Battle of the Grebbeberg
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| Battle of the Grebbeberg | |||||||
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| Part of World War II | |||||||
 The Grebbeberg, seen from the south |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Royal Dutch Army |
 German Wehrmacht Luftwaffe |
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| Commanders | |||||||
 Jan Joseph Godfried baron van Voorst tot Voorst (Field Army) Jacob Harberts (2nd Corps) Antonie Marinus Michiel van Loon (4th Division) |
 Karl von Tielemann |
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| Strength | |||||||
| ca. 10,000 men, 1 division, 2 brigades | 23,000 men, 2 divisions, 1 brigade | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 382 men | 259 men | ||||||
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The Battle of the Grebbeberg (Dutch: Slag om de Grebbeberg) was a major engagement during the Battle of the Netherlands, which was a part of the World War II operation of Fall Gelb.
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[edit] Background
In the 1930s the Dutch government pursued a policy of strict neutrality. After World War I the Dutch parliament backed a disarmament policy because it was generally thought that World War I had been "the war to end all wars". When the threat of Nazi Germany became more apparent the Dutch government decided to reinforce and retrain the Dutch Armed Forces. In case of a violation of neutrality by Germany the strategy of the Dutch Army Command was to fall back on the Dutch Water Line, which formed part of the Fortress Holland, the Dutch national redoubt and to await Allied assistance from France and the United Kingdom. To defend the redoubt it was necessary to slow the German advance down in order to give as many Dutch forces in the nation the possibility to assemble in the Fortress Holland. To this effect several defensive lines had been constructed throughout the country. The Maas Line and the IJssel Line had been constructed along the Maas and IJssel rivers and served to detect German incursions in Dutch territory and to delay the Germans in the first hours of an invasion. The fortress at Kornwerderzand on the narrow Afsluitdijk guarded the northern approach to Fortress Holland while the Peel-Raam Line in North Brabant guarded the southern approach. An attempt to approach the Fortress Holland through the middle part of the nation would be delayed at the Grebbe Line. At the start of 1940 Chief of Staff Henri Winkelman designated the Grebbe Line as a top priority for defense, because once the German Army had crossed the IJssel it wouldn't encounter any major rivers until it reached the Fortress Holland.
The Grebbe Line was built in 1745 and had been used for the first time in 1794 against the French. It was maintained throughout the 19th century, but had been neglected ever since because it was thought to have become obsolete. In 1926 most fortifications were disbanded. When Germany became a potential threat the Dutch government had the Line recommissioned. At the end of the 1930s a series of pillboxes and casemates were constructed in the area south of the IJsselmeer and north of the Rhine. The Line was constructed according to French military principles from World War I which had proven to be successful back then but had, unknown at the time of construction, become obsolete. There were major flaws in the design of the pillboxes, which were difficult to defend against attack from the flanks and the rear. The (fixed) weapons were antiquated too, many of them dating back to World War I. Because the Dutch government didn't want to antagonise local residents permission to tear down buildings and trees in the line of fire was refused, which greatly reduced the effectiveness of the defenses and gave attackers a possibility to seek cover. The trench system too was based on World War I principles. It consisted of a line of outposts (voorpostenlijn), a frontline (frontlijn), a stopline (stoplijn) and a final line (ruglijn). Another dangerous mistake was the lack of serious security measures at the construction sites. The government didn't want to interrupt tourist activities as the local economy of Rhenen was dependent on tourist revenues from the Ouwehands Dierenpark, a zoo located on a hill near Rhenen, the Grebbeberg. In the months leading up to the invasion German officers in plain clothes visited the zoo and used its lookout tower to survey the local defenses. The government estimated that the Line would be completed in November 1940 and in May 1940 the bomb-proof pumping station at the Grebbeberg, which was necessary for local inundation, hadn't been completed yet. Because of the lack of inundation the German spies realised that the Grebbeberg would be a vulnerable spot in the Grebbe Line.
[edit] The battle
At 3:55 local time on 10 May 1940 the German Army Group B invaded the Netherlands. The 207th Infantry Division, commanded by Karl Tielemann and part of the 18th Army, had been tasked with overrunning the Grebbeberg within a day. Resistance at the IJssel Line near Westervoort was fiercer then anticipated and it was dusk by the time the Germans had occupied Wageningen, the city directly to the east of the Grebbeberg. The 207th Infantry Division, reinforced with the SS-brigade Der Führer, made preparations to assault the mountain the next morning.
[edit] 11 May
[edit] The outposts fall
In order to mount a direct assault on the Grebbeberg, the Germans had to breach the line of outposts (voorpostenlijn) which covered a 3 kilometre wide area directly in front of the Grebbeberg which hadn't been inundated. The line was manned by two companies of the third batallion of the 8th Infantry Regiment (III-8 RI), which was part of the 4th Division and the 2nd Corps. In the early hours of 11 May, German artillery opened fire on the line of outposts, disabling the radio system of the Dutch defenders. Now that communication with the other defensive lines had become impossible the Dutch were deprived of artillery support. At dawn the SS-brigade launched a direct assault on the outposts. The defensive positions at the outposts were mostly improvised and consisted of sandbags, and wooden obstacles. The field of fire of the Dutch defensive positions didn't overlap. German forces were able to neutralise them one by one by sending two teams of machine gunners to attack a single position. One team would provide covering fire while the other would use the blind spots to launch a flanking attack.
In the northern part of the line, on the edge of the inundated area, the Germans ran into a section of the Dutch 19th Infantry Regiment (19 RI) which, because it was part of a different command, hadn't been informed of the attack. This section broke after a short skirmish and retreated westward, thereby creating a gap for other German units to breach the line. Near the Rhine the Germans used a dike to approach defending forces in the rear unhindered. Dutch support from the frontline was largely ineffective because the area between the frontline and the line of outposts was littered with orchards, which kept the Germans out of sight. Now that the SS-forces had succeeded in approaching the Dutch forces in the rear the line of outposts could be neutralised. At 18:00 the last Dutch section surrendered and the voorpostenlijn had fallen into German hands.
[edit] Dutch counter-attack
In the evening German armoured vehicles tried to attack the hill itself but were repelled by a 47-mm anti-tank gun. In the evening Chris Meijer, an artillery sergeant who had been arrested for abandoning his post, was brought in and subjected to a court-martial and Meijer was executed by a firing squad. After the war this court-martial would become controversial because of possible undue influence by the commander of 2nd Corps, General Harberts. This incident and unfounded rumours of a massive rout in the line of outposts incited Harberts into setting an example for other Dutch forces. At 21:00 he ordered the second battalion of 19 RI to initiate a counter-attack against the outposts. Harberts estimated that about a hundred Germans were in the line of outpost, but in reality II-19 RI faced 3,000 SS troops. At the stopline, which was situated directly on the Grebbeberg, II-19 RI was fired upon by other Dutch troops who hadn't been informed of the impending counter-attack. The confusion that followed caused the attack to lose momentum before it had made contact with the enemy and by the time order had been restored dawn had come and the counter-attack was aborted. One positive side-effect of the counter-attack had been that Dutch artillery support caused the Germans to abort their own planned night attack.
[edit] 12 May
[edit] Capture of the frontline
After the seizure of the outposts the previous day the focus of the German force was on capturing the frontline, which ran along the eastern slope of the Grebbeberg. Von Tiedemann decided to initiate a powerful attack on the hill. It was defended by companies from II-8 RI and I-8 RI. They were reinforced by a machine gun company and an anti-tank unit which occupied the casemats nearby. There was a much larger presence of Dutch machine guns in the frontline, so that this time round there were no blind spots in which German units could hide. Von Tiedemann realised that an all-out assault like that of the day before wouldn't work and ordered an artillery barrage which lasted for the better part of the morning. The artillery engagement didn't serve to decimate the Dutch lines, but to undermine the morale of the Dutch regiments, which were mainly composed of conscripts who weren't used to the horrors of war.
After 12:40 the German guns ceased firing and the SS brigade attacked the Hoornwerk, an old 18th century fortification which had to be seized first. The ammunition supply of the defenders was low because of skirmishes with German forces the night before and in the early afternoon the Dutch started to give way. After a short engagement the Hoornwerk fell and the Germans stormed the hill. The Germans threathened to flank the Dutch casemats which could only put fire on the area directly in front of them. A fierce battle ensued on the wooded slope, but the automatic weapons of the SS gave them an advantage. The Dutch didn't have sufficient forces in reserve to initiate a counter-maneuver.
At 16:00 the Dutch troops at the stopline on top of the Grebbeberg encountered the first German units. A frantic attempt was made to drive the Germans back to the frontline, but the Dutch counter-advance was no match for the automatic guns of the Germans. North of the Rhenen-Wageningen road Major Johan Henri Azon Jacometti, commander of II-8 RI, personally led a counter-attack, but it failed after Jacometti got killed. To stall the German advance reinforcements were necessary and II-19 RI, the same battalion that executed the aborted counter-attack the previous night, was ordered to advance to the frontline. The battalion, however, suffered the same fate as the night before and nervous Dutch troops once again opened fire on the battalion. The demoralised soldiers withdrew to safety and the attack petered out.
Due to their rapid advance the left flank of the SS brigade came within range of Dutch artillery. As the German advance was largely dependent on the strength of the SS brigade, the destruction of a large part of the brigade could turn the tide of battle. The Dutch artillery commanders were ordered to open fire, but most commanders were afraid to hit their own troops and the artillery bombardment was limited to individual commanders firing on their own initiative. There was some effective fire from mortars though.
[edit] Infiltration of the stopline
In the late afternoon and the early evening the SS brigade cleared the area between the stopline and the frontline of all resistance. By 20:00 the penetrated area was still quite limited with a depth of 700 meter and a width of a kilometre. There was no great pressure on Von Tielemann to advance even further. The commander of the third battalion of the SS brigade, Obersturmbannführer Hilmar Wäckerle, wasn't satisfied with the limited progress and considered the fact that the Grebbe Line hadn't been breached yet a stain on his personal honour. Furthermore he noticed that the Dutch stopline had lost most of its cohesion because of the exhausting counter-attacks. Completely in line with his impetuous character and the fearsome reputation he wished to create for the Waffen-SS, Wäckerle ordered his battalion forward into the stopline. An attempt was made to penetrate the stopline at two places: the first attempt was made by Wäckerle himself near the Rhenen-Wageningen road and the other further south near the Rhine. The first attempt succeeded and Wäckerle advanced unopposed for 1,500 metres, driving the disheartened Dutch defenders in front of him. Then he stumbled on the final line (ruglijn), which was equivalent with the Rhenen-Veenendaal railroad. The disadvantage of the rapid SS advance now became apparent. Because the other German units hadn't participated in the advance, there was no support for a further advance and most of the stopline held firm. Wäckerle's only hope for a fast breakthrough now rested in a spontaneous collapse of the Dutch defenses.
[edit] Dutch reserves arrive
At the same time, however, the Dutch situation seemed to improve as Dutch reinforcements arrived. II-19 RI had reassembled itself along the final line and a battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment (I-46 RI) had been dispatched from the Betuwe to assist in the defense of the Grebbe Line. From the north the 3rd and 4th Regiment Hussars arrived on the scene. The only way into Rhenen was the viaduct underneath the railroad. The viaduct was defended by units from the Royal Marechaussee led by Captain G.J.W. Gelderman. The Royal Marechaussee was tasked with preventing any units from getting passed the railroad, be they Germans or routing Dutch forces. Gelderman was in the process of convincing withdrawing Dutch forces to resume fighting when Wäckerle's SS battalion reached his position. Gelderman ordered to open fire and many Dutch and German soldiers were hit. The SS-battalion was successfully contained in a factory located between the railroad and the Rhine.
The reinforcements were sent in by the commander of the Field Army, baron van Voorst tot Voorst, to stabilise the front. Van Voorst tot Voorst also decided to take additional measures. The amount of troops at his disposal was very limited because most reserve forces were involved in repelling an airborne attack near The Hague. At his disposal were seven battalions: II-11 RI, I-20 RI and five battalions of the newly arrived Brigade B. The safest option was to give up the stopline and to regroup at new defensive line, but the Dutch Army lacked the engineering capacity to quickly create one and thus van Voorst ordered the forces in the stopline to recapture the frontline. A captain from the General Staff of 4th Division, A.H.J.L. Fiévez, drew up an attack plan in the night of 12 May.
According to the plan three of the seven available battalions were to reinforce the troops at Grebbeberg, the stopline and the final line, while the other four were to execute a flanking attack from the village of Achterberg, located north of the Grebbeberg. The purpose of this flanking attack wasn't just to drive the German forces from the hill, but also to stabilise the local situation. In the late evening the situation north of the Grebbeberg had worsened considerably and the counter-attack also served the purpose of reversing the situation there. As night fell, only a single Dutch section occupied the frontline and it would only surrender after the Dutch Army capitulated.
[edit] 13 May
[edit] The counter-attack fails
On the morning of May 13 Von Tiedemann had lost all contact with Wäckerle and the situation on the Grebbeberg was very confusing to him. He assumed that Dutch reinforcements were being assembled on the hill but noticed that the Dutch defenses north of the Grebbeberg had deteriorated. He decided to open a second front of attack in this sector of the Dutch defenses. For the first time the 207. ID itself was to be deployed, not against the endangered Dutch sector north of the Grebbeberg, but on the Grebbeberg itself to pin Dutch forces there down and to purge the stopline of defenders. The job of attacking the Dutch troops north of the hill was given to the two remaining battalions of the SS brigade, which had seen continuous action for the passed two days. At the same time the Dutch were preparing their own attack in the very same sector.
The attacks of both sides were supported by indirect fire. The Dutch requested air support from the British Royal Air Force, but the British were unable to divert any planes from the ongoing battle in France. Instead the Royal Netherlands Air Force dispatched the last aircraft it could spare: four old Fokker C.X light bombers, which were protected by the last operational fighters in the Air Force. The bombers dropped 30 bombs on the German artillery positions in front of the Grebbeberg and together with the fighters continued to strafe the Germans along the Rhenen-Wageningen road until they ran out of ammunition. The Dutch used artillery too, but its effectiveness was diminised by the old fear of hitting own forces. The Germans would use artillery too, when their attack started late in the morning.
The Dutch attack near Achterberg should have started at 04:30 but delays caused it to start only at 08:00. Brigade B, which had arrived the evening before, supplied four battalions (I-29 RI, III-29 RI, II-24 RI and I-20 RI) to carry out the attack. They were ill-prepared and exhausted from having marched all day long on May 12. It was often unclear to the troops what their exact objectives were, what the terrain in front of them looked like and what resistance they could expect. The battalions were made up of middle-aged men (as the high regimental numbers show) who hadn't been retrained for service and hadn't been able to create strong bonds of comradeship. These factors contributed to less cohesion in the ranks, which would prove fatal in the battle to come.
At first little opposition was encountered as the Dutch advanced to the stopline and reoccupied positions which had been abandoned too hastily the evening before. But the situation deteriorated after the advance had passed the stopline. The Dutch advance walked into a German artillery bombardment which preceded the German attack of the SS battalions. The SS soon mounted their own attack. While it would have been best for the Dutch to move into defensive mode and repel the attack, the Dutch divisional command was unaware of the German intentions and it ordered the advance to continue into the open field. Many troops were killed by German artillery and by supportive fire from their own machine guns. The confused battalions, many of which had lost their NCOs, started to retreat back to the stopline at noon. A second attack wave faltered and also started to fall back and at some places the stopline was abandoned too. The retreat was exacerbated when at 14:00 27 Stuka dive bombers launched an attack. Though the attack wasn't aimed at Brigade B, but rather at the positions on the Grebbeberg itself, it was enough cause a massive panic in the retreating battalions. A sauve qui peut mentality took hold of the Dutch troops and the defense mounted by the 4th Division effectively collapsed as events on the Grebbeberg had taken a turn for the worst too.
[edit] The stopline is penetrated
The success of a Dutch counter-attack had also depended on whether the stopline on the Grebbeberg itself would hold, for elimination of the stopline would remove all Dutch possibilities of a successful defense. To make sure the line would hold, it was necessary to send in fresh troops to reinforce the line. Communication was made difficult because of the presence of Wäckerle's pocket of SS troops. The day before many trenches south of the Rhenen-Wageningen road had been hastily abandoned by Dutch forces. Fièvez, who didn't have a clear picture of the situation near the stopline, had designated the final line (ruglijn) near the railroad in Rhenen as the main line of defenses. This, however, caused the stopline to be undermanned. Furthermore, as the final line served only as an assembly area for incoming reinforcements rather than as a true defensive perimeter, the final line couldn't be developed into a full fledged defensive position. By the time these mistakes became apparent it was too late to reinforce the endangered stopline.
The fatal decision not to tear down wooded areas near the stopline now became detrimental to the defenders, who weren't able to keep German forces at bay due to the cover the trees provided them. The stopline served as the last real line of defense and served as a point from which enemy breakthroughs could be countered. Once the stopline was breached the Grebbe Line would be compromised. After shelling by artillery the Germans launched their first attack. Although it was generally unsuccessful some German units managed to break through the line. Most of the German troops in this attack wave were older, less experienced forces and they panicked. But the German commanders were aware of this possibility and after a second artillery bombardment another attempt was made. This attempt proved to be successful shortly after noon and, using the earlier penetrations, the stopline was largely put out of action. A fierce struggle ensued in the woods as the German forces started their descent into Rhenen. Most Dutch command posts were located behind the stopline and they now came under attack. One command post was valiantly defended by the commander of I-8 RI, Major Willem Pieter Landzaat, who gave his men the order to "stand firm behind the rubble" and to "resist until the last bullet". Once the group had run out of ammunition, Landzaat thanked and dismissed his men and continued to defend the command post. His body was found after the battle by his wife and after the war Landzaat would be posthumously awarded the Order of William, the highest Dutch military honour. The attacking Germans had become nervous and it took quite a few hours before the area between the stopline and the railroad was cleared of Dutch forces. At 17:00 hours the German forces started to reform for an attack on the final line. But Dutch morale had broken to such an extent that such an attack was no longer necessary.
[edit] Rout at the final line
There were a lot of Dutch forces concentrated in or around Rhenen, but most were scattered groups guarding the railroad. There was little cohesion and the different commands in the area overlapped so that all oversight was lost. Most troops were exhausted and nervous because of the continuous artillery bombardments. Overall command in the sector had devolved to jonkheer De Marees van Swinderen, the commander of the 4th Hussar Regiment. He hadn't been informed of the situation in the Grebbeberg and didn't send any reinforcements to the stopline. Instead he send some troops back to Elst, some 6 kilometres west of Rhenen, to have a mobile reserve. This caused the cohesion of the Dutch forces in Rhenen to further decrease. As the day progessed more troops would leave the battlefield to retreat westward.
In the mean time Wäckerle's stranded SS battalion had spent an uncomfortable night in the factory. He decided to make another attempt to break through the final line. He made two attempts and during both attempts Wäckerle violated the laws of war. During the first attempt he used Dutch prisoners of war as a human shield and during the second attempt he ordered his men to advance in Dutch uniforms. The Royal Marechausse unit of Captain Gelderman, under orders to shoot all men moving in the wrong (westward) direction, repelled both attempts. On the second attempt the masquerading SS troops were given away by their distinctive boots which they hadn't taken off. After Wäckerle's attempts had failed the Dutch forces destroyed the viaduct. Wäckerle, heavily injured, was relieved by German forces in the afternoon and went to Wageningen to have his wounds treated.
The same attack that had caused Brigade B north of the Grebbeberg to turn tail and run, also hit parts of the final line. It had the same effect, little physical damage but a complete breakdown of morale. Most Dutch forces started to leave the battlefield at this point. At 16:00 Captain Gelderman noticed to his disappointment that only 15 men remained in his vicinity while he had ordered food for 600 men earlier that morning. By this time the entire Dutch 4th Division had come to the conclusion that it had suffered a defeat and that only a retreat could save their formation. The reserves behind the line were caught in the retreat after rumours spread that an official retreat had been ordered. One exception to this massive rout was a company of the 11th Border Battalion, the last Dutch reinforcements sent to the Grebbeberg. In the evening it crossed the final line and evicted German forces from the railway station. In their end their deployment didn't make a difference and the battalion withdrew as Rhenen was being destroyed by fire.
[edit] 14 and 15 May
[edit] Mopping up the last defenders
[edit] References
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