Battle of Vimy Ridge
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- This article is about a First World War battle. For the memorial, see Canadian National Vimy Memorial.
Battle of Vimy Ridge | |||||||
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Part of the Western Front of World War I | |||||||
The Battle of Vimy Ridge after a painting by Richard Jack. Canadian War Museum. |
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Belligerents | |||||||
Canada United Kingdom |
German Empire | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Julian Byng | Ludwig von Falkenhausen | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
5 Divisions | 3 Divisions | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3,598 dead, 7,004 wounded[1] |
20,000 dead or wounded, 4,000 captured |
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The Battle of Vimy Ridge was a military offensive of World War I by the Canadian Corps against the German Sixth Army along the Western Front in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France, from 9 April 1917 to 12 April 1917.
The attack on Vimy Ridge was part of the opening phase in the wider scaled Battle of Arras, which served as a diversionary attack for the Nivelle Offensive.[2] The immediate objective of the Canadian Corps was to take control of the German-held high ground that dominated the Plains of Douai to permit the southern flank of the Arras offensive to advance without being fired upon in enfilade.[3]
The success of the Canadian Corps in capturing the ridge and surrounding area is largely attributed to a mixture of technical and tactical innovations, powerful artillery preparation and meticulous planning. Noted as the first occasion on which all four divisions of the Canadian Corps attacked as a composite formation, the battle quickly became a nationalistic symbol of achievement and sacrifice. The former battleground is now home to the Canadian National Vimy Memorial.
Contents |
[edit] Background
Vimy Ridge had fallen under German control in October 1914, during the First Battle of Artois. Situated 8 km northeast of Arras, the ridge is approximately 7 km in length and culminates at an elevation of 145 m, providing a natural unobstructed view for tens of kilometers. The German Sixth Army had heavily fortified the ridge with tunnels, three rows of trenches behind barbed wire, artillery and numerous machine gun nests to more effectively protect the Lens coal mines, which were essential to their war efforts. During the Second Battle of Artois, The French 1st Moroccan Division managed to take possession of the ridge, after an astonishing 4 km advance, but was unable to maintain it due to a lack of reinforcements, and consequently suffered heavy losses. The French suffered approximately 150,000 casualties in their attempts to gain control of Vimy Ridge and surrounding territory.[4] Following the Third Battle of Artois the Vimy sector became calmer, with both sides taking a live and let live approach.
The British XVII Corps, commanded coincidentally by Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, relieved the French Tenth Army from the sector in February 1916, permitting the French to expand their operations at Verdun.[5] It was quickly discovered that German tunnelling companies had taken advantage of the relative calm on the surface to push aggressive tunnelling and deep mining activity against French positions, taking full control of the underground in the Vimy sector. Royal Engineer Tunnelling Companies were immediately deployed along the front to combat the German mining nuisance. This underground clash developed into a fierce struggle, with both sides blowing mines to destroy enemy infantry positions, and camouflet charges to destroy the opposition's mining activity.
In response to increased British mining aggression, German artillery and trench mortar fire intensified in early May 1916. On 21 May 1916, after shelling both forward trenches and divisional artillery positions from no less than 80 out-of-sight batteries on the reverse slope of the ridge, the German infantry attacked the British lines along a 2000-yard front in an effort to repulse them from positions along the ridge.[6]
The German advance, having captured their objective of the British mine craters, halted, and entrenched their position. Small counterattacks by units of 140th and 141st Brigades took place on 22 May, but did not manage to change the situation.[6] The newly-formed Canadian Corps relieved the British IV Corps stationed along the western slopes of Vimy Ridge in October 1916.
[edit] Assault preparations
Formal discussions of a spring offensive near Arras began following a conference of corps commanders held at First Army Headquarters on 21 November 1916.[3] It was not until 5 January 1917 however that Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, having taken command of the Canadian Corps from Lieutenant-General Sir E.A.H. Alderson in May 1916, was formally presented with orders outlining Vimy Ridge as the corps' objective for the Arras offensive.[7] Heavily drawing on briefings of staff officers sent to learn from the French Army's experience during the Battle of Verdun, a formal assault plan was devised, approved and adopted by early March 1917. [7] For the first time, all four Canadian divisions were to be assembled to operate in combat as a corps. The four Canadian divisions were joined by the British 5th Infantry Division, and reinforced by artillery, engineer and labour units. This brought the Canadian Corps nominal strength up to about 170,000 all ranks, of whom 97,184 were Canadians.<=Nicholson 229">Nicholson 229</ref>
[edit] Tactical plan
In January of 1917, a large contingent of British and Dominion officers, amongst them three Canadian Corps officers, were nominated to attend a series of lectures hosted by the French Army regarding their experiences during the Battle of Verdun.[7] One of the limited allied successes of 1916 had been the French counter-offensive devised by General Robert Nivelle. Following extensive rehearsal, eight French divisions, assaulting in two waves on a 6 miles (9.7 km) front, with exceedingly strong artillery support, recovered lost ground a inflicted heavy casualties on five German divisions.[8]
Upon their return, the Canadian Corps staff officers produced a tactical analysis of the Verdun battles and delivered a series of corps and divisional level lectures primarily espousing the primacy of artillery but also noting the importance of harassing fire and company and platoon flexibility [8] Correspondingly, the Canadian Corps assault plan for Vimy Ridge, which was submitted to First Army commander General Henry Horne for approval on 5 March 1917, drew heavily on the experiences and tactical analysis of the three corps officers who had attended the Verdun subjected lectures.[7]
The plan submitted divided the Canadian Corps advance into four coloured objective lines. The Black Line, the first objective, involved the seizure of the German forward defense line.[9] The Red Line, the final objective of the norther flank, involved the taking of the highest point on the ridge, the fortified knoll known as "the Pimple", the La Folie Farm, the Zwischen-Stellung dugout and the hamlet of Les Tilleuls. On the southern flank, two additional objectives were planned.[9] The Blue Line, encompassing the town of Thélus and the woods outside the town of Vimy, and the Brown Line which consisted the Zwolfer-Graben dugout and the German second line.[9][10] The infantry would proceed close behind a creeping barrage, placed down by light field guns, which would advance in timed 100 yards (91 m) increments.[9] The medium and heavy howitzers would establish a series of standing barrages further ahead of the infantry, against known defensive systems.[11] To maintain momentum during the attack, the plan arranged for units to leap frog over one another as the advance progressed. The first units were to reach the Black Line and push forward to the Red Line. After a pause to enable reserve units to move up, the barrage would recommence to allow the reserve units to push beyond the Red Line and reach the Blue Line. Once the Blue Line was secured the plan would be repeated for the capture of the Brown Line. Conducted properly, the German forces would have little time to exit the security of their deep dugouts and defend their positions before being overwhelmed by the infantry advance. [12]
[edit] Artillery
Twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of 480 eighteen-pounders, 138 4.5-inch howitzers, 96 2-inch trench mortars, 24 9.45-inch mortars, supported by 245 corps level siege guns and heavy mortars, were made available to the Canadian Corps.[13] [14] This firepower gave a density of one heavy gun for every 20 yards (18 m) and one field gun for every 10 yards (9.1 m) of Canadian Corps frontage,[13] representing a considerable average increase, including three times the heavy guns, over the distribution of artillery at the Battle of the Somme a year earlier.[15] To logistically manage three times the artillery normally allocated to a corps, Royal Artillery staff officer Major Alan Brooke developed coordinated communication and transport plans to work in conjunction with his complex barrage plans.[16]
The artillery along the Canadian Corps front remained extremely active largely due to their 1.6 million shell allotment.[14] The higher quality of the shells, in comparison to earlier points in the war, also ensured fewer duds.[17] The effectiveness of the artillery was further aided by the introduction of the instantaneous No. 106 fuse. This fuse reliably burst with the slightest of contact, unlike past fuses which were timed, making it especially effective at cutting barbed wire before the advance.[14] To ensure that men at observation points could communicate, in particular with the artillery, over 1400km of cable was laid at a depth of 7 feet (2.1 m) for telegraph and field telephones.[18] To aid artillery operations during the battle, coordinated counter-battery initiatives before the battle were also conducted. Utilizing flash spotting, sound ranging and aerial reconnaissance from No. 16 Squadron and No. 1 & 2 Balloon Company of the Royal Flying Corps in the week before the battle, the counter-battery artillery under command of Lt-Col Andrew McNaughton fired 125,900 shells, harassing an estimated 83% of the enemy gun positions.[19]
[edit] Training
In February 1917, the British General Staff released a training pamphlet entitled SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, espousing the return of fire and movement tactics in which the platoon was considered a self contained tactical unit.[20] The Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigor. Prior to the attack, assaulting infantry battalions utilizing hilled areas behind the lines as full scale model representations of the battlefield.[18] Infantry were trained in platoon-level tactics, taped lines were utilized to represent enemy trench lines and officers on horseback carried flags to represent the advancing front of the artillery barrage.[8]
Recognizing that the men in leadership positions would be wounded or killed, soldiers were meant to learn the jobs of those beside and above them. At the First Army headquarters, a large-scale plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and utilized to show officers and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system.[18]. In addition, upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield. The objective was to give each platoon a complete picture of the battle plan and a specific task within it, with the intent of reducing the command and control problems that plagued World War I combat.[21] [22]
[edit] Underground operations
The Arras-Vimy sector was conducive to tunnel excavation owing to the soft, porous yet extremely stable nature of the chalk underground. As a result, pronounced underground warfare had been an active feature of the Vimy sector since 1915, with no less than 19 distinct mine crater groups existing along the Canadian front by 1917.[23] Since their arrival in 1916, British Royal Engineer tunnelling companies had been actively engaged in offensive mining against German miners with 5 tunnelling companies stationed along the Vimy front at the height of subterranean operations.[24]
There in preparation for the assault, British tunnelling companies, with the assistance of Canadian engineers and infantry, created extensive underground networks and fortifications. Twelve subways, up to 1.2 km in length, were excavated at a depth of 10 metres and utilized to connect reserve lines to front lines, permitting soldiers to advance to the front quickly, securely and unseen. Concealed light rail lines, hospitals, command posts, water reservoirs, ammunition stores, mortar and machine gun posts, and communication centres were also often incorporated into the subways.[25] Many subways were also lit by electricity provided by generators.
Thirteen multi-thousand pound mines were also laid under German positions, particularly near the Pimple and Broadmarsh crater, with the intention of destroying fortified points prior to the assault.[26] Also laid were eight Wombat mine charges designed to open up the end of subway into an elongated trench-depth crater across no man's land, protecting advancing troops from enfilade machine gun fire. Of the explosive charges laid, three mines were fired prior to the assault, and three mines and two Wombat charges fired in support of the assault.[24]
[edit] Trench raiding
For more details on this topic, see Trench raiding
The practice of making small scale surprise attacks on enemy positions, in the dead of night without the intention of consolidation, became common practice for the Canadian Corps by late 1916. Trench raiding was often utilized to build the experience of men, gain intelligence and diminish the morale of opposing troops.[27] What had originally largely been a strategy to harass the enemy, by capturing prisoners or destroying their trenches, soon developed into a training and leadership building mechanism. The four months prior to the April attack saw the Canadian Corps execute no less than 55 separate trench raids.[27] A sense of competition between units even developed with units competing for the honour of greatest number of prisoners captured or most destruction wrought.[28]
The policy of aggressive trench raiding was not however without its cost. On March 1, 1917, a month before the assault, an ambitious brigade-sized trench raid by the 4th Canadian Division, backed by poison gas deployment, failed horrifically resulting in 637 casualties including two battalion commanders and a number of company commanders killed.[29] This invariable decreased the fighting capacity of the affected units, a significant loss given it's proximity to the April advance. This experience did not however lessen the extent that trench raiding was employed which continued up until the night before the attack.[30]
[edit] Battle in the air
In support of the spring offensive, the Royal Flying Corps launched a determined effort to gain air superiority over the battlefield. It was considered essential that activities such as artillery spotting and photography of opposing trench systems, troop movements and gun emplacements continue unimpeded.[31] The Royal Flying Corps deployed 25 squadrons totaling 365 aircraft along the Arras sector, outnumbering the enemy by no less than 2-to-1.[31] Byng was given use of No. 2 Squadron, No. 8 (Naval) Squadron, No. 25 Squadron, No. 40 Squadron and No. 43 Squadron, with No. 16 Squadron permanently attached to the Canadian Corps and employed exclusively for observation and artillery support.[32] Conducting aerial reconnaissance was often a hazardous task as aircraft were forced to fly at slower speeds and at lower altitudes. A task made all the more dangerous with the arrival of additional German flying squadrons, including Manfred von Richthofen's highly experienced and well equipped Jasta 11, which led to sharp increase in Royal Flying Corps casualties. Although significantly outnumbering the enemy, The Royal Flying Corps lost 131 aircraft during the first week of April alone.[32] Despite the losses suffered by the Royal Flying Corps, the Imperial German Army Air Service failed to prevent the Royal Flying Corps from carrying out its prime objective, who continued to support the army throughout the Arras offensive with up-to-date aerial photographs and reconnaissance information.
[edit] Equipment
Insisting on the utilization of Canadian manufactured equipment, Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence Sir Samuel Hughes presided over the deployment of equipment that was often inappropriate for the Western Front, or of dubious quality. Previous to 1917, this had negatively affected the operational performance of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.[33] The Ross rifle, MacAdam Shield Shovel, boots and webbing (developed for use in the South African War), and the Colt machine gun were all Canadian items which were eventually replaced or abandoned due to quality or severe functionality issues. The management of spending for supplies was eventually taken away for Hughes and assigned to the newly formed War Purchasing Commission in 1915.[34] However, it was not until Hughes' resignation in November 1916 that the Ross Rifle was fully abandoned in favour of the British standard Lee-Enfield rifle. When training began for the spring offensive of 1917 the Canadian Corps was better outfitted with generally higher quality standard issue equipment than at any point previous during the war.
[edit] Staffing
Canadian staff officers possessed an extremely limited level of experience and competence at the start of the war, having been discouraged from passing through the British Staff College for man years prior to the war.[35] Compounding the issue was Sir Samuel Hughes' regular attempts to promote and appoint officers based upon patronage and Canadian nativism instead of ability, an act which not only created tension and jealousy between units but ultimately negatively affected the operating performance of the Canadian Expeditionary Force as well.[35] Byng eventually became so incensed with the continuous interference on the part of Hughes that he threatened to resign. Criticism from Field Marshal Douglas Haig, King George V and from within his own party gradually forced Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Laird Borden to tighten control over Hughes.[36] However, it was not until Hughes' political isolation, with the creation of the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada and subsequent forced resignation in November 1916, that the CEF was able to concentrate on the task of the spring offensive without persistent staffing interference.[37] Decreased political involvement in staffing eventually permitting Byng to develop an organizational climate which principally rewarded military merit. This allowed the true quality of senior commanders and staff to emerge well prior to the battle[38].
[edit] Battle
By March 1917, the German forces were aware that a major attack was imminent.[39]
[edit] Defending forces
German general Ludwig von Falkenhausen's Sixth Army had twenty line divisions (plus reserves) responsible for the Cambrai to Lille sector.[40] Vimy Ridge itself was principally defended by the ad hoc Gruppe Vimy, formation based under I Bavarian Corps commander General Karl von Fasbender.[41] However, a division of Gruppe Souchez, under VIII Reserve Corps General Georg Karl Wichura, was also involved in the front-like defence along the northernmost portion of the ridge.[42]
The defending elements of the German Sixth Army were;
- the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division under the command of General Arnold Ritter von Möhl. Located opposite the town of Souchez and responsible for the defence of the northernmost section of the ridge, the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division had been created in January 1917 from existing Bavarian formations and had so far only opposed the Canadian Corps.[40]
- the 79th Reserve Division under the command of General Von Bachmeister, responsible for the defense of vast central section including the highest point of the ridge, Hill 145.[43] The 79th Reserve Division had fought for two years on the Eastern Front, transfered at the end of 1916, and appeared in the Vimy sector at the end of February 1917.[40]
- the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division under General Freiherr von Bechmann, which had been in the Arras area since October 1914, were holding Thélus, Bailleul and the southern slope of the ridge.[40]
[edit] Attacking forces
Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng had four attacking divisions, one division of reserves and numerous support units under his command. He was supported to the north by the 24th British Division of I Corps which advanced north of the Souchez river and by the advancing XVII Corps to the south.
The attacking elements of the Canadian Corps consisted of;
- the 10th, 11th and 12th Canadian Infantry Brigades of the 4th Canadian Division under Major-General Sir David Watson. Watson's command was responsible for the capture of the highest point of the ridge, Hill 145, followed by the heavily defended knoll known as the "Pimple" just north of the town of Givenchy-en-Gohelle.
- the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades of the 3rd Canadian Division under Major-General Louis J. Lipsett. Lipsett's command was responsible for the narrow central section of the ridge, including the capture of La Folie Farm.
- the 4th, 5th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades of 2nd Canadian Division, and later also the 13th British Brigade of 5th British Division, under Major-General Sir Henry Edward Burstall. Burstall's command was directly south of 3rd Canadian Division and entrusted with the capture of the town of Thélus.
- the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades of 1st Canadian Division under Major-General Sir Arthur Currie at the broad southernly sector of the corps advance.
Byng also planned for a healthy reserve for contingencies that included the relief of forward troops, help consolidating positions and aiding the 4th Canadian Division with the capture of the "Pimple". The reserve forces of the Canadian Corps consisted of;
- the 9th Canadian Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division.
- the 15th British Brigade of the 5th British Division.
- the 95th British Brigade of the 5th British Division.
[edit] Preliminary barrage
To support the efforts of the infantry, a 35 page multi-phased fire support plan called Canadian Corps Artillery Instruction No. 1 for the Capture of Vimy Ridge was developed, and subsequent issued by Brigadier General Edward Morrison.[44] The preliminary phase of the plan, which lasted two weeks, began on 20 March 1917 with the systematic bombardment of German batteries, trenches and strongpoints.[45] Particular attention was paid to eliminating enemy barbed wire, a task made easier with the introduction of the instantaneous No. 106 fuse which reliably burst with the slightest of contact.[14] [45] In addition, only half of the available artillery was committed at any one point in time with the intensity of the barrage expressly varied as to confuse the enemy and preserve some level of secrecy.[45] Phase two began 2 April 1917, lasted an entire week, and employed the entire artillery arsenal at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, the equivalent of one heavy gun for every 20 yards (18 m) and one field gun for every 10 yards (9.1 m).[13] The German soldier aptly named the week before the attack “the week of suffering”.[46] In many cases, the German trenches were completely demolished and morale suffered in the the stress of remaining at the ready for eleven straight days and compounded by the inability of ration parties to bring food supplies to the front lines.[45]
[edit] Main assault
After a cold night the mud had hardened underfoot by dawn on 9th April, Easter Monday. At dawn the assault divisions of the Canadian Corps attacked. The mines were fired, a blanket of shells from the barrage crept towards the German front line, and the first wave of the Canadian Corps walked closely behind it. As insurance, heavy machine fire, calibrated to four hundred feet to their front, arced over their heads towards the German lines. The first wave of about 15,000 Canadian troops attacked positions defended by roughly 5,000 Germans, followed by the second wave of 12,000 Canadians to meet 3,000 German reserves. Over 1,100 cannons of various descriptions, from British heavy naval guns mounted on railway cars miles behind the battlefield, to portable field artillery pieces dragged into place by horses, mules, or soldiers just behind the Canadian lines, fired continuously. Nearly 100,000 men in total were to take and hold the ridge.[47] The first wave advanced behind a creeping barrage, known specifically for the battle as the Vimy Glide. This tactic had been used earlier at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and the Battle of the Somme but required fine tuning in the absence of voice control.
After less than two hours, three of the four Canadian divisions had taken their objectives; the 4th Division, however, was held up by machine gun nests on the highest point of the ridge, known as Hill 145. The 87th Battalion suffered 50% casualties. The 85th Nova Scotia Highlanders, who had been intended to function in a supply and construction role, were sent in as reinforcements and the hill was captured by the end of the day. The fight to take Vimy Ridge cost the Canadian Corps dearly, but it would become clear that they won this battle because they made sure that they knew every part of land they were fighting on and prepared very well for what was to come.[citation needed] Additionally, the massed British and Australian divisions attacking along a 24-mile (39 km) front on the Canadian Corps' north and south flanks achieved their preliminary objectives.
[edit] Results
By April 12, the Canadians controlled the entire ridge, at a cost of 10,602 casualties (3,598 killed and 7,004 wounded).[48] The German Sixth Army, under General Ludwig von Falkenhausen, suffered an unknown number of casualties, and lost approximately 4,000 as prisoners of war.[49] The loss of the ridge forced the Germans to retreat to the lower Douai plain that was far more difficult to defend.[50] It also seriously undermined German morale, as they had long recognized the ridge as one of their most impregnable strongpoints.[49] Allied domination of the ridge also denied the Germans the rich coalfields of the plain. The Hundred Days Offensive counter-attack to the German Spring Offensive would ultimately lead to victory over Germany by November 1918.[51]
[edit] Enduring legacy
The Battle of Vimy Ridge remains historically significant for Canada. It was the first time in the nation's history a corps-sized formation fought as a unit. The success of the attack which had resulted from detailed planning and a variety of innovative tactics, stood in stark contrast to what had happened at the Somme only months earlier, and sealed the reputation of the Canadians as among the finest troops on the Western Front.[52] "In those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation" said Brigadier-General A.E. Ross afterwards.[53]
Some have suggested that Canadian unity was fostered—all nine provinces were represented in the order of battle of the Canadian Corps.[54] As Pierre Berton points out in Vimy, the taking of the ridge achieved iconic status in Canada very quickly, and with it attendant myths grew.
Previously, in battle after battle, thousands had died for gains measured in yards. The breakthrough had tremendous tactical significance: it relieved the city of Arras from the immediate threat of attack and proved that the front lines could be moved forward once again. In all the battles at Vimy Ridge in World War I, there was a staggering cost in dead and wounded on both sides. Across 16 kilometres of ridge, approximately 200,000 men perished: French, British, Canadian, and German. Considering that typically there were three wounded to every man killed, the total casualties at Vimy during the War can be estimated at 800,000.[55]
Four Victoria Crosses (VC) were awarded to members of the Canadian Corps for this battle: Private William Johnstone Milne (16 Bn CEF); Lance-Sergeant Ellis Welwood Sifton (18 Bn CEF); Private John George Pattison (50 Bn CEF); and Captain Thain Wendell MacDowell (38 Bn CEF).
[edit] Commemoration
[edit] Vimy Memorial
Set on the highest point of Vimy Ridge is the Canadian National Vimy Memorial, the largest of Canada's war monuments. In 1922, use of the land, for the battlefield park which contains the memorial was granted, in perpetuity, for all time by the French nation to the people of Canada in recognition of Canada's war efforts. 250 hectares of the former Vimy Ridge battlefield is preserved as part of the memorial park which surrounds the monument. The grounds of the site are still honeycombed with wartime tunnels, trenches and craters, closed off for public safety.
The memorial took eleven years and $1.5 million to build and was unveiled on 26 July 1936 by King Edward VIII (prior to his abdication), in the presence of President Albert Lebrun of France and 50,000 or more Canadian and French veterans and their families.
The memorial site is tended by Veterans Affairs Canada.
[edit] Vimy Cross
.
After the battle a number of memorials were erecting along Vimy Ridge, including a wooden cross by the Canadian 2nd Division in memory of the soldiers killed during the battle. Before the Canadian National Vimy Memorial was constructed, the responsibility of this Cross was given to the Royal 22e Régiment and moved to the Citadelle of Quebec between 1923 and 1924. The cross underwent restoration in 1947 and again in 1978 and is still used today during commemoration ceremonies of the battle.[56].
[edit] 90th anniversary of the battle
Though memorial ceremonies have taken place on the anniversary date for many years, a confluence of events brought the 90th anniversary into sharp focus and attracted considerable attention. Simplest is the fact that it was the 90th, but the anniversary fell on an Easter Monday, as had the battle itself in 1917, which seemed to give it even more symbolic importance. The anniversary was also built up in a groundswell of nationalistic nostalgia that has swept through the formal and informal community of Canadian historians and history educators in recent years.
The 90th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge was celebrated on April 9, 2007, in many locations across Canada, and in formal ceremonies in the cities of Toronto (at Queen's Park), Ottawa, and at the Canadian National Vimy Memorial atop Hill 145 on Vimy Ridge in France.
At the Vimy Memorial over 25,000 people, primarily Canadians, attended a ceremony that commemorated the 90th anniversary of the battle and rededicated the memorial itself upon the completion a multi-year restoration program. The 'pilgrims' to the commemoration and rededication ceremony included over 5,000 Canadian students from across Canada, many of whom were involved in a program that saw them representing a Canadian soldier who died in the battle at Vimy Ridge. The presiding platform party included Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, who formally rededicated the restored memorial, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who delivered speeches.[57][verification needed]
Leading up to the 90th, a movement was initiated by the Royal Canadian Legion to have a historic Canadian Red Ensign flown at the memorial alongside the current Canadian 'Maple Leaf' and French flags. The Legion reasoned it was appropriate as the Canadians who had fought in 1917 had done so under the Ensign. According to a poll conducted by Ipsos Reid, 79 per cent[citation needed] of respondents supported the idea of flying both at the monument during the April 9 ceremony in Vimy, France. Initial government press releases seemed to dismiss the Legion's request, citing government protocol that dictated only the current Canadian flag adorn federal monuments. However, on March 30, 2007, it was announced that a version of the Canadian Ensign would be flown at the memorial on April 9, 2007, and that an ensign of some type would be flown year-round in addition to the current Canadian and French flags.[58] The Legion donated a Red Ensign from the 1868–1870 period (i.e., a four-province flag) and this continues to fly at the Vimy site. Some commentators, including Robert Watt, then the Chief Herald of Canada, noted that it might be more correct to fly the nine-province flag that was flown in Canada and abroad between 1905 and 1921, since the Dominion of that period was made up of nine provinces.[59] Alternatively, it is most historically accurate to note that the Canadian soldiers of the First World War fought for the British Expeditionary Force, and therefore under the Union Jack, rather than any Canadian flag.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Zuelke & Barris
- ^ Ashworth 55–56.
- ^ a b Nicholson, 245
- ^ Turner 8
- ^ Boire, 15
- ^ a b Samuels, 200–202
- ^ a b c d Brennan, 94.
- ^ a b c Nicholson 227
- ^ a b c d Granatstein 113
- ^ Nicholson 254
- ^ Nicholson 249
- ^ Turner 38
- ^ a b c Nicholson 225
- ^ a b c d Cook 113
- ^ Sheffield 191,194
- ^ Brennan 98–99
- ^ Sheffield 191
- ^ a b c Turner 39
- ^ Cook 117
- ^ Corkerry, Shaun (2001). Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action 1916, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action 1917. Buckinghamshire: Military Press. ISBN 9780854202508.
- ^ Barris 41
- ^ Terraine 180
- ^ Boire 20
- ^ a b Durand Group. Vimy Ridge. Retrieved on 2008-01-12.
- ^ Barton 200
- ^ Boire 22–23
- ^ a b Cook 10
- ^ Turner 41
- ^ Cook 7-24
- ^ Turner 41-42
- ^ a b Barris 49
- ^ a b Turner 43
- ^ Haycock 272
- ^ McInnis, 408–409
- ^ a b Dickson, 36–38
- ^ Dickson, 43
- ^ Haycock, 306–308.
- ^ Dickson, 44
- ^ Hopkins 157–158
- ^ a b c d Nicholson 246
- ^ Williams 149
- ^ Godefroy 228–229
- ^ Hopkins 157
- ^ WO 106/399 Canadian Corps Artillery Instruction No. 1 for the Capture of Vimy Ridge (1917)
- ^ a b c d Barris 58
- ^ Nicholson 251
- ^ Barris 27–28
- ^ [1] The Battle of Vimy Ridge
- ^ a b Gibbs, Philip. All of Vimy Ridge Cleared of Germans New York Times April 11, 1917]
- ^ The War Situation—By the Military Expert of the New York Times April 9, 1918
- ^ Ross
- ^ Granatstein (2007)
- ^ Canadian War Museum
- ^ Kathleen Harris, Back to Vimy April 7, 2007
- ^ Barris 256
- ^ Ceremony at the Québec Citadel
- ^ Saunders, Doug. "Vimy ceremony a thoroughly Canadian moment", Globe and Mail, April 9, 2007
- ^ Red Ensign to fly over Vimy Ridge year-round
- ^ Fraser, Alan. The Canadian Ensigns
[edit] References
- Ashworth, Tony. 2000. Trench warfare 1914–1918. London: Pan Books. ISBN 0330480685
- Barris, Ted. 2007. Victory at Vimy: Canada Comes of Age, April 9–12, 1917. Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers. ISBN 0887622534
- Boire, Michael (Spring 1992). "The Underground War: Military Mining Operations in support of the attack on Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917". Canadian Military History 1 (1–2): 15–24. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.
- Brennan, Patrick (2007), “Julian Byng and Leadership in the Canadian Corps”, in Hayes, Geoffrey; Iarocci, Andrew & Bechthold, Mike, Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, pp. 87–104, ISBN 0889205086
- Cook, Tim (2007), “The Gunners of Vimy Ridge: "We are Hammering Fritz to Pieces"”, in Hayes, Geoffrey; Iarocci, Andrew & Bechthold, Mike, Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, pp. 105–124, ISBN 0889205086
- Cook, Tim (1999). ""A Proper Slaughter": The March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy". Canadian Military History 8 (2): 7-24. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.
- Dickson, Paul (2007), “The End of the Beginning: The Canadian Corps in 1917”, in Hayes, Geoffrey; Iarocci, Andrew & Bechthold, Mike, Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, pp. 31–49, ISBN 0889205086
- Granatstein, Jack Lawrence (2004). Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0802086969.
- Granatstein, J. L. 2007. "Without Peer: Canadians at Vimy Ridge" Legion Magazine Apr/May 2007. Retrieved: 30 December 2007
- Haycock, Ronald (1986). Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885–1916. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. ISBN 0889201773.
- Hopkins, J. Castell (1919). Canada at War, 1914–1918: A Record of Heroism and Achievement. Toronto: Canadian Annual Review Ltd..
- McInnis, Edgar (2007). Canada – a Political and Social History. Toronto: McInnis Press. ISBN 1406756806.
- Nicholson, Gerald W. L. (1964). Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914–1919. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary.
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- Samuels, Mart (1996). Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918. Portland: Frank Cass. ISBN 0714645702.
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[edit] External links
- The Battle of Vimy Ridge Battle info, video footage and photos.
- Canadian War Museum — The Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9 April–12 April 1917
- Historica Minutes Vimy Ridge
- CBC Vimy Ridge Site
- Vimy Ridge from The Canadian Encyclopedia
- 360° Panoramic view of Memorial site