Battle of the Espero Convoy

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Battle of the Espero Convoy
Part of the Mediterranean Theater of World War II

HMS Liverpool, Vice-Admiral Tovey's flagship.
Date June 28, 1940
Location Mediterranean, southwest of Crete
Result Allied tactical victory
Two-thirds of the Italian reinforcements reached destination
Two Allied convoys from Malta postponed
Belligerents
Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom
Flag of Australia Australia
Flag of Italy Kingdom of Italy
Commanders
Flag of the United Kingdom Vice-Admiral John Tovey Flag of Italy Captain Enrico Baroni 
Strength
5 cruisers 3 destroyers
Casualties and losses
1 cruiser lightly damaged 1 destroyer sunk
150–180 dead

The Battle of the Espero Convoy was one of the very first naval battles between the Royal Navy and the Regia Marina in the course of the Second World War. The engagement took place on June 28, 1940, when the escort of three Allied convoys headed for Alexandria spotted a smaller Italian convoy, consisting of three destroyers and bound for Tobruk from Taranto.

Contents

[edit] The two forces

The Italian Commando Supremo, foreseeing a British Army push into Cirenaica led by armoured forces, decided that an antitank unit, comprising ten antitank guns, 120 tn. of ammunition and 162 servicemen, should be deployed at Tobruk as soon as possible.

Three destroyers of the Turbine class were chosen to accomplish this mission, due to their high speed and loading capabilities: they were the Espero (flagship), the Zeffiro and the Ostro. This class of warships could reach 36 knots if needed. The commander of the Italian squadron was Captain Enrico Baroni.

At the same time, three Allied convoys, two from Malta, the other from Greece, were heading towards Alexandria under the escort of seven cruisers (two light cruisers, HMS Capetown, HMS Caledon, the other five from the 7th Squadron: HMS Liverpool, HMS Orion, HMAS Sydney, HMS Gloucester and HMS Neptune) along with 16 destroyers, all of them under the command of Vice-Admiral Tovey. Reconnaissance planes from Alexandria and Malta also gave support to the Allied operation.[1][2]

[edit] The engagement

The Italian destroyers were spotted at noon by two Sunderland flying-boats some 50 miles west of Zante island.[3][4] They were at striking range of Tovey’s 7th Squadron, so the Vice-Admiral ordered the cruisers to intercept the enemy force with a two wings formation.

Sketch of the Battle
Sketch of the Battle

At 18:30, the first 6” salvoes from the five Allied cruisers began to fall on the surprised Italian convoy from a distance of 16,000 meters. Baroni, realizing that despite the best speed of his ships they were hopelessly outgunned, attempted to cover the remaining destroyers using smokescreens and faced his formidable adversaries with evasive maneuvers. He decided to sacrifice the Espero as the Zeffiro and Ostro headed safely to the southwest at full speed.

It was not until 19:20 that the first British broadside struck home, when the range had closed to 12,800 meters.

By this time, Tovey had given up the chase of the other two destroyers. The 7th Squadron spent about 5,000 rounds before the Espero was sent to the bottom, after two hours and ten minutes of fierce fighting.

A single Italian 4.7" shell hit the Liverpool, but caused little damage. The battle resulted in such a shortage of ammunition that the planned Malta convoys were suspended for two weeks.[5] HMAS Sydney rescued 47 men from the Italian destroyer, and six others were later found alive by an Italian submarine almost twenty-days later.[6] Captain Baroni was lost with his ship, and was posthumously awarded the Medaglia d´oro al valor militare. Zeffiro and Ostro both reached Bengasi the next day and arrived at Tobruk shortly after. Two-thirds of the convoy had been saved.

[edit] Aftermath

There were two main lessons learned by both sides after this battle. For the Allies, the lesson was that a daylight naval action at long range was unlikely to be decisive when the enemy units outmatched one's own speed. For the Italians, it was a grim forecast about the importance of well-coordinated air surveillance. Had Italian aircraft spotted the Allied cruisers before they reached the firing line, the three destroyers would have escaped unscathed.[7]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Greene & Massignani, pp. 63–65.
  2. ^ De la Sierra, pp. 58–63.
  3. ^ Greene & Massignani, pp. 63.
  4. ^ De la Sierra, pp. 58.
  5. ^ Green & Massignani, page 65.
  6. ^ De la Sierra, page 62.
  7. ^ Greene & Massignani, page 65.

[edit] References

  • Greene, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro: The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943, Chatam Publishing, London, 1998. ISBN 1861760574.
  • De la Sierra, Luis: La Guerra Naval en el Mediterráneo, Editorial Juventud, Barcelona, 1976.
    ISBN 84-261-0264-6. (in Spanish)
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