore, lacking and I have edited it.

[edit] NPOV

Below "The fight":

Durnford's 1,400 soldiers fought bravely, but were totally overwhelmed.

Bravely? I don't think this subjective phrase belongs in an encyclopedia. Therefore I must remove it. cun 17:44, 22 Jan 2005 (UTC)

If they fought against a greatly superior enemy falling almost to the last man, it can be said that they fought bravely. Don't you think that it can be said that the Spartans fought bravely in Thermopylae? --80.186.100.180 23:57, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

Zulu nation is not linked correctly!

This is fixed. →Raul654 01:40, Mar 16, 2004 (UTC)

In the Article it says "While Chelmsford was out"

LOL:some one shoud insert "to lunch" after that!
I've always liked his comment  My only fear is that the Zulu will not fight Philip

Lieutenant Coghill fell from his horse and wrenched his knee in an attempt to catch a fowl but was able to remain with the column. - Well, I liked it, so I am putting it here for posterity :-) Wizzy 07:51, 21 Jul 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Number of Zulus at Rorke's Drift

This article says: "From a morale perspective, this was made even worse by the victory of a small handful of British over hundreds or thousands of Zulus at Rorke's Drift."

But the Rorke's Drift atricle says: "At Rorke's Drift approximately 150 British soldiers defended their garrison against an intense assault by roughly 5000 Zulu warriors."

Which is correct, hundreds or thousands of Zulus, or roughly 5000?

Perhaps one of the articles should be changed to reflect the correct number.

---The Zulu force which attacked Rorke's Drift numbered around 4,000 men.

Dubidub 22:55, 28 Aug 2004 (UTC)


I have read an interesting article that question whether Rorkes Drift was really a victory. In Zulu tradition if you have taken the enemies cattle you have won the battle.

-Interesting. However, given the fact the Zulus' aim was to capture Rorke's Drift and defeat the defenders and that they totally failed to do this, suffering heavy casualties in the process, it is difficult to argue how it could have been a Zulu victory. The British did not rely on the cattle that were at Rorke's Drift in the same way that the Zulus' traditional enemies may have done.

--Renier Maritz 17:51, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Aftermath

I do not like the last section as it is at the moment. I think it is wrong for several reasons:

  • This amounted to the death of 10% of all Zulu males This implies that there were only 30,000 Zulu males (and say 20% not fit for active service). I have never seen an article which says that there were only 100,000 adult Zulus. I think this needs to be sourced.
  • The Zulus did not want the war. They knew that they could not hope to win a long war of attrition agaist the British
  • Losses of 3000 or more in one battle was nothing new for the Zulus - (
  • The Zulus knew about laagering, because of battles like the Battle of Blood River where civilians armed with muskets had defeated them, so Rokes drift would have come as no suprise to them, and is the reason the Zulus had been given orders not to attack fortified/laagered postions.

So I have rewritten it. Philip Baird Shearer 11:11, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

Commander is listed as Chelmsford, but he was absent from the battle, shouldn't Henry Pulleine and Anthony Durnford be listed instead of or with Chelmsford as Commaders? BritBoy 14:22, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine was the official CO. I ahev changed the article accordingly.

[edit] Survivors?

I just a show called Turning Points on History Channel International that said there were only eight survivors, this says sixty. Anyone know for sure? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.206.165.7 (talk) 09:40, 15 January 2007 (UTC).

The Battle of Rorke’s Drift says "Only about sixty white and four hundred black soldiers survived". Eight seems far too low. Nunquam Dormio 20:46, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

There were 5 Imperial officers who escaped the battle and 50 or so other ranks. Several hundred Africans escaped, mainly as they fled the field early.

[edit] Zulu tactics, etc.

It would be nice to have description at all of Zulu tactics, actions, etc. I know nothing but broad strokes of these events, but surely someone better informed can supply much more on the context of this battle for Zulus... Also important is a much more detailed description of the events leading up to the battle; The British presented an ultimatum [what ultimatum? in what context?] on 11 December 1878, to the Zulu king Cetshwayo... is a pretty sketchy exposition. Pinkville 03:37, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

Well, the ultimatum et al is covered in the overview article for the whole war, so re-listing the entire information might not be the best route, but some clarification can't be a bad thing to help the conext. The Kinslayer 16:01, 22 January 2007 (UTC)
Yeah, the article on the battle should be able to stand alone, though, of course, one would expect much greater detail on the background of the battle in the linked article (Anglo-Zulu_War#The_Ultimatum). At the moment this reads like a fragment. Pinkville 16:10, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] citation request

The Natal Native Contingent broke, and led the flight to Fugitive's Drift. After the battle, the Zulus, as was their tradition, ripped open the dead bodies of their casualties and those of their enemies to free the spirits. I feel this need a citation. thanks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.144.161.223 (talk • contribs)

[edit] Washing of the spears

This article mentions the death to the redcoats but not the Zulu ceremony of splitting the stomachs of the dead enemies, to release the dead spirit. Kendirangu 06:48, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] No credit to the Zulus?

Great article - I enjoyed reading it. One question: why is there seemingly no credit given to the Zulus for their victory? It seems like the only explanations for tohe outcome are: (i) technological problems (the rifles jammed in the heat); (ii) lack of adequate defences; (iii) leadership... etc. Was the outcome of this battle solely the result of British actions? Surely either the planning, leadership, stealth, surprise, etc. by the Zulus was important(?). Or am I missing something? Thanks, Hu Gadarn 18:38, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

The Zulus certainly concealed their position successfully until quite a late stage. The key reason for the British defeat was that they divided their forces without first knowing the disposition of the enemy. This classic blunder is still used an example in military academies, I understand. Nunquam Dormio 14:22, 24 February 2007 (UTC)
The Zulus exploited their enemies' weaknesses well but could not have defeated the British if they had taken proper defensive positions.

[edit] Stuff about battle formerly in the Isandlwana article

The Isandlwana article had all this stuff about the battle. If there's anything of value here, please integrate it into the main article. Nunquam Dormio 06:27, 13 April 2007 (UTC)


After having crossed into Zululand at the head of No.3 column made up of approximately 4,000 men - of whom about 1,500 were British and European - Lord Chelmsford ordered camp to be made underneath the rocky slopes of Isandlwana on January 21st. Scout reports led Chelmsford to believe that the main Zulu impi lay to the south west and, eager to find and engage this force, he split his forces. In fact, he had been outmanouvered by the Zulus, whose main intention had been to lure the British forces from the camp and then strike a decisive blow against it.

Under Colonel Pulleine, Chelmsford left behind six companies (between 60-100 each) taken from both battalions of the 24th Foot, made up of experienced and steady troops, many of whom had seen active colonial service previously. In addition, Pulleine had further British forces in the shape of two guns from the Royal Artillery with about seventy gunners. Colonial forces added a further 500 troops to the defence of the camp, although of these the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) were not intended to be used in frontline defence but rather as a reserve - they consisted of tribal conscripts armed mainly with spears (only one in ten had firearms, many of these outdated) and led by White officers. On the morning of the 22nd January, Colonel Durnford was ordered to march up from Rorke's Drift (a with his contingent of about 400 natives (both foot and mounted) and a rocket battery. He arrived at the camp early morning. There has been much debate over whether Durnford - as senior - was supposed to take over command of the camp or whether he believed his orders were to support Chelmsford's advance. The orders were vague and the debate persists.

In any case, during the early morning of 22nd January, groups of Zulus could be seen in the distance away from the camp. Durnford believed that these forces were possibly attempting to attack Chelmsford's rear and he took out his mounted infantry as well as the rocket troop to push the Zulus back, not appreciating the odds he was facing. The camp was ordered to stand-to. At this stage, there was no realisation that the camp was incredible danger from vastly superior forces and a calm mood prevailed. Pulleine sent a message to Chelmsford informing him that a Zulu force was moving on the camp - though at this stage there was no request for reinforcements. It was expected that even fairly small British forces could deal with a native force several times their number due to the firepower and discipline they enjoyed.

Mid-morning, as they were several miles from camp, scouts from Raw's Troop (under Durnford) stumbled upon a large Zulu impi (army), which had possibly been intending to wait another day before attacking (the 22nd January saw an eclipse, which was not a suitable day to be fighting for the Zulus). The force was sitting down in a large gulley and numbered some 25,000 men. Durnford and his mounted troops began a fighting retreat towards the encampment but Major Russell and the rocket troops was overrun and the crew killed after having only managed to fire one, ineffectual rocket.

With reports of the Zulu advance reaching the camp, Pulleine deployed his infantry in an extended firing line over a mile in length and some considerable distance from the camp in an effort to meet the attack - which seemed to be developing from a specific area - head on. He had not fully grasped the Zulus' use of "the horns" of the buffalo, which were intended to move behind the British force and envelop it. The redcoats were in two ranks, standing some five yards apart in extended order. They carried about 70 rounds of ammunition for their Martini-Henri rifles. Pulleine has been criticised for using a firing line as opposed to a square, as it spread the men too thinly and left the flanks wide open to attack. However, it probably wasn't at first clear, given the topography of the terrain and the gunsmoke, that either the Zulus were attacking in such overwhelming force or that they intended to outflank the British position.

For roughly an hour, the firing line held back the Zulu attack and most of the estimated 3,000 Zulu casualties were inflicted in this period. The Martin-Henri was a formidable weapon and could stop a man dead in his tracks, shattering bone and leaving an exit wound the size of a large plate. The Zulus were forced to lie down in the long grass to seek protection and for a time their attack in the centre stalled.

At this stage, then, morale was strong in the British lines and it appeared that all was going well. However, it soon became apparent that the men were both running low on ammunition and seriously exposed. Durnford's troops, which had been defending a donga (dried stream) on the right of the British line after their fighting retreat, and who had therefore been in action for longer than the rest of the force, were the first to pull back in an attempt to re-form in the camp. This left the right flank of the firing line - Charlie Pope's "G" Company - totally exposed and they were slaughtered to a man, unable to form in rallying groups larger than three of four men at a time due to their extended formation.

Pulleine may have seen this and this led to his command for the rest of the British line, whose right flank and rear was now exposed, to also fall back on the camp and take up a more secure, tigther defensive formation. The gravity of the situation was only now becoming clear. It was too late. As the British line pulled back, the Zulu force in the centre which had hitherto been pinned down, rose and charged forward. Although reports vary, it is generally accepted that centrally-organsied British defence fell apart at this moment and the retreat became confused with no central rallying point and with Zulus and British mixed together as they ran into the camp. The Zulus were able to outrun many of the redcoats who were weighed down with heavy boots and kit.

Once the line had broken, all hope of maintaining a concerted defence was lost, although there was still much killing to be done. Individual groups, large and small, rallied together but were overwhelmed amongst the debris of the camp. Unarmed cooks, servants and European "casuals" who had accompanied the column were speared as they tried to flee. The Zulus attacked in the shape of a horn to envelop the whole British position and cut off the retreat. As the camp was overrun, the British defenders fought to the last man in bitter hand to hand fighting, back to back and using rifle butts, fists and even pocket knives, once their ammunition had been expended. Zulu accounts testify to the bravery of the defenders and the tenacity of their resistance.

The position of the bodies indicated a number of determined stands of several large groups (40-100 men) mainly from the 24th Foot but also including other defenders who found themselves left in camp with no escape. These stands took some time to break down, but with ammunition running out and facing overwhelming odds, they were wiped out by a foe who asked and gave no quarter - an example the British in the rest of the war would follow. The bravery shown by the redcoats - and their use of the bayonet to spear the Zulus through the throat, face and belly - earned them the Zulus' respect - one legend is that the Zulus allowed the remnants of one group under Capt. Younghusband to shake each others' hands before they were finally killed. No prisoners were taken and even animals were slaughtered. Once the Zulus had taken the camp, they set about mutilating the bodies of the dead in a ritual that was brutal but actually a spiritual act to free the soul of the dead and stop the killer's body from swelling.

Stragglers who had left the battle before the British line collapsed completely were hunted down in what is now called Fugitives' Drift, and only thirty Europeans, all mounted, survived. The colours of the 24th Foot were lost, despite heroic efforts by Lt Melville and Coghill to save them. In total some 1,200 men were killed in and around the camp. Not one man of the 24th Foot lived and only five imperial officers survived, along with about 300 natives who fled very early in the engagment. The battlefield today is marked with many whitewashed stone cairns, covering the remains of the dead - mainly British as they were left on the battlefield for several months after the defeat. In a bitter irony, Isandlwana Mountain is shaped like the very Sphinx on the 24th Foot's regimental crest that had been awarded for its service in Egypt some fifty years before the regiment suffered its most infamous reverse.

Various reasons have been given for this defeat including difficulty in supplying ammunition and attempting to defend too great a frontline with too few men. Once the Zulus were able to penetrate and outflank the British line their strength in hand to hand combat and sheer weight of numbers proved critical. However, the key factor in the defeat was the total failure to secure the camp by forming a laager - the traditional Boer method of defence against an attacking Zulu force, whereby the camp would be enclosed and barricades erected, where possible. This would have kept the British forces supplied with ammunition and protected their flanks - and possibly changed the course of the battle. Indeed, this was to be the case at Rorke's Drift where 100 British held off 4,000 Zulus. However, the bravery of those troops left and who fought to the last man has long held fascination for historians and laymen alike - C.E. Fripps' famous painting, on show at the National Army Museum, of the last stand of the 24th Foot, is extremely evocative.

Lord Chelmsford returned that night of 22 January 1879 to a scene of utter devastation and his men spent the night amidst the carnage in what must have been an extraordinarily unpleasant experience, given that these men had lost comrades and friends they had only left a few hours before oblivious to their fate. They were deliberately woken before dawn to escape the full horror of the camp, but many of them slept in the blood and entrails of the dead and the next morning gave the impression of badly wounded men, such was the condition of the blood-soaked ground. The sight of smoke rising over Rorke's Drift in the distance - where one company of the 24th Foot was left to guard - would not have helped the morale of the men, either. However, as Chelmsford and his column would soon discover, the position had been held and Britain had one piece of news to celebrate on an otherwise terrible day.

[edit] Location?

The location of this battle is not very clear from this article.User:Tebucky 20:16, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

I've added a sentence that should help. Nunquam Dormio 09:33, 24 June 2007 (UTC)

ENDS

[edit] memorial

I dont think that it is fair that there is a picture of a memorial to the zulus but not to the british because a lot of british died there too

[edit] Geographic Coordinates

Can someone please check the geographic coordinates for Isandlwana? Isandlwana is close to 10 miles from Rorke's Drift. henkberg55 13:15, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Looks wrong to me. It is the wrong side of the N2. I can't vouch for Rorke's Drift either, but it looks like it might be correct. They face each other over the Tugela. Wizzy…☎ 12:38, 18 September 2007 (UTC)
Is this correct 28°48′0″S 29°8′60″E / -28.8, 29.15 ?

Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:13, 27 December 2007 (UTC)

How does one correct information on a Google link? These coordinates are definitely wrong- the battle is shown as having taken place high in the Drakensberg! Also, one of the Google links still shows a comparison to the battle to Yellow Ford: "... remaining one of the greatest British military defeats at the hands of native forces in history, second only to the 1598 Battle of the Yellow Ford defeat to the Gaelic Irish." This is erroneous, and not only for the reasons set out by the editor who removed it from Wikipedia above. The defeat in Ireland was of English forces - not British. The various Acts of Union were still a century or more away and there was as yet no such thing as a 'British' army. To compound the irony of the overly enthusiastic entry by an Irish patriot, there were Irishmen amongst the dead of the Imperial British force at Isandlwana.

Co-ordinates updated, based on map B here Socrates2008 (Talk) 13:27, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

  • Ensured that the article is: within project scope, tagged for task forces, and assessed for class.
  • This article would benefit from: subheaders and additional in-text citations. --Rosiestep (talk) 23:03, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] This article needs a lot more citations.

This article needs a lot more citations. For example the battle box states:

Strenth: 1,400 British, ca. 2,500 African, Zulus 22,000 men

Where do these numbers come from? And near the start of the article:

"It would have been possible to bring in the troops to a closer formation, with the rocky Isandlwana feature securing the rear and the overwhelming British firepower beating back the attacking force, even when this greatly outnumbered the defenders."

Who says it would have been possible? Who says that the fire power would have been enough? Throughout the article there a facts and figures given and opinions expressed with no supporting citations. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 16:48, 6 June 2008 (UTC)