Battle of the Seelow Heights
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The Battle of the Seelow Heights (German: Schlacht um die "Seelower Höhen", was a part fo the Seelow-Berlin Offensive Operation (16 April 1945 - 2 May 1945); one of the last assaults on large entrenched defensive positions of World War II. It was fought over four days, from April 16 to April 19, 1945. Close to one million Soviet soldiers of the 1st Belorussian Front (including 78,556 soldiers of the 1st Polish Army), commanded by Marshal Georgi Zhukov, attacked the position known as "Gates of Berlin". They were opposed by about 100,000 German soldiers of the Ninth Army, commanded by General Theodor Busse, as part of Army Group Vistula.
This battle is often incorporated into the Battle of the Oder-Neisse. Seelow Heights was where the most bitter fighting in the overall battle took place, but it was only one of several crossing points along the Oder and Neisse rivers where the Soviets attacked. The Battle of the Oder-Neisse was itself only the opening phase of the Battle of Berlin.
The result was the encirclement of the Ninth Army and Battle of Halbe.
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[edit] Buildup
On April 9, 1945 Königsberg in East Prussia fell to the Soviet Army. This freed up 2nd Belorussian Front under Marshal Rokossovsky to move to the east bank of the Oder. During the first two weeks of April the Soviets performed their fastest Front redeployment of the war. 2nd Belorussian Front relieved 1st Belorussian Front along the lower Oder, from Schwedt to the Baltic Sea. This allowed 1st Belorussian Front to concentrate in the southern half of its former front, opposite the Seelow Heights. To the south, 1st Ukrainian Front, under Marshal Konev) shifted its main force from Upper Silesia north-west to the Neisse.
The three Soviet Fronts together had 2.5 million men, 6,250 tanks, 7,500 aircraft, 41,600 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,255 truck-mounted Katyusha rocket launchers, and 95,383 motor vehicles.[1]
1st Belorussian Front had 11 armies consisting of 77 rifle divisions, 7 tank and mechanized corps, 8 artillery divisions, and a mixture of more artillery and rocket launcher brigades. The Front had 3,155 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 16,934 artillery pieces.[2] 8 of the 11 armies were posted along the Oder. In the north, 61st Army held the river line from Schwedt to the meeting with the Finow Canal. From the Canal to the Soviet bridgehead at Kustrin, 1st Polish Army, 47th Army, 3rd Shock Army, 5th Shock Army, and 8th Guards Army were concentrated for the attack. 69th Army and 33rd Army covered the river line south to Guben. 2nd Guards Tank Army, 3rd Army, and 1st Guards Tank Army were in reserve. 5th Shock and 8th Guards were posted directly opposite the strongest part of the defenses, where the Berlin autobahn passed through the Heights.[3]
The German Ninth Army held the front from about the Finow Canal to Guben, which included the Seelow Heights. It had 14 divisions, 512 tanks, 344 artillery pieces and 300 to 400 anti-aircraft guns.[4] Further south the front was held by the Fourth Panzer Army, opposing the 1st Ukrainian Front.
General Gotthard Heinrici replaced Himmler as commander of Army Group Vistula on March 20. Heinrici was one of the best defensive tacticians in the German army. He correctly predicted that the main Soviet thrust would be made over the Oder river and along the main east-west autobahn - at Seelow Heights. He decided to defend the riverbank with only a light skirmishing screen. Instead he fortified the Seelow Heights, which rise about 48 meters above the Oder and overlook the river where the autobahn crossed it. He thinned out the line in other areas to put more men at the Heights. The Oder's flood plain was saturated by the spring thaw; German engineers released water from a reservoir upstream, which turned the plain into a swamp. Behind this they built three lines of defenses, spreading back towards Berlin. The last line of defense was the Wotan Line, 10 to 15 miles behind the front line. These lines consisted of anti-tank ditches, anti-tank gun emplacements, and an extensive network of trenches and bunkers.[5][6]
[edit] Battle
In the early hours of April 16, the offensive began with a massive bombardment by thousands of artillery pieces and Katyushas. Well before dawn, 1st BRF attacked across the Oder. 1st Ukrainian Front attacked across the Neisse before dawn the same morning. 1st Belorussian Front was the stronger force but it had the more difficult assignment and was facing the majority of the German forces.[7][8]
The initial assault by 1st Belorussian Front was a disaster. Heinrici and Busse anticipated the attack and withdrew their defenders from the first line of trenches just before the Soviet artillery obliterated them. The light from 143 searchlights, intended to blind the defenders, was diffused by the early morning mist and made useful silhouettes of the attacking Soviet formations. The swampy ground proved to be a great hindrance, and under a German counter-barrage, Soviet casualties were enormous. Frustrated by the slow advance, or on the direct orders of Stalin, Zhukov threw in his reserves, which in his plan were to be held back to exploit the expected breakthrough. By early evening an advance of almost six kilometers had been achieved in some areas, but the German lines remained intact. Zhukov was forced to report that his battle was not going as planned. However, in the south the attack by Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was keeping to plan. To spur Zhukov, Stalin told him that he would let Konev wheel his tank armies north, towards the great prize of Berlin.[9][10]
On the second day, 1st Belorussian Front staff were reduced to combing the rear areas for any troops which could be thrown into the battle.[citation needed] The Soviet tactic of using massed attacks was proving more costly than usual. At nightfall on April 17, the German front before Zhukov remained unbroken (though very strained).
To the south, however, 1st Ukrainian Front was pushing back Fourth Panzer Army, the left flank of Army Group Centre under Schörner. Schörner kept his two reserve panzer divisions in the south covering his centre, instead of using them to shore up Fourth Panzer. This was the turning point in the battle, because the positions of both Army Group Vistula and the center and right sectors of Army Group Centre were becoming untenable. Unless they fell back in line with Fourth Panzer, they faced envelopment.
In effect Konev's successful attack on Schörner's poor defense, to the south of Seelow Heights, were unhinging Heinrici's brilliant defense.
On April 18, both Soviet Fronts made steady progress with acceptable losses. By nightfall, 1st Belorussian Front had reached the third and final German line of defense, and 1st Ukrainian Front, having captured Forst, was preparing to break out into open country.[11]
On April 19, the fourth day, 1st Belorussian Front broke through the final line of the Seelow Heights, and nothing but broken German formations lay between them and Berlin. The remnants of Ninth Army and Fourth Panzer Army were enveloped by 1st Belorussian Front and elements of 1st Ukrainian Front which had broken through and turned north. Other armies of 1st Ukrainian Front raced west towards the Americans. By the end of the 19th the German eastern front line had ceased to exist. All that remained were pockets of resistance. The cost to the Soviet forces had been very high, with over 2,807 tanks lost between April 1 and April 19.[12][13]
[edit] Aftermath
The defensive line on the Seelow Heights was the last major defensive line outside Berlin. Gen. Heinrici had said before the battle that the Seelow Heights could be held for only three or four days without reinforcments, which he didn't have. From April 19, the fourth day, the road to Berlin (90 kilometers westward) lay open. By April 23 Berlin was fully encircled and the Battle for Berlin entered its last stage. Within two weeks Hitler was dead and the war in Europe was effectively over.
After the war, Zhukov's critics asserted that he should have stopped 1st Belorussian Front's attack by the direct line to Berlin along the autobahn, and moved by way of 1st Ukranian Front's breakthrough over the Neisse. This would have bypassed the strong German defences at Seelow Heights, and avoided many casualties and the delay in the Berlin advance. However, 1st Belorussian Front was drawn up on a very narrow front, so such a maneuver may not have been possible. The other Front commanders could and did bypass the main defenses.
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Battle of the Seelow Heights on The History Net
[edit] References
- ^ Ziemke, Earl F. (1968). The Battle for Berlin: End of the Third Reich. New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-356-02960-3. page 71.
- ^ Ziemke, page 76.
- ^ Goodenough, Simon (1982). War Maps. Macdonald. ISBN 0-312-85584-2. page 116
- ^ Ziemke, page 76.
- ^ Ziemke, page 76.
- ^ Zuljan, Ralph, Battle for the Seelow Heights - Part II Originally published in "World War II" at Suite101.com on May 1, 1999. Revised edition published in "Articles On War" at OnWar.com on July 1, 2003.
- ^ Beevor, Antony (2002). The Fall of Berlin, 1945. New York: Viking. ISBN 0-670-03041-4. page 217
- ^ Ziemke, page 81.
- ^ Beevor, pages 217-233.
- ^ Ziemke, page 82
- ^ Ziemke, page 83.
- ^ Ziemke, page 84.
- ^ World War II Axis Military History Day-by-Day: April April 20th 1945