Battle of Villers-Bocage

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Villers-Bocage Part of World War II, Western Front, Battle of Normandy This map shows the direction of the 7th Armoured Divisions advance and the directions of the German attacks (One should note that there was no 901st Division on the German Order of Battle, however this is probably a slip for Panzergrenadier-Lehr Regiment 901 of the Panzer Lehr Division). Date June 13, 1944 Location Villers-Bocage, Normandy, France Result Tactically indecisive[1] German strategic victory Belligerents  United Kingdom  Germany Commanders Major-General Erskine Brigadier Hinde Brigadier Walton Major I.B. Aird General Bayerlein General Lüttwitz SS-Obersturmbannführer von Westernhagen[2] Strength 22nd Armoured Brigade group:[3][4] ~60 tanks[5] Elements of the: Panzer Lehr Division Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 Elements of the 2nd Panzer Division 28-29+ tanks[6] Casualties and losses 1 British:[7] 308 Men killed, wounded or captured 27 tanks destroyed 31 other vehicles destroyed 1 2 German[8] 9-15 tanks destroyed 1 Tiger I damaged 1More detailed information is available in the 'Aftermath' section2Both the Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer Division did not count the casualties sustained at Villers-Bocage separately from the losses they both incurred that day. Thus a definitive casualty list is not easy to establish.[9]

v • d • e Battle of Normandy Neptune – Tonga – American Airborne Landings – Sword – Juno – Gold – Omaha – Utah – Pointe du Hoc – Brécourt Manor – La Caine – Perch – Carentan – Villers-Bocage – Cherbourg – Epsom – Charnwood – Jupiter – Goodwood – Atlantic – Verriéres Ridge – Spring – Cobra – Bluecoat – Totalise – Lüttich – Tractable – Falaise – Brest – Paris

The Battle of Villers-Bocage was fought on June 13, 1944, during the Battle of Normandy, between the British 7th Armoured Division and German forces made up of the Panzer Lehr Division, 2nd Panzer Division and the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 in the area around the town of Villers-Bocage in Normandy, France.^[10]

The city of Caen was a vital allied objective and had not been captured as planned during D-Day. XXX Corps launched Operation Perch to push south of the city and envelop it from the west while other British troops from I Corps would attempt to envelop it from the east. The battle was a result of improvisation due to a successful push south by American troops to the west of XXX Corps, which created a 12 kilometer-wide gap within the German lines.^[11] The 7th Armoured Division attempted to push through the gap and around the main defences of the Panzer Lehr Division, which was holding up the advance of XXX Corps. The British believed that control over Villers-Bocage and the higher ground to the east of the town, called Point 213, would force the Panzer Lehr Division to retreat and possibly result in the capture of Caen.^[3]

The lead elements of the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th County of London Yeomanry and the 1st Rifle Brigade, entered the town during the morning of June 13. 'A' Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry pushed on from the town up the main road, Route Nationale 175, and captured Point 213 1.2 miles (1.9 km) to the east of town. Three Tiger tanks encamped to the south of the main road under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann, the commander of the 2nd Company, Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, then attacked the British tanks. Wittmann and his crew pushed down the main road towards Villers-Bocage and, in the following fifteen minutes, destroyed ten tanks, two anti-tank guns, and a dozen or more half-tracks and Universal carriers.^[12] The 7th Armoured Division reinforced the town with the 1/7 Battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment and the Germans, now aware of the danger posed to the rear of the Panzer Lehr Division, dispatched more tanks and men. At 1300 hours^[13], fighting resumed and went on throughout the streets of Villers-Bocage for the next six hours.^[10][14]

During the late afternoon Brigadier Hinde, the commanding officer of the British forces fighting within the town, reluctantly ordered his men to fall back due to the increased pressure from the German forces.^[15] They pulled back 2.5 miles (4.0 km) west to the village of Amayé-sur-Seulles and formed a defensive "brigade box" alongside other elements of their division. The fighting continued the following day in the Battle of the Brigade Box.^[16] Historians have called the Battle of Villers-Bocage a German strategic victory and stated that it halted any British hopes of capturing Caen during first half of June.^[17][18] The British Second Army continued the Battle for Caen and finally captured the city on July 19.^[19] Villers-Bocage would be flattened by RAF bombing^[20][21] and finally liberated on August 4 when a patrol from the 1st Dorset Regiment, 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, entered the town.^[22][21]

[edit] Background

Main article: Operation Perch

Operation Perch was the second major attempt to capture the city of Caen after the direct attacks by the 3rd Infantry Division on June 6–June 7 failed. The plan envisioned I Corps and XXX Corps striking south to encircle the city and for the landing of the 1st Airborne Division, codenamed Operation Wild Oats. I Corps would form the eastern pincer, XXX Corps the western and the paratroopers would land between both Corps to complete the encirclement of the city and to prevent any German withdrawal from Caen.^{[23][14][24][25]}

The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, I Corps, was to push south out of the Orne bridgehead to capture the town of Cagny, six miles (10 km) southeast of Caen. 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, XXX Corps, was ordered to strike south from their lodgement created on June 6, to capture the town of Bayeux (another D-Day objective which had not been captured), and then capture the town of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Once Tilly-sur-Seulles had been captured the 7th Armoured Division would pass through the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and push south to capture the town of Villers-Bocage before turning east to capture the town of Evrecy.^[23][14][24]

However the air force refused to drop the 1st Airborne Division south of Caen to support the next step of the operation, following the eventual fall of Tilly-sur-Seulles, due to the operation being too dangerous for the pilots and men involved. Regardless, General Montgomery decided to push ahead with the basic plan without the use of paratroopers.^[23][14][24]

The attacks by the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division were halted by the 21st Panzer Division and the attacks by the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and elements of the 7th Armoured Division bogged down in front of Tilly-sur-Seulles due to stiff resistance from the Panzer Lehr Division.^[14][24][26] The Panzer Lehr Division was considered to be the strongest, best-equipped division in France, containing some of the most experienced and best-trained men within the German army.^[27]

On the right flank of XXX Corps, the United States 1st Infantry Division was pushing the German 352nd Infantry Division back and was nearing the town of Caumont-l'Éventé slowly opening up a gap in the German lines at the junction of XXX Corps and the American V Corps, a gap which eventually stretched to 7.5 miles (12.1 km) in length.^[11][28]

Conscious of the opportunity created by the American advance Lieutenant-General Dempsey, the commander of the Second Army, personally ordered Major-General Erskine^[29][30], the commanding officer of the 7th Armoured Division, to disengage his division from fighting around Tilly-sur-Seulles^[31] and prepare to exploit the gap created in the German front line. The 7th Armoured Division was ordered to push through the gap, circle around the Panzer Lehr Division then capture Villers-Bocage and the high ground beyond the town, called Point 213. It was hoped that the appearance of British armour in the rear of the Panzer Lehr Division, occupying the high ground and important lines of communication, would compel the German forces to withdraw from Tilly-sur-Seulle or surrender, get the operation to capture Caen back on track and keep operations fluid.^[3][32][33]

However there has been some controversy regarding who came up with the plan to have the 7th Armoured Division outflank the Panzer Lehr Division. Everyone from Montgomery down to Erskine have claimed or have been given credit for the idea.^[28][34] More modern studies have supported the case that it was Dempsey who gave the order.^[35]

However the Germans were also aware of the importance of this high ground and that the British would most likely want to capture it. They dispatched elements of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 to close any gaps on the Panzer Lehr Division's left flank and to keep the high ground out of British hands.^[36] The first part of this force, Michael Wittmann's 2nd Company, down to only six serviceable tanks after a five day road march from Beauvais, France, ^[37] had only arrived in the area the previous night.^[36]

[edit] Plans and orders

This article or section needs copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone or spelling. You can assist by editing it now. A how-to guide is available. (May 2008)

Further information: Battle of Villers-Bocage order of battle

[edit] British

The 7th Armoured Division, tasked with capturing Villers-Bocage, planned to send a reinforced brigade to seize the town and surrounding area while the remaining forces kept the division's lines of communications open.^[38][39]

This force, the 22nd Armoured Brigade group, was made up of Corps and Divisional troops from XXX Corps and the 7th Armoured Division as well as elements of the divisions two brigades, the 22nd Armoured Brigade and 131 (Queens) Infantry Brigade. The Brigade group was placed under the command of the 22nd Armoured Brigade commanding officer, Brigadier W.R.N. "Looney" Hinde.^[3][4]

During the night of June 12/13, while the Brigade group leaguered near the village of la Mulotiere, Brigadier Hinde drew up his plan for the occupation of Villers-Bocage and surrounding area.^[38]

A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade and the 4CLY would proceed through the town and capture Point 213. 1/7 Queen's would follow them up and secure the eastern end of the town while the remaining companies of the 1st Rifle Brigade would occupy the western end. ^[38]

Outside of the town, the 5RTR would capture the high ground around the village of Maisoncelles-Pelvey, 2 miles (3.2 km) to the southwest of Villers-Bocage, and the 260th Anti Tank battery would take up positions between them and the 4CLY on Point 213.^[38] The 1/5th Queen's would position themselves to the west of Villers-Bocage while the two Hussar regiments would provide flank protection.^[40]

The rest of the division, the 1st Royal Tank Regiment and the 1/6th Queen's, under the command of the 131st (Queen’s) Infantry Brigade, were given the mission of keeping the division's lines of communication open and would stay in the la Mulotiere area.^[39]

[edit] German

Aware of the gap in their front line, and the probability that the British would attempt to exploit it, Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 was dispatched to take up positions on the Panzer Lehr Division’s left flank and ordered to keep Villers-Bocage and Point 213 out of allied hands.^[36]

The only unit from this formation, present in the vicinity of the town on the morning of June 13, was 2nd Company. This Company comprised six Tiger Is: Said to be Tigers 211, 221, 222, 223, 233 and 234. However another Tiger 231 was photographed damaged after the battle) under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann.^[2][41] At full strength, the 2nd Company would have consisted of 14 Tiger tanks^[42]. However, the remaining Tigers, including Wittmann’s own, had not been able to complete the road march from Beauvais for various reasons, largely breakdowns.^[43] On the morning of June 13 Tiger 221 was sent off to establish contact with the Panzer Lehr Division.

[edit] Opening moves

This article or section needs copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone or spelling. You can assist by editing it now. A how-to guide is available. (March 2008)

The 7th Armoured Division moved off from Trungy with the 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars leading the way at around 1600 on June 12.^[40][44] They made good progress, advancing the 12 miles (19 km) to Livry within the space of a few hours against little resistance.^[30] However at Livry, the 8th Hussars ran into Panzergrenadiers and an anti tank gun of the Panzer Lehr Division’s Escort Company.^[40] The Rifle Brigade was called up to clear the village,^[44] which it accomplished by 2000 hours. To hide the intention of the operation Brigadier Hinde then decided to halt for the night.^[3][45] The move put the division "...several miles further inland than any other of the allied forces." ^[46] The need to refuel, perform weapon and vehicle checks, and conduct order groups to plan the next day's actions meant that it was well after midnight before the Brigade group was able to settle into its leaguer off the road in the la Mulotiere area.^[40] A Company of the Rifle Brigade also had to conduct reconnaissance of the first half mile of the route to be travelled following dawn.^[47]

The advance resumed at 0530 hours, led by the 4CLY and the Rifle Brigade while the 8th and 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) reconnoitred the flanks and provided flank protection.^[40] As the 22nd Armoured Brigade group passed through villages on their way to Villers-Bocage they were greeted by jubilant civilians and received reports that suggested German tanks were stranded in Tracy-Bocage. No opposition was encountered and the column continued towards their objective.^[44] There was one final stop for the column; on a forward slope just before Villers-Bocage. Here Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Pearce spotted a German armoured car around 600 metres away from the column, with its commander clearly watching the advance of the Brigade group. Major Arthur Carr was instructed to engage it, but the turret of his tank was obstructed by kit and could not be traversed. Lieutenant-Colonel Pearce then broke radio silence to call for someone else to take on the armoured car. Lieutenant John Cloudsley-Thompson responded, but by the time he had moved into position his target had withdrawn.^[44][48][49] The advance resumed and by 0830 the 22nd Armoured Brigade group entered Villers-Bocage after covering the 5 miles (8.0 km) from their overnight leaguer.^[50] The men of A Squadron, 4CLY and the Rifle Brigade who entered the town were met as conquering heroes, adding to a mood of general relaxation.^[51][50]

Map shows the positions of the British regiments prior to the attack launched by Michael Wittmann.

With Villers-Bocage in British hands, A Squadron motored ahead as fast as possible and without prior reconnaissance, as per orders, to capture Point 213.^[49][52][53] When they reached this objective the leading troop commander; Lieutenant Bill Garnett, engaged and destroyed a Kübelwagen which was driving up the road towards them.^[54] The lead tanks of A Squadron took up hull down positions in the fields. Behind them, on the road back down to Villers-Bocage, vehicles of the 4CLY reconnaissance troop, the 4CLY regimental headquarters and A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade moved to the side of the road to allow easy passage for other vehicles and began to dismount.^[55][50][53] In his history of the Rifle Brigade Major Hastings records that A Company were ordered to the side of the road to keep it clear by officers from the 4CLY, that the terrain was very narrow with line of sight to their flanks being less then two hundred meters, and that they had already posted sentries.^[56]. The historian D'Este is more critical of A Company's conduct at this point, citing a failure to adhere to doctrine and form an all round defence once they had halted.^[53]

In Villers-Bocage Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Arthur Cranley, commanding officer of the 4CLY, was concerned that his men were “out on a limb”. He was visited by Brigadier Hinde, who tried to reassure him and ordered him up to Point 213 to check on the defensive position of A Squadron. The Brigadier then returned to his tactical headquarters (although some sources suggest that he did not return until the German attack began). Major J. Wright, the commanding officer of A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade was also up on Point 213 where he had called an orders group for his platoon commanders and other NCOs.^[57]

Undetected by the British forces, Michael Wittmann and his company of six Tiger tanks observed these events from a position around 200 metres south of the main road. The Germans had anticipated a British advance in the area, but were surprised by the number of British tanks and troops now there.^[58] The time was 0900 hours.^[59] The British were split into several groups; A Squadron, the commanding officer of the 4CLY, and most of the officers and NCOs from A Company of The Rifle Brigade were on Point 213, the 4CLY reconnaissance troop, regimental headquarters and the Rifle Brigade were in Villers-Bocage and its eastern outskirts, while the rest of the Brigade group were well to the west of town.

[edit] The morning action

This article or section needs copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone or spelling. You can assist by editing it now. A how-to guide is available. (March 2008)

Sergeant O’Connor was travelling towards Point 213 in a half-track when he broke radio silence to give the only warning the rest of the Rifle Brigade or the 4CLY received before the Tigers attacked.^[36] At approximately 0900,^[59] The Tiger commanded by Wittman drove onto Route Nationale 175 and engaged the two rearmost tanks from A Squadron, 4CLY, destroying a Cromwell and Sherman Firefly.^[59] At the same time two more A Squadron Cromwells were knocked out by Tigers 221 and 223 (commanded by SS-Unterscharführer Georg Hantusch and Jurgen Brendt^[2]) which were making their way up to Point 213 via a wooded track^[60] around 200 meters south of the main road.^[36]

Following the destruction of the two rearmost tanks, Wittmann proceeded down Route Nationale 175 towards Villers-Bocage, and in the following minutes destroyed the mechanized transport of the 1st Rifle Brigade parked at the side of the road along with two QF 6 pounder anti-tank gun. As the riflemen had dismounted from their transport minutes before the attack, they took the opportunity to take cover in the hedges and fields nearby when the firing started and suffered few casualties.^[2] Some French sources, along with British eyewitness accounts of the fighting, report that two Tigers engaged and destroyed the transport of the Rifle Brigade and that it was not solely Wittmann's Tiger.^[61] It is speculated that the second Tiger I was positioned north of the main road, near the road junction to Tilly-sur-Seulles, and possibly out of fuel.^[61] Wittmann continued down Georges Clémenceau Street into the town proper, engaging and destroying along the way two M5 Honeys of the reconnaissance troop^[62] before turning on the regimental headquarters' Cromwell tanks, the medical officer's half-track, the scout car of the intelligence officer (although no wreckage from these last 2 vehicles are visible in the after action photos) and two artillery observation post tanks ("OP tanks") of 5th Royal Horse artillery.^[63]

SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann

Wittman and his crew were eventually forced to abandon their Tiger when it was disabled by fire from an anti-tank gun, withdrawing on foot to the Panzer Lehr Division headquarters at Chateau d'Orbois.^[64] Accounts differ as to the exact circumstances of Wittman's disengagement. Drawing on testimony from British tankers in Villers-Bocage, the historians Taylor and Forty record that Wittman duelled briefly and without result with a Sherman Firefly commanded by Sergeant Stan Lockwood before being forced to turn around and withdraw when his tank was struck on the driver's visor by fire from a tank commanded by Bob Moore.^[65][66] Their account then reports that this move brought Wittman face to face with a surviving regimental headquarters Cromwell commanded by Captain Pat Dyas which had followed the Tiger down the road, seeking a shot at its thinner rear armour. Dyas opened fire, hitting Wittmann's Tiger twice without effect, before Wittmann returned fire and destroyed the Cromwell, killing the co-driver and gunner.^{[65][67][68][69]} Wittman's Tiger is then said to have continued eastwards before being disabled by a British 6 – pounder anti–tank gun on the outskirts of Villers-Bocage, at the road junction with Tilly-sur-Seulles.^[70] Wittman's own account contradicts this sequence of events, stating that his tank was disabled in the town centre, and photographic evidence taken after the event of Tigers knocked out in Villers-Bocage corroborates this.^[71][72] This version means that Wittman can not have engaged Dyas in the manner described above. Lieutenant Cloudsley-Thompson thinks that Dyas confused the sequence of events, believing instead that Dyas was hit by a shot from the Tiger as it traversed its turret rearwards whilst it advanced into Villers rather than meeting it head on as it withdrew.^[73]

Destroyed Cromwell observation post tank in Villers-Bocage

Within the space of only 15 minutes, Wittman's Tiger had destroyed 5 Cromwell tanks, 1 Sherman Firefly, 2 M5 Honeys, 1 Sherman OP tank, 1 Cromwell OP tank, two 6-pounder anti tank guns and a dozen half-tracks and carriers.^[74] A further two tanks and several half-tracks had also been destroyed by the two other fully functioning Tigers. While most accounts of the battle suggest that Wittmann and the crew of his Tiger were the only Germans to enter the town that morning, British eyewitness accounts suggest otherwise, with men from the 4CLY reporting German troops firing at them from the upper floor windows of houses within town.^[75][76]

Back on Point 213, A Squadron was down to only seven Cromwells, two Fireflies and an attached Cromwell OP tank from the 5RHA. There were also around a dozen infantry and a fair number of the Rifle Brigade's officers and NCOs, along with a few half-tracks and scout cars.^[77] Following a short conference between Lord Cranley and Major Wright of the Rifle Brigade it was decided to hold the position and await reinforcements.^[77] Lord Cranley attempted to organize an all round defence of the hill with the forces available, but SS-Panzergrenadiers from the 4th Escort Company of Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 arrived, some time around 1000 hours.^[78] The Panzergrenadiers began to engage and round up the men trapped on the hill, and by 1030 hours, Lord Cranley reported over the radio that the position was untenable, and withdrawal impossible.^[79][78] Within half an hour the radios in Lord Cranley’s scout car and in all remaining tanks were off the air.^[78] Few managed to escape. Captain Christopher Milner MC of the Rifle Brigade, spent the rest of the day on the run, crossing back into British lines after dark,^[80] whilst Corporal Hoar of A Squadron, 4CLY, didn't return to his unit until June 25.^[79]

[edit] Late morning and the afternoon fighting

This article or section needs copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone or spelling. You can assist by editing it now. A how-to guide is available. (March 2008)

This photo was taken on June 17 of Captain Bill Cotton MC (on the left wearing an Iron Cross) and his tank crew. He was promoted and awarded the Military Cross for his actions during this battle.^[81]

Sometime following Wittmann's attack into Villers-Bocage, Major Wenck was on a reconnaissance mission for the Panzer Lehr Division to find out what the 7th Armoured Division was doing. After leaving his Scout Car he procceeded on foot until hearing tank engines. He crawled to cover where he found a troop of Cromwells abandoned with "all the crews up in front with an officer, looking at a map". Crossing the road, Major Wenke captured one of the tanks and drove off before the crew had time to react. Crossing the east end of Villers-Bocage he described the scene full of "burning tanks and Bren-gun carriers and dead Tommies". Arriving near German soldiers Wenck waved one over and together travelled to Chateau Orbois to deliver the tank.^[82]

By 1100 hours, the Panzer Lehr Division was reacting after receiving information (possibly from the scouts whom the men from the 7th Armoured Division spotted earlier, from Major Wencke or from members of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101) about the 7th Armoured Division's incursion

"Before 1100 hours... received orders to advance to the area north of Villers with every available panzer - about 15 - in order to prevent the feared strike in the division rear. The divisional general staff officer, Major Kauffmann, gathered all available soldiers from his staffs and other units in order to cover towards the south.
- Major Helmut Ritgen^[83]

Major Helmut's force was then ordered directly from General Bayerlein to block all roads heading north from the town, in order to prevent any attack into the Panzer Lehr Division's rear. When the lead panzer reached the road to Anctoville north west of the town, it was destroyed by a concealed anti-tank gun and burst into flames. "We had run into the British all-round defence west of Villers."^[83]

Following the loss of Lord Cranley, Major Aird took command of the 4CLY^[84] and ordered B Squadron to hold the town at all costs, he then ordered C Squadron to move into the town to reinforce them. The 1/7 Queens was also called up into town to secure it following the initial fighting. Lieutenant-Colonel Desmond Gordon, the battalion commander, ordered A Company to the area around the railway station and B and C Companies to cover the eastern entrances to the town.^[85]

However the men were only able to clear the western half of town^[3] as men from the 4th Escort Company had already infiltrated into the eastern end of town. After some skirmishing between the two forces, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon decided to pull his men back into a tighter perimeter. A Company were still positioned around the railway station, while C and D Companies and their anti tank guns held the town, with B Company placed in battalion reserve.^[86]

Attempts were made by the 4CLY to send tanks up the main road of Villers-Bocage to take Hill 213. However, being fired upon and unable to make any progress, No. 4 Troop, commanded by Lieutenant Bill Cotton, was ordered to find another way to the hill. This was an unsuccessful trip which resulted in Cotton leading his troop into the town centre where he organised the defence and set up an ambush made up of his own tanks, a 6-pounder anti tank gun and riflemen from the 1/7 Queens.^[87]

Wittmann was debriefed at Chateau d'Orbois and was given a Schwimmwagen, so that he could return to his unit at Point 213. When they arrived they found that Karl Mobius, the commanding officer of the 1st Company, Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, had arrived with his company of at least eight Tiger tanks. The two company commanders then discussed the upcoming attack which was to be made by the 1st Company.^[87]

Heavy fighting for the town resumed around 1300^[13] when the men and machines from the Panzer Lehr Division and the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 attacked. The Panzer Lehr Division launched its attacks from the north while the latter attacked from the west.^[88] Fighting continued for the next six hours.^[15]

During these attacks, several Tiger tanks were taken out of action by the 1/7 Queens, two of which were knocked out by PIATs.

Bryan de Grineau artist’s impression of the Tiger being engaged though the corner window by Sergeant Robert “Bobby” Bramall MM. Note how the Firefly appears more like a Crusader tank.

In the town centre, Sergeant Bramall, commanding a Sherman Firefly, spotted a stationary Tiger tank around the corner from his position in the adjoining road. Realising the only safe way to engage the tank would be to order his own to reverse a few metres and then line the gun up through two adjacent windows in a corner building, he did so. Making final corrections by looking down the barrel of the gun, his crew fired two rounds in quick succession but did not manage to knock the Tiger out. The Tiger then tried to rush past the ambush but was engaged as it did so by Corporal Horne, commanding a Cromwell tank, shooting into the rear of the Tiger, knocking it out. This engagement was immortalised in the drawing for the Illustrated London News by Bryan de Grineau. Sergeant Bramall went on to destroy a Panzer IV.^[89]

During a lull in the fighting, Lieutenant Cotton and Sergeant Bramall went around the knocked out German tanks in their vicinity carrying bundles of blankets and jerry cans of petrol, setting fire to the tanks so they could not be recovered later. This action along with their bravery and skill during the defence of the town won them the Military Cross and Military Medal respectively.^[89]

"When things had died down a bit, Bill Cotton, sheltering under an umbrella, remonstrated with the French Fire Brigade for attempting to put out a fire in a disabled German MkIV tank."

-Robert A. Moore^[90]

By 1600, the British were still in possession of the town after a spirited and determined defence. The Germans then put in another determined counterattack against the town supported by mortar and artillery fire. Portions of the attack were blunted but close street fighting continued. At the railway station the attacking Panzergrenadiers overwhelmed A Company, 1/7 Queens, and captured a complete platoon. Elsewhere they managed to surround the battalion headquarters.^[15]

As the pressure built up on the defending troops, Brigadier Hinde reluctantly decided that the situation was becoming untenable and that the troops must be withdrawn from the town.^[15] Under the cover of artillery fire and a smoke screen laid by the 5RHA, the infantry withdrew from the town covered by the tanks of the 4CLY who withdrew last.^[91]

The defenders of Villers-Bocage withdrew to Amaye-sur-Seulles, nearly 3 miles (4.8 km) to the west while being covered by the tanks of the 5RTR. There, along with the rest of the 22nd Armoured Brigade group, they formed a “Brigade Box”, an all round defensive position.^[91]

[edit] Aftermath

Further information: Battle of the Brigade Box

Heavy fighting resumed the following day, with German forces attempting to crush the British brigade box. Although the Panzergrenadiers were at times able to overrun some of the British positions and advance dangerously close to the Allied field guns and tactical headquarters, each time they were repelled by infantry assault and devastating fire from the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry and American 1st Infantry divisional artillery as well as Army Group artillery. At times they were also able to call upon air support. The day ended with the 22nd Armoured Brigade group confident they could continue to hold their position and surrounded by approximately 20 knocked out German tanks and hundreds of German casualties. Allied losses for the day included three Cromwell tanks and light infantry losses.^[92]

Brigadier Hinde was confident the position could be held and used to regain the initiative, as the Germans were clearly suffering in their attempts to eliminate the box. Due to the unsuccessful attack by the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division at Tilly-sur-Seulles he was ordered to withdraw that night in order to straighten the front line.^[93]

Lieutenant-General Bucknall had two infantry brigades to spare, which could have been used to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division in an attempt to recapture Villers-Bocage and force the Panzer Lehr Division to retreat. However, he chose to reinforce the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and their head-on assault against the Panzer Lehr Division at Tilly-sur-Seulles.^[94] He chose not to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division, as he concluded there position was now a liability, with its lines of communication endangered, and he had also learned that Erskine's men were now under attack from the 2nd Panzer Division.^[95]

Operation Aniseed, the British withdrawal from Amaye-sur-Seulles, commenced at 0030 hours on June 15 under the cover of a RAF bombing operation on Aunay-sur-Odon and artillery fire in an attempt to drown out the noise of the withdrawing tanks and other vehicles.^[96] By around 0500 the withdrawal had been completed without incident, as German forces were too slow in reacting to the British move.^[97]

While historians such as Carlo D'Este state that the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage ended any British hopes of unhinging the German front south of Caen,^[98] Major Ellis, the official campaign historian for the British army in Normandy, notes that Bucknall ordered the withdrawal as only a temporary move. The withdrawal was to be made so that the 33rd Armoured Brigade could be moved up to reinforce the 7th Armoured for a renewed strike towards Evrecy after a few days rest.^[99] On June 19, the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division finally captured Tilly-sur-Seulles and forced the Panzer Lehr Division to withdraw. They joined up with the 7th Armoured Division, who were holding the general line of the River Aure as far south as Livry while preparing for their second attack. With the storm that hit the Channel that day, all offensive operations were called off and this repeated attack from the 7th Armoured Division never materialised.

There were further repercussions due to the failure at Villers-Bocage. During early August, Dempsey used Operation Perch as one of the reasons to have Bucknell removed from command after several more poor performances from XXX Corps. Erskine and Hinde, along with the Commander, Royal Artillery and the Chief Staff Officer of the 7th Armoured Division were also relieved of their positions. This purge of the division had been on the cards since Villers-Bocage and over 100 men, including the four above, were removed from their positions and reassigned.^[100] Historian Daniel Taylor states that the purge and Villers-Bocage being used as one of the excuses, was to "demonstrate that the army command was doing something to counteract the poor public opinion of the conduct of the campaign".^[101]

[edit] Criticisms

Historians believe that a great opportunity to succeed and lead to an early capture of Caen was lost due to the actions of Bucknell.^[102] The stalling of the push towards Evercy necessitated repeated operations to capture the city and to exploit the open terrain beyond. Major Ellis, being somewhat less critical, called the immediate result of the fighting disappointing, and states that with the stubborn defence of the Panzer Lehr Division and the unexpected arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 7th Armoured Division "could hardly have achieved full success".^[103]

The failure of the operation led Dempsey to write there was "no chance now of a snap operation with airborne troops either to seize Caen or to deepen the bridgehead on XXX Corps front. It is clear now that Caen can be taken only by set-piece assault and we do not have the men or ammunition for that at this time".^[104] He later remarked that "this attack by 7th Armoured Division should have succeeded. My feeling that Bucknall and Erskine would have to go started with that failure. ...the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace".^[105]

While most of the criticism surrounding this battle is aimed at the British forces, Wolfgang Schneider has stated that "A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made".^[106]

He criticises the disposition of Wittman's forces, including hampering their mobility by having his Tigers position themselves in a sunken lane and by placing a vehicle with engine trouble at the head of a stationary column, risking blocking all the other tanks. His main criticism is aimed at the sole advance of Wittmann into Villers-Bocage, he states while it may "seem brave" he notes that "it goes against all the rules". Not only was intelligence not gathered, there was "no centre of gravity" or "concentration of forces" and because of Wittmann's actions "the bulk of the 2nd Company and Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive".^[106]

He sums up "The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly" and states elsewhere that "Such overhastiness was uncalled for". Had Wittmann waited to regroup with elements of his Company and the 1st Company "Such action would have been more effective".^[106]

[edit] Propaganda

German propaganda was offered an opportunity to exploit the battle, as the British had lost contact with the forces on Point 213 and had withdrawn from Villers-Bocage they could not establish what exact losses they had inflicted or what had happened on the ridgeline.

They were able to claim that Michael Wittmann, who was already a household name in Germany before the events at Villers-Bocage due to clever manipulation of his actions^[107], was credited with the destruction of almost of all the British lost vehicles.^[108] His actual tally consisted of 5 Cromwell tanks, 1 Sherman Firefly, 2 M5 Honeys, 1 Sherman OP tank, 1 Cromwell OP tank two anti tank guns and just over a dozen mechanised transport vehicles.^[109]

Wittmann also made a recording for radio broadcast late on the 13th, in which he described the events of his ambush upon the 4CLY. However, proving he did not take part in the afternoon attack and in part downplaying the stubborn British defence he reported "Subsequent counterattacks destroyed the enemy. The bulk of the armoured regiment and a rifle battalion was destroyed".^[110]

The battle area was also heavily photographed and in one instance a photograph was doctored to show more British losses then were actually inflicted. An article in the German forces magazine Signal, published in August 1944, about the fighting at Villers-Bocage had three photographs merged into one and captioned "Here ended an English armoured breakthrough on the road south-west of Caen".^[111]

Regardless of the propaganda surrounding the battle, Wolfgang Schneider has stated that the actions undertaken by the schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 was "everything but awe-inspiring".^[112]

However the Germans were not the only ones exploiting the events surrounding Villers-Bocage. Lieutenant Cloudsley-Thompson and his crew after having their Cromwell knocked out, spent the day hiding in a basement within the town before setting off for allied lines during the night and eventually ran into elements of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. During his debriefing he recalls them stating that they "never wished to see another tank as long they lived!", which was later changed when the British press ran a story on them and the fighting to "The first thing the five tank men asked for was another tank."^[113]

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• "The Sharpshooters", the County of London Yeomanry Association website
• Tiger aces and combat history at the Tiger I Information Center
• Battle of Villers-Bocage, German newsreel film

[edit] Footnotes

v • d • e World War II
Western Europe · Eastern Europe · Africa · Mediterranean · Asia and the Pacific · Atlantic
Major participants			Timeline		Aspects
To 1945 unless otherwise indicated. Principal co-belligerents in italics.			Prelude • Causes • in Asia • in Europe 1939 • Invasion of Poland • Phoney War • Winter War • Battle of the Atlantic5 1940 • Denmark and Norway • Battle of France • Battle of Britain • Libya and Egypt • British Somaliland • Baltic Occupation • Bessarabia and Bukovina • Invasion of Indochina • Invasion of Greece 1941 • East Africa Campaign • Invasion of Yugoslavia • Invasion of the USSR • Middle East campaign • Siege of Leningrad • Battle of Moscow • Attack on Pearl Harbor 1942 • Battle of Midway • Battle of Stalingrad • 2nd Battle of El Alamein • Operation Torch • Guadalcanal Campaign	1943 • End in Africa • Battle of Kursk • Solomon Islands • Invasion of Sicily • Invasion of Italy5 • Gilbert and Marshall Islands 1944 • Cassino and Anzio • Invasion of Normandy • Mariana and Palau Islands • Operation Bagration • Battle of the Dnieper • Warsaw Uprising • Iassy-Kishinev Operation • Liberation of Paris • Operation Market Garden • Operation Crossbow • Operation Pointblank • Battle of Leyte Gulf 1945 • Battle of Iwo Jima • Battle of Okinawa • Battle of Berlin • Germany surrenders • Hiroshima and Nagasaki • Japan surrenders • List of military engagements	• Attacks on North America • Blitzkrieg • Comparative military ranks • Cryptography • Home front • Military awards • Military equipment • Military production • Nazi plunder • Resistance • Technology • Total war Aftermath /consequences • Effects/Casualties • Expulsion of Germans • Operation Paperclip • Occupation of Germany • Morgenthau plan • Territorial changes • Occupation of Japan • Franco-Vietnamese War • Cold War • in contemporary culture Civilian impact / atrocities • Allied war crimes • German war crimes • Italian war crimes • Japanese war crimes • Soviet war crimes • The Holocaust • Bombing of civilians
Allies		Axis
at war from 1937  China entered 1939  Czechoslovakia  Poland  UK  India  France  Australia  New Zealand  South Africa  Canada entered 1940  Norway  Belgium  Netherlands  Greece	entered 1941  Yugoslavia  USSR  USA entered 1942  Mexico  Brazil entered 1943  Italy   entered 1944  Romania  Bulgaria  Finland • others	at war from 1937  Japan entered 1939  Germany  Slovakia entered 1940  Italy  to 1943 entered 1941  Bulgaria  to 1944 Croatia Finland  to 1944  Hungary  Iraq  to 1941  Romania  to 1944 entered 1942  Thailand entered 1943  RSI • others
• Allied Leaders • Axis Leaders • Commanders
Resistance movements Austria · Baltic1 · Czech lands · Denmark · Ethiopia France · Germany2 · Greece · Italy Jewish2 · Korea · Netherlands · Moldavia2 Norway · Poland · Thailand · Soviet Union Slovakia4 · Ukraine3 · Vietnam Yugoslavia · others
				Lists
				Category · Topics Conferences
1 Anti-Soviet. 2 Anti-Soviet and anti-Nazi. 3 Anti-Nazi, anti-Polish, and anti-Soviet. 4 Anti-Magyar, anti-Nazi, and anti-Soviet. 5 Lasted to May 1945.		World War II at Wiktionary  WWII textbooks at Wikibooks      WWII quotes at Wikiquote  WWII source texts at Wikisource       WWII media at Commons  WWII news stories at Wikinews

Coordinates: 49°4′50″N 0°39′22″W / 49.08056, -0.65611 (Battle of Villers-Bocage)